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Morality and Leadership in Work Organizations: 
Developing a Normative Model 
Abstract 
Leadership is a morally ambivalent notion. While leaders of organizations may have the 
capacity to do a great deal of good, they can also do a great deal of harm. Furthermore, there 
is something intuitively disconcerting about the idea of individual leaders exerting 
disproportionate influence over other people. My objective in this PhD is to develop an 
understanding of what.moralleadership might look like. I approach this question through a 
number of different avenues. I begin by reviewing the leadership literature to see what it has 
to say about morality. In particular, I consider the extent to which the literature, in responding 
to the moral concerns mentioned above, either ameliorates or exacerbates those concerns. I 
then consider moral leadership and from the perspective of ethical theory. Taking a 
representative cross-section of different meta-ethical stances, I consider the implications that 
principle-based, existentialist and intersubjectivist theory might hold for moral leadership. 
Lastly, I attempt to find out what some leaders have to say about morality. Using semi-
structured discussions with sixteen people who hold formal leadership roles in large 
organizations, I identify a number of themes that characterise the way that they think about 
the ethical dimension of leadership. 
I draw out the implications of the perspectives that emerge from each of these separate 
avenues of enquiry, also highlighting relationships between different perspectives. I take the 
view that each of these perspectives offers some positive insights into what moral leadership 
might comprise but that each may also lead to some troubling ramifications. While a simple 
template for moral leadership is likely to remain elusive, sensitivity to the positive and less 
positive implications of these various perspectives will enable a more enlightened response to 
the ethical challenges presented within different leadership contexts. I conclude that an 
intersubjectively facilitative style will be better placed to respond to the moral challenges 
presented by leading in organizations th:;tn will more mono logical or oligarchic approaches. 
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1.0 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
My objective in this PhD is to develop an understanding of what moral leadership in work 
organizations looks like. In other words, I am trying to get a picture of what leading in a 
morally desirable way consists of. This is a worthwhile undertaking for a number of 
reasons. 
The first reason is that, despite the high regard in which leadership is generally held in 
contemporary Western culture, it is also a potentially troubling notion. On the one hand, 
the clamour for better, more effective leaders assaults us from all directions. The attention 
devoted to the appointment of political leaders, the "compensation packages" awarded to 
business leaders and the attention devoted to leadership development in all sorts of 
organizations are testimony to the importance that we attach to leadership. The person at the 
top seems to be more important to the electability of a political party, and also to its 
suitability to govern, than the nature of its ideology, the capabilities of its members of 
parliament or the quality of its administrative systems. Such is our expectation of the impact 
that leaders can make on businesses that CEOs are able to command remuneration that 
exceeds that of their employees by multiples of more than three figures. And the ever 
increasing profile of leadership programmes on the web sites of corporate training 
companies indicates that leadership is in big demand and that developing it is big business. 
However, despite our apparently insatiable demand for leadership, leaders can be very 
scary. The political and business landscapes of the twentieth century are littered with 
highly effective leaders who are held responsible for situations which most today consider 
to be at least questionable, and at most downright deplorable. Clearly being good at 
leadership is no guarantee for being a good leader in a moral sense. Furthermore, there is 
something conceptually troubling about the notion of individuals using exceptional 
influencing skills to move the masses. Such a one-sided power relationship seems 
worryingly at odds with the democratic ideals which define the self-understanding of the 
Western world. This is perhaps why it is easy to detect, within the field of so called 
"critical" organization studies, an air of suspicious disdain when the subject of leadership is 
mentioned. 
The importance of the relationship between organizational leadership and morality also 
becomes apparent when we consider the way in which we use these terms. What do we 
generally mean when we talk of"leadership"? Joseph Rost (1991) considers two-hundred-
and-twenty-one definitions of leadership, selecting those that he considers to be most 
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representative of different eras. Despite the generational variations that Rost identifies, a 
common characteristic is that leadership is understood as a process of social influence: it is 
generally considered to involve the exercise of influence by one person over the behaviour 
and attitudes of other people. Of course, any social situation involves an interchange of 
influence between its participants (Pondy, 1978); exerting influence is not the unique 
preserve of leaders. When we speak of leadership, though, we generally refer to a degree of 
influence over-and above the norm in terms of either its magnitude or its scope. We 
understand leaders to be people who exercise an exceptional amount of influence, often 
over multitudes of people rather than over isolated individuals. Leadership within a work 
organization, then, comprises the exercise of influence by one person over the behaviour 
and attitudes of other people. And the more effective the leadership is, the greater its 
impact. This is why leadership is considered to be a desirable quality for those who perform 
management roles within work organizations1: in order to be a successful manager, it is 
generally considered necessary to be an effective leader. 
So if leadership generally refers to the application of influence on a grand scale, what do we 
mean by "morality"? Morality, or ethics2, is concerned with the meaning of terms such as 
"right", "wrong", "good" and "bad" in relation to human conduct. It considers the criteria 
by which a person's relationships with other people, other sentient beings and the non-
sentient environment might be evaluated with respect to such terms. All human behaviour 
can, to some extent, be subject to moral evaluation. However, given the exceptional degree 
of influence that effective leaders wield over other people, leadership is an undertaking that 
is particularly laden with moral implications. With leadership, there is a multiplier effect at 
play that is not present with most person-to-person interactions. And since, by definition, 
effective leadership is likely to have a greater influence over other people than ineffective 
leadership, the moral implications of the former are proportionally greater. The more 
successful the leader is, the more important the morality of leadership becomes. In the case 
of leadership within work organizations, successful leaders tend to have a substantial 
impact on those who work within those organizations, on society in general and on the 
natural environment. Therefore, the impact that leaders have and the manner in which they 
achieve that impact merit consideration. 
1 Putting aside, for the time being, the distinction that is sometimes made between leadership and 
management, which I will return to later. 
2 A distinction is sometimes made between morality and ethics. "Morality" is used to describe the 
moral commitments of a particular person or a culture, whereas "ethics" is used to describe the 
discipline which involves theoretical and/or empirical consideration of various moralities. However, 
it is more common, particularly in general discourse, to use these terms synonymously. In this PhD I 
will therefore follow this more common convention. 
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However, despite our moral ambivalence about leadership and the significance of its moral 
ramifications, the relationship between morality and leadership has received relatively little 
attention in the leadership literature. The last seventy years have witnessed escalating 
interest in the theory and practice of leadership. However, the focus of this interest has 
been predominantly effectiveness-based. While theorists and practitioners have been eager 
to identify the behaviours, personal qualities and circumstances that contribute to effective 
leadership, the moral dimension of that effectiveness has, to a large extent, been neglected. 
Consequently, managers who seek to become more successful by developing their 
leadership skills do not want for theoretical guidance. On the other hand, those who wish to 
make sense of the specific moral challenges presented by the leadership role have few 
resources upon which to draw. 
By considering the relationship between morality and leadership, my PhD therefore aims to 
make a contribution to remedying this shortcoming. It proceeds in four stages. I will begin 
by reviewing the leadership literature. I will structure this review around the reservations 
about leadership to which I have already alluded: firstly, the possibility that leaders may 
apply their exceptional influencing skills to achieve outcomes that are of dubious moral 
quality; secondly, that there is something inherently suppressive and worryingly 
asymmetrical about the notion of leadership. In discussing the literature, I will consider the 
extent to which it either ameliorates or exacerbates these concerns. 
Clearly, in order to make sense of the moral implications of leadership, we need to have 
some idea of how we might attribute and evaluate moral probity in the context of 
organizational leadership. Therefore, having looked at morality from the perspective of the 
leadership literature, I will next approach the relationship from the opposite direction and 
consider leadership through the lens of moral philosophy. This is an ambitious undertaking: 
whereas the leadership literature has evolved over a short span of seventy years or so, and 
has only really gathered momentum in the last twenty-five, the ethics literature spans more 
than two millennia. Therefore, my review of the latter is necessarily undertaken in summary 
form and must be selective. I will structure this review around three meta-ethical 
perspectives, or three different ways of thinking about morality. I will refer to these as 
principle-based ethics, existentialist ethics and intersubjectivist ethics. After outlining some 
core ideas behind each of these meta-ethical perspectives, I will explore the implications 
that each holds for organizational leadership. Although the theories that I discuss do not 
exhaust the range of ways in which we might think about ethics, they do comprise a fairly 
representative cross-section. They therefore offer a reasonably diverse framework from 
which to conduct my enquiry into leadership and ethics. 
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The third stage of the PhD looks at leadership and ethics from an empirical perspective. I 
will use discussions with practising leaders - people who occupy prominent formal 
leadership roles in work organizations- in order to explore how they think about the ethical 
implications of their roles. I will consider the extent to which their different understandings 
respond to the areas of moral concern discussed in the first section. I will also explore the 
extent to which they articulate the three meta-ethical perspectives discussed in the second 
section. I thus hope to add further insights to both. I will also draw attention to the 
implications of the various perspectives manifested by research participants and any 
tensions which they may present. 
My approach in these three sections comprises a synthesis of the theoretical and the 
empirical, in which each is used to elucidate the other. Thus, I will draw upon theoretical 
perspectives within both leadership and ethics literature to provide a framework for 
undertaking and interpreting empirical research. At the same time, I will use empirical 
enquiry to illuminate specific theoretical perspectives. In this iterative manner, I hope to 
draw out the implications of the perspectives that emerge from each of separate avenues of 
enquiry, also highlighting relationships between different perspectives. 
I will structure my fourth and concluding section around some key themes that emerge from 
my theoretical and empirical research. I take the view that each of these themes may offer 
some helpful insights into what moral leadership might comprise. However, each may also 
present some troubling ramifications. I will try to identify both the former and the latter. I 
will then propose a-normative model of ethical leadership; one which seeks to embrace the 
positive insights of these various themes while avoiding their troubling ramifications. I will 
end with some reflection on the feasibility of such a normative model in contemporary 
work organizations. 
The overall spirit that drives this PhD is a normative one. That is, as the Oxford Companion 
to Philosophy puts it, it seeks to "proffer moral guidance, instruction or a guide for 
appraisive judgement", or as Hugh Willmott defines normative ethics, "it is most directly 
engaged with the process of developing a judgemental standpoint about what is (deemed to 
be) right and wrong" (1998: 78). However, I do not believe that, in order to propose a 
normative ethic, it is necessary to adopt an objectivist meta-ethic. In this respect, my own 
meta-ethical sympathies lie closest to the third of those that I describe in my review of the 
ethics literature: the intersubjectivist. I do not seek to uncover universal ethical standards 
that await discovery but nor do I view ethics as little more than a matter of personal or 
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cultural choice. I believe that, as Richard Bemstein (1983) proposes, it is possible to go 
"Beyond Objectivism and Relativism" and that the route to that "going beyond" lies in 
intersubjectivist theory. I hope that my synthesis of a broad range of theoretical and 
empirical perspectives is true to that dialogical agenda. 
Nevertheless, despite the overall, intersubjectively normative tone of my research, it is built 
upon foundations that have both positivist and interpretive elements. My review of the 
leadership literature owes a positivist debt insofar as most of that research has a strong 
positivist flavour. Most leadership research is driven by a belief that certain behaviours, 
personal qualities and circumstances enable effective leadership and that these behaviours, 
personal qualities and circumstances can be identified and classified. Therefore, in 
discussing the moral implications raised by this research, I am drawing upon material that 
is, to a large extent, positivist in its methodological orientation. 
The third part of my research, the empirical part, comprises its interpretive element. I use 
my discussions with leaders of organizations to try to get access to their understanding of 
the moral implications of leading. However, like the positivist tone of the leadership 
literature, I will try to apply this hermeneutic undertaking to an overall normative agenda. I 
seek to use the understandings revealed by my interpretive empirical research to generate an 
enhanced normative understanding of moral leadership. 
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2.0 LEADERSHIP AND ETHICS 
In this section I will review the leadership literature to see what it has to say about morality. 
I have already mentioned that the literature is overwhelmingly concerned with exploring the 
grounds of leadership effectiveness and pays relatively little attention to the moral 
dimension. Even texts whose titles explicitly promise to address the subject (e.g. von 
Weltzein Hoivik, 2002; Sison, 2003) tend to dwell more generally on the role of ethics in 
business than on the specific ethical challenges of leadership. Nevertheless, a number of 
theorists have proposed models of leadership effectiveness that carry an intuitively moral 
tone. Prominent amongst these are Robert Greenleafs discussion of servant leadership 
(1977), which suggests that the role of the leader is to minister to the needs and aspirations 
of followers, and James MacGregor Burns' transforming (or transformational) leadership 
theory (1978, 2003) which proposes that leaders fulfil an intrinsically moral purpose by 
enabling followers to satisfy so-called "higher order" needs. Furthermore, the focus on 
relationship-orientation and on "feminine" leadership traits, which characterises a lot of the 
literature, carries an intuitive moral allure. Meanwhile, some theorists have responded to 
charges of moral unresponsiveness in their prescriptions for effective leadership by offering 
ethically sanitised versions (e.g. Bass and Steidlmeier, 1999). 
Therefore, despite the paucity of systematic treatment of morality (Ciulla,1998b), there is 
sufficient material concealed within the folds of the curtains of the leadership-effectiveness 
literature to offer at least a starting point for theoretical enquiry into leadership ethics. 
Furthermore, far from undermining its relevance to morally-focused enquiry, the leadership 
literature's general preoccupation with effectiveness actually enables it to make a useful 
contribution to such enquiry. In exploring different perspectives on what is involved in 
being an effective leader, I will be able to consider the extent to which these recipes for 
effectiveness either exacerbate or ameliorate some moral challenges that are associated with 
leadership. Accordingly, in this chapter I will draw not only on those elements of the 
literature that have an explicit link to ethics; I will also draw on discussions of leadership 
that are explicitly concerned with effectiveness but which are nevertheless relevant to moral 
enquiry. 
I have already mentioned two ways in which leadership may offer grounds for moral 
concern. The first area of concern relates to the moral probity of the outcomes towards 
which leaders lead. The notion of effective leadership implies that certain individuals are 
able to apply exceptional influencing skills to rally support for a particular agenda. If those 
individuals, those effective leaders, are either morally degenerate or morally injudicious, 
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they may lead towards outcomes that, from a moral perspective, are undesirable. Leadership 
effectiveness thus becomes a dangerous tool. The second area of moral concern relates to a 
vague feeling of discomfort with the very notion of leadership, which I attribute to its 
connotations of imposition: the imposition of the will of the leader over that of other 
people. There seems to be something worryingly asymmetrical about leadership-
followership relationships; that leaders are expected to exert their agency over and above 
that of their so-called "followers". Effective leadership thus courts the challenge that the 
imposition of the leader's agenda erodes other people's capacity to fulfil their own 
aspirations, to pursue their own interests, to work towards realisation of their own potential 
or even to pursue their own moral agendas. 
I propose to structure this review of the leadership literature around these two areas of 
concern. I will discuss the extent to which different theories may exacerbate these concerns 
and also the extent to which various leadership theorists respond to them, either implicitly 
or explicitly. My discussion will indicate that each of these moral challenges is, in a sense, 
two pronged. The response adopted by some theorists in responding to the first prong of 
attack opens them to challenge from a second direction. Thus, in responding to concerns 
about the ethicality of the agenda towards which leaders lead by reassuring us that 
leadership effectiveness is normally accompanied by altruistic intent on the part of the 
leader, some theorists court the challenge of a narrowly-defined altruism; one which 
prioritises the organization and its interests over and above all other considerations. 
Similarly, in responding to the challenge to individual agency presented by an impositional 
leadership style, some commentators suggest that only those leaders who attend to the 
human-relationship needs of their followers will be able to successfully achieve their 
desired outcomes. But the focus that these theorists place on building a collective purpose 
raises concerns about the threat posed to individual agency by a sort of totalitarianism of the 
majority. 
My focus on these particular themes should not be interpreted as an assertion that they are 
the only possible grounds of moral discomfort with effective leadership; only that each is 
sufficiently compelling to merit attention during enquiry into the relationship between 
leadership and morality. Therefore, these themes are not offered as a complete classification 
of grounds for moral disquiet. They are, rather, offered as a reasonable starting point for 
theoretical consideration and empirical enquiry on the understanding that, as with the 
planks of Neurath's boat (Cartwright, 2005), I have to start from somewhere but that 
starting point may be subject to revision as my enquiry progresses. 
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I will conclude this chapter by reflecting on some general issues that arise from discussion 
of these themes. I will also outline the extent to which the responses to these issues offered 
by various leadership commentators relate to contrasting perspectives within the broader 
field of organization and management studies. 
The Moral Probity of Leadership Agendas 
I will begin by considering the extent to which the literature offers a basis for differentiating 
those leaders who use their leadership talents to bring about morally desirable ends from 
those who apply them to agendas that are morally reprehensible. The importance of this 
question is apparent from abundant instances of highly effective leaders who have used that 
effectiveness to achieve outcomes which, at least in retrospect, are considered to be morally 
dubious. Commonly cited examples include Adolf Hitler, Pol Pot and Saddam · Hussein 
from the political arena and the likes ofRobert Maxwell, Jeffrey Skilling, and Kenneth Lay 
from the world of business. Some might dismiss the relevance of such examples on the 
basis that each of these characters, eventually, ran into difficulties. It might be suggested 
that, since the leadership that they provided ultimately failed, they should be discounted as 
effective leaders. However, to disregard the importance of their agendas on the basis of 
their eventual failure would be unwise. The limited tenure of these leaders should not divert 
attention from the awful consequences of their leadership: Hitler's eventual capitulation did 
not undo the horrors perpetuated in his name; nor does the demise of Lay and Skilling offer 
much consolationto the employees, shareholders and pensioners who were impoverished 
by their greed and duplicity. These people were highly effective in applying their leadership 
skills for long enough to matter. 
Now, it might be asked why the moral tone of leadership agendas should merit particular 
attention. Surely, it might be argued, the moral tone of any person's agenda is important, so 
why focus specifically on leaders? I propose that the moral tone of leadership agendas is 
particularly important just because leaders are not "any person". They are regarded, at least 
by most of the leadership literature and notwithstanding disagreements about causal 
direction, as persons who are able to wield considerable influence over the behaviour of 
other people. So if the moral tone of any person's agenda matters, then the moral tone of a 
leader's agenda matters a great deal more. The influence which leaders wield amplifies 
their moral potency. Therefore, the moral probity of leadership agendas is particularly 
worthy of reflection. 
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Many commentators are keen to identify organizational leadership with the ability to evoke 
change, an association which further magnifies the moral significance of leaders' agendas. 
Popular business writers (e.g. Peters and Waterman, 1982; Handy, 1993 and 1995; Covey, 
1996; Drucker, 2001) draw attention to the flux and instability that characterise the 
contemporary organizational world. Consequently, those who lead successfully within that 
environment are those who can adopt dynamic responses to the challenges presented by its 
fluidity: effective leaders do not seek to maintain the status quo; they engineer change to 
situations and to people in response to shifting organizational imperatives. Abraham 
Zalesnic's (1977) concise summary is that leaders elicit change in order to get organizations 
where they need to be; managers, on the other hand, merely keep organizations in a steady 
state. Therefore, the latter do not qualify for the epithet of leader. Similarly, John Kotter 
(1990) depicts leaders as agents of change who develop and communicate new visions for 
the future, compared to managers who plan and monitor for the present and the short term. 
Charismatic leadership theory also applauds the capacity of leaders to bring about 
revolutionary and visionary change. Max Weber's (1947 [1924]) seminal description of 
charismatic authority is characterised by challenge to traditional and legal forms, while Jay 
Conger and Rabindra Kanungo (1998) emphasise charismatic leaders' capacity to envision 
discrepant organizational goals and to champion creative and innovative ways of achieving 
them. Linda Smircich and Gareth Morgan (1982) also portray leadership as a dynamic 
process that challenges prevailing wisdom to uncover new definitions of meaning, while 
Thayer (1988) reflects on leaders' capacity to reveal different ways of knowing the world. 
Effective leaders are also characterised by their ability to evoke changes in those who they 
lead. James MacGregor Bums (1978, 2003) and Bemard Bass (1985, 1990, 1994) focus on 
the propensity of transformational leaders to lift people to a better sense of self, contrasting 
this with transactional exchanges which leave people fundamentally unchanged. 
If effective leaders are able to bring about significant change to their environments and to 
the people whom they lead, then clearly they have the capacity to do a great deal of good. 
However, any moral allure associated with change assumes that changed situations are 
morally preferable to the circumstances that they supersede and that changes to people 
leave those people better off than before. Clearly, there is no guarantee that this will be the 
case. If, on the one hand, leadership theory conjures visions of pioneering change-agents, 
selflessly leading organizations and people towards a better future, it is equally prone to 
images of self-interested or misguided meddlers who, through the application of their 
leadership talents, leave everything in a considerably worse state to that in which they 
found it. 
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Relying on the altruistic intent of the leader 
For a number of reasons, then, the moral tone of leadership agendas matters. So how might 
we distinguish a morally good agenda from a morally bad agenda? One response to this 
question, offered by transformational and charismatic leadership theorists, is to focus on the 
hazards presented by leaders' egotism: altruistically motivated leadership is presented as 
being morally generative; egotistically motivated leadership as morally degenerative. 
Bemard Bass and Paul Steidlmeier thus distinguish authentic transformational leaders from 
inauthentic/pseudo transformational leaders in order to tell those who wear the "white hats 
of heroes" from those who sport the "black hats of villains" (1999: 187). According to this 
depiction, authentic transformational leaders place the interests of followers above their 
own ambitio_n for power and position. Pseudo transformational leaders, on the other hand, 
are the "inauthentic CEOs [who] downsize their organization, increase their own 
compensation, and weep crocodile tears for the employees who have lost their jobs" (ibid). 
Furthermore, authentic transformational leaders channel their need for power "in socially 
constructive ways in and to the service of others" (ibid: 189), whereas pseudo 
transformational leaders "use power primarily for self-aggrandisement and are actually 
contemptuous privately of those they are supposed to be serving as leaders" (ibid). 
Researchers into charismatic leadership also emphasise the moral hazards presented by 
egotistic leaders. Conger and Kanungo observe that charismatic leaders may be prone to 
"extreme narcissism that leads them to promote highly self-serving and grandiose aims. As 
a result, a leader's behaviours can become exaggerated, lose touch with reality, or become 
vehicles for pure personal gain" (1998: 211). Conger and Kanungo note that this may result 
in outcomes that are harmful to followers and to the organization, and eventually may not 
even be in the best interests ofthe leader. 
Just as Bass and Steidlmeier use the authentic-pseudo distinction to tell heroes from 
villains, charismatic leadership theory has produced its own distinctions to differentiate 
between the altruistic good guys and the egotistic bad guys. Jane Howell (1988) thus 
distinguishes between personalised and socialised charisma. The former is concerned 
primarily with the exertion of power and dominance over others: personalised charisma tics 
only encourage the development of followers insofar as this may contribute to the personal 
goals of the leader. Socialised charismatics, on the other hand, are motivated by a collective 
ethic, by so-called "higher-order values" and by a disposition to promote the personal 
development and intellectual stimulation of followers as an end in itself. Pursuing this 
distinction between socialised and personalised charismatics, Conger and Kanungo note 
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that socialised charismatics' "need for power" is balanced by, "low Machiavellianism" 
(1998: 212). A personalised charismatic's need for power, on the other hand, is 
ch~racterised by "high authoritarianism, high narcissism and high Machiavellianism" (ibid). 
Conger and Kanungo also allude to Musser's (1987) distinction between positive and 
negative charismatic types, the latter of which emphasise devotion to self as opposed to 
internalisation of the values and ideological goals that they are ostensibly promoting. 
These theorists therefore offer criteria against which we can distinguish morally generative 
transformational and charismatic leadership from morally degenerative transformational 
and charismatic leadership. However, while these distinctions may assist reflection on the 
reasons why leadership has gone morally wrong, they offer little reassurance against the 
prospect of transformationally or charismatically empowered egotists leading towards self-
serving ends which are morally undesirable. There seems to be no reason to believe that 
pseudo transformational and personalised charismatic leaders will be any less successful at 
leading than their authentic and socialised counterparts. Therefore, the ability to make 
retrospective and detached distinctions between morally good and morally bad leadership 
on the basis of egotistic and altruistic intent does little to assuage misgivings about egotists 
who demonstrate transformational and charismatic flair being placed in positions of 
considerable power and influence in organizations. 
A more comforting picture is offered by Beverley Alimo-Metcalfe and John Alban-
Metcalfe's (2001; 2004; 2005) research into the effectiveness of transformational leadership 
in British private-sector organizations. Bass and the charismatic theorists have tended to 
focus their research at the level of observable behaviour, thus deriving prescriptions for 
leadership effectiveness. They have only gone deeper to consider the level of underpinning 
values when presented with the possibility that these recipes for effectiveness may be eo-
opted by "bad", egotistically-motivated people. The research of Alimo-Metcalfe and Alban-
Metcalfe, on the other hand, is faithful to Louis Pondy's (1978) injunction that we need to 
explore leadership effectiveness not only in terms of observable behaviours but also in 
relation to the values that underpin those behaviours. 
Offering a somewhat different account of transformational leadership from that presented 
by Bass and his colleagues, Alimo-Metcalfe and Alban-Metcalfe have thus identified 
correlations between leadership effectiveness and the underpinning motivation of the 
leader. Noting the difference between their own findings and those of US models, "where 
vision and charisma [of the leader] dominate" (2005: 57) they find that successful 
transformational leaders are inclined to value individuals and to show genuine concern for 
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others' well being and development. Furthermore, they suggest that "this factor is 
unequivocally the most important aspect of transformational leadership in the UK sample, 
explaining more variance than all the remaining factors together" (ibid). Alimo-Metcalfe 
and Alban-Metcalfe also find a strong positive correlation between effectiveness and the 
leader's inclination to consider "the good of the organization as more important than 
satisfying his/her own personal ambition" (ibid: 60). The reassuring conclusion of Alimo-
Metcalfe and Alban-Metcalfe's value-sensitive exploration, therefore, is that, at least in the 
contexts within which they have researched, effective leaders are generally willing to 
renounce personal gain in the interests of the collective. 
A link between altruism with leadership effectiveness is also apparent in Robert Greenleaf's 
(1977) model of servant-leadership. Greenleaf's work was inspired by his reading of 
Herman Hesse's novel, Journey to the East. The novel describes a spiritual journey to the 
East that is undertaken by a group of travellers. The group is accompanied by a servant 
called Leo. Leo is a remarkable character; in addition to carrying out menial chores on 
behalf of the group, he sustains morale and spirit by his personal example, binding the 
group together with his uplifting presence and his songs. All goes well until Leo disappears; 
then the group falls apart and the journey is abandoned. Some time later, the narrator 
discoverers that the servant, Leo, is, in fact, the titular head of the spiritual sect that inspired 
the journey; the leader rather than the servant that the travellers had thought him to be. For 
Greenleaf, the key point to this story is that Leo was, deep down, driven not by a desire to 
lead, but by a desire to serve. Servant leaders are those who are driven first and foremost by 
a desire to serve others. The desire to lead comes later through a process of conscious 
choice when the servant-leader realises that he or she will be able to serve more 
productively by taking on a leadership role. Greenleaf contrasts such individuals with those 
who wish only to lead, either to assuage a desire for power or because the leadership role 
brings privilege and wealth. If Greenleaf's depiction of servant leaders seems a little 
idealistic, subsequent researchers have added a degree of practical relevance to his work by 
identifying correlations between servant leadership and leadership success in certain 
organizational contexts (Spears, 2002). 
The challenge of narrowly defined altruism 
The association of moral probity with altruistic intent is intuitively appealing. The 
suggestion that leaders who care about people are likely to be driven by ethically sound 
agendas seems to make sense. However, as a guarantor of leadership ethicality, altruism is 
not entirely unproblematic. A particular difficulty is that, by focusing on the hazards 
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presented by egotistical leaders, we run the risk of overlooking an even greater moral 
hazard: that of narrowly-defined altruism. Joseph Rost articulates this concern with respect 
to transformational leadership, noting that 
even if 'leaders and followers raise one another to higher levels of motivation and 
morality', there is nothing in this notion of transformational leadership that speaks to 
organizations and societies being raised to higher levels of motivation an~ morality ( 1991: 
164). 
Terry Price (2003) elaborates on this theme, suggesting that the vigour with which Bass and 
Steidlmeier respond to the hazards of co-optation by egotists only serves to magnify the 
danger of transformational leadership conflicting with wider moral considerations. For 
Price, Bass and Steidlmeier' s effort to discredit egotists over-emphasises the desirability of 
those leaders who place the interests of the group above all else. It thus understates the 
"peculiar cognitive challenge of leadership" (ibid: 69): that is, a pernicious, misplaced 
altruism. For Price, narrowly-defined altruism may present an even greater threat to the 
ethicality of leadership than egotism. 
Arguably, the dangers of narrowly-defined altruism are embodied by two of the leaders that 
Bass and Steidlmeier (1999) describe as pseudo transformational leaders in order to 
illustrate their authentic-pseudo distinction. Saddam Hussein and Pol Pot have been 
demonised by the medias of those, mainly Western, nations whose political ideologies, 
economic agendas and cultural backgrounds differ from theirs. And both appear to have 
pursued human rights policies that contrast markedly to Western norms. However, it is not 
self-evident that these men have been driven only by egoistic self-interest or that they have 
pursued their brutal regimes purely out of a desire for personal aggrandisement as Bass and 
Steidlmeier suggest. Although the charge of egotism conveniently fits the dominant 
Western perception of such leaders, an equally plausible interpretation is that they were, in 
fact, driven by a single-minded desire to do what they considered best for the people that 
they led and to impose the political ideologies in which they believed. Thus, they may be 
authentic-transformational "heroes" after all. 
Even Adolf Hitler, that popular stereotype of the villainous charismatic leader, may not 
have been driven by a desire for personal enhancement, as is often supposed, but by a 
mission to rejuvenate the economic and military status of Germany and restore his people to 
what he considered to be their rightful position of European pre-eminence (Hobsbawm, 
1995; Grint, 2000). According to this interpretation, Hitler's vision of redemption for the 
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German nation, unacceptable though it is to most detached observers, was not the agenda of 
a narcissistic egotist. It was the vision of a man who believed so strongly in the ideals and 
values that underpinned his political ideology that he was prepared to place them above all 
other moral considerations in initiating acts of barbarous atrocity. For Bass and 
Steidlmeier, a measure of authenticity in transformational leadership is that leaders have a 
"strong attachment to their organization and its people" (1999: 187) and that they are 
"inwardly and outwardly concerned about the good that can be achieved for the group, 
organization or society for which they feel responsible" (ibid: 188). If we accede to Price's 
(2003) reservations, this "strong attachment" and "inward and outward concern" may serve 
to cloud the moral perspicacity of leaders and followers alike, leading to a collective 
abnegation of any broader moral considerations. 
In responding to this particular challenge, leadership theorists have pursued two contrasting 
approaches. The first approach, which is articulated notably by Bass and Steidlmeier, is to 
put faith in the ethical character and moral perspicacity of the leader. Thus, in order to 
demonstrate the moral purity of transformational leadership, Bass and Steidlmeier 
undertake a tour of Western ethical perspectives, pointing out how the values embodied in 
authentic transformational leaders lie easily with Confucian and Socratic thought, Judaeo-
Christian tradition and the "modern ethical Western ethical agenda of individual liberty, 
utilitarian social choice, and distributive justice" (1999: 193). 
As far as the ethicality of ends is concerned, Bass and Steidlmeier compare the role of the 
transformational leader to that of the moral sage who figures in Socratic and Confucian 
philosophy. Their understanding of a moral sage is of an exceptional individual who has a 
clear personal understanding of moral truth and who is able to share that understanding with 
followers. Notably, there is little space for followers to participate in the definition of moral 
truth. Although Bass and Steidlmeier regard the activities of such moral sages as "no 
individualist project- it occurs both within and for a fiduciary community" (ibid: 196), it is 
clear that the communal quality of moral truth lies not in the nature of its derivation but in 
the constitution of its beneficiaries. Moral truth is not defined through participative 
processes; it is unilaterally defined by morally sagacious leaders. Its apprehension is not a 
social accomplishment; it is the solo achievement of exceptionally gifted visionaries who 
decide what is best for the rest of us. Bass and Steidlmeier go on to trace the impact of the 
Socratic notion of the moral sage on the Judaic/Christian tradition, where "the moral sage 
(saint/holy person) exercises a transforming influence upon those s/he contacts" (ibid: 196). 
Again their understanding is one of leaders blessed with exceptional moral insight who are 
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able to share their personally defined moral understanding with their followers: thus "the 
true transformational leader is to be, in Confucian terms' a 'superior person"' (ibid: 196). 
An alternative approach, which places a less onerous burden on the leader's moral 
judgement, is to trust in the desirability of outcomes that are reached through consultative 
processes; processes which it is the task of the leader to facilitate and mediate. If effective 
leaders are those who involve others in the definition of organizational agendas, then moral 
sagacity on the part of those leaders is less important: the burden of moral legitimisation is 
shared with followers. This approach is apparent in descriptions of so called "feminine" 
leadership style (Hegelson, 1990; Rosener, 1990; Marshall, 1995; Stanford et a!, 1995), 
which emphasise the role played by consultation. These accounts focus on the importance 
of participation, power-sharing, information-sharing, listening skills and open 
communication to leadership effectiveness, thus reducing the weight of dependency on the 
moral perspicacity of leaders. The early behavioural theories (e.g. Lewin, 1939) are also 
redolent of shared decision-making which shifts the moral onus away from the leader's 
unilateral judgement. Alimo-Metcalfe and Alban-Metcalfe's (2001, 2004, 2005) 
descriptions of transformational leadership also indicate that a willingness to consult is 
positively correlated with leadership effectiveness. 
To summarise so far, some theorists suggest that we can identify moral leaders by their 
altruistic intent. They suggest that the leaders who are most likely to lead in morally 
reprehensible directions are those who are egotistically inclined. Therefore, by identifying 
the nature of the leader's intent, in accordance with the check list supplied by the theorist, 
we can assure ourselves of the moral probity of their agenda. Other theorists note an 
intrinsically altruistic dimension to leadership; they suggest that leaders, if they are to be 
effective at all, need to be altruistically motivated. However, this focus on altruism in both 
sets of researchers sets up another potential concern: this is that leaders' altruistic devotion 
to the members of the organizations they lead may blind them to broader moral 
considerations. Again, two alternative responses are offered to this challenge. The first is to 
trust in the moral perspicacity of the leader; to cast the leader as moral sage. An alternative 
response is to note that the most effective leaders tend to adopt a consultative approach and 
to take reassurance in the moral probity of the outcomes that are likely to emanate from 
consultative processes. 
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The Suppression of Agency 
A second moral concern with leadership is that the asymmetrical nature of the leader-
follower relationship is inherently suppressive of the agency of the latter. A great deal of 
the theory starts from what might be termed an "impositional" presupposition about 
leadership. In other words, the theory takes it for granted that leadership necessarily 
involves imposition of the will of the leader over the will of his or her followers. 
Regardless of the concerns already discussed about the moral probity of the agenda that. is 
thus imposed upon followers, there seems to be something intrinsically disconcerting about 
this suppression of agency. 
Some commentators note the tendency of leadership research itself to exacerbate this 
troubling state of affairs. Indeed, it has been suggested that the neat, dualistic categorisation 
of "leaders" and "followers" upon which much of the research is premised is no more than 
a self-reinforcing myth that induces dependency upon the former and suppresses the agency 
of the latter (Smircich and Morgan, 1982; Gemmill and Oakley, 1992). A glance at some of 
the definitions of leadership offered by researchers lends credence to this view. For 
example, Joanne Ciulla, drawing upon Rost (1991), includes the following in her review of· 
some of the definitions offered during the last eighty years: "the ability to impress the will 
of the leader over those led and induce obedience, respect, loyalty, and cooperation" 
(Moore, 1927, cited in Ciulla, 1998b: 11); "a process in which the activities of many are 
organised to move in a specific direction by one" (Bogardus, 1934, ibid); "acts by a person 
that influence others in a shared direction" (Seeman, 1960, ibid); "to inspire others to 
undertake some form of purposeful action that is determined by the leader" (Sarkasian, 
1979, ibid). A monocratic tone is equally apparent in the recurrence of traits such as 
"masculinity", "dominance", "extroversion" and "self-confidence" in the lists of qualities 
frequently attributed to successful leaders (Northouse, 2001). 
The term charisma, which conjures up visions of exceptionally gifted individuals rallying 
support for their personally-defined agendas, is particularly laden with impositional 
overtones. Max Weber offers a seminal definition of charisma. Contrasting it to rational and 
traditional forms of authority, he describes charismatic authority as "resting on devotion to 
the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual 
person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed by him" (1947 [1924]: 328). 
Some commentators (e.g. Birnbaum 1992; Drucker 1996; Solomon 1998) have expressed 
concerns about the idea of charisma as evoking images of indefinable personal magnetism 
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and specifically reject its legitimacy within leadership theory. Nevertheless, its allure is 
pervasive in popular descriptions of leadership and a great deal of attention has been 
devoted to defining precisely what it is that enables certain individuals to possess this 
highly prized quality. R.J. House (1976), for example, identifies the attribution of charisma 
with high levels of self-confidence, dominance, a strong sense of the moral righteousness of 
ones beliefs and a desire to influence others. Some commentators explicitly alert us to the 
potentially autocratic quality of charisma: Conger and Kanungo warn of an "overpowering 
sense of self-importance and a strong need to be the centre of attention (which) can lead 
charismatic leaders to ignore the viewpoints of others and the development of leadership 
ability in others' (1998: 211-212). Meanwhile, Alan Bryman (1992) observes that 
charismatic leaders' arrogance about their special abilities can lead to obsession, or that 
they may become autocratic and unwilling to heed the advice of others. 
An impositional understanding of leadership even intrudes into those research agendas that 
reveal a less positivist tone, as in Keith Grint's description of leaders as seeking to impose 
their own version of reality over and above alternatives: "the only essential element of 
identities [is] that they are essentially contested, and that contestation is the context within 
which leaders vie to impose their own version of identity upon populations" (2000: 9). 
Smircich and Morgan (1982) articulate concern about the totalising proclivity of leadership 
when they warn of a tacit recognition of the right of the leader to shape reality on behalf of 
the group. They point out that this right is often accorded in conditions of power imbalance 
which inhibit challenges to its legitimacy, since attributed rights and obligations on the part 
of leaders are commonly the outcome of pre-existing organizational power structures. 
Smircich and Morgan concede that this right is not always unanimously recognised. They 
allude to tensions whereby alternative understandings of reality are offered by other 
organizational members. However, such alternative definitions of meaning are offered 
within a power structure that is fundamentally unbalanced: meaning is therefore "shaped in 
important ways by the power relations embedded in the situation as a whole" (Smircich and 
Morgan, 1982: 270). 
Sensitivity to the aspirations and needs of followers 
In contrast to these visions of leadership as an essentially impositional undertaking, many 
theorists suggest that successful leadership requires an adaptive response to the needs of 
followers. A notable characteristic of such findings is their congruence with human 
relations approaches to management and organization. The human relations movement (e.g. 
Mayo, 1997 [1949]) drew attention to the limitations of scientific management (Taylor, 
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1997 [1012]) in achieving managerial effectiveness. In the same way, behavioural and 
style leadership theories illuminate the limitations of a leadership approach that focuses 
uniquely on task achievement, drawing attention to the importance of sensitivity to human 
needs. For example studies carried out by the University of Ohio (Hemphill and Coons, 
1957) stressed that effective leaders need to show consideration to employees' needs as 
well as initiating structure. Later, the Michigan University study (Lickert, 1970) drew 
attention to the importance of employee-centred as well as job-centred leadership 
behaviours, while Robert Blake and Jane Morton (1985) describe successful leadership 
behaviour in terms of concern for people as well as concern for results. 
The human relations theme continues to figure prominently in more recent leadership 
research. For example, the gender-related perspectives already referred to (e.g. Johnson, 
1976; Hegelson, 1990; Rosener, 1990; Marshall, 1995) identify a feminine leadership style 
that is consultative, participative and empathic, contrasting with the adversarial, competitive 
and aggressive tone of traditional masculine approaches. Similarly, Alimo-Metcalfe and 
Alban-Metcalfe (2005) advocate a transformational leadership style that values individuals, 
that promotes well-being and personal development, that empowers and delegates and that 
is accessible, approachable and in-touch with followers. Alimo-Metcalfe and Alban-
Metcalfe also note that successful transformational leaders - according to their depiction of 
transformation, which is somewhat different from that of Bernard Bass and his colleagues -
are inclined to share power with followers rather than pursuing what they refer to as "grace 
and favour power relationship[s]" (2005: 59). 
More common than a straightforward advocacy of ministration to the needs and aspirations 
of followers are what Keith Grint (2000) refers to as situational prescriptions. Situational 
theories point to the efficacy of different leadership behaviours in different circumstances. 
For example, Paul Hersey and Kenneth Blanchard (1982) propose that leadership style 
should be adapted in response to the favourability of leadership situations while Fred 
Fiedler (1967) suggests that different stages of task-readiness amongst followers call for 
different mixes of relationship-building and task-orientation. Calls for an androgynous 
leadership style, which combines characteristically masculine and feminine traits (Grant, 
1992; Syrett and Hogg, 1992), also valorise an apposite blend of imposition and facilitation. 
A troubling aspect of these relationship-oriented and situational theories is their potentially 
manipulative implications: if leaders switch on and off their responsiveness to followers' 
needs, aspirations and interests as circumstances dictate then, while they may not 
necessarily suppress agency, they at least seem to be harnessing it to their own agenda. 
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Human relationships between leaders and followers, instead of being rooted in emotional 
responses, are thus colonised by considerations of rational accounting. Apart from the 
intrinsically discomfiting nature of such instrumental co-optation of emotions, this may also 
increase followers' vulnerability: followers may be tempted to place trust in leaders as a 
consequence of the latter's apparent concern for their wellbeing, only to find their interests 
sacrificed to the leader's agenda when contingently apposite. For this reason, an 
unequivocally transactional, task-focussed relationship may seem morally preferable to the 
apparent, but conditional, kindness of relationship-sensitive, transformational and other 
"new paradigm" (Alimo-Metcalfe and Alban-Metcalfe, 2004) leaders. Although the former 
do not carry the warm glow of inclusion which surrounds the latter, they at least offer the 
virtues of transparency and consistency. 
According to some commentators, we should not be overly concerned about the 
manipulative potential of situational theories. For example, Abraham Zalesnic (1977) 
suggests that successful leaders are highly unlikely to dissemble. Proposing that 
genuineness is one of the defining qualities of leadership, Zale~nic paints a picture of 
leaders who say what they believe, who stand by their principles and who can be relied 
upon to support those with whom they have built a relationship of trust. However, it is not 
clear whether, in his differentiation of leaders from managers, Zalesnic is painting an 
aspirational picture of how he would like leaders to behave or whether he is presenting 
anecdotal research findings concerning the way in which effective leaders actually do 
behave. 
In contrast with Zalesnic, other commentators warn of the dangers of dissembling. For 
example, Beverley Alimo-Metcalf notes that, while the concept of empowerment, "clothed 
as it is in the warmth of humanistic language", is a seductive one, in practice it is an 
approach often pursued by managers with "reputations for favouring a management style 
more akin to Machiavelli than to the public image of Mother Teresa" (1995: 6). On a 
similar note, reflecting on the superficial way in which feminine values are often adopted in 
organizations, Judi Marshall suggests that: 
the language used seems to herald a revaluing and integration of "female" values. But this 
may be a eo-option, a token effort leaving the dominant base of values largely unreformed. 
The transformative potential of new approaches is seriously undermined if they are used for 
instrumental purposes or within frameworks of competitive advantage (Marshall, 1995: 
101). 
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Mayumi Mori articulates a similar concern, observing that, in a world whose social 
structures are dominated by "Western, white male, left brain thinking patterns and 
approaches ... we need to be going lower, deeper and wider as well as faster and higher" 
(2002: 229). The moral hazard, then, is that relationship-oriented leadership behaviours will 
be eo-opted by those who regard them, not as a means for organizational leaders to address 
"lower, deeper and wider" human concerns, but purely as an instrumental tool for getting 
"faster and higher". 
Conflict between the collective and the individual 
Even if we overlook the concern that an apparently people-focussed approach to leadership 
might be used as a manipulative tool, there is a further troubling tone in some of the 
leadership models considered so far. This is the emphasis that they place on building a 
collective purpose and on establishing fealty to a shared vision. While this focus on the 
collective may assuage concerns about monocratic imposition of the leader's agenda, it also 
raises an alternative challenge to agency. This is the challenge that the collective will may 
present to individual agency. 
The emphasis on building shared purpose is particularly evident in some transformational 
leadership theories. For example, James MacGregor Burns (1978, 2003) suggests that 
herein lies "transforming" [or transformational] leadership's moral purpose. According to 
Bums transforming leadership is characterised by the leader's ability to encourage 
followers to subordinate their individual needs and wants to a collective agenda. In a appeal 
to the essentially uplifting qualities of participation in a Durkheimian-style common 
conscience (Morrison, 1995), Bums suggests that it is only through participation in a 
shared mission that people satisfy their "higher order" needs and thus find true self-
actualisation. Therefore, in facilitating fealty to a collective agenda, transforming leaders 
enable followers to rise above their illusory wants and thus evoke agency on a more 
elevated level. Burns therefore calls upon transforming leaders not only to move followers 
vertically up a Maslow-type needs hierarchy but also to move them horizontally towards an 
appreciation of the essentially social nature of their "higher order" needs: 
The process is 'vertical' as individuals are motivated to higher and higher levels of want and 
hope and ambition and demand. There is an equally important "horizontal" dimension as 
these spiralling motives of individuals interact, creating integrated structures of collective 
motivation (2003: 151). 
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Bernard Bass (1985, 1990, 1998a) and Bruce Avolio (1994) follow Burns in focusing on 
the need to transcend individualised, transactional exchanges by building a shared sense of 
purpose. They also suggest that the moral dimension of transformational leadership lies in 
its capacity to divert attention frorn the individual to the collective: 
Leaders are truly transformational when they increase awareness of what is right, good, 
important and beautiful; when they help to elevate followers' needs for achievement and 
self-actualisation; when they foster in followers higher moral maturity; and when they move 
followers to go beyond their self interests for the good of their group, organization or 
society(Bass, 1998a: 171). 
Some researchers who are critical of the more positivist contributions to leadership research 
also highlight our tendency to think about leaders as creators of shared understanding. Thus 
Smircich and Morgan (1982) draw on Weick's (1995) interpretation of reality as a shared 
cognitive map to highlight the role of leadership in defining followers' understanding of 
reality. Keith Grint (2000) also emphasises how effective leadership can overcome 
divergent self-identities to generate group-identity and a shared understanding of present, 
past and future. 
Michael Keeley (1998) articulates the moral challenge to agency that is presented by this 
emphasis on building commitment to a shared agenda. Keeley's criticism is directed 
particularly at Bass's transformational leadership theory, but his comments are also 
apposite to other perspectives that focus on the creation of collective purpose. Keeley 
points out that the efficacy of self-actualisation as an ethical justification for 
transformational leadership rests upon the questionable assumption of homogeneity of 
followers' interests, values and aspirations. Keeley questions this premise, concluding that 
transformational leadership presents an insidious version of majority rule, in which peer 
pressure is placed upon all followers to support the common vision generated by the leader 
regardless of its congruence with individual agendas. Under the thrall of transformational 
leadership, minority groups and individuals will thus be subjected to subtle coercion to 
conform and "unless leaders are able to transform everyone and create absolute unanimity 
of interests (a very special case), transformational leadership merely produces a majority 
will that represents the interests of the strongest faction" (1998: 124). 
In responding to the challenge presented by the collective to the individual, different 
researchers adopt contrasting approaches. The first approach echoes Alan Fox's (1966) 
depiction of a unitarist frame of reference. Fox used this term to describe the supposition 
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that the real interests of organizational members are in harmony; that apparent conflicts of 
interest are the result of misunderstanding, poor coordination or misbehaviour by deviant 
individuals; and that disagreements can be resolved by the application of remedial conflict-
resolution techniques. Leadership theorists who present a unitarist understanding suggest 
that apparent tensions amongst followers or between individuals and the collective should 
be resolved in favour of the latter by morally sagacious and socially influential leaders. 
Unsurprisingly, this stance is articulated most explicitly by Bass in his direct defence 
against Keeley's (1998) challenge. Bass (1998a) suggests that transformational leaders must 
attend to both transactional and transformational dimensions, so that transactional checks 
and balances will ensure adequate representation of individual interests while the 
transformational elements build commitment to the common purpose. Bass downplays the 
likelihood of tension between those transactional and transformational dimensions, 
implying that the real interests of followers lie on the transformational side. The task of 
transformational leaders is therefore to make followers aware of these real interests and, 
using their exceptional leadership capabilities, to build commitment to the shared purposes 
through which those real interests can be realised. 
An alternative response to the potential for moral tension between the individual and the 
organization also echoes the work of Fox (1966), this time recalling his description of the 
pluralist frame of reference: that organizations are collections of separate groups, each with 
its unique needs and interests, and that a certain amount of conflict is inevitable as each 
group seeks to meet its own needs and pursue its own interests. This second approach 
acknowledges plurality of interests, aspirations, values and perspectives, not only in relation 
to sub-groups within the leader's domain of influence but also on an individual level. It thus 
accentuates the need for leaders to respond to this heterogeneity amongst groups and 
individuals in order to succeed. Whereas Bass's discussion of transformational leadership 
leans heavily towards the unitarist perspective, the alternative transformational leadership 
model offered by Alimo-Metcalfe and Alban-Metcalfe shows greater sympathy for 
pluralism, highlighting the congruence between effective leadership and respect for 
diversity. Thus Alimo-Metcalfe and Alban-Metcalfe's (2005) contend that "the constructs 
of leadership emerging from our data also place great importance on being sensitive to the 
agenda of a wide range of internal and external stakeholders, rather than seeking to meet the 
agenda of only one interest group" (2005: 63). Sensitivity to pluralism is also apparent in 
the distinction that Alimo-Metcalfe and Alban-Metcalfe draw between their networking and 
achieving factor and Bass's inspirational charismatic dimension: the former includes a 
"crucially important additional aspect, which is 'sensitivity to the agenda of different key 
players/interest groups, such that they feel they are being served by the vision"' (2005: 58). 
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This pluralistically-responsive perspective is also apparent in Smircich and Morgan's call 
for leadership researchers to pay greater attention to "the processes through which the 
management of meaning in organised situations can develop in ways that enhance, rather 
than deny, the ability of individuals to take responsibility for the definition and control of 
their world" (1982: 271). The message underpinning Smircich and Morgan's invocation is 
that leaders need not be viewed either as unilateral shapers of meaning or enforcers of fealty 
to a shared meaning. Rather, they can be regarded as facilitators of a process in which, 
rather than surrendering their sensemaking autonomy to leaders, organizational members 
are encouraged to make sense for themselves and to negotiate, in contexts that are not 
distorted by hierarchical power structures, their own understanding of reality. 
I will now briefly summarise this discussion of the challenge which leadership presents to 
agency before drawing some general conclusions from my overview of the leadership 
literature. Many researchers fmd that the capacity to respond to the needs of individuals is 
an important ingredient to effective leadership: although leaders may sometimes need to 
adopt an autocratic approach, they must also take account of the needs of the individuals 
who they lead. On the one hand, leaders might thus be encouraged to make space for the 
needs and aspirations of followers; a leadership imperative that may be expected to 
promote, rather than suppress agency in the latter. On the other hand, the contingent nature 
of follower-responsive leadership prescriptions gives them a Machiavellian undertone: the 
call for leaders to adopt an expedient mix of task-focused and relationship-focused 
behaviours may be interpreted as a prescription for dissembling manipulation on their part. 
Indeed, some commentators express particular concern about the consequences of leaders 
being encouraged to adopt behaviours which do not reflect their underpinning values. Even 
if concerns about the calculating instrumentality of situational leadership prescriptions are 
set aside, a further challenge to individual agency is presented by the valorisation of the 
collective that defines a lot of leadership theory. Some commentators counter this 
challenge by proposing that it is only through participation in a collective undertaking that 
individuals realise their "true" interests. According to this perspective, its capacity to build 
commitment to a shared vision gives leadership an intrinsically moral quality. Other 
commentators express greater sympathy for heterogeneity and call upon leaders to respond 
to the diverse needs and aspirations of different groups and individuals. An understanding 
thus emerges of the leader as a facilitator of agency, rather than as an imposer of 
personally-defined or collective agendas. 
23 
Locating the Leadership Literature and Some Concluding Comments 
In this review, I have drawn on the leadership literature in order to explore some moral 
challenges associated with leadership. Although the literature is primarily focused on 
identifying the ingredients of effective leadership, it nevertheless offers a starting point 
from which these moral challenges can be explored. Some theorists offer an explicit 
defence to these challenges; other researchers do not explicitly consider the moral 
dimension of leadership but the recipes for effectiveness which they offer include the basic 
materials from which such a defence might be constructed. In discussing these responses, I 
may have given the impression that whatever a leader does is open to moral critique. My 
review of the literature might therefore be interpreted as a destructive undertaking; a 
demonstration that leadership cannot be moral. However, this is not my intention. At this 
stage, I am assuming that leadership has the capacity to be morally commendable as well as 
morally degenerate. My quest is to establish a basis from which such differentiation might 
be made. 
It is clear that avoiding the arrows of moral critique is not a straightforward matter. This is 
primarily because those arrows may be loosed from many different directions. Therefore, 
responses which propose simple defences against moral critique are unlikely to stand up to 
anything but the most superficial interrogation. For this reason, some of the more explicit 
responses that I have discussed above seem to be particularly unsatisfactory. The 
complexity of the issue precludes simple, straightforward recipes for moral legitimacy. A 
credible template for moral leadership which offers simple, unequivocal rules for action is 
therefore likely to be elusive. A credible template is more likely to comprise a complex of 
imperatives, issues and points for consideration that might be used to assist reflection on the 
moral legitimacy of specific leadership interventions. This review of the leadership 
literature has enabled some preliminary observations concerning the content of such a 
template. I will summarise these observations. I will then reflect on the contrasting nature 
of different leadership commentators' stances in relation to these observations, relating 
these stances to broader perspectives within management and organization theory. 
The first observation concerning the ethicality of leadership is that altruistic intent lends to 
leadership a certain amount of intuitive moral credibility. It is far easier to mount a moral 
defence for a leader who is altruistically motivated than it would be for one who is 
primarily driven by personal interest. However, to differentiate between moral and immoral 
leadership purely on the basis of altruism and egoism seems inadequate. Such a basis of 
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evaluation overlooks the potential hazards of unmitigated commitment to the interests of a 
narrowly defined group. An unqualified and non-reflective preoccupation with the 
wellbeing and aspirations of the group which falls under the leader's patronage thus seems 
an incomplete prescription for moral leadership. Although, to a certain extent, altruism 
might be considered "good" and egotism "bad", the moral allure of altruism in leaders is at 
least partly dependent on their ability and willingness to consider the implications of their 
actions in relation to the wider world. Reflection on these broader ramifications clearly 
requires breadth of vision and moral perspicacity. 
A second observation is that moral leadership calls for sensitivity to the vexations 
associated with imposition. In particular, it is apparent that an overly autocratic leadership 
approach may undermine the agency of so-called followers. Responsiveness to the personal 
and group needs of followers may help to avoid the hazard of imposition. Such 
responsiveness also lends to leadership an intuitive moral appeal. However, this allure is 
undermined if the leader's apparent concern for people is driven purely by expediency. In 
order to be morally sustainable, it seems reasonable to expect people-related leadership 
behaviour to be applied consistently. Its moral sustainability is also enhanced if leaders' 
people-related behaviour is congruent with their underpinning values, for this offers at least 
some assurance that it will be manifested with a degree of constancy. 
The ability of leaders to build commitment to a shared agenda is also ethically attractive. 
There seems to be something intrinsically uplifting about setting aside individual agendas 
and participating in a collective undertaking. However, in rallying support for a shared 
agenda, leaders need to be sensitive to the challenge presented by the collective to the 
individual: the moral allure of participation in a common vision is tarnished if it is erosive 
of individual agency. 
In reviewing leadership commentators' responses to issues such as these, it is possible to 
distinguish contrasting stances. These stances are readily apparent in explicit ethical 
discussions of the moral challenges presented by leadership. They also simmer at a more 
tacit level throughout various prescriptions for effectiveness. The tone that echoes most 
stridently through the commentaries is that of a managerialisl (Burnham, 1972 [1945]; 
3 Using the term "managerialist" here is potentially confusing, given the distinction drawn by some 
commentators between leadership and management (e.g. Zalesnic, 1977; Kotter, 1990). These 
commentators tend to present a laudatory picture of leadership, contrasting it to a somewhat 
pejorative depiction of management. It is even more confusing that some of the most "managerialist" 
recipes for leadership effectiveness either adopt this leader-manager distinction or, as in the case of 
Bemard Bass and his associates, prescribe a transformational leadership model that is congruent ... 
25 
Enteman, 1993) discourse. The key premise of managerialism has been concisely 
summarised by Tony Watson as: 
"a belief that modem societies, and the institutions within them, should be run by qualified 
managers who can organise society rationally on the basis of expert knowledge - thus 
replacing the divisiveness and inefficiency of debate and democracy" (Watson, 2002: 53). 
The faith in leaders' moral sagacity that characterises some of the accounts described in this 
chapter sits comfortably within this managerialist perspective. These accounts take for 
granted that those who occupy formal leadership roles are innately better placed than those 
who occupy less exalted hierarchical levels to make decisions that affect the rest of us. Such 
is their confidence in the proficiency of senior managers that this presumption of expertise 
extends even to the apprehension of moral probity. The application of managerialism within 
the realm of ethics is thus accorded normative legitimacy. 
The emphasis that charismatic and transformational theorists place on altruism as an 
indicator of moral probity is evocative of managerialism's trust in those who sit atop 
organizations. This onus on leaders' altruistic intent implies that, so long as the distractions 
of self-interest can be overcome, leaders' moral perspicacity will ensure ethically legitimate 
outcomes. If the apprehension of moral probity is a challenging undertaking for the rest of 
us, we can entrust this awesome responsibility to our leaders, safe in the knowledge that 
their superior aptitude sanctions such a role. 
A managerialist tone is also apparent in the presumption that skilled, transformational 
leaders will navigate a pathway between transformation and transaction, thus synthesising 
collective agendas with individual agency in such a way that evaporates tensions between 
the two. Managerialism also infuses some of the responses to the impositional implications 
of leadership described above. It is particularly evident in the assumption that successful 
leaders will choose an appropriate balance of task and relationship oriented behaviours, 
only resorting to outright imposition when necessitated by the common interest. An iconic, 
managerialist vision is thus presented of warmly paternalistic and morally sagacious senior 
managers, equipped with social influencing skills and technical expertise, ushering 
organizations towards a better future. 
with it. Nevertheless, it is, I believe, elucidatory to use this term in relation to the broader context of 
management and organization studies. 
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That managerialism permeates a great deal of leadership theory should come as no surprise 
given the primarily functionalist nature of the latter. As I have already pointed out, the 
overwhelming preoccupation of leadership theorists has been to uncover the secrets of 
leadership success. This agenda is generally undertaken in the interests of enhanced 
management. It presupposes that managers will be better placed to manage if they can learn 
to lead effectively. The right of leaders, or managers, to lead is rarely questioned. In most 
leadership commentaries, that those who occupy formal positions of authority will dispense 
their responsibilities in the common interest is either taken as a given or is not subjected to 
critique. Nevertheless, despite this preponderance of managerialism, a more critical tone 
can be detected in the accounts of some leadership commentators. 
I use the epithet "critical" with caution, given the multiple meanings attributed to it in 
relation to management studies (Alvesson and Willmott, 1996; Watson, 2001; Parker 2002). 
I am using it here in the sense articulated by M~ts Alvesson and Hugh Willmott when they 
appeal for: 
a qualitatively different form of management: one that is more democratically accountable 
to those whose lives are affected in so many ways by management decisions, ... [where] ... 
activities are determined through processes of decision making that take more direct 
account of the will and priorities of a majority of employees, consumers and citizens -
rather than being dependent on the inclinations of an elite of self-styled experts whose 
principle allegiance is either to themselves or to their masters (1996: 40). 
Martin Parker, in arguing Against Management, articulates a clear challenge to what he 
refers to as the "imperialism of management" (2002: 11 ). Parker proposes that, not only is 
managerialism not the sole way in which contemporary organizations might be structured; 
it is also far from clear that it is the best way. In challenging the presuppositions of 
managerialism, with its veneration of hierarchical prerogative, Parker draws attention to a 
range of media that express dissatisfaction with it. He also calls for enquiry into alternative 
forms of co-ordination that may better attend to the interests of those constituencies that 
organizations are presumed to serve. While he does not imprecate against the notion of 
organization per-se, Parker rails 
against a historically specific construction of the manager and the managed, against the 
vastly unequal distribution of rights and responsibilities that now seems to follow in 
lockstep from this originary distinction between those who rule and those who are ruled 
(2002: 210). 
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Some of the commentaries that I have reviewed in this chapter are explicitly critical in the 
sense described by Alvesson and Willmott. They might also be interpreted as offering 
critiques of leadership that are consistent with Parker's appeal for enquiry into alternative 
ways of coordinating peoples' activities. Falling into this category of overt critique is 
Smirchich and Morgan's (1982) warning that distorted power structures within 
organizations will act to privilege leaders' versions of reality over discrepant versions. 
Likewise, Price's (2003) and Keeley's (1998) critiques of the ethicality of Bass's 
transformational leadership model constitute a direct challenge to Bass's managerialist 
presuppositions. Price's disquiet with Bass's overemphasis on leaders' altruistic care for 
their followers is that it deflects attention from the broader social and environmental 
consequences of organizational activities. Keeley's concern is that Bass's emphasis on a 
collective agenda overlooks the inevitable heterogeneity of followers' interests and 
aspirations. Both Price's focus on extra-organizational affect and Keeley's emphasis on 
pluralism strike a characteristically critical note. 
An overtly critical tone is also apparent in Marshall (1995) and Mori's (2002) admonition 
that situational and supposedly human relations-oriented leadership prescriptions may be 
harnessed to the wheel of corporate productivity with little genuine regard for the agendas 
of followers. Marshal and Mori's critique echo Alvesson and Willmott's critical allusion to 
''the velvet language of humanism and employee involvement" (1996: 98-99), which 
"serve[s] to advance and legitimise an expansion of systems of management control that 
aspire to infiltrate the hearts and minds of employees" (ibid: 34). 
Other commentators display critical sympathies whilst offering a less overt challenge to 
functionalist managerialism. Indeed, some are as eager to discover and share with 
management the secrets of leadership success as are their more candidly managerialist 
colleagues. Nevertheless, some of the conclusions drawn by the former are closer to the 
critical criteria proposed by the likes of Alvesson, Willmott and Parker than they are to 
managerialism's wholehearted obeisance to management expertise in all matters. Thus, 
those theorists who draw attention to the instrumental effectiveness of consultative 
behaviours and those who stress the benefits of meeting the diverse needs of a 
heterogeneous population of followers, while not of an explicitly "critical" persuasion, are 
at least on its wavelength. Those theorists who advocate feminine-style leadership 
behaviours might qualify for this category, as might Alimo-Metcalfe and Alban-Metcalfe's 
(200 1; 2004; 2005) accounts of transformational leadership. 
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Now to suggest that some of the leadership accounts that I have reviewed in this chapter are 
broadly managerialist and that others display a critical demeanour is not to propose a 
precise, dualistic distinction into which each perspective can be placed. "Managerialist" and 
"critical" are not clearly delineated and mutually exclusive bins into which leadership 
theories can be sorted. These descriptions are better understood as loose bundles of 
characteristics that can be attributed in varying degrees to each commentary. One of the 
benefits of labelling them as I have done is that this may help to orient them within the 
broader field of organization and management studies. This exercise in orientation, in turn, 
may facilitate later reflection on the ramifications of different approaches to the ethical 
evaluation of leadership. 
A further benefit of this loose categorisation is that classifying theories as either 
managerialist or critically-inclined helps to draw attention to some difficulties that relate to 
each respective group. The chief difficulties associated with the more managerialist 
accounts concern the expectation of unilateralism that they place upon leaders: to a large 
extent, these accounts put the gavel of moral legitimisation firmly in the hands of leaders. 
This asks an awful lot of those leaders, for ethics is rarely a simple matter. Reflection on the 
ethical ramifications of leadership decisions is a complex undertaking, requiring breadth of 
vision and moral perspicacity. It seems unreasonable to expect leaders to undertake such 
processes of moral reflection single-handedly. Possession of the social influencing skills 
that enable effective leadership, along with whatever additional technical and practical 
skills may be demanded of specific leadership roles, is no guarantee that a leader will also 
be endowed with the moral sagacity required to legitimise unilateral, moral decision-
making. Given the complexity of moral decision-making, its quality will surely be 
enhanced by contributions from diverse perspectives. Managerialism is broadly inimical to 
such breadth, leaving leaders to shoulder the burden of moral arbitration alone. 
The focus that the more managerialist versions place on building commitment to a shared 
vision is also potentially problematic. Although the interests and aspirations of individuals 
are likely to share some common ground with those of the group, there are also likely to be 
points of tension. Sensitivity to individual difference will enhance a leader's ability to 
respond to that tension. To some extent, leaders themselves can take individual differences 
into account whilst developing and implementing a group agenda. However, while 
paternalistic respect for plurality is laudable, the active involvement of individuals in the 
establishment of a collective agenda is likely to enable a more accurate representation of 
individual difference. Again, the managerialist accounts of leadership do not generally 
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encourage such involvement except insofar as it will make people feel better about 
supporting the "common" vision that has been defined by the leader. 
But if the unilateralism of managerialist accounts places upon leaders an unreasonable 
burden of moral sagacity, critically tinged commentaries present their own characteristic 
difficulties. Managerialist expectations of leaders entail a limitation of scope that is 
potentially damaging for ethical legitimacy. The difficulties with the critical accounts of 
leadership, on the other hand, are more concerned with the practicalities of organizational 
life. If leaders adopt the responses to the moral challenges of leadership that are proposed 
by critically-inclined theorists, there is a danger that they will not be perceived to be 
leading. Leaders are generally expected, after all, to take the lead. Notwithstanding Parker's 
(2002) description of the critical undercurrents that suffuse a range of cultural arenas, 
managerialist expectations of imposition seem to be deeply embedded in popular 
understanding of leadership. Despite managerialism's faults, its pervasive influence is hard 
to avoid. As Parker himself puts it, "the particular vision of managerialism that has been 
constructed over the past century is deeply implicated in a wide variety of political and 
ethical problems" (2002: 11). Nevertheless, so deeply engrained is it that it "limits our 
capacity to imagine alternative forms of organising" (ibid). As a consequence of the 
predicament that Parker describes, leaders who respond to the inevitable limitations of their 
own purview by sharing the burden of ethical reflection are likely to be perceived as 
shirking the responsibilities that accompany their elevated status and privileged 
remuneration: they are paid to lead; therefore they must lead. 
A further difficulty with the more consultative accounts of leadership concerns the time-
bounded nature of organizational life. People who occupy leadership roles are expected to 
make decisions with a minimum of delay so that others can get on with implementing those 
decisions. Consultation, on the other hand, can be a lengthy process. As the majority of the 
literature indicates, we tend to look for qualities such as decisiveness, self-assurance, 
determination and resoluteness in our leaders. Enhancement of the moral legitimacy of their 
decision-making through the facilitation of consultative processes will be of little comfort 
to leaders who lose their jobs for pussyfooting. In view of these tensions, those models of 
leadership which place an onus on unilateral pronouncement by the leader may be more 
supportive of career enhancement than those which stress the ethically legitimating force of 
consultation. 
In addition to the preliminary observations that I have made above, then, an important 
question emerges from this exploration of the leadership literature. That question concerns 
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the extent to which the managerialist expectations of leadership that dominate the literature 
leave space for the type of consultative engagement that may enhance the ethical legitimacy 
of leadership. Or to put it another way, it concerns the extent that ethically legitimising, 
consultative forms can be reconciled with the impositional unilateralism that permeates 
most theoretical and practitioner expectations of leadership. 
It is important to clarify the nature of the preliminary observations that I have made in this 
chapter. Firstly, they have been adduced from a review of leadership research that is 
empirically validated by a variety of methodologies that range from the positivist to the 
interpretive, with an overwhelming tendency towards the former. I have sought to avoid 
those popularist prescriptions for successful leadership that are intuitively rather than 
empirically derived, avoiding, in particular, what Alvesson and Willmott refer to as the 
"self-celebratory books penned by heroic senior executives" (1996: 210). 
Secondly, since the focus of this research has been on describing, analysing and offering 
recipes for effectiveness, the discussion of morality that it contains is largely devoid of 
theoretical philosophical content. These observations, then, have been drawn from mainly 
empirical research that is not overly concerned with the moral implications of leadership 
and any moral consideration that it includes lacks rigorous reference to the philosophical 
ethics literature. My intention now is to augment this foundation in two respects. Firstly, the 
next section will examine leadership through the lens of the philosophical ethics literature. 
Just as the present chapter has explored what leadership theorists have to say to ethics, the 
next three chapters ask what the ethical theorists have to say to leadership. These chapters 
will outline some of the most widely discussed moral philosophical theories, grouping these 
under the three meta-ethical headings of principle-based ethics, existentialist ethics and 
intersubjective ethics. After outlining some prominent contributions to each of these m eta-
ethical perspectives, I will elaborate on the implications of that each holds for leadership. 
My exploration of the ethics literature will be followed by, but also partly guided by, 
empirical research4• Since the majority of empirical research concerning leadership has not 
explicitly considered its ethical ramifications, I will make my own contribution to 
alleviating this deficit by conducting empirical research that enquires specifically into the 
relationship between morality and leadership. The findings of this research will be 
presented in the three chapters which comprise my empirical report. 
4 Although, in the presentation of this thesis, the chapters that comprise my empirical report stand 
apart from the chapters that discuss moral philosophy, the structure and content of the latter is partly 
shaped by the findings of my empirical research. 
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3.0 ETHICS AND LEADERSHIP 
Introduction 
In the following three chapters I will outline some different ways of thinking about morality 
and explore the implications that these different approaches have for the relationship 
between morality and leadership. To simplify this undertaking, I propose to group the 
approaches to morality under the headings of three meta-ethical perspectives and focus on 
those theories ·within each group which have received the most attention in the Western 
philosophical tradition. The first group comprises those theories which understand morality 
in relation to principles that are held to be universally valid. The second group considers 
morality as a matter of individual definition. Within this group I will focus specifically on 
existentialist theory. The third group understands morality as an intersubjective 
achievement. 
The theories that I have chosen to include in these chapters do not exhaust the ethical 
perspectives from which leadership might be considered. However, it is necessary to limit 
this review in some way and I have chosen these three headings a being sufficiently 
representative of the broad gamut of ethical theory to offer a diverse framework for 
exploration. 
In focusing on the Western tradition I am precluding consideration of those moral 
philosophies from outside of that tradition. This should not be taken as an inference that 
alternative traditions are any less valid than Western philosophy or that they could not offer 
a useful basis for considering the challenges presented by leadership in contemporary 
British organizations. My reasons for focusing on the Western tradition, rather, are 
twofold. Firstly, it is necessary to limit, in some way, the scope of this undertaking. 
Secondly, the Western tradition is that with which I am most familiar and which is also 
easiest for a UK based researcher to access. 
To apply these ethical theories to the field of moral leadership is to court the challenge of 
misappropriation. The theories have been developed in response to the particular 
philosophical preoccupations of their proponents. A comprehensive appreciation of them 
would therefore need to be developed with reference to those preoccupations. In most cases, 
those preoccupations do not include the morality of organizational leadership: Immanuel 
Kant, for instance, was not thinking about the CEOs of 21st century business corporations 
when he penned his various formulations of the categorical imperative. Therefore, to take 
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these theoretical offerings out of their context and apply them to that of contemporary 
organizational leadership runs the risk of anachronism. However, although these 
philosophies were not written with organizational leadership in mind, they have something 
to offer to that domain. Therefore, while I regret any misrepresentation that may arise from 
this anachronistic application, I believe this appropriation to be justified. 
My treatment of each of these three m eta-ethical perspectives is a little different. In the first 
chapter, which discusses principle-based ethics, I cover quite a lot of ground in a fairly 
superficial manner. This reflects the breadth of principle-based theories that shape the 
Anglo-American tradition of moral philosophy, a representative selection of which I have 
attempted to include. In order to give some consideration to each of these· theories, that 
consideration has to be brief. I will reflect on some of the implications of these various 
theories for leadership as I go along. I will then draw out some general implications at the 
end of the chapter. 
In the chapters on existentialist and intersubjectivist ethics, on the other hand, I will discuss 
the theories in greater detail. This is partly because of the more narrowly focussed nature of 
the material that I cover in these two chapters. It is also partly due to my own prior 
experience of these three respective meta-ethical perspectives. My own philosophical 
education, some thirty odd years ago, was rooted firmly within the Anglo-American 
tradition, which I found quite unsatisfying. I was, until recently, relatively unfamiliar with 
existentialist and the intersubjectivist theory, and with the virtue ethical theory that I also 
refer to in the chapter in intersubjectivism. Therefore, my more detailed elaboration of these 
perspectives is perhaps reflective of my greater and more recent interest in them. 
There is a further difference between the structure of the chapters on existentialist and 
intersubjective theory and that on principle-based theory. This is that, whereas in the latter I 
have drawn out the implications for leadership as I go along, I have saved most of my 
reflections on the implications of existentialism and intersubjectivism for the end of their 
respective chapters. These contrasting structural approaches seem appropriate given the 
diverse range of material covered.in the principle-based chapter and the more homogenous 
character of the material in each of the existentialist and intersubjective chapters. 
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3.1 PRINCIPLE-BASED ETHICS AND LEADERSHIP 
Principle-based ethics theory holds that morally right action is action which is consistent 
with the application of certain principles. Therefore, in order to explore the moral 
challenges associated with leadership we must consider them in relation to those principles. 
Principle-based ethics is characterised by a universalist commitment: the principles which 
define moral action are generally believed to apply universally. It also tends to be premised 
upon an objectivist moral ontology: a belief that the legitimacy of moral principles pertains 
irrespective of a person's apprehension of that legitimacy. Principle-based ethics is thus 
contrasted to those theories which believe that morality is culturally relative or that it is a 
matter of subjective judgement. 
Many approaches have been taken to the identification of those universal, objective 
principles which defme moral action. Broadly speaking, these approaches can be classified 
in relation to the extent to which they display a consequentialist or a non-consequentialist 
character. Consequentialist theory judges the moral worth of action in relation to the 
consequences that it brings about. It focuses on the desirability of states of affairs, 
proposing that actions are morally right or wrong insofar as they promote or detract from 
those intrinsically desirable states of affairs. The manner in which these outcomes are 
achieved is of lesser importance in judging moral worth: consequences take primacy in 
moral evaluation, so the moral probity of a certain end justifies the means adopted to bring 
it about. Non-consequentialist theory, on the other hand, focuses on the moral worth that is 
intrinsic to an action. It proposes that certain types of action carry an intrinsic rightness or 
wrongness irrespective of the consequences that they bring about. Whereas consequentialist 
theory focuses on the ends of ethical action, non-consequentialist theory pays particular 
attention to the means adopted to bring about those ends. 
In this chapter, I will describe some of the consequentialist and non-consequentialist 
theories that have received most attention in the Western philosophical tradition, and which 
are also frequently drawn on in business ethics texts. I will consider the ways in which these 
theories relate to the context of work organizations and explore some of their implications 
for leadership within that context. I will conclude by making some general observations 
about principle-based theory and reflecting upon some insights that it affords to the 
relationship between ethics and leadership. 
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Consequentialist Ethics and Leadership 
When philosophers speak of consequentialist theory they generally refer to utilitarianism. 
Utilitarianism proposes that the morally right action is that which brings about the greatest 
good for the greatest number of people. Utilitarian analysis of leadership decisions therefore 
seems to be a fairly straightforward matter: the morally right action for a leader to take is 
that which maximises the good for the greatest number of people. The apparent simplicity 
of the utilitarian imperative is, however, misleading, for its use as a template for moral 
leadership is beset with conceptual complexity and practical difficulties. 
The first difficulty is that the precise nature of the "good", which leaders must seek to 
maximise, needs to be defined. Jeremy Bentham's seminal formulation of utilitarian ethics 
defined good in terms of pleasure. Bentham premised his theory on the principle of 
psychological hedonism, proposing that the only thing that humans seek in its own right is 
pleasure and that the one thing that they avoid above all else is pain: "Nature has placed 
mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure" (2000 [1789]: 
88). Pleasure, according to Bentham, is therefore the only categorical good: all other 
supposed goods, such as wealth, status, friendship, culture and achievement, are only 
contingently desirable insofar as they promote pleasure. Conversely, supposed evils such as 
poverty, rejection, dishonesty and hostility can only be bad insofar as they bring about pain; 
they have no categorical undesirability. Since pleasure and the avoidance of pain are the 
only things that people desire in their own right, Bentham argued, maximisation of pleasure 
must comprise the basis of moral evaluation. 5 A Benthamite utilitarian would therefore 
judge the morality of leadership in relation to the amount of pleasure that it brings about. 
Confronted with a morally charged decision, a leader should choose that course of action 
which leads to the greatest amount of pleasure for the greatest number of people. 
Later utilitarians have, however, taken issue with the psychological hedonism which 
underpins Bentham's theory, distancing themselves from its depiction of humans as "a large 
assembly of pleasure hogs constantly out for a buzz" (Goodin, 1993: 242). Even some 
commentators who agree with the principle of psychological hedonism question whether 
this entails ethical hedonism: it does not necessarily follow, just because pleasure is all that 
some people value categorically, that pleasure ought it be accorded intrinsic merit. Some 
critics even go so far as to propose that certain types of pleasure are intrinsically bad, such 
as the pleasure that some might take from witnessing a public execution (Dancy, 1993). 
5 As far as Bentham was concerned, the maximisation of pleasure should therefore serve as a 
criterion for legislation. 
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In moving away from Bentham's hedonistic foundation, utilitarians have taken various 
directions. The first direction is taken by what Parfit (1984) calls desire-fulfilment theorists. 
These place the satisfaction of people's desires, irrespective of what those desires are, at the 
centre of morality. A second direction, referred to by Goodin (1993) as welfare 
utilitarianism, places people's long-term interests, as opposed to their immediate desires, at 
the centre of utilitarian calculation. A further variant, which Parfit refers to as objective list 
theory, holds that certain things are intrinsically good or bad for a person however much 
that person may or may not desire those things. The objective list typically includes items 
such as knowledge, culture, aesthetic experience and intellectual achievement. 
The moral philosophy of John Stuart Mill responds to concerns about the implications of 
Bentham's psychological hedonism. Mill (1962 [1861]) observes that those people who are 
given the opportunity, through education and experience, to experience what he refers to as 
"higher" forms of pleasure tend to fmd these higher forms inherently preferable. He thus 
offers a basis for reconciling hedonism with a valorisation of cultural and intellectual 
achievement. 
Each of these variants of utilitarianism holds slightly different implications for moral 
leadership. Desire-fulfilment utilitarians would expect leaders to maximise the extent to 
which people can satisfy their desires, whatever those desires might be. Welfare utilitarians 
would call upon leaders to maximise long-term welfare, whether or not people desire this in 
the short-term. Objective list theorists would expect leaders to maximise those states which 
are considered to be objectively good, whether or not people desire those things and 
regardless of alternative conceptions of welfare. Notably, these three variants of 
utilitarianism would be sympathetic to varying degrees of paternalism on the part of 
leaders, where paternalism is understood as imposing some form of restraint on followers' 
freedom in order to secure their good (Kleinig, 1983). If we take desire-fulfilment 
utilitarianism as a basis for action, it would be hard for leaders to maximise the fulfilment 
of desire without first finding out what people desire. Furthermore, according to desire-
fulfilment utilitarianism, leaders would have no basis upon which to disqualify the 
legitimacy of those desires. Welfare and objective list utilitarianism, on the other hand, 
have a place for paternalist leadership. Each offers some space for leaders to restrain people 
from satisfying their current desires on the basis that they claim to know better what is in 
those people's long term interests or what is objectively good for them. 
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A second conceptual complication with the utilitarian template for moral leadership lies in 
defining the universe of moral relevance; that is the composition of the group whose good 
must be taken into account in the leader's moral decision-making. For example, should it 
include only those people with whom the leader has direct contact; should it include all 
members of the organization for whom the leader has responsibility; should it extend to all 
people who, in some small way, may be affected by the actions of that leader? And should 
the universe of moral relevance only include those people who are currently alive or should 
future generations also be taken into account? 
It would seem that, if utilitarianism is to stand alone as a basis for moral decision-making, 
then the universe of moral relevance can have no limits. To limit that universe would 
require more than a utilitarian rationale: other, non-utilitarian criteria would need to be 
enlisted, such as notions of duty or contractual obligation, which pertain only to that limited 
group. If utilitarianism is to stand alone as a principle for moral leadership, without support 
from non-consequentialist rationales, then its universe of moral relevance must surely 
embrace every person who may in some small way be affected by the decisions and actions 
of that leader, either currently or in the future. 
But even this definition leaves unanswered the further question of whether we should limit 
moral consideration to humans or whether all sentient creatures, and perhaps even non-
sentient beings, should be included in the universe of moral relevance. This question has a 
particular bearing for leaders of organizations that are involved with activities such as food 
production, clothing, cosmetics and pharmaceuticals. However, since nearly all 
organizations impact to some extent on the natural environment, the indirect impact on 
animals and other wildlife is of potential moral significance for all leaders. 
Leaders who seek to maximise good are not free of complexity even when they have 
reached an understanding of both the nature of good which they seek to maximise and the 
universe of moral relevance, for the question of distribution of good within that 
constituency also needs to be addressed. Should leaders aim for the greatest total good, 
which may justify substantial inequalities in distribution, or should they aim to raise the 
minimum level of good experienced by every member of the universe of moral relevance? 
This question is important with regard to the distribution of rewards within organizations 
and also the way in which products and services are priced and marketed. Furthermore, is a 
considerable reduction of the good experienced by a few members of the universe of moral 
relevance justified by small increases in the good experienced by a far larger number? For 
example, is the redundancy of a few justified by a slight commercial benefit for many? 
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These conceptual difficulties do not preclude the claims of utilitarianism to provide a 
template for moral leadership. They do, however, highlight the need for clarification of 
what is understood by "the greatest good for the greatest number". Conceptual difficulties 
do not exhaust the problems presented by utilitarianism though, for the leader wishing to 
maximise the good, however "the good" may be conceptualised, must also confront some 
substantial practical challenges. 
Chief amongst these practical challenges is the need for leaders to forecast the 
consequences of their decisions and actions. This is a particularly onerous undertaking 
given the nature of the leadership role. Those who occupy formal leadership positions in 
organizations are called upon to make many decisions. Those decisions are likely to impact 
on many people, so will be particularly influential on the store of common good. Therefore, 
in terms of both the quantity and potency of ~ecision-making, utilitarianism imposes a 
heavy burden on leaders. Not only must they anticipate the likely effects of their actions on 
diverse groups of people, and perhaps also on other sentient and non-sentient beings; they 
must also carry out complex equations of the amount of good that may flow from 
alternative courses of action. To this complexity is added uncertainty: leaders can be sure 
neither of the outcomes of their actions nor of the degree to which those actions may bring 
about their intended outcomes. 
One response to such practical difficulties revolves around the distinction between act 
utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism. Act utilitarianism proposes that each specific act 
should be evaluated according to the amount of good that it promotes. According to act 
utilitarianism, a leader should weigh up every single action in accordance with its likely 
outcomes in order to identify the moral course; a seemingly impossible project. Rule 
utilitarians, on the other hand, acknowledge the impracticality of placing moral agents 
under such an onerous decision-making regime and base morality, instead, around a set of 
rules that, in general, can be expected to maximise good. According to rule utilitarianism 
then, a leader would need to follow a set of moral principles which, generally, are found to 
promote the greatest good for the greatest number. 
An extreme version of rule utilitarianism goes a stage further in according sanctity to 
utility-maximising rules in every case; even in those cases where following the rule would 
undoubtedly diminish the total amount of good. This is because disregarding a utility-
maximising rule, even in those rare cases in which the greater good would thus be 
promoted, would undermine respect for that rule. According to extreme rule utilitarians, 
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unless rules are enforced in all circumstances, those rules will lose their sanctity. Therefore, 
for a leader to contravene a utilitarian rule, even when doing so would appear to be 
consistent with the greater good in that particular instance, is morally wrong. This seems to 
be the principle that underpins extreme versions of free-market, economic theory: that the 
uninhibited workings of economic markets, although they may be unkind to some in the 
short term, will ultimately promote the greatest good for the greatest number. Leaders of 
business organizations who adhere to the rule of market freedom will therefore permit 
Adam Smith's "invisible hand" (1998 [1776]: 292) to perform its beneficent role in the 
belief that this will, in the long time, be for the greater good of all. 6 
The legitimacy of this particular rule utilitarian rationale for market liberalism has, 
however, been challenged on two counts. Firstly, a number of observers (e.g. Stiglitz, 2001; 
Turner, 2002; Kay, 2003) have pointed out that free markets do not necessarily offer the 
surest route to the economic growth as their advocates claim7• Secondly, many 
commentators (e.g. Marcuse, 2002 [1964]; Galbraith, 1999 [1958]; Hamilton, 2003) 
challenge market liberals' association of the common good with economic prosperity, 
suggesting that human wellbeing cannot be reduced to economic indicators and that 
unbridled pursuit of economic growth may undermine the social and environmental 
conditions upon which human flourishing depends. 
An alternative application of rule utilitarianism to the leadership context comprises its 
synthesis with a limited specification of the universe of moral relevance. This synthesis 
proposes that overall good will be maximised as long as leaders focus their attentions on 
promoting the good of certain groups. For example, it might be argued that organizational 
leaders are best placed to influence the good of groups such as shareholders, employees or 
customers. Although their decisions also affect more distant groups, these effects will be 
minor in comparison to those for the more proximate groups. Since these more proximate 
stakeholders are those upon which leaders will have the greatest impact, by focusing their 
attentions on maximising the good for these groups they will be most likely to maximise the 
total amount of good. Therefore, leaders should always follow the rule of maximising the 
good of those defined groups. 
6 It is worth noting that, at the other end of the political spectrum, a rule utilitarian rationale also 
seems to lie behind the repressive cruelty of Stalinism. 
7 Events of the summer and autumn of 2008 offer some support for this argument, at least as far as 
financial markets go, while the appointment of Lord Turner as Chairman of the Financial Services 
Authority might be interpreted as an acknowledgement of its merits on the part of the UK's financial 
and political establishment. 
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Such is the form taken by certain articulations of shareholder theory (e.g·. Hayek, 1969 
[1960]; Friedman, 19708). These commentators suggest that business leaders are best placed 
to promote the good of shareholders by maximising profits: this is the task for which their 
training and skills qualify them. Therefore, if businesses leaders prioritise the rule of 
shareholder wealth-maximisation over and above all other considerations, this will, 
ultimately, work to the benefit of everyone. However, this suggestion has also been 
energetically challenged by commentators who suggest that the prioritisation of shareholder 
interests will actually undermine the common good (Hutton, 1996 and 1997) rather than 
promoting it. Therefore, as a rationale for business ethics, the utilitarian rules of respect for 
free economic markets and the prioritisation of shareholder wealth are both hotly contested. 
They therefore offer bases for ethical organizational leadership that are, to say the least, 
controversial. 
I will make one final observation about rule utilitarianism in order to clarify the distinction 
between it and non-consequentialism. Rule utilitarianism might seem to offer a bridge 
between consequentialist ethics and the non-consequentialist theories considered below 
insofar as both call upon moral leaders to respect certain principles come what may. So, 
even when the consequences of upholding a principle may reduce the total amount of good, 
the sanctity of that principle must nevertheless be respected. However, the derivation of that 
sanctity is different in each case. For the rule utilitarian, it derives from the desirability of 
the consequences of following that rule in most cases and therefore of upholding its sanctity 
in every case. For the deontologist, on the other hand, it derives from an intrinsic or 
categorical desirability which resides within that principle irrespective of either its general 
or specific consequences. I will now turn to non-consequentialist theory to explore some of 
the explanations that have been offered to account for the intrinsic desirability of various 
principles. 
Non-Consequentialist Ethics and Leadership 
Whereas consequentialist theory focuses on the outcomes of moral actions, non-
consequentialist theories give precedence to those actions themselves. According to non-
consequentialist theory, actions are judged to be morally right or wrong to the extent that 
they conform to fundamental principles which carry universal, categorical worth 
irrespective of the states of affairs that they may or may not bring about. Therefore, whereas 
utilitarianism would judge the ethicality of leadership in relation to its propensity to 
8 Although Friedman actually offers a range of consequentialist and non-consequentialist rationales 
for his claim that the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. 
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maximise good, non-consequentialist perspectives would call upon leaders to respond to 
universal standards of moral rightness that have primacy over, and which may 
countermand, desirable consequences. These universal standards of moral rightness are 
generally expressed in terms of duties and rights. For this reason, the term deontological is 
often used to refer to non-consequentialist moral theory. 
The notion of universal human rights and corresponding duties is firmly entrenched in the 
Western ethical and political tradition. It provided a rationale for the American 
Independence movement, which championed the right to life, liberty and pursuit of 
happiness, while the French Revolution codified the right to liberty, property, security and 
resistance to oppression (Almond, 1993). The perceived abuse of human rights has also 
offered a basis for the criticism of political regimes throughout the twentieth century and at 
the beginning of the twenty-first. Unlike the negative, protective framing of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, contemporary rights theory may also offer a positive aspect by 
focussing on the provision of social benefits by government, such as education and health 
care (Almond, 1993). 
A discourse of rights and duties is also commonplace within the corporate context. Large 
corporations have been criticised either for complicity in state abuse of human rights or for 
direct abuse of the rights of groups such as employees, local communities and customers 
(e.g. Chomsky, 1999; Klein, 2001). Conversely, respect for human rights figures 
prominently in the self-legitimating claims that characterise the espoused social policies of 
many large corporations (e.g. BP, 2007; Coca-Cola, 2007; Nike, 2007; Shell, 2007; Tesco, 
2007). A deontological tone is also prominent in the way in which the employment 
relationship is often conceptualised; that is, as a relationship in which employees' rights and 
organizations' complementary duties of care form one side of a deontological equation 
which is balanced, on the other side, by a valorisation of loyalty on the part of employees. 
Similar notions of obligations and rights also emerge in corporate governance theory. The 
right to hold property, championed by Locke (1988 [1690]) and more recently by Nozick 
(1974), comprises a significant component cif shareholder theory's prioritisation of 
management's agentic duty to maximise shareholder wealth (Friedman, 1970). On the other 
hand, normative stakeholding (Donaldson and Preston, 1995) emphasises corporations' 
duties to a wide range of other groups as well as shareholders. Clearly, then, deontological 
theory is consistent with intuitive conceptions of morality, particularly insofar as it relates 
to the contemporary organizational context. 
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Deontological ethics clearly requires some means of identifying and legitimising rights and 
responsibilities. Traditional, pre-Enlightenment ethics looked to religion to provide both the 
detail and the justification of deontological codes. Post-Classical, Western moral 
philosophy up to the seventeenth century is deeply rooted in theology and even the theorists 
of the Enlightenment were concerned to reconcile their rationally-based enquiry with 
religious doctrine. Religion has also exercised an influence on the modern business and 
leadership ethics landscape. The early twentieth-century philanthropic business activities of 
the Cadbury and Rowntree families were deeply influenced by Quaker belief (Kennedy, 
2000; Freeman, 2004), while spirituality continues to shape the moral commitments of 
some managers through organizations such as the Christian Association of Business 
Executives and the Ecumenical Council for Corporate Responsibility. 
Secular, non-rationally-based explanations have also been offered to account for moral 
rights and duties. Notable amongst these are W.D. Ross's (1930) theory of prima facie 
duties and Thomas Nagel's (1986) proposal that knowledge of right and wrong can be 
accessed through the application of common intuition. Accounts such as these veer towards 
the existentialist meta-ethic that I will discuss in the next chapter. However, they differ 
from existentialism insofar as they are premised upon a universalist rather than a relativist 
meta-ethical understanding. 
During empirical research I will remain open to the possibility that research participants 
may offer accounts of their moral responsibilities that appeal to religious principles. I will 
also keep in mind the possibility of a secular, non-rationalist, universalist understanding. 
However, in the present discussion I will focus on those deontological accounts that have 
arguably been most influential on Western moral philosophy and which, perhaps for this 
reason, are most commonly included in the reviews of ethics theory that appear in business 
ethics texts (e.g. Chryssides and Kaler, 1993; Mellahi and Wood, 2003; Crane and Matten, 
2004) and in discussions of HRM and ethics (e.g. Legge 1998 and 2006; Winstanley and 
Woodall, 2000). These are contract theory and Kantian moral philosophy. I will also 
discuss the theory of justice offered by John Rawls, which combines elements of contract 
theory and Kantian ethics and which has also receives quite a lot of attention in 
contemporary business ethics literature. 
Contract theory 
Contract theory posits a tacit contractual agreement between members of a community to 
abide by certain conventions and, in particular, to respect the rights and duties that those 
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conventions entail. This inevitably involves some curtailment of the liberty of those 
members to act as they might otherwise choose. However, contract theorists propose that 
members freely agree to such curtailment of their liberty because it is in their long-term 
interest to do so. 
The notion of a tacit social contract as a basis for moral obligations first appears in the 
political and moral philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes proposes that men and women 
are, by nature, free but that they choose to accept limitations to their freedom because this 
brings about a state of affairs that is more advantageous for them than one in which 
everyone has unbridled freedom to do whatever they choose. Hobbes envisages a state of 
nature without controls on freedom in which the life of man would necessarily be "solitary, 
poore, nasty, brutish, and short" (1985 [1651]: 186). For Hobbes, the rationale for political 
rule lies in avoidance of the unpleasantness that this state of nature entails. Applied to the 
ethical arena, contract theory suggests that we contract to limitations on the pursuit our own 
immediate interests on the condition that others will do likewise. We thus avoid the 
unpleasant consequences that unbridled pursuit of short-term self-interest by everyone else 
would bring for us personally. 
It is important to emphasise that the nature of the social contract is generally regarded as 
tacit. Few contract theorists would argue that an actual contractual agreement had ever 
taken place. Hobbes' (1985 [1651]) application of the notion of contract appeals not to a 
historical event but to a conceptual notion that explains why it is in our enlightened self-
interest to accept limitations on our liberty. The assumption that underpins contract theory 
is that, in order to remain within a community and enjoy the benefits offered by 
membership of that community, we make a tacit agreement to abide by its conventions. Our 
continued presence in a community thus implies fealty to its conventions and agreement to 
any restrictions on personal liberty that this may entail. 
Contract theory offers a deontological foundation for leadership responsibilities, 
particularly insofar as it draws attention to tacit or implied contractual arrangements that 
may pervade leader-follower relations within work organizations. Some of the contractual 
responsibilities that circumscribe workplace arrangements are legally enshrined, so have a 
compulsion which goes beyond moral imperatives. Formal contracts of employment 
provide a legally enforceable, minimum definition of the mutual rights and responsibilities 
that define the employment relationship. However, in addition to legally defined, explicit 
commitments, relationships between organizational leaders and employees are also subject 
to tacit, mutual agreements that are not legally defined. Within contemporary HRM theory, 
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the term psychological contract has been adopted to describe the tacit conditions which 
define employers' and employees' expectations of one another (Guest and Conway, 2002; 
Conway and Briner, 2005). The psychological contract thus offers an example of how 
contract theory might be operationalised in the modem work context. It refers to a set of 
imprecise expectations, based more on precedent than on formal statement of intent. It 
defines notions of fairness with respect to the balance between employee input and non-
material rewards, including development opportunities, promotion, feedback, task-
allocation and the nature of the working environment. It also embraces expectations of job 
security on the part of employees as well as expectations of employees' loyalty on the part 
of employers. 
To apply the Hobbesian notion of social contract to the psychological contract is to 
understand the latter as a tacit acknowledgement, rooted in enlightened self-interest, of the 
legitimacy of the principles of right and duty which circumscribe the relationship between 
an organization and its employees. The actions of leaders within those organizations might 
thus be evaluated in relation to those principles. Such an interpretation acquires moral 
complexity, however, from the possibility that those tacit contractual arrangements may 
originate from bargaining positions that are characterised by power differentials. Those 
power differentials may operate at an overt level (Haugaard, 2002), where followers agree 
to tacit contractual terms because they perceive that they have little choice in the matter. 
The legitimacy of contract theory depends to a large extent on the assumption of choice: if 
remaining within a group is to be taken as a tacit accord on the part of group members to 
adhere to the conventions of that group, then it is reasonable to assume that those group 
members have a choice; i.e. that they have somewhere else to go should they decide that 
that group is not for them. 
This is a potential flaw in contract theory, in both its political and its workplace 
applications. The proposal that all citizens are free to leave a society if they do not find its 
conventions to their liking is nonsense. Equally, the contention that all members of a work 
organization can easily take their services to other employers takes no account of either the 
realities of the job market or the switching costs involved in changing jobs. Although 
employees who are fortunate enough to possess sought after skills (including proven 
leadership skills) may enjoy a degree of flexibility in their choice of workplace, and also a 
more solid platform from which to negotiate both tacit and explicit contractual 
commitments, the majority are not so well placed. 
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But power differentials do not only operate at overt levels. Bachrach and Baratz (2002 
[1962]) draw attention to the covert manner in which some parties to a contractual 
agreement may limit the parameters within which that accord is reached. At a still more 
covert level, Steven Lukes (2002 [1974]) suggests that power differentials may be 
instrumental in shaping some parties' perceptions of their interests so that they willingly 
accord to contractual terms that are contrary to what they might, in a more enlightened state 
of mind, consider to be their best interests. 
Considerations such as these do not preclude appeal· to the psychological contract as a 
social-contract style basis for legitimating rights and duties within leader-follower 
relationships. However, if the psychological contract is to offer such a basis oflegitimation, 
it is reasonable to expect that agreement to its terms is accorded under certain conditions. 
These conditions include absence of coercion, the availability of alternatives and access to 
information. Psychological contractual agreements that are shaped by asymmetrical power 
relationships or misinformation, or where the only choice is to take it or leave it, provide a 
basis of moral legitimation that is questionable to say the least. 
Kantian theory 
An alternative perspective on deontological ethics is provided by Immanuel Kant. Kant's 
moral philosophy needs to be understood within the context of his enquiry into the 
possibility of rational knowledge (2003, [1787]). Kant proposes that we cannot have 
rational knowledge of the "noumenal", or real, world. This is because our experience of that 
real world is necessarily filtered by what he called the "transcendental" framework of our 
senses and our conceptual understanding. We can, however, reflect on the nature of that 
transcendental framework and thereby acquire indubitable, universal knowledge about it. 
By defining truths to which our transcendental framework must conform, we can derive 
truths about the world as it will necessarily appear to us. Those truths are not about the 
world as it is in itself, they are about the world as it will always be as far as any rational 
being is concerned. 
Applying this process to moral enquiry, Kant derives transcendental truths about moral 
understanding (1997 [1788]; 1948 [1797]). In other words, by reflecting on the nature of 
our moral understanding, he identifies fundamental presuppositions which will always hold 
true for moral judgements. Most importantly, for Kant, the notion of moral action is 
inseparable from the notion of autonomy; autonomy from the influence of anything except 
the practical reason of the agent. Autonomous action is thus action which is motivated 
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purely by a rational apprehension of duty. It is not influenced by desires, emotions or 
personal interests. According to Kant, it is this. autonomy of the will that is ultimately 
deserving of moral esteem for it manifests the true nature of humanity. It is therefore the 
sole principle of moral action and moral judgement. Kant concludes that the only acts 
which qualify for moral approbation are acts that are performed out of a sense of duty. 
The status of autonomy as a fundamental precondition of moral action also provides a basis 
for determining the content of moral duty. Kant refers to the principle by which we 
determine our duty as the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative is, for Kant, a 
basic principle without which the very concept of moral understanding would be 
meaningless. It is universally binding on all rational creatures because rational thought 
about morality presupposes it. Kant proposed a number of formulations of the categorical 
imperative, of which two have been particularly influential. The first of these is often 
referred to as the principle of universalisability. It proposes that, since moral action must be 
based on the application of reason alone, and since reason is a homogenous faculty that is 
shared with all other rational agents (unlike desires, which vary between people), then the 
principle upon which we act must be universalisable. Kant expresses this as: "Act only on 
that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become universal 
law" (1948 [1797]: 84). Many intuitively immoral acts would be conveniently proscribed 
by this principle since, were they universalised, they would be self-defeating. For example, 
telling a lie only achieves its desired objective if the general expectation is that people will 
not tell lies: if everyone lied then there would be no point in lying because the liar would 
not be believed. To tell a lie whilst wishing for the universalisation of lying would therefore 
be irrational and thus, according to Kant' s dictum, it would also be immoral. 
To apply Kanfs principle ofuniversalisability to the leadership context would be to invite 
leaders to identify the principles upon which they are acting when they make ethically 
charged decisions and to ask themselves whether they would be happy for all people to act 
upon that principle in similar circumstances. It would call upon them to project themselves 
into the positions of those who are on the receiving end of their ethically charged 
pronouncements and ask themselves how they, from that perspective of empathic 
engagement, would feel about the fairness of those pronouncements. 
The second influential formulation of the categorical imperative is sometimes referred to as 
the principle of ends. Given that autonomous beings are not just the agents but are also the 
repositories of all value, Kant proposes that they should always be treated as ends in their 
own right. The principle is expressed by Kant as: "Act in such a way that you always treat 
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humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a 
means, but always at the same time as an end" (1948 [1797]: 91). 
Now, the application of the principle of ends, to the world of organizational leadership 
seems at first glance to be rather impractical. For surely, at least part of what we expect of 
any leader is that they coordinate the resources that are at the disposal of the organization 
that they lead and that they apply these to the achievement of the objectives of that 
organization. Whatever those objectives may be, whether they relate to commercial 
accumulation, public service or charitable ends, leaders are expected to use the resources 
available to them, including people, to assist the achievement of those ends. Thus, all of the 
stakeholders who contribute in some way to the achievement of an organization's aims are 
being used as a means to the achievement of those ends. 
However, a less rigorous, although more literal, translation of Kant' s principle of ends 
avoids this apparent impracticality. Kant's precise wording of the second formulation does 
not necessarily preclude treating people as means to an end; it only precludes treating them 
simply as a means. It does not disallow treating people as a means as long as they are also 
treated at the same time as an end. According to this interpretation, it would be permissible 
to use people as a means to the achievement of an organization's ends as long as they are 
regarded, at the same time, as ends in themselves. Thus, it would be acceptable for a 
commercial organization to regard customers as a source of revenue as long as, at the same 
time, it treats them as ends in themselves. For example, it might regard the delivery of 
customer satisfaction not just as a means to making profit but also as a goal that carries 
intrinsic worth. Similarly, employees should not be viewed by leaders as purely 
instrumental to organizational success; rather, they should also be accorded intrinsic value. 
So, instead of cherishing employees as long as they offer the most cost-effective source of 
labour and then casting them aside as cheaper labour markets emerge, leaders should 
ascribe unconditional worth to their workforce. A similarly respectful approach should be 
extended to suppliers, shareholders and also to other groups upon whom organizational 
success depends. 
To apply Kant's principle of ends to contemporary organizational contexts need not, then, 
morally invalidate the governance principles common to those contexts. To apply it as I 
have suggested would, however, prescribe a particular governance model. It would 
invalidate an understanding of the organization which regards profitability and shareholder 
wealth as the overriding imperatives, and which calls for other stakeholder groups to be 
treated as no more than instrumental to the achievement of that end. It can thus be used to 
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validate a normative stakeholding (Donaldson and Preston, 1995) governance model, which 
calls for the interests of all organizational stakeholders to be taken into account in corporate 
decision making. On the other hand, it would morally invalidate the shareholder (Hayek, 
1969 [1960]; Freidman, 1970; Sternberg, 1998/1999/2000) model of governance, which 
subordinates the interests of all stakeholders to those of shareholders, since this treats the 
former purely as means to the end of promoting the wealth of the latter. 
Kant's rather convoluted reasoning thus delivers two principles which seem to offer a 
workable basis for evaluating the morality of organizational leadership. The principle of 
universalisability invites moral agents to consider whether they would wish the principle 
upon which they act to be universally adopted. It calls upon leaders to place themselves in 
the position of those who are affected by their actions and to consider the rightness of those 
actions from the point of view of those others. The second principle, Kant's principle of 
ends, might be otherwise described as a "principle of respect for persons". In a leadership 
decision-making scenario it would call upon leaders to consider all stakeholders as having 
value in themselves. 
Despite the apparent usefulness of these two formulations ofKant's categorical imperative, 
his theory does seem over rigorous in one respect. This is Kant's insistence that only acts 
performed in response to a sense of duty carry moral worth. According to this stipulation, a 
leader who is driven by non-moral imperatives but whose actions are nevertheless 
coincidental with duty should not attract moral approbation. On the one hand, this criterion 
is intuitively appealing insofar as it precludes from moral approbation CSR policies that 
pretend environmental or social concern but which are motivated purely by a desire to 
engender positive public relations. So, for example, leaders who dedicate the resources of 
their organizations to charitable causes but who do so purely in order to gather the kudos 
that such charitable action might attract would not, according to a Kantian evaluation, 
attract moral praise. This seems, intuitively, to be correct. 
However, Kant's stipulation that only acts that are performed out of a sense of duty should 
attract moral approbation also seems rather severe. It precludes emotionally motivated acts 
from moral approbation, so leaders who are driven by altruism, charity or benevolence to 
pursue intuitively appealing moral agendas should not necessarily attract moral praise. Kind 
people do not seem to have much moral worth in the Kantian system; attributions of worth 
are reserved for the rationally dutiful. 
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The distinction that some of Kant's commentators draw between perfect and imperfect 
duties serves to address this point and also responds to a further limitation of deontological 
ethics: that duty-based ethics tells us what we must and must not do but it has little to say 
outside this morally legislative minimum. Although Kant does not offer an explicit and 
unambiguous definition of these two categories of duty (Rosen, 1996), the distinction 
generally drawn from a broad reading ofhis work by his commentators (e.g. O.Neal, 1993; 
Allison, 2005) is that a perfect duty is a duty to which, under any circumstances, one is 
bound. Imperfect duties, on the other hand, respond to the inevitability of relations of 
mutual dependency between humans. Based on this assumption of mutual dependency, it 
would be irrational for us to will that sentiments such as benevolence did not exist. 
However, these duties seem to be less complete than perfect duties since we cannot fulfil 
them absolutely: we cannot be benevolent or sympathetic to everyone in the world. 
Applying this distinction between perfect and imperfect duties to the organizational 
leadership context, we might, by employing either formulation of the categorical 
imperative, identify a leader's perfect duties. For example, we might thus identify 
obligations to certain groups who have a formal relationship with the organization: its 
shareholders, employees, suppliers etc. However, fulfilling these duties does not exhaust the 
possibilities of ethical leadership, for beneficent conduct towards other groups with whom 
no formal relationship exists might be included under the heading of imperfect duties. 
Although precedence is accorded to the leader's perfect duties, a moral leader might also be 
expected to observe imperfect duties to wider groups. 
John Rawls' theory of justice 
I will end this brief tour of principle-based ethical theory by mentioning a recent approach 
proposed by John Rawls (1971). Rawls' theory of justice incorporates elements of both 
contract theory and Kant's principle of universalisability and also adds a vital third 
ingredient: the notion of fairness. It thus arrives at conclusions that avoid some of the 
difficulties with contract theory that were alluded to earlier and which also refines Kant's 
principle. Like contract theorists, Rawls roots a system of rights in the idea of a 
hypothetical pre-social condition, proposing that the duties incumbent upon moral agents 
are those which they would commit to were they placed in this imaginary situation. 
However, Rawls introduces the notion of a "veil of ignorance". He invites moral decision-
makers to reflect on the contractual arrangements that they would agree to were they 
ignorant of their own eventual status, talents or potentials. Ethical behaviour, for Rawls, is 
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that which "free and rational persons (who are) concerned to further their own interests" 
(1971: 1 0) would accept if placed behind such a hypothetical veil of ignorance. 
Applying Rawls' theory to leadership would invite leaders to assume this hypothetical 
"original position"; to undertake an imagined dismantling of the privileges that attend their 
rank and ask themselves how they might then appraise the fairness of their 
pronouncements. Now, whether or not leaders can easily make the imaginative leap that is 
required in order to don Rawls' proposed veil of ignorance is open to question. Rawls' 
prescription supposes that people are able to stand back from the reality of their existential 
circumstances sufficiently to make hypothetical assessments of value. His theory has also 
been criticised (for example by Maclntyre, 1985) on the basis that different decision makers 
would tolerate different levels of risk in seeking to maximise their self-interest. Different 
people would therefore choose different standards of justice when placed behind the veil of 
ignorance: some would be willing to take a gamble on receiving a fortuitous allocation of 
talents, so would be inclined to adopt a less charitable disposition. Others would go for the 
safer option and opt for minimal differentiation in benefits. 
Nevertheless, by introducing the veil of ignorance, Rawls goes some way to responding to 
the challenge of asymmetrical bargaining positions mentioned earlier in relation to contract 
theory. Leaders who follow Rawls moral prescription would not just respond to tacit 
contractual commitments which may be arrived at through positions of unequal power; they 
would be expected to reflect on the fairness of those commitments from a position of 
imagined impartiality. Rawls also responds to a criticism of Kant's principle of 
universalisation. Kant's principle invites leaders to ask themselves whether they would 
wish the maxim upon which they act to be universally adopted. However, they are asked to 
make that judgement from their privileged position of leadership. Again, Rawls takes things 
back a stage. He asks leaders to follow the course of action they would choose if placed in 
an original position where they were ignorant of their eventual status. 
Concluding Comments 
I will complete this discussion of principle-based theory with some general observations 
concerning its application to the leadership context. The first observation is that principle-
based ethics offers a basis for unilateral, moral decision-making on the part of leaders. If 
morality is just a matter of applying the right rules, then leaders who are equipped with 
those rules, and who have the necessary moral perspicacity to apply them accurately, can 
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unilaterally audit the ethicality of their actions and decisions. Principle-based theory 
therefore holds the promise of personally-derived moral authorisation. 
However, while unilateral moral evaluation is thus theoretically legitimised, its practice is 
no simple matter. Quite apart from choosing which to favour from the pantheon of 
principle-based theories - a question about which moral philosophers have yet to agree and 
about which I will say more shortly - the application of both utilitarian and deontological 
principles a fraught with practical difficulties. Utilitarian analysis demands clear definition 
of the common good. It also requires leaders to make complex predictions of the 
consequences of their actions and their likely impact on different groups. Although rule 
utilitarianism offers a potential escape from the decisionistic burden that is imposed by act 
utilitarianism, it also presents its own difficulties. Chief amongst these is that, if 
disagreements in the fields of corporate governance and macro-economic theory are 
anything to go by, the identification ofunproblematic, utility-maximising rules is no simple 
matter. 
The application of deontological theory is no less equivocal. Apart from the conceptual 
difficulties with deontological theories that have already been mentioned, their employment 
in leadership contexts is likely to involve complex matters of interpretation as well as fine 
adjudications between perceived responsibilities to different people, and even perhaps 
responsibilities to non-people. However sensible and straightforward these principles may 
seem in theory, their use in real life situations demands intricate qualitative evaluations that 
will tax any decision maker. 
While challenges such as these need not preclude the relevance of principle-based theory 
for leadership ethics, they place a heavy burden on any leaders who choose to impose a 
personally-defined moral agenda on their organization. Quite apart from everything else 
that is required of leaders - including all those personal qualities that the effectiveness 
literature has identified - they would also need to be moral sages. It therefore seems 
sensible for leaders to share the onerous burden of moral authorisation of their actions, 
decisions and effects. 
My second observation relates to the sheer breadth and variety of principle-based theories. 
In this chapter I have discussed some of the most frequently cited approaches, but there are 
many more. As Zygmunt Bauman observes, these theories "speak in different voices, one 
praising what the other condemns. They clash and contradict each other, each claiming the 
authority the others deny" (1993: 20). The possible consequences of this breadth and 
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variety are twofold. On the one hand, leaders who seek guidance from principle-based 
theory may find themselves bewildered by the multiplicity of perspectives, each of which 
seems sensible and intuitively appealing in its own right but each of which may legitimise 
courses of action which others proscribe. Surrounded by such an array of alternative 
versions of right, it is difficult to know which way to turn. 
In the hands of someone who is keen to do the right thing, then, the breadth and diversity of 
principle-based theory and the complexities of choice that it entails might be seen as a 
challenge. But perhaps the more pernicious outcome of this breadth and diversity is that it 
may render moral judgement prone to a sort of expedient flexibility. Whereas leaders who 
are anxious to select a moral course may find the heterogeneity of principle-based ethics 
problematic, those who are more concerned with finding convenient moral rationales for 
their decisions than actually informing those decisions may be attracted to the possibilities 
that this heterogeneity presents. Those leaders who do not seek moral guidance but who, 
instead, seek to legitimise decisions that have already been made without reference to moral 
sensitivities may not have to look too far to find a convenient justification. This expedient 
flexibility is further enhanced by the complexities of application already referred to. While 
these complexities of application complicate the task of moral decision-making, they also 
facilitate the application of different theories to justify diametrically contrasting agendas. 
Therefore, whatever organizational leaders may choose to do, they should be able to find a 
suitable principle-based theory which can be applied in such a way as to justify their 
actions. 
The worrying implications of this expedient flexibility are partly ameliorated by a 
presupposition that principle-based theories hold in common: this is their assumption of 
consistency in application. A presupposition that underpins utilitarian and deontological 
rationales is that their respective principles apply for all people in all situations. The 
rationality common to all principle-based ethics demands this. Principle-based theories 
cannot therefore be regarded as a quiver of moral rationales from which agents may select 
whichever arrow matches the course of action that they wish to legitimise at a particular 
time. It is not morally legitimate for leaders to pick-and-mix principle-based rationales in 
order to conveniently justify courses of action to which they may feel attracted on non-
moral grounds. If a leader chooses to apply a particular theory in a particular way to justify 
a course of action in one scenario, it seems reasonable to expect them to adopt the same 
criteria in other situations. 
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However, even the principle of consistency in application is not without its problems. 
Consistent application requires that, if a principle is applied in a particular way in situation 
A then, if situation B arises in which all things are equal, the same principle should be 
applied in the same way in situation B. However, all things never are equal (Toulmin, 
1990). Situation A and situation B are different situations, each with their own specific 
circumstances, some of which approximate, some of which differ. The moral agent who 
chooses to apply a principle consistently in both situations does so because that agent has 
decided that the dimensions across which both situations approximate are the morally 
relevant ones. Someone else may see things otherwise; may identify morally relevant 
dimensions across which the two situations differ and which therefore call for a different 
mode of application. The apprehension of sameness is subjectively defined. 
My third point relates to John Kaler's (1999) observation that ethics theory has no practical 
value for ethical decision making in business contexts. Kaler suggests that we do not tend 
to think about practical moral problems in terms of principles such as "maximisation of the 
good" or by considering specific rights and duties. Instead, he suggests that we act on a sort 
of gut feel about what is morally right. Kaler's point can be illustrated using the metaphor 
of a snooker player who is about to take a difficult shot. The snooker player does not 
calculate angles and velocities with the aid of tools and calculators, before applying the 
laws of applied physics to decide at what point, with what force and with what degree of 
spin to strike the ball. The player takes a stroll around the table to familiarise herself or 
himself with the overall situation before striking the ball in a way that seems appropriate to 
those circumstances. Similarly, Kaler suggests that people confronted with business ethics 
decisions base those decisions, not on the application of principles, but on an overall 
apprehension of what is the morally correct thing to do in the circumstances. Indeed, Kaler 
notes that we tend to test our moral theories with reference to our common sense 
judgements of right and wrong, rather than the other way round. If a theoretical principle 
points in a direction with which we feel morally uncomfortable, he suggests, we would be 
more inclined to ditch the theoretical principle than to act against our moral gut feel. 
If we agree with Kaler, then there would seem to be little need for principle-based theories 
in the evaluation of moral leadership: we should let intuitive moral judgement be our guide 
rather than going to the trouble of interpreting and applying theoretical principles. 
Combining Kaler's analysis with my earlier observations about the expedient flexibility of 
principle-based theory, we might conclude that the latter's prime purpose is a justificatory 
one: it is used purely to reassure ourselves and to persuade others of the ethical probity of 
the actions towards which our intuitive moral judgement has already pointed us. 
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Criticisms such as these have led some theorists towards an existentialist meta-ethical 
perspective, which I will discuss shortly. Before doing so, though, I will just say a few 
words in defence of principle-based ethics. The first point is that, even if Kaler is correct 
and that business people normally rely on moral intuition rather than ethical principles - a 
contention that I will test during empirical enquiry - this does not necessarily preclude a 
role for theoretical principles in addressing moral dilemmas. If we are able to identify the 
principles that are important to us in those situations where the moral course of action is 
clearly apparent, then it seems reasonable to use those principles for guidance in situations 
that are less clear cut.9 Principle based theory can thus be understood as an attempt to define 
those imperatives that are morally significant and to design principles that will enable their 
application to real life dilemmas. 
My second point in defence of principle-based theory is that, even if we agree with 
commentators such as Bauman (1993) and the existentialist theorists that I will discuss 
shortly that the quest for universally valid moral principles is conceptually misguided, we 
might nevertheless accede that different principle-based theories serve a useful purpose in 
drawing our attention to relevant aspects of morally-charged situations that we might not 
otherwise have considered. A utilitarian perspective invites us to think of the long-term 
consequences of our actions, particularly as they affect people who might not spring readily 
to our attention. Similarly, deontological theory serves the purpose of evoking sensitivity to 
the relationship that a business has with less obvious stakeholders, particularly those who 
are not able to champion their rights as stridently as others. Even if we agree with Kaler that 
business people make moral decisions by applying a sort of moral gut-feel, we might still 
argue that the quality of those decisions can be enhanced if gut feel is exposed to a degree 
of critical reflection on the part of those business people. And business people's critical 
reflection may be enriched by considering a dilemma through the lens of a range of 
principle-based theories. 
9 Contrary to Bauman (1993), who presents the quest for universal, rational, ethical principles as a 
cunning conspiracy by legislators and philosophers to impose their authority over a plurality of 
untrustworthy moral intuitions, I suggest that this is the agenda that characterises the majority of 
principle-based moral philosophy. Bauman may be right that this quest is futile- I reserve judgement 
on that question. However, I believe that his treatment of the tradition of principle-based moral 
enquiry is harsh. 
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3.2 EXISTENTIALIST ETHICS AND LEADERSHIP 
Whereas the principle-based theories considered in the previous chapter seek to identify 
absolute bases of moral evaluation, the message that existentialism holds for ethics is that 
such a quest is futile. Existentialist philosophy can be characterised by both its negative and 
its positive themes. The negative theme is that universal, objective foundations of moral 
truth are problematic. The positive implication of this negative theme is that, in the absence 
of absolute criteria of evaluation, the source of moral truth is to be found within each 
individual. As Kierkegaard expresses it, "to subjective reflection, truth becomes 
appropriation, inwardness, subjectivity, and the point is to immerse oneself, existing in 
subjectivity" (1997 [1846]: 201). Thus, Mary Warnock stresses existentialism's capacity to 
evoke awareness of the freedom that resides within each of us: "anyone who is an 
existentialist must adopt the view that men are free, and that their freedom extends further 
than they will have thought, before their eyes were opened by the study of philosophy" 
(2003: xvi). According to existentialism, then, leaders who aspire to ethicality cannot 
appeal to external principles for guidance; they have to consult the font of moral authorship 
that lies within them. 
Critique of Objectivist and Universalist Meta-Ethics 
Seren Kierkegaard is widely regarded as a founding father of existentialist philosophy 
(Kaufman, 1956; Barrett 1990 [1958]; Gardiner, 1988; Langiulli, 1971; Hannay, 2005) and 
it is in Kierkegaard's work that the roots of both the negative and positive themes of 
existentialism can be found. In Fear and Trembling (1997b [1843]), Kierkegaard strikes a 
blow against reliance on conventional standards of morality when he contrasts, on the one 
hand, the ethical way of life that is lived in accordance with moral convention with, on the 
other hand, a religious life that follows the dictates of faith. The former, for Kierkegaard, is 
fundamentally misguided insofar as it appeals to norms which claim an objective legitimacy 
to which they have no right. Moral convention, for Kierkegaard, comprises closed systems 
of reasoning that cannot be legitimated externally: the ethical way of life "rests immanent 
in itself, has nothing outside itself that is its purpose, but is itself the purpose for everything 
outside itself, and when the ethical has assimilated this, it does not go any further" (1997b 
[1843]: 99). Maclntyre sums up the message of Kierkegaard's philosophy thus: "not only 
are there no objective tests of morality; but ... doctrines which assert that there are function 
as devices to disguise the fact that our moral standards are, and can only be, chosen" (2002 
[1967]: 209). 
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A more polemical critique of moral convention is delivered by Friedrich Nietzsche in The 
Genealogy of Morals (2003 [ 1887]). Nietzsche refutes the objective, universal legitimacy of 
moral standards on the basis that genealogical exploration of conventional morality reveals 
it to be no more than an expression of the interests of particular types of people. Nietzsche 
proposes a deterministic understanding of human psychology and physiology: that people 
can be categorised according to type. He considers type to be determined by birth, so people 
have little or no control over their psychological or physiological capabilities. In elaborating 
the implications of type for moral theory, Nietzsche concerns himself with two particular 
types. On the one hand are the lower types, the herd or the slaves, which includes the mass 
of humanity. On the other hand are the higher types: the over men or super men; those 
exceptional individuals who are capable of a level of independence and creativity which 
elevates them above their fellow beings. 
Nietzsche points out that, due to the contrasting capabilities with which lower and higher 
types are endowed, each type finds itself in very different sets of circumstances. 
Consequently, their respective interests are served by c~ntrasting normative principles. 
Therefore, contrasting moralities are prudentially apposite to different types of people. The 
morality that has come to pervade Western civilisation, according to Nietzsche, is that 
which is consistent with the interests of the masses: the ascetic, slave morality of the lower 
types. Values such as compassion, charity and equality have come to dominate our moral 
intuitions for no reason other than that they promote the interests of the lower types. Thus, 
"the morality of the vulgar man has triumphed" (Nietzsche, 2003 [ 1887]: 18) over the elitist 
and egoistic principles that would be consistent with the interests of the higher types. This 
triumph is not based on any objective superiority of the former; it represents simply the 
successful imposition of the self-interest of the masses. Therefore, the principles of ascetic, 
slave moralities derive from nothing more than the self-interested resentment felt by people 
of less elevated social status who "deprived as they are of the proper outlet of action, are 
forced to find their compensation in an imaginary revenge" (ibid: 19). 
Nietzsche thus professes to have demonstrated the relational nature of moral codes, 
undermining any claims that the imperatives of slave moralities might make to universal 
validity. Furthermore, by demonstrating that the triumph of slave morality was "an act of 
the cleverest revenge" (2003 [1887]: 17) which grew from the "trunk of that tree of revenge 
and hate" (ibid: 17) and the "festering venom and malignity" (ibid: 21) of the weak and 
oppressed, Nietzsche claims to have shown that the roots of slave moralities' imperatives 
lie in motives that are vilified by the normative substance of those same slave moralities. 
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He thus exposes not only the self-interested and relativist nature of slave morality but also 
its hypocrisy. 
Having dismantled conventional morality's claims to objective legitimacy, Nietzsche 
proposes a further argument that challenges the very notion of morality. This argument is 
based upon a gloomy psychological understanding of humanity: that people are 
fundamentally driven by a desire to exert power over others. This will to power is, for 
Nietzsche, the driving force of all human motivation. Any other motives that may seem to 
motivate our actions are ultimately reducible to the will to power because, when subjected 
to close analysis, they are found to be instrumental to it. According to Nietzsche, since this 
is the way that people are, it is futile to pretend otherwise; and it is equally futile to moralise 
about the consequences of this psychological reality. The strong impose their will on the 
weak because they can; the weak rail against this subjugation because it inhibits the 
expression of their own will to power. Nietzsche likens strong people to birds of prey 
whereas weak people are as the young lambs upon which they feed. Both the strong person 
and the bird of prey are acting in accordance with basic instinct; it makes no more sense to 
morally judge strong people for imposing their will on the weak than it does to judge birds 
of prey for killing young lambs. But just as the lamb will bear a grudge, so, understandably 
does the weak person: each does what it can to promote its own interests. However, 
Nietzsche is concerned that, through the hegemony of slave morality, this prudential self-
interest of the weak has acquired the force of morality: 
this dismal state of affairs, this prudence of the lowest order, which even insects possess ... 
has, thanks to the counterfeiting and self-deception of weakness, come to masquerade in the 
pomp of an ascetic, mute and expectant virtue, just as though the very weakness ofthe weak 
... were a voluntary result, something wished, chosen, a deed, an act of merit (2003 [ 1887]: 
26). 
Thus far I have emphasised the destructive message in Nietzsche's narrative. He sets out to 
demolish slave morality's pretensions and, in the process, he challenges the very notion of 
morality. However, Nietzsche's intention is not just to commit an act of moral vandalism, 
for this demolition is undertaken in the interests of an overarching constructive agenda. 
Nietzsche's task is not just to dismantle traditional values; it is to effect a revaluation of 
values. He is driven by a passionate conviction that not only do the principles of traditional, 
ascetic, slave morality lack objective validity but that they also constrain human progress. 
Nietzsche's disquiet about slave morality relates particularly to the ways in which it 
restrains the elite. Its values have insinuated their way into our ideological presuppositions 
57 
so that happiness is valued over suffering, altruism is placed above self-love, equality is 
preferred to inequality, the quest for peace and tranquillity inhibits our capacity to endure 
risk and danger. We are encouraged to inhibit the satisfaction of our instinctual drives, we 
are expected to show pity and compassion for the suffering of others, and spiritual well-
being is valued as compensation for the tribulations of the body. 
A major theme of the Genealogy of Morals is that the cultural valorisation of these ascetic 
values will inhibit higher types from realising their potential to further human excellence. 
Precisely what this human excellence consists of is not clear from Nietzsche's narrative. It 
seems to correspond to some vague notion of the realisation of human potential. 
Furthermore, Nietzsche's presentation of Goethe, Beethoven and himself as its 
embodiments (Leiter, 2002) suggests that he judges human excellence largely in terms of 
intellectual advancement and cultural accomplishment. He does, however, offer a fairly 
clear picture of the conditions that are necessary for the attainment of excellence. For 
excellence, in Nietzsche's view, cannot be achieved without suffering. It also requires 
prioritisation of the interests of higher types over those of other people; it is inherently 
unequal. Furthermore, it cannot be achieved without a proclivity for risk and it demands the 
expression of instinctual drives. The crux ofNietzsche's concern, then, seems to be that the 
values of slave morality, having become embedded in our culture, are constraining nascent 
higher types from cultivating and giving expression to those traits which are essential for 
the realisation of their potential and thus for the advancement of humankind. 
Now, in championing the pursuit of excellence, Nietzsche might be interpreted as evincing 
an objectivist meta-ethic. Despite his apparent refutation of all objective bases of moral 
evaluation, his call for a revaluation of morality seems to appeal to overarching notions of 
excellence and human progress which reveal an objectivist commitment. This apparent 
ambivalence has been widely debated amongst Nietzsche commentators (e.g. Clark, 1994; 
Danto, 2002; Foot, 1994; Schacht, 2005). To get too tied up with the question of whether or 
not Nietzsche contradicts his own apparent moral relativism is, however, to divert attention 
from a key aspect of his contribution to moral theory. This is that Nietzsche casts a shadow 
of doubt over the universal desirability of qualities such as charity, benevolence, 
compassion and equality; qualities whose veneration has pervaded the mainstream of 
Western ethics. Conversely, he offers a basis for the valorisation of very different human 
qualities and, in particular, with his call for the "super men" to assert themselves (or 
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perhaps for the super man or super woman that resides within each of us to assert itself0), 
he provides an alternative template for moral leadership. 
Nietzsche's overarching preoccupation is with the pursuit of human excellence. Therefore 
moral leadership that is consistent with a Nietzschean revaluation of values would seem to 
be leadership that promotes the realisation of human potential. Furthermore, according to 
my reading ofNietzsche, the methods adopted to pursue excellence need not be constrained 
by the sensitivities of conventional morality. The Nietzschean leader would be a change-
evoking super man [sic] who is able to apply his exceptional talents in order to unite people 
towards the flourishing of excellence. This can only be achieved if the more capable elite 
are encouraged to join the leader in fulfilling their potential, unrestrained by considerations 
of equality, compassion and altruism. Nietzsche thus provides the basis for a 
characteristically elitist understanding of leadership; one in which, by reason of their innate 
superiority, leaders are justified in asserting their own agendas over weaker people. 
It is perhaps worth noting that Nietzsche's philosophy as been eo-opted to legitimise some 
of the most appalling leadership agendas of the twentieth century. Many of Nietzsche's 
commentators (e.g. Kaufman, 1956; Langiulli, 1971; Leiter, 2002; Schacht, 2005) point out 
that to paint Nietzsche with the brush of Nazism is unfair, since he despised both German 
nationalism and anti-Semitism and would have been appalled at the selective 
misappropriation of his philosophy by the National Socialists of 1930s Germany. 
Nevertheless, given Nietzsche's biological determinism, his unashamed elitism and his 
demolition of many of the values trodden on by Nazi inhumanity, this misappropriation is 
unsurprising. 
Personal Commitment as a Basis for Moral Legitimacy 
The stark message contained within Nietzsche and Kierkegaard's writing is that there are no 
universally valid moral principles in accordance with which moral dilemmas can be 
resolved. Responsibility is therefore thrown back upon each individual to define their own 
moral standards. Kierkegaard stresses that the legitimacy of a moral sentiment derives not 
from conformity to some objective, universal reality but from the commitment with which 
it is experienced. Kierkegaard thus challenges the Cartesian notion of truth as residing in 
correspondence between belief and reality. In Concluding Unscientific Postscript (1997c 
10 A less literal interpretation ofNietzsche's work is that, rather than proposing an elitist social ethic, 
he is merely calling upon every individual to strive for their own self-actualisation and to release 
their own potential for excellence. I find it hard to believe, though, that the polemical narrative of the 
Genealogy of Morals was only intended by Nietzsche to be read metaphorically. 
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[ 1846]), Kierkegaard proposes a subjectivist notion of truth as an alternative to the 
objectivism of the Cartesian position, using this notion of subjective truth to legitimise 
Christian faith: as far as Kierkegaard is concerned, religious truth does not derive from 
correspondence between thinking and being; it concerns the relationship between the 
thinker and that which is thought: 
the issue is not about the truth of Christianity but about the individual's relation to 
Christianity, consequently not about the indifferent individual's systematic eagerness to 
arrange truths of Christianity in paragraphs but rather about the concern of the infinitely 
interested individual with regard to his own relation to such a doctrine (Kierkegaard, 1997c 
[1846]: 189). 
Therefore, the criterion of religious truth does not lie in correspondence with a supposed 
external reality but in the sincerity with which the believer believes: "the passion of the 
_infinite, not its content, is the deciding factor" (Kierkegaard, 1997c [1846]: 206). It is this 
passion, this emotional engagement, which, for Kierkegaard, is lacking in uncritical 
conformity to moral convention. By basing moral decision-making on conventionally 
accepted ethical norms, a moral agent adopts a passive relationship with his or her decision. 
This passivity is inherently limiting because that decision is thus deprived of emotional 
engagement. The application of conventional, principle-based morality comprises rational 
accounting in accordance with rules; rules which, according to Kierkegaard, not only lack 
the external legitimacy they claim but which also offer an inadequate basis for meaningful 
personal engagement. Decisions that are made on the basis of direct, personal faith, on the 
other hand, are characterised by commitment. 
For Kierkegaard, the importance of personal commitment is not confined to the validation 
of religious faith. In Either/Or (1997a [1843]), through the words of the fictitious Judge 
Wilhelm, Kierkegaard stresses the self-actualising force of choice: the act of choosing is its 
own reward; when the spirit is deprived of choice it "withers away in atrophy" (1997a 
[1843]: 72). The value of choice is intrinsic to the act of choosing; it derives not from the 
outcome of the choice but from the degree of personal commitment that is invested in that 
choice: "what is important in choosing is not so much to choose the right thing as the 
energy, the earnestness, and the pathos with which one chooses" (ibid: 73-74). 
Leaders who measure themselves according to Kierkegaardian standards would therefore 
need to be comfortable with the responsibility entailed in acts of choice. They would need 
to weigh their decisions not in accordance with rational accounting of conventionally 
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accepted norms but in relation to the strength of their personal conviction. The right course 
of action, for Kierkegaardian leaders, is that to which they can wholeheartedly commit 
themselves. External measures of moral rightness give way to the leader's personal 
engagement as the sole criterion of legitimacy. Kierkegaard notes that this affirmation of 
personal commitment often requires sustained challenge to the status-quo: like Nietzsche's 
prophetic, Zarathustran superman (2003a [1983-85]), the Kierkegaardian champion of 
passionate engagement may have to stand alone against convention; he "must comprehend 
that no one can understand him, and must have the constancy to put up with it that human 
language has for him naught but curses and the human heart has for his sufferings only the 
feeling that he is guilty" (Kierkegaard, 1967 [1845], cited by Gardiner, 1988: 62). 
Heidegger and Sartre and the Nature of Being 
Whereas Kierkegaard's acclamation of personal commitment and choice is both polemical 
and imbued with religious fervour, Heidegger and Sartre deliver endorsements of individual 
responsibility that are more sober and secular in style and which are also constructed upon 
more systematic rationales than Kierkegaard's. Heidegger's Being and Time forms part of 
an unfinished ontological exploration of the nature of Being. It addresses specifically the 
question of what it is to be human, or, in Heidegger's words, the nature of Dasein 11 , the 
(human) being, for which "in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it" (1962 [1926]: 32). 
A significant outcome ofHeidegger's enquiry is t~at individual responsibility is intrinsic to 
any authentic embodiment of the human condition. Sartre reaches a similar conclusion in 
Being and Nothingness, in his case via an exploration of the nature of consciousness. For 
Sartre, authentic existence demands acknowledgement of the ineluctable freedom which 
defines human consciousness. For Sartre, · "what we call freedom is impossible to 
distinguish from the being of 'human reality'. Man does not exist first in order to be free 
subsequently; there is no difference between the being of man and his being-free" (2003 
[1943]: 49). 
Heidegger derives his notion of authentic being from consideration of three aspects of the 
human condition: its Being-in-the-World, its temporality and its intersubjective character. 
By Being-in-the-World, Heidegger refers neither to Dasein's physical containment within 
its surroundings nor its physical proximity to other worldly entities. He refers, rather, to the 
dialectical process of signification by which the "World" that Dasein is "in" is accorded 
11 When discussing Heidegger's work I have followed the German convention, applied by the author 
and also by his translators and most of his commentators, of capitalising the first letter of many of 
the key terms that he uses to explain his theories. 
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significance and in relation to which Dasein defines itself. The "World" within which 
Dasein dwells, in a Heideggerian sense, is therefore a world of mutual signification and 
reference. 
A key aspect of Dasein's Being-in-the-World is the inevitability of care, or concern: "the 
Being of Dasein itself is to be made visible as care" (Heidegger, 1962 [1926]:83-84). 
When Heidegger uses these terms he does not do so in the sense of custodial care or 
guardianship, nor do these terms carry any implication of benevolent or compassionate 
intent (Polt, 1999). He simply means that each person's World matters for them, not in the 
obvious sense in which it sustains their biological and emotional needs, but in the sense that 
they cannot interact with it other than with some predisposition towards it. 
For Heidegger, the way in which care or concern defmes Dasein's relationship with its 
World, must be grasped within the context of temporality. That is, care and concern can 
only be conceived in terms of Dasein's past and future. The disposition that defines our 
caring relationship with our world is not a cognitive one but is manifested through moods. 
And these moods, which define how we respond to our World, derive from what Heidegger 
refers to as our attunement, or thrownness. Our past experiences attune us, or throw us, in 
certain ways and the consequent mood with which we relate to· our World defines the nature 
of that relationship: "Dasein's openness to the world is constituted existentially by the 
attunement of a state-of-mind" (Heidegger, 1962 [1926]: 176). This attunement does not 
derive only from our first-hand personal experiences but also from absorbing the ideas and 
values that permeate our generation. Thus, "[Dasein] is its past, whether explicitly or not ... 
its own past- and this always means the past of its 'generation'- is not something which 
follows along after Dasein, but something which already goes ahead of it" (ibid: 41 ). 
The way in which our past defines the nature of our Being-in-the-World should not, 
however, obscure the significance of our future. For, just as our Being-in-the-World is 
temporally defined in relation to our past, it is also defined in relationship to our 
understanding of our future potentials: in Heidegger' s terms, not only are we thrown, but 
we are also throwers. Dasein and its Being-in-the-World cannot be conceived in terms of a 
fixed present that is the outcome of attunement. It must also be conceived in relation to the 
totality of its "disclosive potentiality-for-Bein[f' (Heidegger, 1962 [1926]: 183). We define 
ourselves and our relationship with our World in terms of potentials that are important to 
us, so the way in which our past attunes us is structured by our understanding of our future 
potentiality. Equally, that understanding of our future potentiality is attuned by our past 
experiences and by absorption of the experiences and values of our generation. Present, 
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past and future must therefore be conceived not as separate instances of a linear progression 
but in terms of dialectic interrelatedness: each temporal dimension is impacted by the other 
temporal dimensions while, at the same time, each impacts upon the others. 
The third existential characteristic ofDasein's Being-in-the-World is that Dasein is in-the-
World with other Dasein. So our world of signification is not encountered in a solitary 
fashion; it is an intersubjective endeavour. And this sharing of the world is not just a 
contingent, ontic event; it is a fundamental aspect of our ontological Being: Being-with 
is an existential statement as to [Dasein's] essence. Even if the particular factical Dasein 
does not turn to others, and supposes that it has no need for them or manages to get along 
without them, it is in the way ofBeing-with (Heidegger, 1962 [1926]: 160). 
Furthermore, our intersubjective situation entails a mutual engagement of worlds of 
signification within which all parties have significance for one another; that is, those third 
person, "other" Dasein who we encounter are in-the-world just as the first person "I" 
Dasein is in-the-world; just as "I" care so do "they" care: ''they are not encountered as 
person-things present-at-hand: we meet them 'at work', that is primarily in their Being-in-
the-World" (ibid: 156). 
The key points that I take from this reading of Heidegger are that each person's being can 
be conceived in terms of three existential characteristics. The first characteristic is that we 
cannot relate to our respective worlds from an attitude of detached neutrality. The way in 
which each person perceives their own world is inevitably shaped by their respective 
projects and preoccupations: as Heidegger would put it, we cannot Be-in-the-World other 
than with an attitude of care for that World; and that attitude of care will shape our 
understanding of that World. 
The second ineluctable characteristic of being is that it must be understood in terms of its 
dialectical interrelatedness with its past-facing attunement and its future-facing 
understanding of its potentialities. Although we are shaped by our past experiences and the 
experiences of our generation, the way in which we receive and respond to those 
experiences is shaped, in turn, by our future projects. And these, in turn, are shaped by our 
past experiences, and so on. We therefore stand as if between two interfacing mirrors: one 
of which represents our past; the other our future. We cannot look into our future without 
seeing the reflection of our past; and we cannot look into our past without seeing the 
reflection of our future. 
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The third inescapable characteristic of each person's being to which Heidegger draws our 
attention is its intersubjective quality: we find ourselves living in the same world as other 
people. Even if we choose to lead a solitary existence, avoiding contact with these others, 
their presence nevertheless shapes our relationship with our world. And just as my 
relationship with my world is shaped by my projects and preoccupations, so is every other 
person's shaped by the nature of their respective "care". Furthermore, each of these other 
people is just as subject to their own dialectical, temporal embeddedness as I am. 
Whereas Heidegger's conclusions flow from his exploration of the nature of Being, Sartre's 
proceed from his elaboration of the nature of consciousness (2003 [1943]). According to 
Sartre, human subjectivity must be understood in relation to consciousness, for 
consciousness is human subjectivity. But like Kierkegaard and Heidegger, Sartre rejects the 
Cartesian understanding of a detached subjective "mind" which looks out dispassionately 
on an objective world of present-at-hand entities. Sartre focuses on the emptiness of 
·subjectivity: for Sartre, consciousness, in itself, is nothing; it only takes on substance in 
relation to its intentional object. In Sartre's terms, the for-itself (consciousness) takes on 
form through the in-itself entities of which it is conscious. And just as consciousness only 
takes on substance through its relationship with the in-itself, those in-itself entities are 
nothing but featureless matter until given form by consciousness; by the for-itself. Sartre 
thus concludes the ineluctable autonomy of the subject: since meaning is comprised of a 
dialectical interplay between the in-itself (which is given shape and meaning by the for-
itself) and the for-itself (which is, in-itself, nothing) freedom of choice in attributing 
meaning is absolute. 
Despite the autonomy that is entailed in this relationship between the in-itself and the for-
itself, Sartre emphasises the extent to which we are nevertheless impacted by the facticity of 
our situation We do not choose what we are and what our position in the world is; these are 
given to us by the facticity that is the outcome of our past. However, we are free to choose 
how we respond to facticity. Facticity provides reasons for us to act in a certain way but, as 
far as Sartre is concerned, we choose whether those reasons for action should become 
causes of action. Even our biological and psychological makeup, our place in society or 
whatever else may be regarded as causal in our choices are only causal if we choose to 
make them so: they are reasons that become causes through an act of choice on our part. 
We are thus, as Sartre puts it, "condemned to be free" (1973 [1946]: 34): we cannot escape 
being makers of choices. 
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Inauthenticity/Bad Faith and Authenticity 
Heidegger and Sartre develop the notion ofinauthenticity, or badfaith, to describe denial of 
the true nature of our autonomy and our capacity for personal engagement. Inauthenticity 
has two faces. For Heidegger, the first face of inauthenticity consists of overlooking the 
predisposed nature of our care for our World, denying our attunement and repudiating our 
intersubjective context. Inauthenticity is to regard the subject as standing apart from the 
dialectically constituted ontological, temporal and social processes through which it 
constructs its reality. Inauthentic people thus assume that they can construct the nature of 
their Being-in-the-World without reference to the forces that have defined each moment of 
that process of construction. They imagine that the construction of their reality is an act of 
unilateral, rather than dialectical, signification. They pretend a mood-less neutrality, 
disregarding the attunement, or thrownness, which inevitably determines the way in which 
they interact with their situation. Furthermore, they assume that they can stand apart from 
their intersubjective context. They fail to acknowledge that even those who pursue a life of 
reclusive, self-sufficiency cannot escape the actuality ofDasein's intersubjectivity, for even 
a person's avoidance of others is premised upon acknowledgement of eo-presence. 
For Sartre, too, the avoidance of bad faith requires reconciliation with those features which 
comprise the inescapable facticity of ones context. Features such as ones past, ones class, 
ones nationality, ones social experiences, ones gender and ones physical make up. To deny 
facticity is to repudiate the past; a past which constitutes the resistance against which ones 
future choices are made. 
Despite the temptations of this first mode of inauthenticity/bad faith, it is to its second face 
that both Heidegger and Sartre believe that we are more likely to succumb. For Heidegger, 
this is to deny our capacity for choice: to suppose that the World in which we live is 
constituted independently of our own signification of it; to deny that our attunement is 
shaped by our own understanding of our potentiality for Being and to overlook our agentic 
capacity in the face of intersubjectivity. Of particular concern to Heidegger are the 
temptations of falling, averageness and disburdening. Falling refers to non-reflectively 
going where we are thrown; permitting the momentum of our attunement to carry us as 
unreflectively where it may lead. Heidegger notes that we are inclined to use the routines 
and superficialities of everyday situations as props to avoid committing ourselves to clear 
choices about who we are and what we are doing. Falling thus ignores the essential 
interrelatedness of our temporality; it acknowledges that we are thrown whilst failing to 
acknowledge that we are also throwers. 
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A verageness, for Heidegger, is the tendency of Dasein to lose its identity in 
intersubjectivity. Thus, in Dasein's everyday Being-with-others, its Being is taken away by 
those others: "This Being-with-one-another dissolves ones own Dasein completely into the 
kind of Being of 'the Others' ... In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability, the real 
dictatorship of the 'they' is unfolded" (1962 [1926]: 164). The consequence is that Dasein 
comes to think of itself not as "I" but as part of "they" and its actions are largely dictated by 
what is expected of that common togetherness. Heidegger describes this loss of · 
individuality as a disburdening of individual responsibility: "the particular Dasein in its 
everydayness is disburdened by the 'they'. Not only that; by thus disburdening it of its 
Being, the 'they' accommodates Dasein if Dasein has a tendency to take things easy and 
make them easy" (ibid: 165). So disburdening is a tempting kop-out of ones individual, 
agentic capacity, and as a consequence the individual is further emasculated as "the 'they' 
retains and enhances its stubborn dominion" (ibid: 165). 
For Sartre, this second face of bad faith comprises the assumption of passivity in the face of 
facticity. Sartre stresses that, although we are impacted by features of our social, hereditary, 
physical and intellectual circumstances, we are nevertheless free to interpret and respond to 
these features; to "transcend" facticity: "The basic concept which is thus engendered, 
utilises the double property of the human being, who is at once a facticity and a 
transcendence" (2003 [1943]: 79). To deny ones transcendence is to objectify oneself; a 
futile attempt by the for-itself to identify itself as some form of in-itself which it can move 
towards but which it can never become. 
Sartre refers to one manifestation of this second face of bad faith as sincerity. Sincerity is 
the belief that one must come to terms with "what one is". This is the error of seeking to be 
ones "true" self; the assumption that one has an essence that cannot be transcended by free 
choice. Such sincerity is bad faith because, for Sartre, we have no true self; no essence. To 
adopt a Sartrean phraseology: "we are not what we are". In other words, even though our 
past determines our facticity, which may be everything that defines us, we are nevertheless 
free to transcend this facticity towards the future. Authenticity is the acknowledgement of 
this: our abjuration of any essence; our recognition of our autonomy to respond as we 
choose to our facticity; our freedom to be what we choose to be, not what we are. Sincerity, 
on the other hand, is a cunning project that seeks to avoid taking responsibility for ones self. 
Heidegger and Sartre introduce the notions of anxiety and anguish to describe different 
aspects of our response to the ineluctable autonomy of our situation. According to 
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Heidegger, anxiety is the emotion that attends realisation of the inadequacies of the 
inauthentic mode of Being. For Sartre, anguish is a response to the vertigo-inducing 
realisation of our own autonomy. It is the motivating force which evokes our flight towards 
the second face of bad faith; towards sincerity. Faced with the terrifying realisation that we 
are nothing except that which we choose to be, that we have no essence other than that 
which we construct for ourselves, we are racked by anguish. 
. 
The opposite of inauthenticity and bad faith is authenticity. If the former comprise the 
abrogation of our free choice or the denial of facticity, authenticity involves coming to 
terms with both the facticity and attunement of our past and the transcendent potentialities 
of our future. Sartre is particularly explicit in his endorsement of authenticity and 
autonomy. These themes pervade his literary and philosophical works and their moral 
implication is nowhere more clearly stated than in the advice he gives to a student whose 
agonised prevarication he rec~unts in Existentialism and Humanism: "you are free, 
therefore choose- that is to say, invent" (Sartre, 1973 [1946]: 38). For Sartre, authenticity 
can be understood as a form of enlightenment. It represents a realisation of our transcendent 
freedom and a coming to terms with the anguish that this presents. Authenticity is not a 
once and for all achievement though, for to suppose that one has now come to terms with 
ones freedom and that one is now an authentic person would be yet another manifestation of 
bad faith. Authenticity confronts the ever-present freedom to slip into bad faith and deny 
ones freedom: we can always choose not to choose. It thus requires continual renewal and 
constant re-affirmation. Authenticity is not an achievement; it is a never-ending project. 
Sartre's Look and Heidegger's Authentic Solicitude: Contrasting Analyses Qf 
lntersub jectivity 
Despite their agreement on the autonomy of the individual and the nature of authentic 
being, a topic about which the writings of Sartre and Heidegger point in rather different 
directions is that of interpersonal relationships. Sartre, at least in his earlier work12, focuses 
on the conflictual quality of intersubjectivity, dwelling on the challenge that one person's 
authenticity necessarily presents to the creative autonomy of other people. Heidegger, on 
the other hand, describes contrasting types of interpersonal relationship. Although certain 
forms of interaction have the potential to suppress the autonomy of individuals, Heidegger 
also envisages relationships in which the authenticity of one person can actually be enabled 
and encouraged by another person. He thus leaves space for. the possibility of mutually 
12 The conflictual intersubjective implications of Sartre's existentialism may account for the later 
dil~tion of his existentialist commitment in favour of a more Marxian-oriented political stance. 
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authentic co-existence. I will briefly review Sartre's perspective before outlining 
Heidegger's more optimistic stance. 
Sartre introduces the notion of the Look to draw attention to the potentially conflictual 
quality of intersubjectivity and to account for the destructive turn which many interpersonal 
relationships take. The reason for this conflictual quality is that intersubjectivity necessarily 
entails challenge to each person's creative autonomy. Sartre (2003 [1943]) offers an 
account of one person encountering another in a park to illustrate this intersubjective 
tension. I may be sitting on a park bench, quietly contemplating my surroundings, alone in 
my situation. All of a sudden, I become aware of the presence of another person in the park. 
That person may present no physical threat and may make no attempt to engage with me. 
Nevertheless, my awareness of their presence immediately changes my situation: instead of 
being the only "for-itself' entity amongst a field of "in-itself entities", my "for-itself-ness", 
or my subjectivity, is now shared with another. I am no longer a subject surrounded by a 
world of objects; another subject is present. My awareness of that subject's presence 
inevitably challenges my authorship of my world. Of course, the other undergoes the same 
process, at which point a struggle for centrality and ownership of our (now) shared world 
ensues. I can only get back my world if I can reduce that person to an in-itself entity within 
it and they likewise for me. So I inevitably embark on the fruitless process of trying to 
reduce them in this way; fruitless insofar as they are, and cannot be other than, "for-
themselves": despite both of our efforts to objectify the other, each of us cannot but be a 
subject. We thus derive the significance of the Look of another person. It lies not in the 
impact of the eyes but in my awareness that my subjective autonomy is threatened by the 
gaze of another. 
In contrast to the conflictual analysis of intersubjectivity presented by Sartre, Heidegger 
offers the possibility of a more harmonious co-existance with fellow Dasein. As I pointed 
out earlier, one of the key characteristics of Being, for Heidegger, is "Being with" other 
people. Heidegger proposes that this intersubjective quality of Being is not an ontical 
contingency; it is an existential necessity. So, one person cannot conceive of their world 
other than as incorporating other people: "even if the particular factical Dasein does not 
turn to others, and supposes that it has no need for them or manages to get along without 
them 'it is in the way of Being-with" (ibid, 1962 [1926]: 160). Thus far Heidegger is on 
similar ground to Sartre: for Sartre, too, intersubjectivity is inescapable: we are 
"condemned" to be with oth~rs. But whereas, for Sartre, "hell is other people" (In Camera, 
cited in Danto, 1975: 106), Heidegger envisages the possibility ofbenign co-existence. 
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I have already drawn attention to Heidegger's observation that our relationships with other 
people differ from relationships with impersonal objects insofar as other people, unlike 
impersonal objects, have, like us, their own worlds of signification; worlds of signification 
of which other people, including us, are part: "Being-in is Being-with Others [and] Their 
Being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with" (Heidegger, 1962 [1926]: 155). 
Therefore, as Polt (1999) points out, each person's encounter with other people comprises a 
mutual engagement of worlds of signification, within which both parties have significance 
for one another. Again, Heidegger is on shared ground with Sartre: whereas Sartre describes 
a subject as a "for itself' entity who, through interpersonal contact, encounters other "for 
themselves" entities, Heidegger describes meetings of the separate worlds of signification 
that necessarily characterise separate Dasein. The difference between Sartre and Heidegger, 
though, lies in Heidegger's presentation of contrasting attitudes that one Dasein, or one 
subject, may adopt towards another. 
The nature of "care" or "concern" which characterises this intersubjective relationship with 
other Dasein is referred to by Heidegger as solicitude. And Heidegger differentiates two 
extreme kinds of solicitude: an inauthentic mode and an authentic mode; "one which leaps 
in and dominates and one which leaps forth and liberates" (1962 [1926]: 159). Inauthentic 
solicitude would occur if one Dasein were to 
take away 'care' from the Other and put itself in his position of concern: it can leap in for 
him. This kind of solicitude takes over from the Other that with which he is to concern 
himself. The Other is thus thrown out of his own position; he steps back so that afterwards, 
when the matter has been attended to, he can either take it over as something finished and at 
his disposal, or disburden himself of it completely. (ibid, 1962 [1926]: 158). 
Now, inauthentic solicitude is not presented by Heidegger as a necessarily vindictive 
endeavour. For one person's solicitude towards another to be described as inauthentic need 
not imply malevolent intent. Indeed, Heidegger's depiction of inauthentic solicitude seems 
as apposite to altruistic paternalism as it is to self-interested domination. Any negative 
quality derives not from a presupposition of manipulative or exploitative intent but from the 
suppression of the other's agency. 
In contrast to this inauthentic extreme is the other, authentic extreme of solicitude; a 
relationship that is facilitative, rather than suppressive, of agency. For Heidegger, authentic 
solicitude comprises: 
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a kind of solicitude that does not so much leap in for the other as leap ahead of him in his 
existential potentiality-for Being, not in order to take away his 'care' but rather to give it 
back to him authentically as such for the first time . . . it helps the other to become 
transparent to himself in his care and to become free for it (1962 [1926]: 159). 
Heidegger thus presents as authentic solicitude as an interpersonal relationship in which one 
party enables authenticity in the other; a relationship in which one helps the other to come 
to terms with their autonomy. Whereas inauthentic solicitude is suppressive of agency, 
authentic solicitude has a liberating quality: it puts the other in touch with their own 
authenticity. 
For Heidegger, then, Being necessarily involves Being-with others and it would be 
inauthentic of us to repudiate the influence that those others have on our self understanding. 
Furthermore, Heidegger proposes that we are prone to respond to this interdependence in an 
overly dependent manner: to "disburden" our agentic potentiality; to "fall" in the direction 
taken by others rather than self-reflexively asserting our own autonomy; to lose ourselves in 
"average-ness". Given the lure of this "dictatorship of the 'they"' (Heidegger, 1962 [1926]: 
164), we are more amenable to inauthentic solicitude on the part of other people than we are 
to authentic solicitude. However, this need not be the case. Although inauthentic solicitude 
is the easier and more attractive option, the capacity resides within each of us to grasp our 
own agency. Furthermore, the capacity also lies within each of us to adopt an attitude of 
authentic, rather than inauthentic solicitude towards others, thus putting them in touch with 
their own authenticity rather than, out of either repressive malignance or paternalistic care 
for their interests, stepping in to undermine their agency. 
Now, in describing the place that Heidegger holds out for an authentically facilitative form 
of intersubjective relationship I am not imputing t~ him approbation of it. Despite his 
apparent commendation of authenticity, Heidegger's is not an explicitly ethical 
undertaking: he is more concerned with the ontological nature of Being than with normative 
ethics. Indeed, unlike Sartre, who "condemns and approves with the confidence of a pope" 
(Danto, 1975: 144), Heidegger adopts a notably non-prescriptive stance. Nevertheless, in 
drawing attention to the facilitative potential of intersubjective relationships, Heidegger 
points towards an alternative to the necessarily conflictual picture painted by Sartre. He 
therefore offers part of the foundation upon which his one time protegee, Jiirgen 
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Habermas13, builds the systematic valorisation of intersubjective ethics that I will review in 
the next chapter14• 
Concluding Comments 
Existentialism's stark message for leaders is that there are no universally valid principles 
against which they can measure the moral probity of their actions and decisions. Morality is 
not a matter of conformity to principles; it is a matter of individual commitment. Therefore, 
leaders who wish to follow a moral course of action must do without external guidance; 
they must come to terms with their own moral authorship. However, this does not entail 
amoralism. Nor does it validate moral egotism. Just because conventionally prescribed, 
moral principles can offer no irrefutable guidance for organizational leadership it does not 
follow that organizations are morality-free zones. Nor does existentialism legitimise the 
unbridled pursuit of self-interest by those in charge. Existentialism does not invalidate the 
notion of morality; it simply places the onus of moral authorship fairly and squarely on the 
shoulders of agent. Applied to the domain of leadership, existentialism would call upon 
leaders to acknowledge this responsibility; to grasp the moral freedom that it entails and to 
continually reaffirm their own freedom by making and remaking choices. 
Existentialism's preoccupation with authenticity holds some particularly important 
implications for organizational leadership. To follow Heidegger's and Sartre's injunction, 
leaders need to come to terms with their relationship of mutual signification with their 
context. They must acknowledge that the facticity of their situation provides their being 
with significance but that they are nevertheless free to interpret and attribute meaning to the 
detail of that situation. They may have compelling reasons for acting in certain ways, but it 
is up to them to decide whether or not these reasons for action should become causes of 
action. 
On the one hand, leaders must concede their "thrownness"; their "attunement"; their 
"facticity": that their outlook on the world and their responses to that outlook are partly 
13 Although Habermas was a student ofHeidegger's their association became strained and eventually 
ended as a consequence of Habermas's despair at his former mentor's failure to repudiate his 
acquiescence to Nazi rule in the Germany of the 1930s and 1940s (Matustik, 2001). 
14 Emmanuel Levinas also presents an understanding of intersubjectivity which differs markedly 
from that of Sartre. According to Bauman (1993), Levinas not only locates the roots of the moral 
sense in encounters with the "face" of the "other"; he also understands that we only achieve true self-
hood through such encounters. For Levinas, ''the self may be born only out of union. It is through 
stretching myself towards the other that I have become the unique, the only, the irreplaceable self 
that I am" (Bauman, 1993: 77). 
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shaped by their prior experiences and the experiences of the community of which they are 
part. For those who lead within business organizations, the expectations of managerialist 
performativity may figure prominently in that facticity. Their agendas are likely to be 
significantly shaped by the conventions of the business context and by the associated 
expectations of their social and professional peers. Furthermore, they cannot overlook the 
extent to which their own material circumstances, along with those of their dependents, are 
tied in with conformity to those conventions. Those who lead in alternative organizational 
contexts may be less securely shakled to the imperatives of capitalist enterprise, but their 
outlooks will nevertheless be influenced by the preoccupations of those people who shape 
their respective organizational agendas. Both Sartre and Heidegger alert us to the need to 
acknowledge these influences; this facticity of our situation. To do otherwise would not 
only be inauthentic; it would also be unrealistic. Furthermore, reflection on their facticity 
may also serve an important supplementary purpose for leaders: it may illuminate for them 
the extent to which their own thought processes, priorities and judgements are shaped by 
the circles within which they live and work. 
On the other hand, if leaders are to avoid Heideggerian inauthenticity or Sartrean bad faith 
then, as well as acknowledging the facticity of their circumstances, they must also grasp 
their agentic capacity to interpret, to respond to and to transcend that facticity in relation to 
their future potentialities for being. The material and social circumstances that characterise 
their role and their profession may shape their leadership agendas but they are always free 
to choose how they respond to those influences. So, although the economic realities of 
capitalist enterprise may shape the agendas of business leaders, moral choices are still theirs 
to make. They and only they are accountable for those choices and for their consequences. 
Similarly, leaders in the public and charitable sectors may be subjected to the broader 
imperatives that characterise their organizational contexts, but their responses to those 
imperatives are no more pre-determined than those of business leaders. Other, more 
powerful actors may disagree with and negate the choices that leaders make. Leaders' 
moral agendas may thus be frustrated. In extreme circumstances, fealty to their moral 
commitments may even undermine leaders' job tenure or their career prospects. 
Nevertheless, those moral choices are still the leader's to make. 
Phrases such as "I had no choice" or "I had to do what was expected of me" therefore have 
no place in existentialist ethics. For Heidegger, such phases would be manifestations of 
"disburdening" and of "averageness"; of renouncing ones agentic capacity for autonomy; of 
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blending in with ones intersubjective context.15 For Sartre they would represent "bad faith"; 
an anguished denial of ones irrevocable moral autonomy. Existentially moral leaders are 
those who take responsibility for their decisions. They make decisions in response to the 
depth of their moral commitment; not in response to the expectations of their role. They 
accord with Nietzsche's depiction of a Zarathustran super person whose sense of moral 
ownership acknowledges only the "mighty sage", the "unknown commander" that is self 
(Nietzsche, 2003 [1885]: 62). 
I have discussed so far how existentialism venerates commitment and choice in leaders. 
However, leadership necessarily involves a relationship with followers and if commitment 
and authenticity on the part of the leader are to be accorded value, then so must they be 
desirable on the part of those who are led. Kierkegaard draws attention to the self-affirming 
quality of choice: its quality lies not in the nature of its outcomes but in the commitment 
with which it is made. And if committed choice has inherent value, that inherent value must 
pertain as much to choices made by followers as to choices made by leaders. The emphasis 
that Heidegger and Sartre's place on authenticity must surely apply as much to followers as 
it does to leaders: if moral leadership calls upon leaders to come to terms with their own 
autonomy, it must also call upon them to put followers in touch with their autonomy. In 
Heideggerian terminology, if leaders are to avoid "disburdening" their own agentic 
capacity, they should also respect the need for followers to avoid blending into the 
"averageness" of their intersubjective context. 
Existentialist analysis of moral leadership must therefore take into account the extent to 
which leaders enable committed moral choices and facilitate authenticity in those who they 
lead. Different existentialist perspectives would entail contrasting responses to this 
requirement. Nietzsche's elitist and deterministic appraisal implies that those exceptionally 
gifted "super men", whose privileged talents and whose realisation of their own superior 
capability stands them apart from the common herd, should assert themselves over "lower 
types" in order to evoke the flourishing of humanity. Nietzsche would have no truck for the 
notion of super men facilitating authenticity in lesser mortals. However, this is not the 
conclusion towards which Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre push us. Unlike Nietzsche's 
deterministic elitism, these other existentialist contributions are incompatible with 
psychological or physiological determinism. Although our circumstances may be shaped by 
our facticity, we are nevertheless free to choose how we respond to that facticity; in effect, 
15 Heidegger's widely criticised, wartime •'•silence", during which he declined to object to Nazi 
policies and was promoted to the senior academic role vacated by the removal of his Jewish 
erstwhile mentor, Edmund Husserl, might be interpreted as an instance of his own disburdening of 
agentic responsibility. 
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to choose what we are. And if coming to terms with our own autonomy is to be valued, 
there seems to be no basis, unless we accept Nietzsche's elitist exclusionism, for us not to 
place similar worth in evocation of authenticity in all other people. This, then, seems to be a 
key existentialist criterion of moral leadership: that the leader encourages followers to grasp 
their own moral autonomy, thus facilitating authenticity and the avoidance of bad faith in 
those followers. Existentialist leadership, then, has decidedly facilitative connotations. 
Now, here we confront a difficulty, because contested moral authorship presents a possible 
terrain of conflict amongst followers and between leaders and followers. Indeed, for Sartre, 
intersubjective tension is unavoidable. Whereas Heidegger warns of the dangers of 
"averageness" but nevertheless leaves space for authentic intersubjective relationships, 
intersubjectivity for Sartre involves an inevitable battle of wills: each "for-itself' will 
inevitably seek to reduce all other "for-themselves" to "in-itself' status; each subject will 
inevitably seek to objectify other subjects. And just as each seeks to objectify others; her or 
his own subjectivity is challenged by the subjectivity of those others. The presence of other 
"for-themselves" will necessarily challenge each and every "for-itself-ness", seeking to 
make of it an "in-itself'. Intersubjective engagement thus entails, for Sartre, confrontation 
between competing authorships; confrontation from which the only escape is inauthenticity 
in all but one of the parties. 
If we adopt the Sartrean analysis then, leader-follower relationships will necessarily involve 
tension between the autonomy of the leader and that of followers. In order to achieve 
authenticity, leaders must necessarily impose their own autonomy, their own version of 
moral truth, over the competing versions of their followers. Successful leadership cannot be 
a facilitative endeavour: it can only result in the suppression of followers' authenticity. 
Sartre thus points towards an unfortunately Nietzschean impasse. Given Sartre's conflictual 
analysis of intersubjectivity, a battle of Nietzschean Wills to Power seems the most likely 
scenario; a battle in which successful leaders will be those who succeed in impressing their 
autonomy as moral authors over and above the autonomy of their followers. Only thus can 
they preserve their authenticity: the authenticity of followers must necessarily be sacrificed 
to that of the leader. 
Heidegger, on the other hand, points towards a way out of this impositional impasse. By 
drawing a distinction between authentic solicitude, which facilitates agency, and inauthentic 
solicitude, which suppresses it, Heidegger leaves room for leaders to realise their own 
authenticity whilst also enabling authenticity in those who they lead. Whereas inauthentic 
solicitude, undertaken either in the interests of benevolent paternalism or dictatorial 
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repression, is necessarily emasculatory, authentic solicitude offers a template for 
empowerment. It is this model of facilitative leadership that I will develop in more detail 
during the course of next chapter. 
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3.3 INTERSUBJECTIVIST ETHICS AND LEADERSHIP 
Intersubjectivist theory offers a basis for evaluating leadership ethics that differs from both 
of those considered so far. Principle-based ethics seeks to identify universally valid 
foundations of moral legitimacy, while existentialism proposes that no such basis can exist 
and that each individual is the author of his or her own standards of moral rightness. While 
the former tends towards an objectivist meta-ethic, the latter offers a basis for relativism. 
Intersubjectivist ethics, on the other hand, is neither objectivist nor relativist: it holds that 
moral probity does not comprise correspondence with objectively existing standards but 
neither is it a matter of individual construction on the part of the agent. According to the 
intersubjectivist position that I will elaborate here16, moral rightness is created and 
sustained through processes of ongoing dialogue. A moral leader, according to this 
particular intersubjectivist position, would thus be a person who facilitates and responds to 
the outcomes of such dialogical processes. 
In presenting this third ontological possibility, proponents of intersubjectivist ethics 
challenge the assertion that the dualism of objectivism and relativism exhausts the range of 
meta-ethical options. This limited, dualistic understanding, according to Alasdair 
Maclntyre (1985 [1981]), is manifested by the slide into emotivism which succeeded what 
he refers to as the Failure of the Enlightenment Project. Maclntyre describes how, in 
response to the quest for rationally apprehended, objective standards which characterises 
modernity, Enlightenment philosophers sought to identify universally-applicable moral 
rules by which human behaviour could be judged. Failure to reach consensus on such 
objective ethical standards drove later theorists to take recourse in relativist philosophies 
such as existentialism. It seemed to these commentators that, since there can be no objective 
standards of right and wrong, moral legitimacy can only reside in the subjective 
commitment of each individual. It was assumed that either ethical objectivity exists, so 
human behaviour can be evaluated in accordance with conformity to its standards, or that 
all moral evaluation is a matter of individual judgement. This analysis overlooks the third 
ontological possibility, which underpins the intersubjectivist stance: that the ethical 
legitimacy of actions, states of affairs and decisions derives from the nature of the processes 
by which they are brought about. 
16 Habennas is by no means the only person to propose an intersubjectivist ethic and, in focusing on 
his work, I will either exlude or only make peripheral reference to a range of alternative perspectives. 
In concentrating on Habennas's work, I am not necessarily inferring its superiority over these other 
stances; just that it offers a comprehensive, systematic and particularly compelling rationale. 
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In order to elaborate an intersubjectivist stance, I will begin by reflecting on how virtue 
ethics points us in the direction of intersubjectivist theory. I will then describe how Jiirgen 
Habennas, in his discussion of social theory (1987 [1968]; 1974 [1963), communication 
(1979 [1976]; 1984 [1981]; 1987 [1981]) and discourse ethics (1990 [1983]; 2001 [1994]), 
develops aspects of the Aristotelian tradition upon which virtue theory is premised in order 
to present some processual conditions to which discursive engagement needs to confonn in 
order to provide a source of moral legitimacy. 
Virtue Ethics: Pointing the Way towards Intersubjectivism 
Virtue ethics theory proposes that the moral probity of our actions can be judged in relation 
to their confonnity to the standards of virtue that prevail within our community. Stated as 
simply as that, virtue theory seems to offer a relativist analysis of morality. If morality is to 
be judged purely in relation to the ethical nonns that are accepted within a particular 
community, then surely this pushes us towards the Nietzschean understanding that I 
reviewed in the last chapter. However, virtue ethicists avoid the slide into cultural 
relativism by emphasising certain characteristics of communities whose value systems are 
thus accorded moral legitimacy. Those characteristics feature prominently in the 
descriptions of virtue offered by Aristotle (1999 [334-322BC]), the writer whose moral and 
political philosophy has inspired contemporary virtue theory. As far as Aristotle was 
concerned, moral behaviour is behaviour which confonns to the virtuous standards of the 
community within which he lived. That community was the Ancient Greek city-state of 
Athens17• And the characteristic of Athens in the 4th century BC which, for Aristotle, lent 
moral legitimacy to its standards of virtue was the involvement of its citizens in the key 
decisions which affected them. For the Athenian political system comprised a type of direct 
democracy in which the citizens regularly met to discuss and decide on how the city-state 
was to be run.18 
Aristotle considered our capacity to participate in direct democratic processes to be a 
defining characteristic of humanity. He believed that this capacity for political participation 
distinguishes us from other sentient creatures and thus offers a foundation for the attribution 
17 Although Aristotle was originally from Macedonia and spent an extended period in his home state 
as personal tutor to the young Alexander, he studied and taught philosophy in Athens. Athens clearly 
had a significant impact on his political and moral philosophy. 
18 The democratic purity of ancient Athenian politics was partly undermined by the exclusion of 
women from the political process and by its institutional dependency on slavery - slaves were also 
excluded from political decision making. Nevertheless, Aristotle's restricted defmition of citizenship 
should not divert attention from the overriding principle of his political and moral philosophy: that 
all citizens should be included in decision making that affected them. 
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of moral probity. However, it is important to note that Aristotle does not attribute the 
morally legitimising force of direct democracy to its efficacy in identifying moral 
outcomes. If this were his stance, he would be adopting an objectivist perspective: he would 
be assuming that there is an objectively "right way" and that direct democracy is the most 
effective way of identifying that right way. Butthis is not Aristotle's position. For Aristotle, 
the fact that an issue has been decided upon by all those who it affects confers moral 
legitimacy on its outcome. Direct democracy is not a means of identifying moral probity; it 
is a means of conferring moral probity. 
More recently, Alasdair Maclntyre (1985 [1981], 1988), virtue theory's most influential 
contemporary advocate, has suggested that the standards of virtue that prevail within a 
community, or "tradition", are partly legitimised by the extent to which that tradition is 
open to engagement with the competing moral perspectives of other traditions.19 Maclntyre 
(1988) is particularly keen to emphasise the importance of imaginative engagement. He 
points out that merely listening to other people's views may not provide an adequate basis 
for understanding those views. In order to really understand other people, we need to try to 
"get inside" their perspective; to make a proactive effort to see things on their terms rather 
than on our terms. 
In the writing of Aristotle and Maclntyre, then, discourse is offered as a foundation of 
moral legitimacy. Both writers propose that the moral legitimacy of the standards of virtue 
that prevail within a particular community of thought derives from the extent to which that 
community of thought is prepared to critically reflect on its moral agenda and to open its 
moral perspective to imaginative engagement with alternative, competing perspectives. 
Although not generally identified with virtue themy0, Habermas (1979 [1976]; 1984 
[1981]; 1987 [1981]; 1990 [1983]; 2001 [1994]) follows the Aristotelian lead, offering a 
systematic philosophical justification for intersubjectivist ethics and also spelling out some 
of the procedural conditions to which discourse would need to conform in order to confer 
moral legitimacy on its outcomes. 
· 
19 Virtue theory, as interpreted by Maclntyre, has a great deal more than this to say about business 
ethics. Other notable insights are Maclntyre's Weberian-influenced critique of the amoralism that 
pervades management thought, to which I will refer in my concluding chapter, and his distinction 
between practices and institutions in relation to business. These are elaborated by Beadle and Moore 
(2006). Furthermore, Robert Solomon (1993) illuminates the benefits of considering business and 
virtue through the Aristotelian lens of telos, or purpose. For the present undertaking, though, I 
consider Aristotle and Maclntyre's common focus on dialogue to be virtue theory's most significant 
contribution. 
20 Indeed, although he acknowledges his own debt to Aristotle, Habermas is quite critical of some 
branches of what he refers to as "neo-Aristotelianism", particularly those which eo-opt Aristotelian 
theory to support conservative agendas. 
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A Normative Role for Social Theory 
One of Habermas's early preoccupations (1987 [1968]; 1974 [1963) was to establish a 
normative role for social theory and to define a form of rationality that is apposite to the 
fulfilment of that role. He thus sought to augment the positivist rationality that pervades the 
knowledge domain of natural science and the hermeneutic rationality that he considers 
apposite to the domain of social science. For Habermas, normative social theory is 
concerned with critical-emancipatory knowledge. Its task is critical reflection. It seeks to 
go beyond control and interpretation in order to carry out a normative role. Its aim is not 
just to chart the nature of existing states but to "determine when theoretical statements 
grasp invariant regularities of social action and when they express ideologically frozen 
relations of dependence that can in principle be transformed" (1987 [1968]: 310). Habermas 
thus follows in the tradition of critical theory, which draws upon writers such as Kant and 
Hegel, Marx and Weber, and which includes the theorists of the Frankfurt School, in 
seeking to establish a social theory which goes beyond the realms of positivist science and 
hermeneutic enquiry. 
For Habermas, the validity of truths within the domain of critical-emancipatory knowledge 
derives from their efficacy in meeting the needs that pertain within that domain: he 
describes those needs as "progress toward the autonomy of the individual, with the 
elimination of suffering and the furthering of concrete happiness" (1974 [1963]) 254). This 
is a conception of truth which "does not improve the manipulation of things and of 
reifications, but which instead advances the interest of reason in human adulthood, in the 
autonomy of action and in the liberation from dogmatism" (ibid; 256). Habermas's critical 
social theory thus shares a common agenda with social and political philosophy: critical 
social science "is determined by an emancipatory cognitive interest. Critically oriented 
sciences share this interest with philosophy" (1987 [1968]: 310). In particular, critical social 
theory treads the same ground as applied moral philosophy in exploring the normative 
legitimacy of political and social structures and in seeking to loosen the constraints which 
inhibit progress along the path towards human enlightenment. 
Habermas is aware that the viability of a critical social theory is dependent upon some basis 
of rationality by which the truths that it reveals can be validated. This is problematic for two 
reasons. On the one hand, the pervasive influence of empirical-analytic, natural scientific 
method has led to an expectation that all forms of knowledge be amenable to positivistic 
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verification. Since positivistic verification is unattainable in relation to critical-
emancipatory knowledge, the very possibility of such knowledge is cast into doubt. 
On the other hand, the possibility of critical-emancipatory knowledge is also under attack 
from the terrain of historical-hermeneutic social science. This is because the hermeneutic 
agenda seems incompatible with the notion of normative critique. A key supposition of the 
hermeneutic endeavour is that, in order to understand a person's reasons for acting, we must 
be able to identify with those reasons: "only to the extent to which the interpreter also 
grasps the reasons why the author's utterances seem rational to the author himself does he 
understand what the author meant" (1990 [1983]: 30). Now, presumably, all agents have 
reasons to act that are legitimate to them, so if we have truly understood their reasons for 
acting we must have got inside these conditions of legitimacy. Therefore, "there is a sense 
in which any interpretation is a rational interpretation" (ibid: 31). Hermeneutic success 
seems, then, to preclude rational critique, leaving us to conclude that a hermeneutic 
undertaking necessarily commits us to a relativist conception of rationality. 
Therefore, a key task facing Habermas is to counter, on the one hand, positivist calls for 
critical-emancipatory propositions to conform to the same criteria of rationality as 
empirical-analytic knowledge. This is the notion of rationality that underpins Enlightenment 
moral philosophy's absolutist agenda; an endeavour which Habermas believes is doomed to 
failure. On the other hand, he must counter the methodological expectations of the 
historical-hermeneutic domain, which entail that that all forms of rationality must 
necessarily be culturally and historically relative. This is the understanding which, he 
believes has resulted in meta-ethical stances such as that of existentialism. Contrary to the 
implications of empirical-analytic and historical-hermeneutic methodology, Habermas sets 
out to demonstrate the existence of a critical rationality which can claim universal 
legitimacy whilst avoiding objectivist pretensions; a critical rationality which will permit us 
to declare that, although a person has reasons to act, these reasons may not be rational from 
a critical-emancipatory perspective. 
Importantly, Ha berm as's project is not to refute the legitimacy of positivist and hermeneutic 
rationality in relation to their respective knowledge domains, for he considers each to be 
pragmatically apposite to the realisation of those human needs that it seeks to satisfy. It is, 
rather, to establish the legitimacy of an alternative form of rationality that is apposite to the 
domain of critical-emancipatory knowledge. As Thomas McCarthy (1984) puts it, he thus 
hopes to provide the basis for redirection, rather than abandonment, of the project of 
modernity. Habermas takes a far more positive view of modernity and the Enlightenment 
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than do some of his Frankfurt School predecessors (e.g. Adomo and Horkheimer, 1997 
[1944]). He applauds the achievements of empirical-analytic knowledge over the last few 
centuries as well as the more recent developments in historical-hermeneutic method. 
Furthermore, although he believes that the pathway to even greater enlightenment lies in 
carving out a separate terrain for critical-emancipatory rationality, the establishment of this 
separate terrain can benefit from selective appropriation from the empirical-analytic and 
historical-hermeneutic knowledge domains. Just as the methodological presuppositions of 
those domains can deflect from the achievement of critical-emancipatory knowledge, so can 
they contribute to it 
In the empirical-analytic world of natural science, Habermas observes that attributions of 
scientific truth entail a tacit assumption of rational consensus amongst a scientific 
community. In other words, for a proposition to be considered as scientifically true within a 
community, it is assumed that this proposition would be agreed to by all members of that 
community who are in possession of all relevant information and who are driven only by a 
quest for understanding. Habermas appropriates this idea that unforced, rational consensus 
offers a basis for attributions of "truth". He applies it in order to define those processual 
conditions which constitute the basis for critical-emancipatory legitimacy. Furthermore, 
since the attribution of scientific truth implies liberation from the dogmas and cultural 
prejudices which threaten to undermine rational consensus, it offers a methodological 
precedent for a critical social theory which sets out to clear a pathway towards 
enlightenment by dismantling those ideological barriers which impede it. 
As far as the historical-hermeneutic domain goes, hermeneutic understanding can only be 
achieved through dialectical interplay between the interpreter and that which is interpreted: 
the interpreter constitutes meaning and is in turn constituted by that meaning, so that 
interpreter and interpreted confront one another in the manner of interfacing mirrors. This 
process of dialectical creation of meaning presents a template for the dialogical 
establishment of shared normative understanding by which, according to Habermas, 
critical-emancipatory knowledge is legitimised. Most importantly, the historical-
hermeneutic focus on understanding is fundamental to the achievement of critical-
emancipatory knowledge, and it is the achievement of shared understanding which provides 
the major preoccupation ofHabermas's later work. 
In elaborating his processual model of moral legitimation, Habermas acknowledges his debt 
to Lawrence Kohlberg and Jean Pia get, for his model conforms to the assumptions of these 
theorists in two important respects. Firstly, the models of developmental moral psychology 
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proposed by both Kohlberg and Piaget offer a processual, rather than a substantive, 
conception of moral legitimation. That is, the validation of moral truth which they propose 
rests not on empirically verifiable correspondence to some supposed ontological reality but 
on the quality of the processes by which that truth is derived. This processual validation is, 
for Habermas, a key characteristic of the "constructivist concept of/earning ... [that is, that] 
knowledge in general can be analysed as a product of a learning process" (1990 [1983]: 33). 
In Habermas's case, normative legitimacy lies not in conformity to some absolute standards 
of substantive outcome but in relation to the quality of the dialogical processes by which 
that outcome is achieved. 
A second enlightening feature of Kohlberg and Piaget's systems is their suggestion that 
those who are involved in a learning process can judge the inadequacy of an earlier stage of 
development from the position of enhanced critical insight that is afforded by having 
reached a later stage: ''the learner can explain, in the light of his second interpretation, why 
his first interpretation is false" (1990 [1983]: 34), and "a subject who moves from one stage 
to the next should be able to explain why his higher stage judgements are more adequate 
than those at lower stages" (ibid: 3 8). Habermas appropriates this "internal logic of an 
'irreversible learning process" (ibid: 35) by proposing that the perspectives which result 
from processes of dialogical engagement are necessarily superior to those which precede 
such engagement. 
Emphasis on the Social Nature of Humanity 
I have so far outlined Habermas model for a critical social theory. I have described how he 
differentiates the knowledge that it provides from that offered by both positivist natural 
science and hermeneutic social science. I have also explained how Habermas's critical 
social theory productively draws on certain aspects of these other two knowledge domains. 
Notwithstanding those commentators (e.g. Giddens, 1985) who lament the discontinuity 
between Habermas's earlier work and that which follows his so-called "linguistic turn" 
(Pusey, 1984), I propose that his elaboration of critical social theory provides a background 
for the increasingly explicit discussion of normative ethics that characterises his work after 
the early 1980s. I have begun to outline the latter by explaining how Habermas identifies, in 
developmental moral psychology, a test case for a model of moral legitimation which is 
processual and which appeals to the enhanced insights enabled by retrospective 
comparison. I will now outline the steps taken by Habermas to present his notion of 
communicative rationality as a source of moral legitimation. 
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In contrast to the individualistic focus of a great deal of principle-based and existentialist 
theory, Habermas emphasises the social constitution of humankind. In focusing on the 
social nature of the human condition, Habermas is not presenting a novel idea, for this same 
understanding defines Aristotelian moral and political philosophy. However, along with 
contemporary Aristotelian-inspired theorists such as Maclntyre (1985 [1981]), Taylor 
(1991) and Walzer (1995), Habermas proposes that the social understanding that had 
underpinned Classical theory has been lost to the modern era. Modern moral philosophy is 
thus premised upon atomistic individualism. Maclntyre attributes the Failure of the 
Enlightenment Project to this deficiency. According to Maclntyre, the principle-based 
theorists of the Enlightenment were as scientists trying to piece together the incomplete 
fragments of a once complete system of thought. Their vain efforts at reconstruction could 
only end in failure because they were deprived of the vital ingredient that gave this system 
unity and meaning: the Aristotelian focus on humanity's social predicament. Habermas 
(1974 [1963]; 1990 [1983]) also describes the fundamental error of Enlightenment 
philosophers as lying in their individualist presuppositions; their conception of men and 
women as independent rather than as interdependent creatures. And the emotivist stances 
that have superseded the breakdown of principle-based ethics fare no better: by privileging 
the subjective over the intersubjective or by casting intersubjectivity as necessarily 
conflictual, existentialists are as culpable of marginalising humanity's social character as 
are their Enlightenment predecessors. 
It is important to emphasise the contrast between the social understanding which informs 
Habermas's intersubjectivist ethics and that which underpins certain other perspectives 
which also claim fealty to social presuppositions but which reach different conclusions 
from Habermas. Firstly, a distinction needs to be drawn between the intersubjectivist 
position and the understanding which underpins the social contract theories reviewed 
earlier. Social contract theory seeks to establish a basis for the validity of the rules which 
govern men and women in society. However, this endeavour tends to start from the premise 
that humans are, by nature, solitary creatures who surrender their independence and some of 
its associated liberties in order to enjoy the fruits of social living. It thus commences from 
an atomistic rather than a social understanding of people. Social contract theory seeks to 
rationalise social arrangements in terms of the satisfaction of the economic and political 
needs of individuals. As Michael Walzer notes, it thereby gets things back to front, since it 
fails to acknowledge that: "we are by nature social, before we are political or economic 
beings" (1995: 16). 
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A second school of socially-oriented moral and political theory focuses on the creation and 
sustenance of social capital. Social capital is generally used to describe the relations which 
exist between individuals within families and communities and the extent to which these 
relations can bring about desirable states of affairs. Thus, Coleman describes the 
contribution of social capital to levels of educational achievement (Marshall, 1994) while 
Szreter (2001) proposes that, in order to achieve the perceived benefits of economic 
prosperity, organizations and governments need to attend to the development and 
sustenance of social capital rather than focussing uniquely on financial, human and bio-
physical capital. The common assumption in these positions is that the value of social 
capital lies in its capacity to bring about desirable ends: social capital is regarded as a 
necessary means to the achievement of ends which are, in themselves, considered to be 
morally estimable. As Taylor describes it: "the relationship is [seen as] secondary to the 
self-realisation of the partners" (1991: 43). Taylor explains the difference between this and 
the intersubjectivist position as that between needing relationships to fulfil ourselves and 
needing relationships to define ourselves: "I negotiate [my identity] through dialogue, partly 
overt, partly internalised, with others . . . . my own identity crucially depends on my 
dialogical relations with others" (1991: 47-48). In Habermas's terms, "membership in such 
an ideal community is . . . constitutive of both the I as universal and the I as individual" 
(1987 [1981]): 148). 
Thirdly, it is important to note that, in emphasising the social constitution of humanity, 
Habermas is not offering an essentialist analysis. As Douglas Kellner (1989) points out, 
Habermas eschews the essentialism that underpins those Marxian perspectives that share his 
social preoccupation. In his social emphasis and his subsequent focus on communication, 
Habermas is not seeking to define the "true essence" of human nature. He is simply echoing 
Aristotle's (1999 [334-322BC]) observation that people live in social groups, they always 
have done and they probably always will do. Therefore, any normative critique of human 
affairs must be built upon that premise. 
In summary, Habermasian and neo-Aristotelian perspectives share a common focus on the 
social constitution of humanity which is opposed to the atomistic individualism which 
informs a great deal of Enlightenment theory. The uniquely Habermasian edifice, which is 
constructed upon this social analysis, is his focus on the importance of the achievement of 
understanding through communication, and his elaboration of a framework of 
communicative action which enables this. 
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Communicative Action, its Criticality to Social Existence and its Primacy over 
Strategic Action 
For Habermas, communication is fundamental to those social relations which are an 
ineluctable aspect of the human condition. Without communication, it would not be 
possible to establish the bases of understanding and cooperation upon which social relations 
depend. Communication can take two different forms, each of which enables the 
achievement of a contrasting purpose. The first of these forms is referred to by Habermas as 
communicative action, which seeks to establish shared understanding. The second is 
strategic action, which is aimed at manipulating our environments and putting them to 
effective use. Since even strategic action needs to be socially coordinated, Habermas 
suggests that we must acknowledge the wider communication structures within which this 
coordination is located and upon which it depends. We are not able to achieve our strategic 
goals unless we first establish shared bases of understanding: "if the hearer failed to 
understand what the speaker was saying, a strategically acting speaker would not be able to 
bring the hearer, by means of communicative acts, to behave in the desired way" (1984 
[1981]: 293). Habermas concludes that communicative action, carried out in an endeavour 
to achieve shared understanding, is therefore the primary role of communication. Strategic 
action, on the other hand, is a derivative usage that is dependent upon achievement of this 
primary role. For Habermas then, "reaching' understanding is the inherent telos of human 
speech. . . . The concepts of speech and understanding reciprocally interpret one another" 
(Habermas, 1984 [1981]: 287). 
Comrimnicative action is therefore integral to the human condition. Given the inescapability 
of this proposition, we can work towards a notion of communicative rationality which can 
offer a basis for normative legitimacy: 
If we assume that the human species maintains itself through the socially coordinated 
activities of its members and that this coordination is established through communication -
and in certain spheres of life, through communication aimed at reaching agreement - then 
the reproduction of the species also requires satisfying the conditions of rationality inherent 
in communicative action (1984 [1981]: 397). 
According to Habermas, communication involves the raising and challenging of validity 
claims by participants in discourse. When each person speaks, that person raises certain 
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validity claims, which the listener can either accept or reject. Habermas illustrates this idea, 
and also further demonstrates the primacy of communicative action over strategic action, by 
drawing upon John Austin's (1961) analysis of different dimensions of a speech act. 
According to Austin, a speech act contains three different, but often interrelated, 
dimensions: the locutionary, the illocutionary and the perlocutionary. The locutionary 
dimension refers to the expression of a state of affairs. So, in saying something, a speaker 
makes an assertion about something in the world. The illocutionary dimension refers to the 
action that a speaker performs in saying something, such as making a confession, making a 
promise, avowing a commitment or issuing a command. The perlocutionary dimension 
refers to the effect that the speaker has in performing the speech act. By carrying out a 
speech act he or she thus brings about something in the world. Habermas summarises that 
"the three acts that Austin distinguishes can be characterised in the foiiowing catch phrases: 
to say something, to act in saying something, to bring about something through acting in 
saying something" (1984 [1981]: 289). 
In performing a speech act, Habermas proposes that a speaker raises validity claims 
pertaining to each of these three dimensions. On a locutionary dimension, the speech act 
appeals to the existence of a shared basis of factual understanding. On an illocutionary 
dimension, it appeals to shared norms by which the performance of the speech act is 
legitimised. And on a perlocutionary dimension, it appeals to a shared understanding of the 
speaker's purpose in carrying out the speech act. Unless shared understanding is reached 
across locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary dimensions, the coordination upon 
which intersubjectivist agreement depends has not been achieved. 
In order to ensure the achievement of shared understanding, the validity claims which are 
raised by the speaker across each dimension must be subject to chailenge by the listener. 
Chaiienging validity claims is essential to communicative action: it enables participants in 
communication to establish mutuaily agreed premises. Communicative action involves 
"cooperative processes of interpretation [in which] no participant has a monopoly on 
correct interpretation" (Habermas, 1987 [1981]: 100). So when a divergence arises between 
situation definitions, "the interpretive task consists in incorporating the others interpretation 
of the situation in such a way that ... the divergent situation definitions can be brought to 
coincide sufficiently" (ibid: 1 00). Communicative action thus enables a meeting of 
lifeworld commitments, where lifeworld is understood as the "more or less diffuse, always 
unproblematic, background convictions ... [which] serves as a source or situation definitions 
that are presupposed by participants as unproblematic" (Habermas, 1984 [1981]: 70). It also 
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permits differences in the lifeworld commitments of participants in communication to be 
recognised and negotiated. 
For Habermas, then, achieving understanding through communication is not about 
linguistic familiarisation but, ultimately, it is about raising validity claims and being able to 
challenge the validity claims raised by others upon each of the three dimensions of a speech 
act: "The speech act of one person succeeds only if the other accepts the offer contained in 
it by taking (however implicitly) a 'yes' or 'no' position on a validity claim that is in 
principle criticisable." (1984 [1981]: 287). 
Thus, integrating insights from Habermas' earlier and later work, we arrive at the form of 
rationality which is apposite to the domain of critical-emancipatory knowledge and by 
which the validity of the normative and regulative statements that are made within that 
domain is to be judged. This is the notion of communicative rationality; a rationality which 
validates moral truths: 
This concept of communicative rationality carries with it connotations based ultimately on 
the central experience of the unconstrained, unifying, consensus-bringing force of 
argumentative speech in which different participants overcome their merely subjective 
views and, owing to the mutuality of rationally motivated conviction, assure themselves of 
both the unity of the objective world and the intersubjectivity of their lifeworld (1984 
[1981]: 10). 
Truth, then, lies in and can only lie in the establishment of shared lifeworld commitments. 
Albrecht Wellmer summarises Habermas's position thus: 
a reflexive conception of human communication according to which validity claims, 
because they can only emerge from the sphere of communication, can also only be 
redeemed in the sphere of human discourse: there are no possible external sources of 
validity, since the sphere of validity is - conceptually is - identical with the sphere of 
human speech (1985: 53). 
Communicative Action and Discourse Ethics 
Habermas thus claims to have presented a transcendental-pragmatic valorisation of 
communicative rationality as the basis for normative critique: pragmatic insofar as it is 
related to the fulfilment of human needs; transcendental, in a Kantian sense, insofar as it 
defines the fundamental presuppositions upon which any endeavour to meet those needs 
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must be premised. It concerns "the general symmetry that every competent speaker who 
believes he is engaging in argumentation must presuppose as actually fulfilled" (Habermas, 
1990 [1983]: 88). This is that of an "unrestricted communication community" (ibid: 88) in 
which the force of the better argument is allowed to prevail unaffected by external or 
internal coercion and which "neutralises all motives other than a cooperative search for 
truth" (ibid: 89). 
Habermas acknowledges that this ideal speech situation is indeed an ideal, since we rarely 
engage in communication in a state of disinterested neutrality. Communication is usually 
situated within strategic contexts insofar as we communicate in order to bring something 
about and we generally have some degree of emotional commitment to, or vested interest 
in, the outcome of that communication. Nevertheless, by establishing common ground on 
each of the dimensions of the speech act, non-coerced, shared understanding can still be 
achieved. Specifically, even when acting strategically, as long as validity claims are made 
. apparent by the speaker, as long as all parties to communication are at liberty to challenge 
the validity claims raised by other parties, and as long as such challenges are responded to 
with transparency and sincerity, shared understanding can be reached. 
Habermas expresses the principles of discourse ethics which flow from this analysis of 
communication as follows: 
3.1 Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in the 
discourse 
3.2 a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever. 
b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse. 
c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and needs. 
3.3 No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his 
rights as laid down in 3.1 and 3.2 {1990 [1983]: 89). 
These process rules have a moral content in that they provide a basis for the universalisation 
principle that is a transcendental presupposition of ethical discourse: "everyone who 
seriously tries to discursively redeem normative claims to validity intuitively accepts 
procedural conditions that amount to implicitly acknowledging [this universal principle]" 
(Habermas, 1990 [1983]: 93). Thus, we come to the holy grail of discourse ethics; the 
overriding principle which provides normative legitimacy; "the assertion that the 
philosopher as moral theorist ultimately seeks to justify ... [that is] the transcendental-
pragmatic justification of a rule of argumentation with normative content" (ibid: 94). This is 
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that: "only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of 
all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse" (ibid: 93). 
Habermas draws attention to the formal, as opposed to substantive, nature of this principle 
of discourse ethics. In other words that, in itself, this principle provides no substantive 
guidance but only a process for debating substantive issues. It therefore makes no claims to 
generate justified norms; rather, it offers a process for testing the validity of norms brought 
to it: 
Discourse ethics does not set up substantive orientations. Instead, it establishes a procedure 
based on presuppositions and designed to guarantee the impartiality of the process of 
judging. Practical discourse is a procedure for testing the validity of hypothetical norms, not 
for producing justified norms. It is this proceduralism that sets discourse ethics apart from 
other cognitivist, universalist, and formalist ethical theories (1990 [1983]: 122). 
Habermas also emphasises discourse ethics' reliance on the practical contexts that give 
meaning to those substantive issues: 
It would be utterly pointless to engage in a practical discourse without a horizon provided 
by the lifeworld of a specific social group and without real conflicts in a concrete situation 
in which the actors consider it incumbent upon them to reach a consensual means of 
regulating some controversial social matter (1990 [1983]: 103). 
Broadening the Scope of Communicative Action 
Habermas's model for communicative action has been criticised for sanctioning a particular 
form of rational articulation at the expense of alternative modes of expression. Iris Young 
(1996), for example, suggests that Habermas's emphasis on rational argumentation implies 
exclusive entry to modes of articulation that are emotionally-controlled and logically 
presented. In Young's opinion, a characteristically white, male, upper-class style of 
communicative engagement is thus privileged. Such partiality may marginalise gender, 
ethnic and socio-economic groups that do not conform so readily to Habermas's model of 
rational· articulation. Indeed, certain groups may even self-deselect from communicative 
action as a consequence of an "internalised sense of the right one has to speak or not to 
speak, and from the devaluation of some people's style of speech and the elevation of 
others" (Young, 1996: 122). 
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To avoid restricting the scope of communication in this manner, the range of permissible 
modes ·of expression needs to be broadened: for example, Young suggests that rhetoric, 
storytelling and greeting can each make a valuable contribution to communicative action. 
Of equal, if not greater importance, is sharing the onus of interpretation between the listener 
and the speaker, rather than placing it solely on the latter. Alasdair Maclntyre's (1988) 
discussion of imaginative engagement between traditions suggests that, in order to inhabit 
an unaccustomed cultural position, it is necessary for the interpreter to take proactive steps 
to engage with the manner of its expression. Therefore, although a commitment to personal 
transparency and openness on the part of those contributing to communicative interaction 
may be a necessary condition for undistorted communication, this needs to be augmented 
by a positive effort on the part of all participants to engage with whatever mode of 
expression is favoured by fellow interlocutors. 
Implications for Moral Leadership 
If the moral legitimacy of a state of affairs derives from the processual conditions by which 
that state of affairs comes about, then the role of moral leaders is, firstly, to facilitate such 
legitimising processual conditions and, secondly, to ensure that their own conduct conforms 
to them. More specifically, moral leaders will ensure that the voice of every organizational 
member can be heard; that all can question any assertion, including those made by the 
leader; that all are able to introduce any assertion whatever into discourse; that all are 
permitted to express their attitudes, desires and needs and that no person is prevented, by 
internal or external coercion, from participating in this manner. No participant in discourse 
should be prevented from challenging the validity claims raised by fellow participants. 
Sincerity and mutual understanding on the locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary 
dimensions of speech should be encouraged by the leader. 
Now, discourse within organizations is hardly likely to conform to the disinterested quest 
for shared understanding that Habermas's ideal speech conditions envisage. It seems far 
fetched to expect discussions about organizational objectives and the means by which they 
are to be achieved to be conducted with the detached neutrality of a philosophy seminar. 
Nevertheless, the strategic context of dialogue need not undermine its legitimating force as 
long as all parties are open about any vested interests or emotional attachment that they may 
have to the outcomes of the discussion. Furthermore, there is an onus on leaders not just to 
provide opportunities for diverse perspectives to be expressed and heard but also to enable 
whatever non-standard modes such expression may require. Leaders therefore need to think 
creatively about how such access can be offered within organizations. They should also 
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encourage participants in communication to take responsibility for engaging with the 
perspectives of fellow interlocutors: communicative action should not be seen as a passive 
undertaking; it demands proactive hermeneutic endeavour on the part of all participants, 
including leaders. 
Intersubjectivist moral leadership in organizations clearly has a strong consultative tone. 
Apprehension of the moral legitimacy of a course of action is not a unilateral achievement 
on the part of the leader; it is achieved in relation to the dialogical processes by which that 
course of action has come about. Unlike principle-based and existentialist versions, 
intersubjectively ethical leadership holds no space for unilateralism. Principle-based ethics 
permits leaders to unilaterally asses the moral legitimacy of both the goals towards which 
they lead and the manner in which they build support for these goals. Existentialism also 
has a monological tone, basing moral legitimacy in the commitment of the agent. Unilateral 
decision making and monological legitimisation are precluded by intersubjectivist ethics: 
intersubjectively ethical leadership cannot but be facilitative. 
Organizational leaders who aspire to this facilitative role confront a number of practical 
challenges. Their first task is to ensure an atmosphere that is supportive of the processual 
conditions of ideal speech. This may not be a simple undertaking: organizational members 
may be unwilling to either discard or declare their emotional commitments and hidden 
agendas; issues of power and self-interest may intrude into communicative fora; 
furthermore, participants in communication may find it hard to adopt the requisite attitude 
of imaginative engagement towards their fellow interlocutors. 
In this respect, it should be noted that the intersubjectivist ethic need not preclude the 
application of social influence by the leader. Intersubjectively moral leadership holds a 
place for leaders to shape the organizational context, to encourage certain behaviours and to 
discourage others. However, intersubjectivist ethics demands that social influence be 
applied within clearly defined parameters. Most importantly, it should not be used to bring 
about particular agendas favoured by the leader. It is to be applied only in the interests of 
achieving the processual conditions demanded by the principles of discourse ethics. In its 
ideal form, then, intersubjectivist leadership stands in marked contrast to the popular vision 
of heroic business leaders parachuting into organizations, rallying support for their 
unilaterally-shaped agendas and thus leading the organization, along with those of its 
members who survive this transformational intervention, towards a better future. 
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A second challenge to intersubjectivist leadership concerns the extent to which leader-
follower relationships may be intrinsically inhibitive of the conditions of ideal speech that 
are envisaged by Habermas. No matter how genuinely leaders may advocate the principles 
of discourse ethics, the formal and social dynamics of their relationship with so-called 
followers may influence the latter in such a way that their participation in communication is 
restrained. In particular, followers may be disinclined to challenge the validity claims which 
leaders raise with their own speech acts. Clearly, in encouraging others to respect the 
conditions of ideal speech, leaders need to be sensitive to the potential for distorted 
communication that lies immanent within any such application of social influence on their 
part. 
A further area of difficulty concerns the extent to which mono logically achieved analyses of 
their own behaviour on the part of leaders can claim any degree of legitimacy. Leaders 
need some way of reflecting on and assessing the moral calibre of their own conduct. Yet, 
just as monological definition of an organization's agenda is precluded by the processual 
conditions of intersubjectivist ethics, so is monological assessment of leaders' fealty to 
those conditions precluded. For any such assessment to be valid, it must also be arrived at 
through intersubjectivist discourse undertaken in ideal speech conditions. Each stage of 
discursive engagement, then, needs to be discursively audited by another stage in order to 
confirm that it has conformed to the processually legitimising criteria of discourse ethics. 
Meanwhile, this further stage has, itself, to be similarly legitimated, and so on ad infinitum. 
The very concept of leadership thus becomes a frozen into inaction by the need for 
continual verification in a never ending succession of intersubjectivist fora. 
If, in their practical application to organizational leadership contexts, the principles of 
communicative action are to avoid this log jam of intersubjective auditing, some 
legitimising space must be allocated to self-discipline and self-reflection. Leaders need to 
commit themselves to the principles of ideal speech and exercise the requisite self-
discipline to ensure that their own behaviour meets that commitment. They must also be 
willing to reflect on the extent to which they measure up to that undertaking. This will call 
for an element of self-doubt: genuine self-reflection on whether ones behaviour has met a 
required standard necessarily entails acknowledgement of the possibility that it has not. 
Therefore, despite the dialogical nature of intersubjectivist ethics, there is an unavoidable 
need for a degree of mono logical self-management on the part of all participants and, given 
their potential immunity to challenge, particularly on the part of leaders. 
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Perhaps the greatest practical barrier to the application of intersubjectivist ethics to 
organizational leadership lies in its apparent dependency on the possibility of consensus. 
Habennas's model of communicative action seems to rest upon an assumption that, as long 
as all the legitimising conditions of ideal speech are adhered to, shared understanding will 
be the eventual outcome. This expectation seems a little far fetched. Indeed, as Kellner 
(1989) points out, Habermas's critics have suggested that his preoccupation with consensus 
may actually encourage authoritarian manipulation and the repression of difference as those 
in authority seek to achieve that morally legitimising end-point. Leaders' desire to build 
commitment to a false consensus may thus encourage them to silent discrepant voices and 
suppress plurality. 
These challenges undermine the possibility of intersubjectively ethical leadership only if 
that possibility is regarded in absolute terms. While the absolutism of the principle-based 
theories that pervade the Anglo-American philosophical tradition encourages such an 
expectation of practical ethics, it need not be regarded thus. Absolute consensus may be a 
rare achievement; furthermore, all of the other legitimising conditions spelled out by 
Habennas may seldom be realised in practice. Nevertheless, a decision, although lacking 
absolute consensus, can still be regarded as morally superior for having been reached 
through discursive processes carried out with a genuine commitment to the principles of 
communicative action. Even if those decision-making processes have not attained 
Habennasian perfection, and even if the eventual decision fails to achieve the support of 
every participant, that decision is still morally superior, in intersubjectively ethical terms, 
from one which has eschewed such processes. The practical elusiveness of intersubjectively 
ethical perfection does not stop one state of affairs from being better than another; the north 
pole ofHabennasian ethical perfection may be beyond reach but it can still offer a magnetic 
focal point against which leaders can orient their intersubjectivist moral compasses. 
Of course, such qualifications about the practical feasibility of intersubjectively ethical 
perfection may simply be taken as a justification for leaders to drop the processual cloak of 
communicative action whenever it suits their agenda to do so, whilst still claiming 
intersubjectivist moral legitimacy for that agenda. This concern seems particularly apposite 
given the prevalence of "pseudo-participation" in contemporary work organizations 
(Claydon, 2000). However, such rhetorical, instrumental and expediently selective 
application of participative leadership approaches is not immune to challenge. Although 
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organizational leaders may be tempted to slip in and out of intersubjective fealty according 
to its congruence with non-intersubjectively defined agendas, there is nothing to stop 
observers challenging the legitimacy of such a tactic. And receptivity to such challenges is 
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fundamental to intersubjectivist legitimacy: for leaders to repeatedly rebuff critique of their 
commitment to the principles of discourse ethics would be to place a stick of dynamite 
beneath their own claims to intersubjectivist legitimacy. 
I will conclude this discussion of intersubjectivist ethics and leadership by discussing a 
particular challenge to which Habermas devotes a great deal of attention. This challenge 
relates to his observations regarding the pre-eminence of steering media such as power and 
money in the contemporary organizational context and the consequent marginalisation of 
communicative action as a means of negotiating shared lifeworld understanding. 
For Habermas, lifeworld comprises those implicit normative and cognitive assumptions 
which provide a basis for shared action and thought. Mutuality of lifeworld commitments is 
a prerequisite of social coexistence and it is this mutuality which is brought about by 
communicative action. According to Habermas, the importance of communicative action to 
the negotiation of shared lifeworld understanding has escalated in modernity as a 
consequence of the disenchantment, or decentring, of those traditional forms that had 
hitherto provided unifying force. The increased capacity for actors to define separate, 
individualised understandings places greater onus on communicative action to establish 
shared bases for social action. Habermas identifies alternative forms of coordinating 
mechanism which have evolved in order to lighten the growing burden on communicative 
action. The most notable of these delinguistified steering media are money and power. As a 
consequence, it is these steering media, rather than communicative action, which provide an 
increasingly dominant basis for social coordination: "generalised instrumental values such 
as money and power ... replace language as the mechanism for coordinating action." (1984 
[1981]: 342). 
The consequence of intervention by delinguistified steering media is a progressive 
rationalisation of social action: action is coordinated not on the basis of a shared lifeworld 
understanding that has a normative dimension, but on the basis of quantifiable systemic 
steering media. The systemic imperatives which have come to provide the basis for social 
action are devoid of normative content and provide scant opportunity for negotiating the 
full breadth of lifeworld mutuality: 
the rationalisation of the lifeworld makes possible a kind of systemic integration that enters 
into competition with the integrating principle of reaching understanding and, under certain 
conditions, has a disintegrative effect on the lifeworld (Habermas, 1984 [1981]: 342-343). 
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Habermas thus echoes Weber (1968 [1911-1920] in pointing to a process of rationalisation 
in which bureaucratic rationality takes on a quasi-autonomous status, with its own self-
contained normative commitments, through systemic distortion of communicative 
rationality. It subverts the role of communicative action in establishing shared premises of 
lifeworld understanding through the raising and challenging of validity claims. Thus the 
"subjective inconspicuousness of systemic constraints that instrumentalise a 
communicatively structured lifeworld take on the character of deception, of objectively 
false consciousness . . . . Structural violence is exercised by way of systematic restrictions 
on communication." (Habermas, 1987 [1981]: 187). The ultimate consequence is that 
systemic imperatives, which have thus become uncoupled from lifeworld realms of 
communicative agreement and which have come to attain an objectified status, penetrate the 
lifeworld. And since the steering mechanisms of systemic integration are ill-suited for the 
intersubjectivist negotiation of meaning, they undermine the capacity of the lifeworld to 
fulfil this role: 
"In the end, systemic mechanisms suppress forms of social integration even in those areas 
where a consensus dependent coordination of action cannot be replaced, that is, where the 
symbolic reproduction of the lifeworld is at stake. In these areas, the mediatisation of the 
lifeworld assumes the form of a colonisation" (1987 [1981]: 196). 
A key challenge to intersubjectively ethical organizational leadership, then, is that the 
steering media of power and money have become so deeply imbued in organizations, and so 
defmitive of the lifeworld commitments of organizational members, that there remains little 
opportunity for communicative action. In other, less Habermasian, words: people are too 
committed to the imperatives of capitalist enterprise to bother with all this nonsense about 
reaching shared normative understanding. However, while this represents a challenge to 
intersubjectivist mediation within organizations, it also represents an opportunity for moral 
leadership. Whereas commentators such as Weber (1968 [1911-1920], Adomo and 
Horkheimer (1997 [1944]) present a pretty gloomy outlook for the future of modernity, 
Habermas believes that resistance to systemic rationality across a range of fora can lay the 
foundation for a reassertion of communicatively negotiated lifeworld. Habermas focuses on 
those "domains of cultural reproduction, social integration and socialisation" (1987 [1981]: 
392) which operate in the public sphere, trusting in institutions such as single-issue protest 
groups, the environmental lobby, student bodies and the press to reconnect a shared 
lifeworld with its normative dimension. But there must also be an opportunity here for 
organizational leaders to make intersubjective space and thus to contribute towards a more 
communicatively legitimated society: just as bureaucratic organizations provide a fertile 
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terrain for systemic domination of lifeworld commitments, they also offer a possible 
incubator for a reassertion of communicative action. As well as presenting a possible 
legitimising force for organizational decisions and actions, then, intersubjectivist leadership 
may also be able to contribute to a reaffirmation of communicative action on a broader 
scale. 
96 
4.0 INTRODUCTION TO EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
Locating Empirical Research within the Broader Context of the PhD 
My empirical research needs to be considered within the context of my overall aim in this 
PhD. That is, to develop a normative model of moral leadership. As a preliminary to this 
undertaking, I identified two areas of concern which, I believe, are raised by the notion of 
leadership: that it might be used to bring about objectives that are of questionable moral 
value and that it may suppress the agency of so-called "followers". I then reviewed the 
leadership literature. The literature seeks to identify recipes for effective leadership. 
However, if leadership is to be both effective and moral then these recipes also need to 
respond to the two areas of moral concern mentioned above. I therefore structured my 
review around these two areas. I endeavoured to draw out the implications that the different 
theories hold for each, thus illustrating the extent to which the theories either exacerbate or 
ameliorate it. In the next section I reviewed the ethics literature to explore the implications 
that it may hold for leadership. I structured this review around three meta-ethical 
perspectives; three different ways of thinking about morality. I sought to identify how each 
of these perspectives might contribute to our thinking about morality and leadership. 
In the present section I will approach this undertaking from yet another direction. I will 
explore the way in which practising leaders think about the morality of their leadership role. 
I will explore the extent to which they articulate the three meta-ethical perspectives 
discussed in the second section along with the tensions that this presents within the 
organizational leadership domain. I will also consider the extent to which these people 
respond to the areas of moral concern discussed in the first section. I thus hope to add 
further insights to those enabled by these preceding sections. On the conclusion of this 
empirical section I hope to be better placed to generate a normative model of moral 
leadership. 
97 
4.1 DISCUSSION OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH METHOD 
Introduction 
The specific objective of my empirical research was to find out how people who occupy 
formal leadership roles in work organizations think about the moral responsibilities that this 
entails. In sociological-methodological terms, this is an interpretive project insofar as it sets 
out ''to grasp the subjective meaning of social action" (Bryman, 2003: 16). Nevertheless, 
this interpretive enquiry is undertaken in the interest of an overriding normative purpose. It 
therefore differs from a great deal of empirical enquiry that has been undertaken in the field 
of business ethics; enquiry which follows a purely descriptive agenda with no normative 
pretensions. Such offerings sometimes restrict themselves to describing the rationale upon 
which different business people make ethical choices (e.g. de Graaf, 2001). Alternatively, 
they may go a stage further and seek to identify either commonalities between the 
approaches adopted by different people (e.g. Das, 2005) or causal factors that account for 
contrasting ethical decision-making frameworks (e.g. Schminke and Ambrose, 1997; Forte, 
2004; Brammer and Millington, 2006). Other commentators have gone on to reflect on the 
possible implications of contrasting approaches to ethical decision-making (e.g. Premeux, 
2004; Krambia-Kapardis and Zopiatis, 2008) or have used observed differences as a basis 
for prescribing practical organizational responses (e.g. Sims and Gegez, 2004; Valentine et 
al, 2006). Some have taken this performative application yet further in exploring the links 
between the behaviour and attitudes of senior managers, insofar as these operationalise 
organizations' corporate social responsibility policies, and corporate performance (e.g. 
Pivato et al, 2008; Perrini and Minoja, 2008). The characteristic which these offerings share 
is that they make no attempt to generate normative conclusions. My intention, on the other 
hand, is to use the findings of my empirical research to assist with the elaboration of a 
normative model of ethical leadership. 
My agenda also differs from that of many of those empirically focussed business ethics 
research papers that do include a normative dimension. The latter often explore the extent to 
which business practice departs from either the espoused ethical norms of particular 
organizations (e.g. Martinez and Crowther, 2008) or those norms championed more 
generally by business communities (e.g. Smith-Hillman, 2007). Even more common are 
enquiries into the extent to which management or corporate behaviour conforms to 
normative standards whose legitimacy is presupposed by researchers (e.g. Vountisjarvi, 
2006; Pratten, 2007; Fisher and Downes, 2008). The difference between these offerings and 
my approach is that the former tend to begin with a pre-defined normative stance, going on 
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to identify and describe empirical divergences from it. I, on the other hand, am not 
beginning with predefined normative stance. On the contrary, this is the intended outcome 
of my research; not its starting point. 
During this chapter I propose to discuss how I went about achieving my empirical research 
objective. The chapter begins with a description of the people who I asked to participate in 
my empirical research, along with an outline of my rationale for selecting this particular 
sample. A discussion of my response to two metaphysical questions relating to qualitative 
ethics research follows; questions that seemed particularly apposite to tnY enquiry. The 
subsequent consideration of methodological detail includes an outline of some of the 
responses that I adopted to these metaphysical questions. I will also discuss some specific 
tools that seemed appropriate to my empirical enquiry. The chapter concludes with an 
outline of how I went about analysing the data produced during the course of my research. 
Research Sample Selection 
I chose to involve people who occupy prominent leadership roles in my empirical research 
for a number of reasons. The first reason might be described as "opportunistic" (Bryman 
and Bell, 2003) insofar as personal contacts initially facilitated access to this group. During 
my own management career I had made the acquaintance of a number of people who either 
work as CEOs/MDs21 or who could introduce me to such people22• Using a snowballing 
(Goodman, 1961), or respondent-driven sampling (Salganik and Heckathorn, 2004) 
approach, I was therefore able to gain access to an "elite" through other members of that 
elite (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995, cited in Bryman and Bell, 2003). As I subsequently 
found out, these personal contacts was not quite as important for persuading people .to 
participate in my research as I had assumed. This resource dried up before I had gathered 
the volume of data I required, so I wrote to some more CEOs direct and asked them to 
participate. This "cold calling" approach actually elicited quite a positive response23 • 
Despite the opportunistic nature of my choice of research participants, there was also a 
more compelling rationale for involving people who occupy formal leadership roles. 
Bryman (1988, cited in Gill and Johnson, 1997: 153) observes that the "quirkiness and 
messiness" of research in practice will inevitably compromise attempts to conform to the 
21 I was already personally acquainted with two of my research participants. 
22 Eight people agreed to participate as a result of such referrals from my management contacts. One 
other was referred by an academic colleague. 
23 Five out of the eight people who I contacted directly agreed to meet me. 
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"rational reconstructed logic of the textbook account" (Gill and Johnson, ibid). In particular, 
the availability of resources often dictates both the choice of research agendas and the 
methods chosen to pursue those agendas. For example, considerations of resource 
availability may account for the frequent use of students as subjects for academic research, 
resulting in findings that are "expeditious and publishable whether what is produced is 
worth knowing or not" (Gill and Johnson, ibid: 154)._This is a particular issue in relation to 
business ethics research, where a number of recent studies have focused upon the attitudes 
and behaviour of students (e.g. Angelidis and Ibrahim, 2004; Connelly et al, 2004; D'Aquila 
et al2004; Smyth et al2004: Karassavidou and Glaveli, 2007; Stedham et al, 2007). While 
such studies provide interesting insights to students' attitudes, motivations and perceptions, 
they reveal little about the attitudes, motivations and perceptions of those people who 
confront the real-time ethical dilemmas presented by organizational life. As such, although 
such studies conform to reliability criteria and may be valid in other respects, they fail the 
test of ecological validity (Bryman and Bell, 2003) in that they do little to enhance 
understanding of the actual practice ofbusiness ethics. 
In contrast to such student-oriented research, it seemed particularly apposite to involve 
organizational leaders in my research. Not only do these people occupy roles in which they 
are formally expected to provide leadership; it is also reasonable to presume that their 
appointment to these roles owes a lot to their proven effectiveness as leaders. Thus, prima 
facie, they are both good at being leaders and familiar with the ethical challenges that 
"doing leadership" presents. Since they meet the requirements of ecological validity, it 
seems sensible to include their views in the elaboration of a normative model of ethical 
organizational leadership. 
By inviting only the leaders of organizations to participate in my research, I have 
deliberately made a significant omission. That is, I have not sought input from the many 
other people in organizations who these people are expected to lead. In other words, I have 
not asked "followers" what they think about ethical leadership. Now, it might be argued in 
defence of this omission that those who occupy leadership roles are most likely to have 
reflected on the ethical implications of that undertaking so will have most to contribute to 
the elaboration of a normative model. However, I make no such assertion. It seems to me 
that those who bear the consequences of the ethically-charged decisions made by leaders, 
particularly those whose material and emotional well-being may have been harmed by those 
decisions, are likely to have as much to say about their ethicality as the leaders themselves. 
Furthermore, the perspective articulated by leaders may well be representative of a 
characteristically managerialist mindset (Alvesson and Willmott, 1996; Parker, 2002) to the 
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exclusion of alternative perspectives that might challenge its legitimacy. Consulting other 
people in organizations may have offered some antidote to this one-sided expression of 
managerialism. 
Instead of justifying my decision to include only leaders on the basis of their unique 
qualification for such a role, I will make two points in support of my non-inclusion of other 
organizational members. Firstly, I will stress that, by accessing and drawing upon the 
discourse of organizational leaders, I am not honouring that discourse with the tag of 
normative legitimacy. My intention in this PhD is to synthesise these empirical accounts 
with the perspectives offered by the ethics and leadership literature. By considering the 
views of research participants through the lens of the literature, I expect to expose them to 
critique. Furthermore, my natural inclination is towards a sceptical hearing of the discourse 
of organizational leaders. Despite a fairly lengthy career in senior management, during a 
great deal of which I wholeheartedly and unreflectively embraced the managerialist 
discourse, my eventual stance upon moving away from that career was much more critical: 
disenchantment had set in. This disenchantment, along with my subsequent reading of 
more radical perspectives, will, I hope, offer some balance. 
Nevertheless, in offering to practising leaders a place at the table of dialogue that is denied 
to representatives of other hierarchical strata, I have necessarily accorded to them a certain 
privilege: it is their words that I am synthesising with the literature, not the words of anyone 
else; it is their discourse that I am exposing to critique, not that of their so-called followers. 
The second part of my response is, therefore, to concede that there is a place for further 
research that embraces the views of other non-leadership organizational players. My PhD is 
not intended as a finished pronouncement on the state of ethical organizational leadership; 
rather it is to be viewed as an exploratory contribution to an ongoing normative project. 
Sample Details 
Sixteen people participated in my empirical research. I had initially expected that between 
twelve and twenty people would provide the required depth and breadth of data but was 
prepared to continue expanding the sample if necessary. However, I found that, by the 
sixteenth person, I was reaching a point of theoretical saturation at which "new data [were] 
no longer illuminating the concept[s]" (Bryman and Bell, 2003: 428) that were evolving 
throughout the research exercise. I therefore decided to stop at sixteen. 
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All of my research participants had occupied prominent organizational leadership roles. 
Twelve of the sixteen either were currently fulfilling, or had previously fulfilled, roles as 
CEOs and/or MDs in large organizations. The remaining four had occupied substantial 
executive board roles: two had been finance directors and two had been HR directors with 
big private companies and/or large public sector organizations. In addition, several 
respondents also undertook formal leadership duties outside of their main job 
responsibilities, either with trade associations, sports organizations or charities. One 
participant had retired from paid employment, although he still worked voluntarily as 
director of two sports organizations. Two had left their leadership roles in the corporate 
world to pursue self-employment. 
Bryman and Bell (2003) point to a potential drawback to the opportunistic, snowballing 
(Goodman, 1961) approach that I initially employed. This is that there may be quite a lot of 
overlap in the backgrounds of the participants to which it gives access. I found this to be the 
case. For example, I began by interviewing a cluster ofCEOs and MDs ofwhich three had 
commenced their management careers with the same brewery and three had worked with 
the same major retailer. I therefore sought to compensate for this by introducing an element 
of purposive sampling (Patton, 1990) to my later selection of additional interview 
candidates. I was thus eventually able to access the perspectives of people from a range of 
businesses that included financial services, hospitality, travel, music, sport, food and 
agricultural produce and healthcare. My eventual sample also included representatives from 
the public and voluntary sectors: four people had accrued leadership experience in local 
government administration, business support and public authority care services, while one 
was finance director with one of the UK's largest charitable organizations. Purposive 
sampling also gave access to more female participants than had initially taken part: four of 
the eventual sixteen were female. I should stress, however, that my intention in accessing a 
more heterogeneous sample was not to generate sector-based or gender-based comparisons; 
only to incorporate the views of a theoretically interesting cross-section of organizational 
leaders. I have provided a more detailed profile of each research participant in chapters 5.1 
and 5.2 as part of my empirical report. 
Metaphysical Challenges Associated With My Research 
Two particular questions are apposite to my empirical research. Each of these questions is 
of relevance to hermeneutically-oriented research in general. However, each also seems to 
have particular significance for ethically-oriented hermeneutic enquiry. I will begin by 
discussing the first of these questions, which is of an ontological nature, before moving on 
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to the second, which is epistemologically-focussed. The subsequent, more detailed 
discussion of choice and application of empirical research method includes consideration of 
appropriate responses to the challenges presented by these two questions. 
An ontological question 
My purpose in undertaking empirical research was to gain access to practising leaders' 
understanding of the moral implication of their leadership role. My ontologically-oriented 
question relates to the status of that understanding. More specifically, it concerns the extent 
to which the moral understanding that I sought to access was pre-determined prior to the 
interview and the extent to which it was negotiated during the interview process. This is not 
a question of m eta-ethics: it is not a question of the ontological status of the principles of 
goodness and rightness upon which a participant's ethical understanding is based, but on 
the status of that understanding. It begs the question whether ethical understanding is itself 
a pre-determined reality that can be revealed by empirical enquiry or whether that 
understanding is a constructed phenomenon that is generated during the course of enquiry. 
To adopt the former stance -what might be called a realist-interpretive perspective on 
ethical understanding, would be to approach my research as a hermeneutic undertaking with 
a strongly positivist flavour. It would be to regard the different understandings that I was 
seeking to elucidate as objectively existent phenomena that could be accessed and 
represented as they stood. To approach the research from the opposite perspective would 
be to take what I will call a constructivist-interpretive stance; to impute to moral 
understanding a less predetermined status and to accede to the inevitability of its 
negotiation via discursive encounters. 
Now, on this question of whether ethical understanding is predetermined or negotiated 
through its expression, my view is that it is probably a bit of both. Furthermore, I suspect 
that the extent to which it is more of one than the other varied from one interview to the 
next. Some research participants appeared to have come to the interview meetings equipped 
with a fairly well-established personal understanding of right and wrong in relation to 
leadership's ethical challenges. Others seemed less accustomed to thinking in depth about 
ethics. Similarly, while some seemed morally self-assured and unlikely to alter their 
predetermined ethical commitments, others demonstrated a more discursively responsive 
demeanour. 
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However, this question of ontological status raises a further question. The reason that I was 
keen to access interviewees' moral understanding is for the contribution that it might make 
to the elaboration of a normative model of ethical leadership. Should I therefore have taken 
a realist interpretive stance and aimed solely at elucidating a pre-existing ethical 
understanding, purposefully avoiding any intervention that may have shaped the nature of 
that understanding so as to replicate it in its purest possible form? On the other hand, how 
realistic would such an endeavour have been? If moral commitment is viewed as something 
that is, at least partially, negotiated and sustained through discourse, perhaps I should have · 
embraced every opportunity to evoke critical reflection on the part of interviewees in the 
hope that the understanding with which they left the interview meetings would be somehow 
enhanced as a result of those encounters. 
To wholeheartedly adopt the latter approach would have been congruent with certain 
aspects of critical theoretical and action research. It would accord with the "emancipatory" 
(Bronner, 1994) tone of a critical theoretical approach to empirical research insofar as 
reflection on the part of participants may have surfaced tensions between what Habermas 
(1984 [1981]; 1987 [1981]) would refer to as their lifeworld commitments and the 
management imperatives of a system that is rooted in the individualising logic of 
modernity. Furthermore, although avoiding the "clinical" (Schein 1987, cited in Gill and 
Johnson, 1997) quality that often characterises consultancy-oriented action research 
interventions, it would accord with Gill and Johnson's depiction of action research as being 
concerned with praxis, or "with the art of taking action in problematic situations in order to 
change them" (1997: 74). Such an agenda would be particularly resonant with Reason's 
(200 1) portrayal of action research as a collaborative endeavour aimed at evoking reflective 
change on the part of research participants. 
However, this was not my intention. My primary objective in conducting empirical research 
was not to change the way that research participants understand the ethical implications of 
leadership. It was to form a picture of that understanding so that this could be used as one 
building block in the construction of a normative model. Nevertheless, several points need 
to be made about my pursuit of this objective. The first point is that it does not imply 
unequivocal fealty to a realist-interpretive perspective. As I have already noted, I suspect 
that moral understanding is at least partially negotiated during the process of its articulation. 
The second point is that, although encouraging research participants to reflect on their 
ethical understanding was not the main objective of my empirical research, if this was an 
outcome of some research interviews then this is no bad thing. If the understanding 
expressed by research participants was a negotiated outcome of the research discussion, 
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then it has already moved some way along the conveyor belt of synthesis with alternative 
perspectives which was the overall aim of my PhD. Furthermore, on the level of individual 
praxis, if articulation, rationalisation and justification of their ethical understanding evoked 
critical reflection on the part of research participants, then, although not its prime objective, 
this is a welcome corollary to my empirical enquiry. 
An epistemological question 
So much for the ontological question of realism versus constructivism in relation to ethical 
understanding .. What of the epistemological question? That epis~emological question 
concerns the extent to which the impressions of leaders' ethical understanding that were 
revealed by empirical enquiry were accurate impressions. The accuracy of those 
impressions is likely to have been influenced by two factors. Firstly, the extent to which 
participants were disposed to present an honest and frank exposition of their understanding 
(regardless of whether that understanding was ontologically predetermined prior to 
discussion or negotiated in the process of discussion); secondly the extent to which I, as a 
researcher, have been able to adequately interpret and represent that understanding. To 
some extent, these epistemological issues are avoided by the emancipatory and change-
oriented agendas of critical theory and action research: if the purpose of my research had 
been to bring about emancipatory change to, rather than to accurately record, the subject of 
study, then the urgency of the question of epistemological accuracy would have faded. 
However, since my purpose was to capture that ethical understanding and to put it to use in 
developing a normative model of ethical leadership, the accuracy with which I have been 
able do so is important. 
As far as the first issue is concerned, the extent to which research participants were 
disposed to offer a truthful account of their moral understanding, I will make one 
observation. This is that, when recounting their real-life responses to moral dilemmas, or 
when telling me what they would do in hypothetically problematic situations, research 
participants may indeed have offered accounts that are judiciously modified for public 
consumption. However, this does not diminish the relevance of those accounts. Participants 
are unlikely to have presented themselves as more morally reprehensible than they are (if, 
indeed, they are morally reprehensible at all). It is more likely that any lack of candour on 
their part will have involved air-brushing their accounts in order to present themselves and 
their organizations as more, rather than less, morally praiseworthy. In such cases then, 
what they have told me is not what they actually did but what they think would have been a 
morally right thing for them to have done. Thus, they have offered me an insight into their 
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moral understanding. And since this is what I was seeking to access, the content of these 
articulations is perhaps more important than their congruity with the teller's actual 
behaviour. 
The measures that I took to encourage openness on the part of participants are discussed 
below. As for the second issue, the extent to which I have been able to accurately interpret 
the understandings that were presented, this depends on the extent to which an effective 
harmony of our respective terminological and conceptual understandings has been 
achieved. This, in turn, leads to a more fundamental question. That is, to what extent can 
the ethical understanding of one person be truly understood by another? I will give some 
consideration to this broader issue before turning to more detailed discussion of research 
method. 
The issue of incommensurability of rival paradigms, or of contrasting systems of 
rationality, looms large in a meta-theoretical landscape that is influenced by writers from 
Thomas Kuhn to Michel Foucault. I have already, in my discussion of intersubjectivist 
ethics, touched on this question; that for one person to truly understand the rationale of 
another he or she must be able to identify with it. As Habermas puts it "only to the extent to 
which the interpreter also grasps the reasons why the author's utterances seem rational to 
the author himself does he understand what the author meant" (1990 [1983]: 30, italics in 
original). 
The question of commensurability is complex and contested and I will not attempt to 
discuss it in detail here. Rather, I will note that the stance that I adopted in relation to my 
research accords with that of writers such as Richard Bernstein and Alasdair Maclntyre. 
Bernstein (1983) suggests that incommensurability does not necessarily entail 
incomparability. Just because contrasting systems of thought, which includes contrasting 
ethical rationales, may be logically self-contained and thus unable to mesh with one another 
does not mean that a person who inhabits one of these systems is incapable of 
hermeneutically occupying the other. Maclntyre, in his discussion of contrasting moral 
traditions, also proposes the feasibility of hermeneutic engagement but emphasises the need 
to imaginatively "live within" a tradition that contrasts with ones own in order to 
understand it. 
Therefore, in reporting on the ethical perspectives articulated by those people who 
participated in my research, I have attempted to undertake such imaginative engagement 
and will try to facilitate the same for readers. However, I will also remain mindful of the 
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difficulties that this presents; particularly of the danger that I may have misunderstood or 
that I may misrepresent research participants' perspectives. The following discussion of the 
implementation of research method, as well as discussing my response to the ontological 
issues mentioned earlier, considers ways of ameliorating this epistemological challenge. 
Choice of Empirical Research Method 
·Having considered the metaphysical challenges associated with my research exercise, I will 
now discuss the method that I adopted and my reasons for selecting this particular 
approach. I will also discuss how, on the level of procedural detail, I have sought to respond 
to the ontological and epistemological challenges that this undertaking presents. 
A bewildering array of terms has been applied to different research interview methods. 
Bryman and Bell (2003) provide a helpful overview of these terms, which permits 
identification of a continuum according to the degree of structure that is imposed by the 
researcher on the interview discussion. At one end of the continuum is the structured 
interview, also referred to as a formal interview (Gill and Johnson, 1997) or a standardised 
interview (Bryman and Bell, 2003), which involves providing each respondent with an 
identical set of closed questions, delivered in the same order and in the same manner. At the 
opposite end of the scale is the unstructured interview, which the interviewer approaches 
with only a loose interview guide and in which the range and sequence of questions are 
likely to vary considerably between interviews. Various terms have been applied to 
interviewing styles that fall towards this less structured end of the continuum. These include 
intensive (Lofland and Lofland, 1995), ethnographic (Spradley, 1979) and qualitative 
(Mason, 1996). 
Lying between the two extremes of, on the one hand, structured/formal/standardised 
interviews and, on the other hand, unstructured/intensive/ethnographic/qualitative 
interviews, is a semi-structured approach. For Bryman and Bell, semi-structured interviews 
are those in which: 
the interviewer has a series of questions that are in the general form of an interview 
schedule but is able to vary the sequence of the questions. The questions are frequently 
somewhat more general in their frame of reference than is typically found in a structured 
interview schedule. Also, the interviewer usually has some latitude to ask further questions 
in response to what are seen as significant replies (2003: 119). 
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A relatively unstructured interview approach seemed best suited to my research for two 
reasons. These reasons relate, firstly, to the purpose of interviews and, secondly, to the 
establishment of a rapport between the researcher and interviewee that is conducive to that 
purpose. 
Regarding the purpose of the interview, Bryman and Bell (2003) note the efficacy of 
qualitative interviewing for encouraging rich, detailed answers, observing that more 
structured approaches are better suited to generating responses that can be coded and 
processed quickly. Easterby et a/ suggest that qualitative methods in general are "useful 
aids or tools to help the respondents think about their own worlds and consider, possibly for 
the first time, the way they construct their reality" (1991: 71 ). Citing Rosemary Stewart, 
Easterby et a/ describe the main reason for conducting qualitative interviews as being to 
understand how interviewees construct the meaning and significance of their situation. 
Regarding the relationship between the interviewee and researcher, a highly structured 
approach prioritises the agenda that is set by the researcher (Bryman and Bell, 2003). A 
tightly ordered interview plan courts the danger of casting the researcher in pole position, 
relegating the interviewee to the role of compliant provider of data. In such situations, 
the interviewer offers nothing in return for the extraction of information ... the interviewer-
interviewee relationship is a form of hierarchical or power relationship. Interviewers 
arrogate to themselves the right to ask questions, implicitly placing their interviewees in a 
position of subservience or inferiority (Bryman and Bell, 2003: 359). 
Such an approach is unlikely to be conducive to the relationship of cooperation and trust 
that is necessary if complex and potentially sensitive issues are to be explored. 
However, while such considerations point to the desirability of a relatively loosely-
structured approach, it is clear that a degree of structure was necessary for my interviews. 
While a non-directive style, which permits the interviewee to talk freely without 
interruption on a loosely-defined topic, may have facilitated candid expression of 
interviewees' perspectives, Easterby et a/ ( 1991) suggest that lack of direction on the part of 
the researcher may leave interviewees with no clear picture of what aspects of their 
experience the researcher wishes to explore. While this may enable an uninhibited 
articulation of certain aspects of the interviewee's understanding, it may completely fail to 
address the research topic. But while a measure of structure was necessary, this needed to 
be applied sympathetically in order to permit digression into areas that were of particular 
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significance to interviewees. Jones advises that "although researchers are to some extent 
tied to their frameworks they shouldn't be 'tied up by them"' (1985, cited by Easterby et a/, 
1991: 75). Easterby et a/ suggest that a topic guide, or agenda should be loosely adhered to, 
and that the conversation should be pulled back on track if it becomes tangentially diverted 
into areas that seem unrelated to the central issues. 
Of course, it is important to remember that what seems tangential to the researcher may be a 
vital ingredient to an interviewee's process of working out and articulating his or her 
understanding. Indeed, Bryman and Bell note that, "in qualitative interviewing, 'rambling' 
or going off on tangents is often encouraged - it gives insight to what the interviewee sees 
as relevant and important" (2003: 342). They suggest that not only should researchers 
permit a degree of digression but that it may even be appropriate to actively encourage 
tangential exploration. Therefore, researchers should be prepared, on occasions, to ask 
secondary questions and explore sub-issues that seem to have only a tenuous link to the 
central issue under consideration. In this respect, Easterby et a/ (1991) suggest the 
employment, in a non-leading manner, of a range of probes by the researcher that serve to 
explore and clarify responses and to sustain dialogue. Similarly, Prasad, (1993, cited in 
Bryman and Bell, 2003) advocates the use of both grand tour and mini tour questions, 
where broad, explanatory grand tour questions give the interview focus and structure, while 
mini tour questions facilitate ad-hoc exploration of sub-issues that may be of particular 
relevance to the research topic. 
My approach consisted of equipping myself with a general topic list. Using Prasad's (ibid) 
terminology, this comprised a list of grand tour topics, against each of which I wrote some 
mini-tour questions. My intention was to use these topic lists as an aide-memoire rather 
than as a script. I generally found that, once I had introduced the discussion with a brief 
summary of my aims, participants were keen to talk and required little prompting. 
However, using my topic list for reference, I sometimes steered the conversations when 
participants seemed to be straying too far from the ethical dimension of leadership. Mini-
tour questions were sometimes useful to open up a topic when the interviewee was not 
initially forthcoming. In keeping with the generally grounded nature of my research, my 
topic list evolved quite a lot during the course of my research. A copy of the interview 
guide that I used for my meetings appears as appendix 1. 
I discussed earlier the question of whether research discussions should be considered as 
offering access to a preconceived ethical understanding on the part of research participants 
or whether they should be viewed as part of the process through which that understanding is 
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constructed. At the level of implementation, this raises the question of engagement on the 
part of researchers: to what extent should a researcher become actively engaged in research 
discussions? On the one hand, interviews might be regarded as a way to "understand the 
meanings interviewees attach to issues and situations in contexts that are not structured in 
advance by the researcher's assumptions" (Easterby et al, 1991: 73). However, in order to 
achieve this aim, researchers must not only understand and record those meanings; they 
may also need to assist interviewees in exploring them. In setting out to assist exploration in 
this way, the researcher inevitably complicates the ontological challenge. Although my key 
objective in my research interviews was to gain access to the way that interviewees think 
about leadership and ethics, there is a chance that my participation in the discourse may 
have shaped that understanding. 
McGrath employs the term dilemmatics (1982, cited in Gill and Johnson, 1997) to refer to 
those research choices in which there are no ideal solutions, only a series of compromises. 
This question of researcher participation might be regarded as one such dilemmatic. On the 
one hand, active participation may be needed to facilitate the gathering of data; on the other 
hand, any intervention by the researcher is likely to shape the nature of that data. This 
particular dilemmatic manifests itself in two specifi~ questions. Firstly, to what extent 
should researchers respond to and encourage interviewees' flow of self-expression. 
Secondly, should researchers try to confirm and summarise points made by interviewees. 
Regarding the first of these questions, Easterby et al (1991) draw attention to the hazard 
that verbal and n~m-verbal responses on the part of researchers might lead interviewees 
down particular avenues. A stance of detached, disinterested neutrality on the part of 
researchers might help to avoid this. If researchers listen dispassionately without projecting 
their reactions onto the discourse, this will permit interviewees to steer the conversation in 
directions that they consider to be important. However, Easterby et al also note that the 
effectiveness of research interviews depends to a large extent on the ability of the 
researcher to gain the trust of the interviewee during the discussion. Complete absence of 
engagement on the part of the researcher is unlikely to be conducive to this essential 
relationship of trust. An interviewee who is confronted with a blank and unresponsive 
interlocutor is unlikely to feel sufficiently at ease to give themselves to open self-
expression. Furthermore, Easterby et al point out that building and maintaining trust is of 
particular significance in one-off interview situations, in which the researcher and 
interviewee are unfamiliar to one another. It is also particularly important when the purpose 
of research is to explore aspects of their experience and understanding to which 
interviewees are not accustomed to giving open expression. In such situations, an absence 
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of trust may result in the interviewee simply not telling the researcher what he or she wishes 
to know. 
The second aspect of the engagement-passivity dilemma is the question of whether or not 
researchers should summarise the points made by the interviewee. On the one hand, it is 
important for researchers to confirm their understanding of what has been said by 
interviewees. On the other hand, such clarification and summarizing will necessarily be in 
accordance with the researcher's personally derived classification of the dialogue, which 
may not conform precisely to the understanding of the interviewee. 
Clearly, my research called for a position of pragmatic compromise in the face of such 
dilemmatics. It was important to be alert to the possibility that empathic engagement on my 
part may have shaped the direction that interviews took. However, it was equally apparent 
that complete absence of engagement would have been just as damaging to the research 
exercise. Any attempt to eradicate all elements of my own intervention would have been 
unrealistic. Nevertheless, it was important that the measures that I took to encourage 
interviewees' flow of self-expression did not steer it. Although empathic and sympathetic 
responses on my part were needed to build trust and put interviewees at ease, empathy and 
sympathy had to be expressed in a neutral manner. In particular, I needed to be alert to the 
temptation to give an overly positive response to contributions that conformed to my own 
proclivities, or to respond negatively to perspectives with which I felt personally 
uncomfortable. 
Furthermore, while it was necessary, on occasions, to confirm or summarise my 
understanding of interviewees' perspectives, it was important to do this in such a way that 
invited confirmation from the interviewee of the accuracy of that understanding. Most 
importantly, I needed to be alert to the risk of imposing my own perceptions onto the 
interviewee while confirming my understanding of the meaning contained within their 
discourse. 
Tools to Enhance Qualitative Interviews 
Two methods that have been used during business ethics research to support exploration of 
participants' ethical understanding are scenario methodology and critical incident 
technique. Both methods invite participants to explore ethical dilemmas. They thus 
encourage explicit articulation of the tacit assumptions and commitments that underpin 
participants' ethical understanding. I will outline below the reasons why I considered using 
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these methods, deciding to opt for the latter and not the former. I will then discuss how 
repertory grid technique also seems to offer rich potential for revealing peoples' deeper; 
unarticulated commitments but why I decided not to use it in the present exercise. 
Scenario methodology 
Scenario methodology is commonly used in business ethics research (Bryman and Bell, 
2003). Interviewees are presented with imaginary situations, or vignettes, and are generally 
asked a number of closed questions to elucidate their likely response should they be 
confronted with such a scenario. Inferences relating to their ethical sensitivity or their 
ethical decision making criteria can thus be drawn. The advantage of a vignette over a 
standard attitude question is that it "anchors the choice in a situation and as such reduces 
the possibility of an unreflective reply" (Bryman and Bell, 2003: 169). Bryman and Bell 
cite the example of Lund's (2000) study of marketing professionals. Lund presented 
respondents with four different vignettes. A closed question relating to each vignette was 
posed, to which the respondent was asked to select a response, ranging from "definitely 
would" to "definitely would not", which was indicative of their own likely actions in such a 
situation. Lund used these responses to draw inferences about the nature of respondents' 
ethical reasoning. 
Asking closed questions about a vignette facilitates comparison and analysis of a large 
number of responses by quantitative methods. However, the benefits of comparability are 
achieved at the expense of depth. A simple vignette approach of this nature precludes 
deeper exploration of the rationales that underpin respondents' choices. A partial 
compromise was reached by Premeaux (2004), which facilitated some exploration of 
underpinning rationales. Premeaux used vignettes to assess ethical responses on the part of 
managers to a selection of hypothetical moral dilemmas that a manager might encounter in 
a business context. Premeaux invited a two-part response from participating managers. The 
first part comprised a straight ''yes" or "no" answer to the question of whether a manager 
would choose a certain course of action. In the second part, the respondent was presented 
with a selection of six rationales from which they were invited to choose the rationale that 
most aptly justified their response. For Premeaux the choice of rationale indicates whether 
the manager is driven primarily by a rule-utilitarian, act-utilitarian, rights or justice-oriented 
rationale. Thus, the study enables identification, in Premeaux's view, firstly, of whether the 
manager is predisposed to act "ethically" and, secondly, of the ethical system upon which 
he or she bases his or her decision-making. By adding a choice of rationales to tlie initial 
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''yes" or "no" response, Premeaux thus enables a degree of probing into the basis upon 
which respondents make morally-charged choices. 
Building upon Premeaux's approach by using initial responses as a basis for further 
discussion would have ameliorated the limitation of closed responses. However, this would 
not have avoided two other difficulties with scenario methodology. The first of these is that, 
since scenarios are imaginary and since respondents have no personal relationship with 
their characters, they can offer rational responses that are untainted by emotional 
attachment. But ethical decisions tend to concern matters about which we care; were that 
not the case, then their dilemmatic quality would be absent. It is the emotional tension that 
real-life ethical dilemmas evoke that makes them difficult. By constructing a hypothetical 
scenario in which the respondent has no emotional investment we inevitably sanitise that 
scenario and remove some of its dilemmatic quality. It is therefore unlikely that the 
responses initiated by vignettes would correspond to those that would be delivered in real 
life. 
A further difficulty with hypothetical scenarios is that, by presenting the respondent with a 
scenario, the researcher is making the assumption that this scenario would be dilemmatic 
for the respondent. The researcher is therefore, to some extent, leading the response. 
Although interviewees are encouraged to focus on aspects of that scenario that they 
consider to be ethically significant, the assumption is made that the scenario is ethically 
significant for them in the first place. Some researchers (e.g. Jaffe and Pasternak, 2006; 
Lund; 2000; Premeaux, 2004) ameliorate this difficulty by devoting resources to the 
identification of scenarios that are likely to be of particular relevance to respondents. 
However, ensuring the relevance of scenarios to the research topic does not guarantee their 
dilemmatic quality. Although scenarios may be of a type that is likely to be encountered by 
research participants, they will not necessarily present those particular participants with 
ethical dilemmas. 
Given the sample size of these surveys - for example, Premeaux's study included 431 
respondents - scenario methodology, despite its drawbacks, may have been the best 
available solution. However, to compromise the extent to which research gains access to the 
worldviews of respondents (Bryman and Bell, 2003) in this way is unnecessary when that 
research is conducted via interviews with a relatively small number of people. The 
interview context permits interviewees to select their own ethical dilemmas, thus enabling 
an even more tailored selection of situations that each particular interviewee regards as 
ethically charged. I therefore decided against using vignettes, opting for an alternative 
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approach that accords greater flexibility to research participants in the selection of what 
they consider to be ethically challenging scenarios. 
Critical incident technique 
Critical incident technique asks interviewees to track back to specific incidents that they 
have encountered which hold particular relevance for the research topic. Interviewees are 
asked to describe the incident and are also invited to reflect on related aspects such as the 
thought processes and emotional responses that they went through at the time, how others 
responded to the incident, what factors may have shaped their response, what consequences 
the incident had for themselves and for others, how they felt about the incident later and 
how they feel about it now. 
The seminal application of critical incident technique by Herzberg et a! (1959) comprised 
part of a quantitative research undertaking. However, its subsequent contribution to many 
qualitative studies (Bryman and Bell, 2003), where it has been used to facilitate exploration 
of the principles that impact on decision-making, indicates its suitability for my purpose. 
During my research discussions, I therefore, asked interviewees to identify particular 
situations within their personal experience that have presented ethical dilemmas. I was then 
able to explore, through secondary questioning, matters such as the nature of their decision-
making processes in these situations, any factors that may have inhibited their decision, the 
extent to which their response to such incidents may have changed within different 
circumstances, and the reasons for such changes. In an attempt to explore the extent and 
manner of intersubjective decision making, I also explored the extent to which such 
dilemmas were discussed with significant others. 
A major advantage of critical incident technique over hypothetical scenarios is that it 
permits respondents to focus on situations that have presented them with ethical dilemmas, 
rather than commenting on imposed hypothetical scenarios that may or may not have been 
dilemmatic for that particular respondent. Indeed, the nature of the critical incidents that 
respondents choose to relate may, in itself, offer valuable insights to their ethical 
perspectives. 
In using critical incident technique, a decision needed to be made on the question of 
whether to ask interviewees to think about incidents in advance of the meeting. The 
disadvantage of doing so is that prior consideration may have impaired the spontaneity of 
the interviewee's response. The advantage of doing so is that it optimises the limited time 
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available for the meeting. Curran and Blackbum (1994, cited by Bryman and Bell, 2003) 
took the latter option and found that, by sending potential critical incident themes to 
respondents prior to the meeting, more detailed narratives were elicited than would have 
been possible had the subjects been raised for the first time during the meeting. 
Alternatively, the decision of whether or not to prepare responses could be left to the 
respondent; Bryman and Bell (2003) note that it is common practice to provide a copy of 
the interview guide on request. 
The approach that I took was, after making initial contact with research participants by 
telephone or by email, to write to them, giving a clear account of my research objectives 
and of what I expected to achieve during the interview. I explicitly stated my intention to 
explore any ethical dilemmas that the interviewees may have encountered. This, I felt, 
offered them the opportunity to reflect broadly on morally problematic scenarios without 
being asked to specifically select critical incidents in advance of the meeting. In alerting 
them to my intention to explore critical incidents, I was alert to possibility that their 
discussion of these incidents may have been rehearsed. Had this been the case, I would have 
withdrawn mention of dilemmas in my letter. However, participants' treatment of dilemmas 
seemed fairly spontaneous, so this was not necessary. 
As well spending part of each interview focussing on a particular critical incident, I also 
encouraged research participants more generally to offer examples drawn from their 
personal experience to illustrate conceptual articulations of their moral understanding. This, 
I felt, assisted the epistemological challenge of imaginatively occupying (Macintyre, 1988) 
the moral perspectives that they were expressing. 
Repertory grid technique 
A third technique that I considered was repertory grid technique, which is based on George 
Kelly's (1991 [1955]) personal construct theory. Despite its origins in personal construct 
theory, it is not necessary to accept the psychological presuppositions of Kelly's theory in 
order to derive the benefits of repertory grid technique (Fransella et al, 2004). Indeed, it has 
been applied in a wide range of milieu "to identify the interpretive processes whereby an 
individual constructs meaning in relation to his or her social context" (Bryman and Bell, 
2003: 131). 
Given its potential for "enabling in-depth discussion and thinking about a topic" (Bryman 
and Bell, 2003: 134) and encouraging interviewees to verbalise constructs that might 
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otherwise remain hidden (Easterby et al, 1991), repertory·grid technique seemed well suited 
to facilitating articulation of interviewees' ethical understanding. Furthermore, since it 
elucidates an exposition of the research subject's understanding of the topic on their own 
terms, avoiding the "laying of [the researcher's] thinking on to them" (Jankowicz, 2004: 
11), it seemed particularly apposite to the interpretive nature of my enquiry. 
I therefore set out to incorporate a repertory grid exercise in my research discussions, using 
it to identify bi-polar constructs which define respondents understanding of ethical 
leadership. Prior to commencing my empirical research, I used repertory grid technique 
with groups of undergraduate and postgraduate students to explore their understanding of 
ethical leadership. This met with mixed results. Putting the difficulties encountered down to 
the fact that I was relying upon students to play the parts of interviewees and interviewers, 
with insufficient preparation for the latter to fulfil their role, I resolved to incorporate the 
method into my trial interviews. This also brought mixed results. The process was very 
time-consuming and, although my trial interviewees reported that they had found it fairly 
interesting, they did not engage with it as enthusiastically as they did with loosely 
structured discussion. I used repertory grids again in my first interview. Since the 
interviewee was a personal acquaintance I was able to debrief him after the meeting. He 
reported that he had enjoyed our discussion but had found the repertory grid exercise 
tedious and cumbersome. 
These difficulties may have been due to my inexperience with repertory grid technique. 
Perhaps a practiced interviewer may have been able to use it more productively and more 
time-efficiently in my research context. However, given the time-bound nature of my 
interviews I decided not to persevere with repertory grid technique. Although it offers 
interesting possibilities for facilitating people's ethical understanding, its use in my 
interviews would have cut down on the time available for less structured discussion. Since 
the latter seemed to be the most productive, it was on this that I decided to concentrate. 
Other Procedural Issues Relating to Empirical Research 
Encouraging cooperation from participants 
Easterby et a! (1991) suggest some measures that might be adopted by researchers to 
establish credibility, to build trust and to elicit cooperation from interviewees. The first of 
these measures is to familiarise oneself with as much information as possible about the 
participant prior to the interview. Not only will this save time during the interview, it will 
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also contextualise the conversation, helping the interviewer to understand what· the 
interviewee is saying on his or her own terms (Bryman and Bell, 2003). I therefore resolved 
to carry out desk research about each interviewee prior to our meetings. This proved quite 
productive. Due to the high profile of many of my research participants, I was able to 
access quite a lot of relevant information via the internet. There is, or course, a risk that 
possession of such biographical detail may have evoked pre-conceptions on my part about 
the interviewees. However, given the need to make optimum use of limited amount of time 
that respondents were able to devote to interviews, I decided to take that risk. 
The second ofEasterby et a/'s (1991) suggestions is that researchers carry out pre-interview 
telephone familiarisation. This, they propose, enables the establishment of voice contact 
and helps the interview to start on the right note. However, the benefits of enthusiastic 
telephone familiarisation need to be reconciled with the practicalities of gaining access to 
participants and also with the hazard of taking up too much of a busy interviewee's time. 
For my earlier interviews, where I had initially been introduced to the research participant 
via a third party, I commenced with a brief telephone or email exchange, following this up 
with a letter outlining my research objectives and my specific aims in relation to research 
discussions. For my later interviews, where I contacted participants "cold" without a third 
party introduction, this formal letter comprised my opening communication to them. This I 
followed with a telephone call. These follow up telephone conversations were, with one 
exception, fielded by participants' personal assistants. Therefore, in these cases, no prior 
familiarisation with the participant was possible. All my formal letters to participants were 
written on Business School notepaper in response to Easterby et a/'s (ibid) suggestion for 
establishing researcher's credibility. A copy of one of my letters of introduction appears as 
appendix 2. 
Thirdly, Easterby et a/ (1991) highlight the importance of using appropriate terminology. 
Describing myself as a "student" may have implied an amateurish inquiry in the eyes of 
potential interviewees, whereas "researcher'' suggests a more professional relationship. 
Referring to the meetings as an "interviews" might have given the impression of a formal, 
structured interrogation that is controlled by the researcher. I therefore used the term 
"discussion", which suggests a less threatening, more relaxed encounter. Choice of 
terminology is also important with regard to subject matter (Bryman and Bell, 2003). 
Within the present context, the language of ethics theory may have held little meaning for 
respondents, so I avoided using it during interviews 
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Fourthly, Easterby et a/ (1991) highlight the importance of venue. They suggest that a 
neutral venue is likely to be preferable to the interviewee's workplace, in which the 
discussion may be subject to interruption. They also suggest that interviewees may feel 
more relaxed away from their workplace. A relatively discreet setting is also likely to be 
conducive to frank expression of views on the part of the interviewee. Bryman and Bell 
(2003) also stress the importance, when audio taping interviews, of choosing a venue that is 
free of extraneous noise that may impair the quality of the recording. In response to 
Easterby et a/ 's suggestions, I initially sought to arrange neutral venues. However, perhaps 
due to the status of these research participants in their organizations, I found that their 
workplaces actually offered more discreet and tranquil settings than hotel lobbies. 
Recording discussions 
Bryman and Bell (2003) note several benefits of an accurate record of meetings. This 
enables thorough and repeated examination of content by the researcher. It also opens up 
the data to others who may wish to audit or share it. Furthermore, it permits data to be re-
used in other ways to those intended by the original researcher, or in the light of different 
perspectives. 
Videotaping is helpful for capturing non-verbal as well as verbal discourse. Garcia and 
Button (1991 and 1992 respectively, both cited in Bryman and Bell, 2003) have used 
videotaping in the interests of discourse analysis. However, in both cases, the process of 
videotaping was facilitated by the fact that the researcher did not actively participate in the 
taped discussions. The logistic challenges presented by videotaping were prohibitive in the 
present context. 
Audio taping is more commonly used, providing a comprehensive and cost-effective record 
of verbal discourse that can be subsequently transcribed. Unlike note taking, audio taping 
permits the researcher to give full attention to the discourse. Like videotaping, audio taping 
may cause some anxiety for interviewees. However, Bryman and Bell (2003) note that 
people generally loosen up after initial anxiety about recorders. Easterby et a/ (1991) and 
Gill and Johnson (1997) find that managers, in particular, are rarely self-conscious about 
being recorded and tend to soon forget about the recorder. Indeed, Gill and Johnson suggest 
that, for this reason, taping tends to cause less anxiety then note taking, which remains at 
the forefront of the respondent's awareness throughout the discussion and is therefore even 
more likely to inhibit frank expression. I therefore chose to audiotape discussions. 
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Gill and Johnson (1997) suggest that anxiety about taping might be reduced if responsibility 
for switching on-and-off the tape recorder is handed to the interviewee. However, I did not 
feel that this was necessary or, given the sophisticated nature of digital recorders, practical. 
I did, though, inform interviewees in my introductory letter of my wish to record meetings. 
I then sought, at the start of the discussion, their permission for me to do this and informed 
them when I was switching the recorder on and off. I encountered neither opposition to nor 
apparent discomfort about audio taping. In several cases, participants initiated the 
continuation of conversation after I had turned off the recorder. In two particular cases, a 
great deal of interesting supplementary data was offered off-record. However, since an 
accurate record of this data was lacking, I did not include it in my analysis. 
Gill and Johnson (1997) also suggest that trust may be engendered if the interviewee is 
given the opportunity to read transcripts of the audiotape and any field notes that are 
subsequently written up. I therefore asked each participant if they would like a copy of the 
transcript of the interview but only one person took up my offer. 
Data Analysis 
So much for the method that I adopted to encourage research participants to share with me 
their understanding of the ethical challenges associated with organizational leadership. 
Having outlined that method and discussed some of the challenges that it presented, I will 
now turn to the closely related issue of data analysis. Bryman and Bell observe that 
qualitative research often tends to be iterative in that it is characterised by a "repetitive 
interplay between the collection and analysis of data" (2003: 425). The iterative nature of 
grounded theory permits an approach that cannot be described as either purely deductive or 
entirely inductive. Instead, it is characterised by an incremental progression, whereby each 
stage of data collection facilitates theoretical reflection and redefinition of subsequent 
empirical focus. Thus, research may begin around relatively loosely defined objectives, 
which are gradually refined as the project evolves. As empirical data is gathered, it is 
integrated with preliminary theoretical perspectives, thus redefining the focus of subsequent 
empirical encounters. 
Accordingly, my empirical exercise had a deductive quality insofar as it followed on from a 
precursory exploration of relevant theory. That exploration had provided it with a tentative 
structure, which comprised a number of themes that seemed to hold resonance for the 
research topic. By themes, I mean a number of headings which had emerged from my prior 
exploration of the leadership literature and from my consideration of the leadership-related 
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implications of various theoretical ethics perspectives. The terms concept or category could 
be applied to these themes, although given the ambiguities and definitional difficulties 
surrounding these labels (Bryman and Bell, 2003) I will stick with "themes". 
Equally, the project has an inductive quality insofar as empirical enquiry expanded and 
provided focus to that preliminary theoretical framework. Thus, the themes that had 
crystallised during theoretical exploration evolved during empirical enquiry. Furthermore, 
additional themes emerged, waxed and waned during my research discussions. The 
emergent theoretical understanding was deductively applied to subsequent empirical 
enquiry, and so on. 
All of my interviews were transcribed by a third party and I began data analysis by reading 
through the transcripts while listening to the recordings24 of the interviews. This served two 
purposes. Firstly, it enabled me to correct errors in the transcribing. Since I sent each 
interview for transcription immediately after the interview, I was usually able to review the 
transcripts within a week or so of recording. The discussions were therefore fresh in my 
memory so I was well placed to correct any transcriptional misunderstandings. 
The second benefit of reading through the transcripts while listening to and correcting the 
recordings is that this provided a welcome vitality to the first stage of coding. I roughly 
followed the stages of coding suggested by Bryman and Bell (2003), where open coding is 
understood as the "process of breaking down, examining, comparing, conceptualising and 
categorising data" (Strauss and Corbin, 1990 cited in Bryman and Bell, 2003: 429). This 
initial stage, as Bryman and Bell suggest, involved "reading through [the] initial set of 
transcripts ... without taking any notes or considering an interpretation" before making "a 
few general notes about what had struck [me] as especially interesting, important or 
significant" (ibid: 435). I found that carrying out this first stage with simultaneous visual 
and audio brought the interviews back to life in a way that just reading the transcripts failed 
to do. I also used this simultaneous approach at later stages of data analysis to help to avoid 
de-contextualisation (see below). 
My second stage of coding involved reading agam through a transcript, making, as 
suggested by Bryman and Bell "marginal notes about significant remarks or observations" 
(ibid: 435). This I did using the "insert comment" function on a standard Microsoft Word 
24 My first six interviews were recorded on a traditional cassette recorder. The remaining ten were 
recorded using a digital recorder. 
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package25 • These notes were guided partly by the themes that had already evolved through 
an iterative interplay between theory and prior data analysis; partly by issues that may have 
appeared for the first time in the transcript under consideration and which seemed to be 
particularly relevant to the research agenda. 
My next stage of coding comprised the compilation of what are sometimes referred to as 
concept cards (Bryman and Bell, 2003). In my case, this consisted of a separate Word 
document relating to each theme onto which I copied and pasted excerpts from each 
transcript that related to that particular theme. Passages of conversation often held 
resonance for several different themes, so I often pasted one section of data onto several 
different concept cards. These concept cards were under continuous review: new cards 
were added as additional themes emerged during ongoing analysis; cards were also 
removed as I sometimes combined several themes onto one card. Twice during my 
research I carried out a major review of coding: after three interviews and after eleven 
interviews. This included the creation of "secondary order cards" (Prasad, 1993 cited in 
Bryman and Bell, 2003: 430), which consolidated the earlier concept cards in the light of 
relationships that were emerging between different themes. Subsequent interviews were 
then conducted against the framework of these consolidated themes, which were further 
augmented and shaped in response to new data. 
The above might be construed as a straightforward, clinical, linear process. In actuality, it 
was tortuously dialectical, involving a constantly troubled quest for theoretical relevance as 
I attempted to steer a passage between the Scy lla of a purely descriptive hermeneutic and 
the Charybdis of a personally derived schema. Alert to the epistemological challenges 
already discussed, my early attempts to theorise the data strayed too far towards pure 
description, with lengthy, unedited passages of data making heavy demands on the reader 
and saying little of theoretical interest. Furthermore, in seeking to avoid the charge of 
massaging data into a preconceived framework, I struggled to synthesise the empirical with 
the theoretical. The eventual outcome, which appears in the three chapters of my empirical 
report, was achieved by adopting a more redactional stance in relation to the data: I came to 
terms with the need to edit and annotate the data in order to set up a worthwhile dialogue 
between theory and empirical material. 
25 I researched the possibility of using a qualitative data analysis software package but decided 
against this. There were several reasons for this; partly cost-related and partly related to the 
difficulties associated with learning to use a complicated new software package. But most 
importantly, I found no need for sophisticated software: Microsoft Word seemed well suited to my 
needs. 
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However, in doing this it was very important to remain vigilant in relation to the coding 
approach that I had adopted. This hazard is that the coding of data involves extracting 
passages from transcripts, which inevitably courts the challenge of de-contextualisation 
(Coffey and Atkinson, 1996 cited in Bryman and Bell, 2003). By considering a fragment of 
data away from its narrative context, the problem of interpretive accuracy, and 
consequently of its misappropriation, is inevitably exacerbated. I sought to ameliorate this 
difficulty by frequently referencing sections of data back to their original context. In this 
respect, I found it particularly helpful to re-read transcripts whilst simultaneously listening 
to original recordings of interviews. 
Concluding Comments 
In summary, my empirical research comprised sixteen interviews with organizational 
leaders, each lasting for between sixty and ninety minutes and delivering a total of 127,000 
words of data. These interviews were conducted using a loosely structured approach. I 
adopted a grounded approach to the gathering and analysis of data. Evaluation of empirical 
research and its integration with theoretical enquiry was therefore carried out on an ongoing · 
basis. Any significant themes that emerged during a particular empirical encounter 
contributed to the agenda of subsequent encounters, permitting gradual evolution of the 
research focus. The outcome of this exercise comprises the three chapters of the empirical 
report that follows. This report discusses the empirical data in relation to a number of 
themes that had either emerged from my precursory theoretical research or that had arisen 
during the course of empirical enquiry. In both cases, these themes were subject to 
continual revision and refocus during ongoing accumulation and analysis of data. 
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5.0 PRESENTATION OF EMPIRICAL DATA 
Introduction 
The following three chapters comprise a report of my discussions with sixteen people who 
occupy, or have occupied, prominent formal leadership roles in work organizations. I have 
made use of the theoretical research already discussed in order to provide a framework for 
this report. 
The report comprises three sections. The first chapter draws upon discussions with three 
particular research participants in order to illustrate some contrasting ways of thinking 
about ethics and leadership. To adopt a Weberian phrase, I am offering the discourses of 
these people as representative of three different ideal types. Each of these perspectives 
resonates with one of the meta-ethical stances discussed in the preceding ethics literature 
review. However, each also departs from its meta-ethical counterpart in important respects. 
Despite these points of divergence, I expect this exercise to aid reflection on some of the 
implications of the various meta-ethical perspectives. The chapter also includes a brief 
introduction to the background and present status of each of the three participants whose 
perspectives are discussed within ir6• This enables reflection on the possibility that the ideal 
type understanding that each articulates is, to some extent, shaped by his respective 
organizational context. 
The second chapter pursues this threefold classification further, examining in greater detail 
a particular characteristic of each of these three discourses. I have selected these particular 
characteristics for two reasons: firstly, because each is particularly relevant to the 
application of its corresponding meta-ethical perspective to the realm of organizational 
leadership; secondly because each characteristic helps to illuminate a particular tension that 
is associated with the application of its corresponding meta-ethical perspective. I will 
discuss these characteristics and explore the associated tensions, drawing upon discussions 
with the other thirteen people who participated in my research. I thus expect to add further 
insights to the implications of applying different meta-ethical understandings to the 
organizational leadership domain. I include, at the beginning of this second chapter, a 
description these thirteen other participants27• 
26 I have changed the names of these people and of the organizations that they work for in order to 
· preserve their anomymity. 
27 As with the three already introduced, I have used pseudonyms in all references to these people. 
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The third chapter of this empirical report looks at how research participants think about the 
areas of moral concern that I identified at the beginning of this thesis and which I have 
already discussed in the leadership literature review. That is, it examines how participants 
evaluate the moral probity of the objectives towards which they lead and how they respond 
to the inherently repressive quality of leadership. I thus intend to shed some more light on 
the extent to which different approaches to leadership may or may not respond to these 
concerns. I will also reflect on a related theme: some contrasting approaches that might be 
taken to the agency of the leader. 
This empirical report will prepare the way for my concluding chapter. In this conclusion, I 
prop'ose to pull together the various aspects of my theoretical and empirical research in 
order to generate a normative conception of ethical leadership. 
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5.1 IDENTIFYING THREE IDEAL TYPES: THE COMPANY MAN, THE MORAL 
CRUSADER AND THE MEDIATOR OF COMMUNICATION 
This chapter focuses on leaders' self-understanding of the part that they play in establishing 
the moral tone of the organization. I will outline the perspectives articulated by three 
different research participants. I have selected these particular participants for two reasons. 
The first reason is that each is particularly expressive of his moral understanding. All of the 
individuals who participated in the research exercise expressed an interest in morality; 
indeed their willingness to participate might be taken as an indication of the seriousness 
with which they treat this dimension of their leadership role. However, I gained the 
impression that some were more preoccupied with that dimension than others. The three 
people that I will discuss in this chapter are amongst that group. 
The second reason that I have chosen to focus on these three individuals is that each 
articulates a very different understanding of his role in setting and implementing his 
organization's moral agenda. I expect these differences to become apparent as the chapter 
progresses. It will also become apparent that these three participants occupy leadership 
roles in very different organizational contexts. I will discuss later the extent to which these 
contextual differences may account for the contrasting perspectives that these participants 
articulate. 
In identifying three ways of thinking about the moral role of the leader, I am not suggesting 
that these are the only ways of thinking about that role. However, each differs sufficiently 
from the others to provide some interesting and insightful contrasts. There are some 
parallels between these three stances and the different meta-ethical perspectives discussed 
in the last section. Therefore, considering these three individuals may offer a basis for 
additional reflection on the implications of each of these perspectives. 
David: the Company Man28 
David works as Managing Director of the UK Division of Rutherford, a global supplier of 
food-based products. Rutherford is one of the world's largest privately owned corporations 
and its founding family continues to exercise a strong influence on its affairs. 
28 It would have been more gender-neutral to use the term "Company Person". However, since the 
person who approximates most closely to this ideal type is male, since none of the women with 
whom I spoke approximate to it at all and since it seems to carry greater rhetorical elegance, I have 
chosen to stick with "Company Man". 
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I sensed a little defensiveness on behalf of Rutherford at the beginning of my conversation 
with David. Despite my reassurance that I was primarily interested in exploring his views, I 
think he may have perceived my approach as a potential attack on the company's CSR 
profile. This might be explained by the contentious nature of Rutherford's core UK product 
(intensively reared poultry) or by the fact that, as David related towards the end of our 
conversation, the global business is currently embroiled in a PR scuffle with a major NGO 
concerning usage of environmentally sensitive land. This defensiveness may account for 
David's eagerness to orientate our conversation towards Rutherford, its systems and its 
values rather than dwelling on his personal moral perspective. 
However, an alternative explanation of David's Rutherford-focussed discourse is that he 
perceives his own moral understanding as deeply embedded within that of the organization. 
David clearly feels very comfortable operating within Rutherford's value systems; he struck 
me as very much a "Company Man" (he wore a sports shirt bearing the company's logo at 
our meeting). In the following narrative he proudly describes the high profile that morality 
occupies within the company's decision-making processes. He also refers to the importance 
of his personal values being in harmony with those that the organization espouses. 
How come you picked us then? How come you selected us? 
Well, what I am keen to do is just speak to people like yourself- the fact that you're 
involved in Rutherford is immaterial really, that's purely coincidental ... I'm not 
necessarily interested in Rutherford's corporate social responsibility policies. What I am 
interested in is how you think about the moral challenges that the leadership role presents. 
So it's you as a leader rather than this particular organization. 
Aha. 
But, obviously there is going to be a bit of a linkage between the two. 
Well hopefully one reflects the other, otherwise you're a fish out of water in your 
organization. 
Presumably, yes. Now clearly, in your role, you are expected to show leadership to a large 
number. of people- is it over two thousand employees you have here? 
Yes, yes. 
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Is the ethics of that something that you think about? Is it something you spend time thinking 
about? 
Well it's a good point actually because the answer is yes. And this is where you can't avoid 
the corporate, the culture of the corporation ... because Rutherford, one of Rutherford's 
fundamental values and one of its building blocks to work with in this organization and 
what it believes is its success over a hundred-and-thirty, hundred-and-forty years is its 
ethics. So Rutherford have very strong ethical values and ensure that the employees 
understand those.... As it's got bigger and bigger and more global, we have a set of 
behaviours that we all sign up to as employees. And what it says is that even though we are 
a global company, eighty countries, all that kind of stuff, here is a set of values that this 
business is going to operate by. 
And to be fair it then picks, I guess it's automatic selection between what people want, i.e. 
people like myself who choose this organization to stay with, plus the values that the 
organization brings. There's almost like a marriage that says we compliment each other 
because Rutherford won't put someone in a leadership position that doesn't exhibit the 
[organisations prescribed] behaviours. But equally the people in those leadership positions 
feel comfortable with that constraint of those behaviours . 
. . . So there's almost a marriage as you develop through the organization. So, to be fair, 
ethics, it's much more of a, it's not a bolt on. It's more endemic as one ofthe core cultural 
behaviours of Rutherford, I would say. Probably more so than a lot of organizations. A lot 
of organizations talk about ethics; I've never really seen it be so consistently applied as it is 
in Rutherford. It is quite amazing really. Now is it something consciously that people 
wander around thinking about all the time? No it's almost like, it gets to a point where it's 
like breathing; it's like the functions of your body. It's just something that happens 
automatically because it's what you do. And the right of it is, ifyou cut to the chase, if I 
make a big mistake that costs this business a million pounds, I'll be forgiven, quite frankly. 
Ifl do something unethical, I'll be sacked. 
David goes on to describe how Rutherford's values are established from the centre; by the 
Rutherford "family". He also relates the steps that the company has recently taken to 
formalise and communicate its moral code and to ensure that its members adhere to that 
code. 
You mention there that it is very important that all the employees understand those values. 
But where do those values come from in the first place? 
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I think to be, the reality of it is, from Rutherford. They are passed down from generation to 
generation. Rutherford is a family-owned business so the family determine: this is what we 
are about; this is what we are; yes, it's different to everybody else, but this is what makes 
us. That gets passed through the organization through very well communicated briefmgs, 
documentation, just reinforcement.... Some of those values were implied for many, many 
years they've been implied and they've been passed down. 
So by implied you mean that they hadn't been formalised? 
Precisely. About ten years ago [Rutherford] actually formalised some of those values and 
made a much, much better job of saying actually, you know, we are on a big growth 
strategy. That means that we acquire businesses. That means that people need to understand 
that when we acquire them and when we do our due diligence: ... yes, we look at numbers; 
yes, we look at plants; but we also look at the culture; we look at the ethical values; we look 
at the safety; we look at their past history on environmental. I mean we put a lot more 
emphasis on those kind of things ... you know: what's your level of safety; what's the 
culture like; do people tell lies; have we got outstanding issues with local governments, with 
regulatory bodies? And we put a huge amount of effort into that because Rutherford doesn't 
necessarily want to be stood there saying "you guys are running a sweat shop, you guys are 
doing this, you're doing things unethically, you're doing things behind the door''. 
[Rutherford] tends to be very, very, you know, very, very open and transparent about those 
things. 
And because we have a big growth strategy as Rutherford world-wide, it needed to be more 
formalised to give people boundaries to operate in ... When we bought businesses, people 
needed to know what they were letting themselves in for regarding the way Rutherford does 
business. So that was much more formalised about ten years ago. And programmes were 
set up within Rutherford to really explain to people what Rutherford's culture is and what it 
wants to be, what it's ethical values stand for, what it's leadership responsibilities are, what 
the behaviours that we would like to see in our culture, the expected behaviours are and that 
kind of thing. 
Ok. So the impression I'm getting is that the values are something which are shaped from 
the top of the organization. And then anybody that comes in for any form of relationship 
with the organization; whether it be another company which you bring in and incorporate 
under-
Oh, we'd entirely expect them to follow-
Or whether it's an employee, they will be expected to conform to those values. 
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Absolutely ... We all sign documents every year to say we are going to conform to certain 
levels, standards and ethics. 
To a large extent, then, David perceives the moral legitimacy ofhis own leadership conduct 
as deriving from its congruence with the company's ethical code. He is clearly very 
comfortable with Rutherford's values and he is happy to measure his own conduct in 
relation to them. 
Where does David's confidence in the moral probity of Rutherford's values derive from; 
why is he so convinced that the company's moral code offers a sound basis for moral 
behaviour on his part? The answer to this question seems to relate partly to the apparent 
seriousness with which the organization treats ethics and the significance that it accords to 
the moral dimension in its commercial decision-making processes. That the organization 
cares about morality and that it cares enough to have reflected upon and formalised a set of 
behavioural principles seems, for David, to convey a certain amount of legitimacy upon 
those principles; that his company is ethically sensitised ensures the moral probity of its 
actions. 
However, other, slightly different, although related, reasons for David's confidence in 
Rutherford's moral code are hinted at by his response to my specific question about the 
legitimacy of its values: 
So how can pe~ple be sure that the values that Rutherford stands for are the right values 
morally? 
I think it's, I mean they're not rocket science, to be fair, they are pretty basic but they are 
not exactly rocket science. But I think on the basis of the feedback we get here, people feel 
comfortable with those values. 
David's observation that Rutherford's values are "not rocket science" suggests that he 
considers the identification of moral rightness to be a fairly straightforward task, at least 
insofar as the identification of a minimal code of behaviour is concerned. His assumption 
seems to be that fundamental principles of right and wrong are easily discernible through he 
application of common sense and that a moral business is one which follows these self-
evident principles instead of allowing other considerations to get in their way. So, by 
placing the emphasis on morality that it does, Rutherford is thereby a moral business. 
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Furthermore, by leading in a manner which is congruent with these self-evidently right 
values, David is confident that he will be leading ethically. 
A further interesting aspect is David's reference to the importance of consistency, a subject 
to which he returned several times during our conversation. There seem to be several 
interrelated strands to David's approbation of consistency. Firstly, he believes that 
consistent fealty to altruistically-oriented moral principles, even when these principles 
conflict with self-interest or organizational performance, is morally desirable. 
And it's just like watching on TV all the politicians; why do people get pissed off with the 
politicians? Because they are not consistent. You know, what people consider to be good, 
strong core values, they expect certain people to operate within that parameter. And when 
they are not consistent that's when they lose trust ... I think if you are consistent, if the 
people think you are looking after their interests not just the interests of your self or the 
organization. You know, if you do what you say you are going to do and you execute well, I 
think people are going to trust you. And I think that whole issue about are you looking after 
their interests as much as looking after your own interests is a big part of it. 
David also dwells the importance of consistency when asked about the part played by 
-
employees in the definition of corporate values. As far as David is concerned, el!lployees 
have little interest in such participation. For them, what is important is that corporate values 
are consistently implemented; not that they are able to contribute to the definition of those 
values: 
Do they get an opportunity to contribute? You mention that the values have evolved to a 
certain extent; do people in the organization get the opportunity to contribute to that 
evolution? 
Well, it is Rutherford that sits right up there and it says: "this is what, these are the 
behaviours we want around the world"... But basis our experience here, this word 
consistency crops up a lot whenever I do these kinds of things [i.e. conduct employee 
feedback] and talk to our employees. Because above all they want to be consistent: ... the 
feedback we get is "we don't care if you are as tough as old boots and we don't care if you 
are as nice as pie. But please be consistent because what we can't handle is when one week 
you are nice to Jo and the next week you are bad to Bill. We don't know where you are 
coming from". So that inconsistency then allows people to play games, it allows 
management to do different things and what you can't have is inconsistency regarding the 
values of the management and the values of the supervisors. 
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Yes. So I'm getting the impression that the employees, for them, it is more important that, 
whatever values the company has, they are consistently applied-
Absolutely. 
Than that they get the opportunity to contribute to the evolution of those values. 
And I'll come back to the contribution because we do cail them in. But I think it's important 
that it doesn't matter where you sit in the organization, I think you need to know what is and 
is not acceptable. And so, I think when people know what is and is not acceptable and 
what's expected of them it makes your life easier at work. Because then you can just 
concentrate on doing your work, because you know you are going to be consistently treated 
with everybody else. If people don't know what's expected of them and it's a free-for-all 
, and actually when I do cross over that white line, we might get penalised versus someone in 
a different factory get penalised, because he's got a different manager than I have got. That 
creates a lot of confusion and creates a lot of management time when it goes wrong. So 
being consistent, having the employees know what's expected of them and what they should 
expect from the organization, I think is a pretty fundamental part and foundation of any 
business. 
David's insouciance about employee participation in value definition is perhaps another 
indication that, for him, moral rectitude is self-evident: corporate values are so obviously 
right that there can be no reason why employees should want to participate in their 
definition. Employees only concern is that those abundantly obvious standards of ethical 
rectitude are consistently applied by management. Employees thus expect consistency in 
the treatment of different people in different parts of the organization by different 
managers. They also expect consistency in the conduct of any particular manager. And in 
both respects, those who occupy leadership roles have an important part to play: their 
consistent application of the organization's moral code is critical to its perpetuation: 
In my view, because you can pass down whatever memos you want from the top, it means 
Jack Shit unless the living organisms of the company; the bosses, the managers, the 
employees within it unless you actually- people just mimic behaviour, so if you've got a 
boss who says one thing and does another you are going to have chaos. If you have a boss 
who lives certain values, no matter what they are, whether it's, you know; we'll do we what 
we say, whether we'll treat people properly, whether we'll have recognition processes, 
whether we're consistent in how we manage people, you know, some of the core values I 
stand for, people see them and say is he consistent in the application of those values? And if 
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he is, then I think people mirror that behaviour. But personally I think a lot of it is 
consistency. 
For David, then, there is a mutually supportive relationship between organizational values 
and organizational leadership: on the one hand, the values offer a template of moral 
rectitude for leaders within the organization to follow; on the other hand, the perpetuation 
of those values demands their consistent exemplification in the behaviour of those leaders. 
The values support the leaders and the leaders support the values; the consequence of this 
relationship of reciprocal support is a virtuous spiral of moral probity. 
To summarise, I have highlighted several themes from David's discourse. These themes 
offer an insight to his understanding of morality in relation to his leadership role. The first 
is that he orientates his moral leadership compass in accordance with the espoused values of 
the organization. He feels very comfortable with the organization and with its moral code 
and understands moral leadership as comprising consistent application of that code. 
The second feature is that the importance which Rutherford appears to attach to ethics 
reassures David of the moral probity of its values. Since the apprehension of moral 
rightness is a relatively straightforward matter, a company which permits this self-evident 
moral template to direct its decision-making is likely to be a moral company. Consistent 
application of an ethically-responsive company's moral agenda therefore offers a 
dependable template for moral leadership. 
A third feature ofDavid's moral understanding is that he considers consistency, in itself, to 
be a virtue. Consistent application of commonly shared behavioural principles, particularly 
in the face of self-interested or commercial imperatives which compete with these 
principles, is therefore an important ingredient to ethical leadership. 
A fourth feature, which follows from the self-evident nature of morality, is that there is 
scant need for companies to engage in critical reflection and debate about morality. If the 
definition of appropriate values is, as David suggests, "not rocket science", then companies 
who aspire to ethicality need devote few resources to moral soul-searching. Furthermore, 
there is little point in involving employees in the definition of the company's moral agenda. 
Since moral probity is a relatively straightforward matter, company's have no need to 
consult about the content of their moral agenda. Instead, they should focus their efforts on 
communicating and enforcing a code of conduct that instantiates those self-evident moral 
truths. 
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James: the Moral Crusader 
James is Executive Vice President (UK) of a global, US-based, executive travel company. 
His role carries overall responsibility for the company's UK business. At the time of our 
meeting, he had been in this post for a little over a year. He previously worked in a number 
of other managing directorship and board roles, mainly within the travel industry. 
James stated at the start of our conversation that he does not tend to think explicitly about 
morality but that it nevertheless occupies a prominent role in the way in which he fulfils his 
leadership responsibilities: 
I've realised that a lot of, I guess, my values, a lot of what I try and do in terms of my style 
and what I try to bring to the business, is about [morality] but I have never sort of thought 
about that as "okay, this is my morality bit" because it's not a word I would necessarily 
always use. But the elements of it, and there are many, many elements of it, would all be 
things that are probably very important to me and are probably a lot of the values that I 
know I have brought to this business in the last year relative to my predecessors. So, yeah, I 
don't sort of package it like that but it's a part, I guess, [of] what things are important. 
The core message of this opening statement was reinforced throughout our conversation. 
This is that James attaches a great deal of importance to morality and, although he may not 
conceptualise it in theoretical terms, he takes the moral dimension of leadership very 
seriously. His willingness to assist with my research seemed to derive from a genuine 
interest in the subject and how it relates to his role. He was keen to share his reflections and 
experiences in a frank and open manner. 
It is also apparent that James has a great deal of confidence in his own moral agenda and 
that he is highly committed to pursuing that agenda. This is evident from the way in which 
he talks about the definition and implementation of corporate values. Like David, James 
reflects how the moral conduct of members of the organization should conform to a shared 
behavioural code. However, whereas David emphasises the role of the company's founding 
family in shaping that code, James dwells on the part played by the leader: 
Who decides what those, you know, what's important? Who should decide what is important 
morally for businesses? Who should be making those decisions about which are the morally 
significant subjects? 
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I think the leadership of the company. I am not just on about the individual and myself, 
there is also a team responsibility in terms of the Senior Board. And it is, I think, in any 
company it is absolutely the style of the leader and it's then the style of the leadership team 
that defmitely influences and creates a culture across the business. And so it is incredibly 
important that as a team you recognise that and I always say to my team, you know it's 
about the shadow that we create. It's the aura that we create a~ a culture, its how we behave 
together and if we slag each other off then that's the culture you create and it goes all the 
way down to the bottom. But actually if we are, you know, then it comes back to like 
respect for each other and integrity, honesty. Not shafting people in the back. All of those 
sort of things that can go on. 
Yeah ok, so what you are suggesting there is that-
The leadership team is responsible for it. 
I returned to this theme a little later in our conversation. Again, James emphasises the role 
played by leaders in shaping the moral tone of an organization. Although junior employees 
may play a small part, the key mora:l shapers must be the people at the top: 
To put it in fairly blunt terms, what I am getting the impression of is a fairly top-down 
management approach. You know, the role of the leadership is to define the moral agendas 
and to define the responses that we should be taking in those moral agendas. Is that the way 
that you tend to run the business? Is that your general approach? 
No, I'm not autocratic in that sense. And actually my style is changing this year because I 
came in a year ago and there was a lot that needed to change and I was much more hands-on 
and directional if you like ... I think a lot of what you are asking about, though, does come 
from the top. You know, the personality of a business is often, you can often see where it 
comes from by looking at the leader of the company. And that can be in a very small 
company. You can see it much more visibly. Or it can be a large company .... So there is a 
top-down which is that if you behave like that, you instil a style that you hope that people 
like and they respond to that and then they try and do it. It cascades down .... And coming 
up from the bottom there is an element; but a lot of it, a lot of it has to come from the top, 
particularly on this [moral] agenda. 
James offers two examples of the significance of leadership in shaping the organizations 
moral tone. Firstly, he contrasts the moral climate that he has developed with that 
encouraged by his predecessor. Such is the moral potency of leadership that, even in a 
relatively short tenure, he has succeeded in driving some fundamental changes: 
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We'd been a sleeping giant for about five years in this company and it was, if you looked at 
the manager, the MD who was here, you could understand why because he's a bit of a 
sleeper and it's just his style and everything about him; he has absolutely zero energy or 
motivational dynamism or whatever else; he hadn't really had control of his team. The 
standards therefore had fallen .... There had been a bit of a drinking culture going on with 
some of the senior team and some people were definitely abusing trips we get offered by 
airlines and so on: it was always the same people with their wives going away. Well we 
stopped all of that and we've injected a momentum and a belief and a different culture in 
our business. 
A second example is James's description of someone he holds out as a role model of moral 
leadership. His account is notable for its depiction of Stuart Rose [CEO of Marks and 
Spencer] as having unilaterally defined and imposed Marks and Spencer's environmental 
policy. James's description allows little space for the possibility that that company's stance 
in relation to a morally sensitive issue may have been developed in consultation with 
others: 
Stuart Rose of Marks and Spencer announced recently that they were going to go carbon-
. neutral and that would mean a dramatic change in everything that they did. He was very 
honest about it and it was shortly after the Stem Report had come out and he said, "I read 
the Stem Report and I read the news and I heard it on the radio and everything else" and he 
said, "I felt that I had a responsibility because I could influence it. I had a responsibility and 
we in our business as individual people have responsibility to do what we can about this so 
that is what we are doing." And that was the initial driver. And I happen to believe him. I 
mean there are all sorts of different drivers: you know, you have got, whether it be 
shareholders or commercial or protection of brand and so on and so forth, but on the 
environmental issue there are lots of things that come at it but there is an awful lot as well 
which is to do with believing that you know you have got an ability to make a change; take 
a stance and make change. And certainly on the environmental side I absolutely believe in 
that and we are doing quite a lot in the business in that way. 
James's understanding of his own role in shaping and implementing the moral tone of the 
organization is particularly apparent from his description of the action he has taken against 
transgressors of the agreed moral code: 
I've fired two directors this year. One for, he was the Director of Sales and he was, he went 
to a sales team meeting and did an overnight. He had too much to drink and was fairly 
abusive to some of the women on the team. I fired him for it because I said "that is 
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unacceptable behaviour. That is not how we behave. That is just not the culture of this 
company. I don't want yo.u around". Clearly, and he was terribly apologetic, he recognised 
that he made an error and I said "no, actually it's more than an error. You have a different 
set of values than I have and that we have so bye-bye". And a similar example just very 
recently, well at a conference in fact, where one of the directors-to-be decided that the 
appropriate thing to do was, rather than buy a new suit and rise to the challenge, was to sit 
up until 6 o'clock in the morning and then sleep through most of the sessions the following 
day. Inappropriate behaviour. You know that is not the value-set that we want in this 
business. So whether that's about dilemmas or decisions but how tough you are in terms of 
saying "no this is what we believe in and this is what we are going to do". There are some 
examples there of saying, "no this is what it's about and these are the values and yes we will 
enforce them". 
Clearly, then, James believes that the most significant influence on the moral tone of the 
organization is the leader. He also speaks of the importance of the "leadership team" - his 
senior managers - supporting the moral agenda. However, it is clear that he casts himself as 
the driver. The person at the top, whether it is James in his organization or role models such 
as Stuart Rose in other organizations, is the person who sets the moral direction. Not only is 
this the case de facto but he sees no reason why it should be otherwise. Furthermore, James 
appears to be very comfortable fulfilling the roles of moral authorship and moral 
enforcement. But where does the legitimacy of the leader's moral legislation and execution 
derive from; how can the leader be sure that his or her moral appraisal is accurate? I asked 
James this question. 
Is there a danger that, if the moral agenda is being set by the person at the top and the way 
that that moral agenda should be handled is being set by the person at the top, you maybe 
missing out on some things and some responses to those things which are morally quite 
important? 
Well yes. 
Can you necessarily assume that the person on the top has that sort of moral perspicuity to 
be able to see what is important and how we should respond to those things? 
No you can't. But equally, you know, to throw it out the other way, you can't assume 
anything actually. That person could be pretty immoral ... you know this actually affirms 
the influence of the role. You can have somebody pretty immoral at the top and that would 
very quickly drive a pretty immoral culture because of the style of that person who would 
run that through the team. So, for instance, [I'll] give you a very easy example of that. If it's 
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acceptable for the guy at the top to, at a conference, go to bed with one of the girls on the 
account-management team, then it's acceptable to the leadership team, the guys in the 
leadership team, to at the end of the night pick them off and be shagging your own staff 
basically. That has happened here before in this company. Two or three years ago that was 
the culture. I fmd that totally, utterly unacceptable. So there you have got to [say]: "no, no" 
because I think it's wrong; it's an abuse of the position. 
So you can see how I sort of, if you like, laid down the culture and style around those 
issues. Somebody else might come in with a very different agenda. They might be quite an 
immoral person and before you know it, they might be dishonest in their dealings. They 
might go to a client and actually look a client in the eye and lie to them; you know, promise 
them that we can do something that we can't do in order to win the business. You don't do 
that. Because I don't believe in that and therefore I am trying to create and develop a 
culture around, if you like, values that I think are important. But it is dangerous because I 
might miss some things but it's equally dangerous that somebody in my position could have 
a very adverse effect because I like to think things I am doing are fairly positive but 
somebody could have an incredibly negative effect if you got the wrong person in the role. 
Yes. I suppose you could get somebody in the role who is doing things which you would 
consider to be immoral and maybe that person doesn't consider them to be immoral. 
Well they would consider them to be moral because they think it's their job and I think 
some of these people do, they consider their role to be a hundred percent unequivocally 
responsible to the shareholders for delivering maximum profit anyway you can get it. And I 
don't think it's as simple as that. But that's how some people would view it and therefore 
you can be, with that agenda, you can be very cutthroat and mercenary and just disrespectful 
of individuals and people and anything else you roll over on the way. There are plenty of 
successful businessmen who have got there simply because they just ride rough shod over 
everything that gets in their way. 
Later in the conversation I returned to this issue, asking if the people at the top of the 
business could be relied upon to have the necessary ethical perspicacity and breadth of 
moral vision to fulfil the onerous role that James envisages. 
So is there a danger then, given the importance of seeing things from the point of view of 
the other side of the tracks, is there a danger in the moral agendas of the business and the 
way that we respond to those agendas being driven primarily by senior management who 
presumably are seeing things mostly from one side of the tracks? 
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... Yes there is a danger because you know it can be a positive or negative influence on a 
business. The responsibility, ifyou like, then comes at every level of the company in terms 
of the recruitment, to try and recruit leaders and managers and at every level so this does 
apply all the way down. What we are talking about is where I am sitting in the company but 
you can equally have a conversation with the [chief finance officer] and look down from 
there or you could have a conversation with someone who is running our [airport] service 
centre of one hundred people and they would have the same view because they have got a 
team and so at every level and every layer these things apply. And I am only a layer because 
there are three layers above me. At every layer we have got a responsibility to try and 
recruit people who have sufficient maturity and experience and the right value-fit so they 
will do the right things ... That's where another responsibility comes in, it's about who do 
you bring into the company and I like to think, in answer to your question in a way, I like to 
think I was brought into this job because, through my interviews, people saw that, yes, I can 
run the numbers and I can look at a spreadsheet and I can do this and that but, actually, I 
also have broader leadership skills or a set of values and integrity that they felt was also 
good and therefore good for the business. 
So, James acknowledges the danger of investing such moral responsibility in the people at 
the top but believes that this hazard can be avoided by appointing people of the requisite 
moral fibre to managerial leadership roles throughout the organization. Assuring the moral 
probity of the organization thus becomes a task in which the function of management 
recruitment plays a key role. 
It is apparent from James's responses that he thinks about morality in fairly straightforward 
terms. He believes that right and wrong are readily apparent, at least to a person with a 
certain degree of moral perspicacity. The task of the moral leader is therefore to ensure that 
the organization and its members follow self-evidently, morally-desirable courses of action 
rather than subordinating morality to other considerations, such as the unbridled pursuit of 
profit or the personal foibles for which James has dismissed senior managers. A further task 
of leadership is to appoint to key, subordinate leadership roles people who share the 
leader's moral sagacity and integrity. The danger of immoral leadership lies primarily in an 
immoral person attaining the role of leader; not in a morally well-meaning leader being 
misguided in his or her moral appraisal. James allows that a morally well-meaning leader 
may have a mistaken understanding of moral rightness but the possibility that his own 
moral compass may be off-course does not seem to trouble him overly. His reference to 
business leaders who "consider their role to be a 100% unequivocally responsible to the 
shareholders for delivering maximum profit anyway you can get it" suggests that such 
people are either blind to the clearly apparent wrongness of their actions or that they are 
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pursuing a morally questionable agenda even though they perceive it to be wrong. The 
difference between moral leadership and immoral leadership, then, lies in the extent to 
which the leader is willing to promote a self-evident moral agenda over other considerations 
and the extent to which that person reinforces that agenda throughout the organization. 
James observation that he may "miss some things" in his moral appraisals is not an 
acknowledgement of fallible moral judgement on his part; it is no more than an admission 
that he may overlook some minor detail. 
To summarize, James presents an understanding of moral leadership that differs notably 
from that offered by David. Whereas David perceives moral leadership as deeply embedded 
in values that have sustained the organization over many generations, James accentuates the 
part played by the leader in shaping those values. While David emphasises the need for the 
leader to consistently apply a predetermined and well-established moral agenda, James 
focuses on the leader's role in defining that agenda, a task which may involve changing 
established behavioural patterns and introducing new priorities. For David, moral 
leadership is measured in accordance with the template offered by his organization's 
traditions; for James moral leadership involves shaping organizational behaviour around the 
leader's unilaterally-defined apprehension of moral probity. 
Despite these differences, though, David and James share some common ground. In 
particular, both consider the apprehension of moral probity to be a straightforward matter. 
Their meta-ethical stance might be paraphrased as follows: we all know what's right and 
wrong; it's just that some of us act on our apprehension of moral rightness while others 
choose to ignore it. Whereas David takes moral reassurance from the ethical sensitisation of 
his company, James draws it from the ethical sensitisation of the leader. The difference 
between moral leadership and immoral leadership therefore lies in the leader's commitment 
to pursuing moral rectitude. If leaders care enough about morality to keep moral 
considerations uppermost in their decision-making, then they will be moral leaders. 
Although the morally-sensitive leader may "miss some things", these are likely to be 
omissions of minor detail rather than a misguided overall agenda. And even these minor 
oversights can be avoided if organizations adopt appropriate leadership recruitment 
policies. Since moral right and wrong are easily apprehended, at least by a morally 
perspicacious leader, the only difficulty such organizations must overcome is to ensure 
commitment to the moral agenda; the accurate definition of that moral agenda presents few 
difficulties. If organizations and leaders care enough about morality, they will be moral. 
Although David tends to focus on the organization while James focuses on the leader, both 
share the presupposition that moral sensitisation ensures moral probity. 
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A further common feature of their respective discourses is that neither David nor James 
envisages the involvement of junior members of the organization in the development of its 
moral agenda. As far as David is concerned, junior employees have little interest in such 
matters; they just want that agenda to be consistently applied. From James's point of view, 
the people at the top of the organization are the ones who are influential in shaping its 
behaviour; therefore responsibility for setting its moral tone should reside with them. And 
although the senior management team are expected to exemplify the organization's moral 
code, the key role in its definition lies with the leader. David's and James's appraisal of 
junior players' capability and willingness to contribute to the organization's moral direction 
contrasts sharply with the more inclusive approach that I will outline next. 
Roger: the Mediator of Communication 
Roger works as CEO of a large, rural county council. He trained as a solicitor before 
embarking on a career in local government. He has previously worked as CEO in other 
councils. He has been in his current role for ten years and is due to retire during the year 
that followed our meeting. 
Like David and James, Roger believes that it is important for an organization to have a 
shared moral code. In response to my opening question about the ethical dimension of 
leadership, he reflects on the need for a clearly defined set of values and describes some 
steps that he has taken to enhance clarity within his own organization. 
Clearly, here, you are providing l(}adership for a large number of people. Is the ethical 
dimension of that something that you give a great a deal of thought to? 
I think it is because it comes from, I mean admittedly when you are exercising leadership 
some of the key values that you hold are an important part of both the style of that 
leadership and actually also of its content because there are particular sticking points. And 
it's interesting ... I wasn't satisfied that the core values [here] were clear enough- we did 
have a set of core values but they were too long and they were too wordy and therefore 
people were able to interpret them, so instead of them becoming a set of organizational 
values they became a set of individual values, still in the right areas but people could place 
there own interpretation on the bits that they were less comfortable with and I think that can 
then give confusing messages around leadership - so we've only recently actually very 
much simplified our core values . . . So we looked quite carefully at some of the subtle 
distinctions that there are in that set of values. 
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Although Roger agrees with David and lames on the need for a shared code, his 
understanding of the relationship between morality and organizational leadership also 
shows marked differences from theirs. The first point of divergence is that Roger presents 
the apprehension of moral probity as a more nuanced task than is apparent from David and 
lames's discourses. David, the Company Man reflects on the need for his own values to be 
in harmony with the company's moral agenda: "hopefully one reflects the other otherwise 
you're a fish out of water in your organization" and also speaks of the importance of 
consistent application of that code throughout the organization. Meanwhile, lames, the 
Moral Crusader shows a steely determination to impose his own apprehension of moral 
rectitude on the organization. Both view the defmition of moral rectitude as a relatively 
straightforward matter. For Roger, on the other hand, there is space for ambivalence. He 
reflects on the possibility of tension between, on the one hand the personal values of 
organizational members, and even of organizational leaders, and, on the other hand, the 
moral code of the organization. Nevertheless, there needs to be some shared ground 
between the values of the individual and those of the organization. 
The way we put it in the debate is: we can have different core values in relation to our 
personal lives. So we are not an exact match for what we might live out personally because 
we'll feel stronger about some aspects. But I think when you come to work you sort of put 
on a hat saying: "What's the minimum value that will actually make me wonder whether I 
wanted to put my name to leading this organization". So I think there are two different -
there's ac~ally a separation between your own personal values, which might be better or 
worse but will almost certainly be more detailed and some will be significantly different 
from those that you are required to adopt in an organization. 
Roger's suggestion that "we can have different core values in relation to our personal lives" 
and that these "will almost certainly be more detailed and some will be significantly 
different from those that you are required to adopt in an organization" implies a far less 
straightforward meta-ethical stance than that articulated by either David or lames. Roger's 
discourse leaves space for conflicting ethical positions, which seems to contradict the 
presupposition, implicit in David and lames's discourses, that the apprehension of moral 
probity is a straightforward matter. Roger does not elaborate on precisely why their can be 
different value commitments, so he could be interpreted as proffering a relativist 
understanding or he may be suggesting that people might disagree about the nature of 
objective rightness. But whether he is presenting a relativist or an objectivist understanding, 
his discourse conflicts with the implication of David's and lames's accounts that we all 
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know what is morally right and that moral leaders and moral organizations are therefore 
those which subordinate other considerations to this self-evident moral agenda. 
A second difference between Roger's stance and those ofDavid and James is that, although 
he believes that leaders have a key role to play in shaping and upholding organizational 
values, Roger shows a greater willingness to involve members of the organization, 
including junior members, in the definition of its moral code. Whereas David describes how 
the organization's founding family defines its values and James dwells primarily on his own 
contribution to the organization's moral agenda, Roger articulates a more consultative 
understanding: 
... the core values of the organization: where do they actually come from? Do they come 
from you? Do they come from the top? 
We had this debate, and it's a fascinating debate, you have to allow discussion around them 
but I also think that it's a function of leadership, I was going to use the word to "impose" 
those core values and that's too strong a word. But it is a function of leadership, at the end 
of the day, to take a clear view on what the core values of the organization are. But I don't 
think you should deny the organization the opportunity to feed into that process . . . We had 
a debate in the corporate management board to start with around some of the thoughts. We 
then put them out to the outer service group, the senior managers. We then had a series of 
groups to which people could volunteer to feed in their views. And they were refined as a 
result of that. And I think they were improved as a result of that, actually. But they are still 
held and they are still owned in leadership terms. I think that's absolutely vital. So it's 
interesting that we had actually been through that. 
Yes ok. So that process of engagement, how deep down into the organization did that go? 
Did that stay at a fairly senior level? 
No. I mean it was - we certainly wanted to take the view of the senior managers in the 
organization so we ran it through ... a tier immediately below Directors. We run with a very 
small management team of five directors and myself and then we have about another 
sixteen people who are heading up individual functions. And then we have a tier then of 
people who are in a management capacity of one form or another and that's probably 
around about the ninety mark. So anybody who is managing a team in any shape or form 
will be included in that senior management. And they participated. We then had a series of 
focus groups which was sliced through the organization. So we'd have people from the top 
to the bottom of the organization working as interest groups to feed into that. 
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Those managers that took part in that process; were they also expected to engage with their. 
respective teams? 
Yes. We had quite a bit, quite a bit of effort in the communication strategy around that so 
that people - there was a website so people could participate individually as well. 
So, for Roger, moral leadership has a consultative dimension. He believes that leaders have 
an important role to play in defining and supporting the organization's moral agenda: "it is 
a function of leadership, at the end of the day, to take a clear view on what the core values 
of the organization are" and the values "are still held and they are still owned in leadership 
terms". Nevertheless, he also describes a range of measures that he has put in place to 
encourage participation in the process of value-definition. Although managers seem to have 
played the more substantial role in that process, focus groups and the intranet have also 
enabled contributions from more junior levels. Furthermore, Roger's suggestion that the 
outcomes "were improved as a result of that" implies his approbation of this consultative 
undertaking. 
For Roger, then, moral leadership is a more democratic undertaking than is suggested by 
either David or James. But this presents a potential difficulty: what is the leader to do if the 
moral agenda that he or she consultatively facilitates conflicts with his or her own 
apprehension of moral rightness? By relinquishing his grip on the organization's moral 
tiller, Roger must confront the possibility that it may steer an ethical course with which he 
is personally uncomfortable. This tension would be of little concern to either David or 
James. In David's case, consistent application of the self-evident standards of probity that 
are enshrined within his organization's moral code offers an adequate template for personal 
conduct. In James's case, self-assurance of the probity of his own moral commitments 
legitimises their imposition over and above any alternatives. Such straightforward certitude 
is not possible for leaders who adopt Roger's consultative style. Facilitators of 
intersubjectively agreed moral agendas must face the possibility that the consultative 
processes that they mediate may reach conclusions with which they radically disagree. 
Roger's discourse is interesting for his reflections on how he negotiates such tension. 
Consider, for example, the following two passages of narrative. Each offers a specific 
example to illustrate a tactic that Roger adopts when chairing public meetings on behalf of 
the Council: 
You know I do a significant number of public meetings and I can probably illustrate it in 
two ways because there are two messages that come out. We don't meet a cross section of 
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the community, I think it's important I say that, but, I mean, predominantly people will say 
if only we exterminated young people the whole world would be a better place. Because 
young people commit crime and young people drink; young people smoke drugs; young 
people make a lot of noise and drop litter; young people congregate in groups and frighten 
us. An incredibly powerful message coming from the public at large. Now if I weren't to 
offer some challenge and some leadership in those circumstances, people will go away from 
those meetings reinforced in their view that if we got rid of young people the world would 
be a better place. But I do fairly simple things in leadership terms which I think, again, we 
come back to what I think is a set of core values that I want to espouse. And I say "look 
there are the same number of good, bad and indifferent young people as there are of good, 
bad and indifferent people of any age group; the same good, bad and indifferent policemen 
as there are people". And those are some of the things I think that you sometimes have to be 
prepared to do. And you have to do it quite sharply because people won't respond 
otherwise, they will just fudge it. 
And the second example: 
Let me try and give you an example; probably pushing the limits in terms of what I ought to 
be doing in leadership terms as Chief Executive. We've had a very significant influx of 
Eastern European workers [in the local area], predominantly young, predominantly quite 
bright young people working in areas that are poorly paid. So they are augmenting our 
existing work force. They haven't posed a threat locally in terms of jobs because we've got 
virtually full employment locally. And one of the early challenges, actually championed by 
[a local celebrity] because he got very involved in this, started a little bit of a hare running 
about: you know: "lock up your daughters, the Eastern Europeans are coming". And, 
probably the limit of what I've ever gone to, I did actually say at a public meeting "look we 
need to wake up to the fact and actually we need to be blunt about it: these young people are 
coming from societies that are actually far less sexually promiscuous than our own". Now 
that's a value that I feel very strongly about treating people equally; it's something that I 
would be very forceful about in my personal life. But I am probably getting quite close to 
the margins of where I ought to be going in terms of challenging locally. Because I am 
exhibiting what is a very strong personal value to me, it would be a very strong value to the 
organization as I said at the outset: it's about equality and that sport of thing. But there is a 
limit to how far your role permits you to go in there and I think that example, I've been ok, I 
got away with it, it was taken in the spirit it was intended. But you've got to be careful how 
far you push that sort of line. 
In these simple examples, Roger relates how, as a leader, he is well placed to encourage 
reflection amongst the group to which he is expected to provide leadership. In these cases, 
Roger is interfacing with external stakeholders rather than the internal groups that have 
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been the main focus of attention in my discussion so far. However, this distinction need not 
preclude the relevance of Roger's facilitative tactics to this discussion. As CEO, these 
external stakeholders look to him for leadership. The processes that he adopts in providing 
this leadership may be just as relevant in relation to different leadership contexts. Rather 
than directly imposing his own convictions on the group, Roger's tactic is to encourage the 
group to think critically about the implications of their own perspectives and also to reflect 
upon the presuppositions upon which those perspectives are based. He thus achieves a 
compromise between on the one hand, leadership as moral autocracy and, on the other 
hand, laissez faire, relativist tolerance. By encouraging critical reflection, and by offering 
insights that might broaden the scope of that reflection, he points the group in the direction 
which he believes is morally apposite without demanding their compliance to his own 
convictions. 
Despite the effectiveness of this tactic in these particular instances, Neal must still come to 
terms with the possibility of rupture between his own perspectives and those of the group. 
No matter what lengths he goes to in order to encourage a consultative outcome that is 
consistent with his own moral commitments, the outcome of intersubjective facilitation may 
conflict with the views of the facilitator. In such instances, Roger indicates a readiness to 
temper aspects of his personal views in order to bring them in line with those of the 
organization. In the following discourse, he speaks of the onus that rests upon leaders to 
observe fealty to democratically defined, organizational agendas, even where these may 
conflict in small ways with their own moral sensitivities. 
So I think it does get more complex and I think some of my personal values are probably 
still simpler and stronger than the values that I bring to the organization ... [which] are 
more subject to the compromise of everyday practical experience than some of the personal 
values that I would hold very, very strongly in my personal life, when I feel much freer to 
deal with it. I deal with the consequences in your personal life in a different way. You are 
not carrying responsibility for an organization. You know you can, I think if anything, you 
can be freer in terms of the values that you would espouse as an individual than you can be 
with those you would espouse on behalf of an organization. I don't think it's going to be 
huge, I think it would be worrying psychologically if there was a huge mismatch between 
the two. 
Yes, is it a difference in values or is it similar values applied in different contexts with 
slightly different outcomes? 
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I'm not going to allow it to be as easy as that. I think what you are saying is partly right. 
The challenge back, I think if the fundamental values were to be different again I think you 
would be worried. I think it's about, you know, feeling free to be more extreme sometimes 
in the way that you express them, in the way that you would apply them if you are 
exercising personal freedom. You know you might take some more radical action against 
elements of society that you are more uncomfortable with in a personal capacity than you 
know you can afford to take in a political environment and leading an organization that is 
democratically elected and which is trying to combine different views. 
So, for Roger, there is something about taking on a leadership role in a democratically 
constituted organization that entails a responsibility to observe the outcomes of its 
consultative processes, even where these may conflict with his own moral commitments. I 
will take a moment to draw out the implications of this stance by contrasting it to some 
alternative perspectives. It contrasts most starkly with the understanding articulated by 
James: for James, since the imposition of the leader's own, self-evidently right, moral 
agenda is a function of leadership, such conflicts are unlikely to occur. It also contrasts with 
Davids understanding. On the one hand, David, like Roger, speaks of the need for the leader 
to support the values of the organization. However, whereas for David those values are 
given to the organization by its founding family, for Roger they are created by the 
organization through ongoing consultative processes. As such they are continually subject 
to revision and evolution. Consequently, whereas David has been able to assess the fit 
between Rutherford's moral agenda and his own, safe in the knowledge that the former is 
unlikely to take an unexpected turn, such security is denied to a leader in a more 
democratically constituted setting. 
T.here are limits, though, to the extent that Roger would be prepared to compromise his own 
moral convictions to consultatively defined values. Roger had mentioned earlier that 
working within certain types of political context would challenge his moral sensitivities. He 
mentioned, in particular, that he would find it hard to lead a council which had a British 
National Party majority. I drew on this scenario to present him with a specific dilemma: 
Now, just take a hypothetical situation: supposing you were to go in to a context where the 
British National Party was the dominant ethos, do you think it would be a legitimate thing 
for you to try and change that? 
That's a very difficult question because it's, you know if you are a democrat you believe in 
democracy. I think the way I'd answer it, which is a bit of a cop out, is that I think that the 
decision that you have to make as a leader is: are you prepared to go in and fight against that 
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democratic process? Because that is effectively what you are doing. And you know there are 
plenty of leaders over time, people like Martin Luther King a prime example, who actually 
exercised that choice: to go in to those situations and to offer leadership that's out of kilt er 
with a large part of the community that they are seeking to influence. And that's a legitimate 
exercise of leadership. Whether it's a legitimate, I think this is an important distinction 
between someone like Martin Luther King who, although he sought direct election and 
achieved some legitimacy through being directly elected in some places, ... wasn't in a 
position that I was in where he's been coming in as an appointed officer to service a directly 
elected body. And I think there's an important distinction there. For me, I'm not saying this 
makes it right; my line would probably be to say that I shouldn't accept an appointment in 
those circumstances because it is not my role as an appointed officer to challenge the 
democratically elected organization. 
Roger's response, then, is that where the rift between the democratically elected stance of 
an organization and his own values is too great, he would decline appointment to a 
leadership role with that organization. This response leaves unanswered the question: what 
would he do if the consultative outcomes that he facilitates once in post are significantly out 
ofkilter with his own values? 
One final question that I explored with Roger is whether his commitment to facilitating 
consultation conflicts with what is expected of him as a "leader". Are the stakeholders in 
his organization happy for him to consult around issues or is there a general expectation of 
him, as the leader, to "lead"; that is, to impose his own convictions on the organization. 
Does the fact that you are formally expected to provide leadership; does it reduce the 
amount that you can be a mediator as opposed to an imposer of values? 
No I don't think it does. I mean it's a question you would have to put to other people in a 
sense, because I think there is always a danger in trying to answer that one yourself. I think, 
you know, I've been here now for ten years and people will understand that in the way that I 
exercise leadership: that I am anxious to engage with other people; that I am not going to 
close the door to those ideas; that those ideas genuinely and importantly influence my 
outlook on running the organization. And I think it is wrong to see that as negating 
leadership. I mean actually what you are doing is you are enhancing your ability to lead by 
listening and creating a climate in which people aren't afraid to contribute their views. 
Roger's suggestion that "it's a question that you would need to put to other people" perhaps 
indicates an ontology of intersubjective constructivism that extends beyond his 
understanding of moral leadership. Most importantly, though, for the present discussion, his 
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response indicates that, in his view, a commitment to consultation need not undermine the 
effectiveness of leadership; indeed, it can enhance that effectiveness. 
To summarise, Roger articulates a more consultative and a more nuanced understanding of 
the relationship between morality and leadership than is apparent from either David or 
James's discourses. Whereas these two locate authorship of the organization's moral 
agenda either in its traditional values or in the judgement of the leader, Roger seeks to 
involve other stakeholders in that process of value definition. The desirability of such 
consultative processes is partly dependent upon the complex and diverse nature of moral 
judgement. Whereas David and James imply that moral evaluation is a fairly 
straightforward matter, Roger's discourse suggests that different people might legitimately 
hold different moral views to his own. 
Roger's discourse in particularly interesting for its account of how he negotiates the 
tensions immanent to such an understanding. The most apparent tension is that between his 
desire to be true to his own moral convictions and his perceived responsibility to show 
fealty to the consultatively agreed moral agenda that he has facilitated. His resolution to this 
tension lies primarily in his understanding of his role as being a facilitator not just of 
consultation but also of critical reflection on the part of organizational members. As well as 
mediating consultative processes, he considers it part of his leadership responsibility to 
encourage people to reflect on their convictions. 
If the outcomes of such facilitated, reflexive processes differ markedly from their personal 
moral convictions, leaders face a choice: to overrule those outcomes and impose their own 
heartfelt convictions; to respect the democratic process and support its outcomes; or to walk 
away from the organization. Roger's discourse suggests that he would eschew the first of 
these three options; he would generally favour the second option; however, where the 
chasm between personal and organizational values is too wide he would need to think 
carefully about his continued tenure with that organization. 
Comparison of the Perspectives Articulated by David, James and Roger 
The three participants that I have discussed so far are illustrative of three very different 
ways of thinking about organizational leadership and morality: David understands the moral 
dimension of his role as being deeply embedded in the established value system of the 
organization; James emphasises his role as a leader in shaping that value system; Roger 
dwells on the desirability of involving others in the value-shaping process. As such, I have 
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drawn on my discussion with each to exemplify what might be referred to as three ideal 
types: the "Company Man", the "Moral Crusader" and the "Mediator of Communication". 
As with any ideal types, these are unlikely to be realised in actuality in their pure form. 
Thus, David, James and Roger, whilst not embodying these ideal types in every detail, at 
least offer enough of an approximation to facilitate exploration of some of the implications 
and repercussions of each perspective. 
At this stage, I should mention the possibility of context dependency in relation to these 
respective ideal types. It is highly likely that the ways in which David, James and Roger 
think and speak about the morality of leadership are, at least partly, shaped by their 
respective organizational contexts. David, the Company Man, has spent a number of years 
working with a very well-established, privately-owned organization. The organization was 
started over a hundred-and-thirty years ago by its eponymous founding family, members of 
which are still involved in its governance. Furthermore, increasing public concern about 
animal welfare and land usage in recent years may have encouraged the corporate centre to 
pay close attention to its ethical profile. James, the Moral Crusader, has recently tal\en over 
as the leader of a national division of a publicly-quoted corporation that trades within a fast-
moving industry context. The company claims a long history but its roots are complicated 
by frequent mergers, demergers and acquisitions. The leader who James has replaced had, 
according to James, permitted morally lax practices in the organization, particularly 
amongst its senior managers. Roger, the Mediator of Communication, leads a public-sector 
organization that that has an explicitly democratic mandate. 
That David, James and Roger understand the moral responsibilities of their respective 
leadership role as they do is therefore unsurprising. David's traditionally shaped 
governance context might partly explain his reverence for the organization and its 
established values. Furthennore, growing public scrutiny of its ethical credentials in recent 
years may have encouraged David's company to develop, and demand fealty to, a unified 
corporate response. In contrast, the dynamic context that James has recently joined and the 
moral torpor of his predecessor may account for James's eagerness to exercise moral 
authorship. Meanwhile the democratic organizational environment to which Roger is 
accustomed, along with the need to answer to empowered external stakeholders, may have 
ingrained his consultative disposition. Furthermore, the language used by each may also be 
expressive of contrasting organizational contexts. It is possible that the way in which each 
represents what he does and how he thinks serves to accentuate the contrasts between the 
three: maybe David, James and Roger are not so different as their discourses suggests; it's 
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just that the nature of those discourses is itself shaped by the expectations of their respective 
contexts. 
The question whether organizational context shapes participants' understanding of moral 
leadership, and/or the language used to express that understanding, is an important one. 
However, a further question, which is perhaps of even greater interest, is this: are these 
different approaches uniquely suited to their respective contexts or are there aspects of each 
that have cross-contextual relevance and which may thus enhance the moral sustainability 
of leadership in different situations? This is a question to which I will return in the 
concluding chapter of this thesis. 
Certain parallels are apparent between these three ideal type discourses and the three meta-
ethical stances that I reviewed earlier, although it would be misleading to overstate the 
extent to which the views expressed by these participants fit neatly into meta-ethical boxes. 
The emphasis which David places on consistent application of pre-established moral 
standards is redolent of a commitment to principle-based morality. Furthermore, his tacit 
assumption of self-evident moral rightness is resonant of the objective moral ontology that 
underpins principle-based theory. However, apart from his evocation of a utilitarian-style 
rationale to justify redundancies (a point to which I will return later in more detail), David 
does not tend to draw explicitly on principle-based rationales in order to explain his moral 
commitments. Indeed, his commitment to the established values of the organizational 
community is evocative of more conservatively-inclined (rather than an intersubjectively-
inclined) versions of virtue ethics rather than a principle-based understanding. 
James's confidence in his own moral judgement and his willingness to implement his own 
moral choices are indicative of the authenticity enjoined by existentialist theorists: his 
readiness to assume the role of moral author on behalf of the organization is notably devoid 
of the anguish which existentialist theorists suggest may attend apprehension, on the part of 
the inauthentic, of their moral autonomy. On the other hand, aspects of James's moral 
understanding are inconsistent with existentialism. He, like David, draws upon a utilitarian-
style moral rationale for making people redundant (see below), he articulates elsewhere a 
deontological commitment to his shareholders and he also places a virtue-style emphasis on 
conformity to shared values. A particular departure between James's discourse and 
existentialist meta-theory is his apparent assumption that the values that he upholds can 
claim some sort of self-evident moral probity; a seemingly objectivist understanding that is 
at odds with existentialism. James's insistence that others share his moral agenda also 
contrasts with the relativist tolerance that permeates some strands of existentialist thought. 
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Of the three, Roger's approximation to the intersubjective meta-ethic seems to offer the 
closest match to a meta-ethical type. Throughout my conversation with Roger, I was struck 
by the extent to which he articulated a consultative understanding of his leadership 
responsibilities. Nevertheless, even Roger departs from the intersubjective ideal in his 
occasional references to seemingly universal standards of moral rightness. 
Therefore, although the moral understanding of each of these three is largely congruent 
with a particular meta-ethical perspective, each also departs in significant respects from the 
perspective to which it approximates. These departures from meta-ethical purity are hardly 
surprising. None of the participants report having read moral philosophy so they are 
unlikely to exhibit consistent fealty to any particular ethical theory or meta-ethical 
perspective. Furthermore, these departures need not invalidate the insights gained by 
drawing comparisons with these respective meta-ethical perspectives. The views articulated 
by the research participants, insofar as there are characteristic of these different m eta-ethical 
perspectives, and despite their points of divergence from them, offer an empirical 
dimension that may facilitate reflection on the implications of these perspectives for 
leadership morality. I will explore these implications in my concluding chapter. 
Before doing so, I will continue my discussion of empirical research. This ongoing 
discussion will comprise two stages. The next chapter will explore the extent to which other 
research participants echo the understandings articulated by David, James and Roger. By 
broadening empirical elaboration of these three perspectives in this way, I hope to enhance 
the insights afforded so far and to thus offer a richer basis for subsequent consideration in 
my concluding section. A further stage, which will comprise the subject matter of the third 
and last chapter of my empirical report, is to discuss the responses offered by participants to 
the two areas of moral disquiet with lea~ership that were examined during my earlier 
review of the leadership literature. 
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5.2 THREE META-ETIDCAL CHARACTERISTICS AND CORRESPONDING 
TENSIONS 
So far in this empirical report I have identified three different ways of thinking about 
leadership morality, or three ideal types, each of which is articulated by one particular 
research participant. I have described these perspectives as those of the Company Man, the 
Moral Crusader and the Mediator of Communication. I went on to reflect on the possibility 
that these different approaches, or at least the language used to express them, might be 
shaped by the respective organizational contexts within which the three participants find 
themselves. I also suggested that, notwithstanding any contextual dependency, the 
perspectives articulated by these three may have cross-contextual relevance; that is, each 
may have something important to say to contexts other than that in which the research 
participant who articulates it currently operates. I have also pointed to the congruence 
between these different articulations and the different meta-ethical perspectives discussed 
earlier. David, the Company Man, understands his leadership agenda as being embedded in 
the values of the organization and places a great deal of emphasis on consistent application 
of those values, which corresponds in some respects to a principle-based understanding. 
James, the Moral Crusader, eagerly embraces moral authorship, which has overtones of 
existentialist authenticity. Roger, the Mediator of Communication, is keen to encourage 
consultative participation, which is redolent of intersubjectivist ethics. 
In this chapter I will explore in greater detail one particular characteristic manifested by 
each of these three participants, drawing on discussions with other research participants to 
facilitate this further exploration. In David's case, I have chosen the importance that he 
places on consistent application of principles. In James's case, I will explore in greater 
depth the issue of moral authenticity on the part of leaders. In Roger's case, I will give 
further consideration to his approbation of intersubjective facilitation. 
I have chosen these particular characteristics for two reasons. The first reason is that each is 
relevant to the practical application of a specific meta-ethical perspective to the realm of 
organizational leadership. In my earlier discussions of m eta-ethical perspectives, I indicated 
the significance of consistency to principle-based leadership; the importance of authenticity 
for existentialist leadership; and the importance to intersubjectively ethical leadership of 
facilitating communication. 
The second reason for choosing these particular characteristics is that each is likely to throw 
up certain tensions in its practical application within leadership contexts. As far as 
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consistency is concerned, tension may occur between the perceived responsibility to treat 
people consistently and feelings of partiality towards certain people, particularly those to 
whom one is closest. In relation to moral authenticity, there may be tension between the 
desire to act authentically and pressures to conform to the imperatives of a particular 
establishment or community. In the case of intersubjective facilitation, tension may arise 
between the desire to facilitate communication between a plurality of perspectives and the 
desire to seek moral succour within a supportive and homogenous community. I will 
therefore explore the extent to which research discussions manifest these tensions and also 
the varied responses that different participants adopt to them. 
Remaining Thirteen Research Participants 
I have already provided some background information about the three participants 
discussed in the last section. Before continuing, I will introduce the other thirteen people 
who have taken part in my research discussions and upon whose narratives I will draw in 
this and the next chapter. This introduction will comprise a brief overview of the 
backgrounds and current roles of each of these thirteen. 
Ray has worked mainly in retailing. He has been operations director with some of the UK's 
biggest retail businesses and is currently CEO of a nationwide, out-of-town, retail chain. 
Alison worked as a business planner in manufacturing and fashion retailing before 
becoming regional CEO for Business Link and the Chamber of Commerce. She serves as a 
director of several other organizations and is also governor of a large academic institution. 
Stan worked as a manager in local authority care before becoming CEO of a private 
provider of care services. His organization has consistently been very highly rated as an 
employer of choice in media surveys. 
Jane, a former finalist for Business Woman of the Year, is MD of a family-owned drinks 
company. She is also chair of a national industry body for her sector. 
Mark was MD for a pub company before joining a major retailing group where he became 
MD of two nationwide high-street retail businesses. He has also been CEO for a medical 
services company and, when I met him, he was researching management buy-in 
opportunities. 
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Patrick's background is in the hospitality industry. He spent nearly twenty years in 
different MD roles for a large pub owning and brewing company before taking up the 
position of CEO for one of the UK's biggest sports organizations. He took semi-retirement 
several years ago but retains board involvement in several professional sport organizations. 
Max worked as a senior manager in hospitality and retailing before becoming CEO of a 
music company in the US. He is currently CEO of a market leading UK travel company. 
George worked as HR director for a range of private and public organizations. He retired 
several years ago and now ruins a small tourism business. 
Gill worked as a senior HR manager in travel and retailing before becoming HR director for 
a large electrical goods company. She recently left this role and is now running her own 
business as a personal trainer and masseuse. 
Nigel has spent most of his career in financial services and is currently CEO of a large 
mutual building society. He is also regional chairman ofthe CBI. 
Robert has spent most of his career as a senior manager in various national sports 
organizations. He is currently MD of one of the country's largest sports venues. 
Dennis spent several years as main board director with one of Europe's leading financial 
services companies. He left this post to work as a management change consultant. When I 
met him he was working as part of a loosely-affiliated partnership that offers consultancy 
services at senior management and board level. 
Sarah worded in finance for several travel companies before becoming FD of an executive 
travel business. She is now FD with a large charitable organization. 
Tension between Consistency and Partiality 
In my earlier discussion of principle based ethics, I drew attention to the breadth and 
diversity of principle-based theories and to the expedient flexibility that this offers to those 
who seek an ethical justification for a chosen course of action. The consequence of this 
expedient flexibility is that, whatever organizational leaders may wish to do, they can 
probably find a suitable principle-based moral rationale if they look hard enough and apply 
it with a sufficient imagination. I pointed out that, to avoid the charge of expedient 
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rationalisation, leaders who aspire to principle-based legitimacy ought to at least show 
consistent fealty to a particular theory and apply it in a consistent manner. Otherwise, 
ethical justification becomes a meaningless exercise. 
I have already elaborated on the emphasis that David, the Company Man, places on 
consistent application of values. David is not alone in his veneration of consistency. For 
example, Max reflects on the need to ensure that the values to which an organization 
commits itself are consistently applied rather than just talked about: 
Do you think objectivity is always a prerequisite when confronting some moral, morally 
charged situation? 
No. Consistency is ... there are things [in this organization] that are out of line here with 
some of the values that people have. And what I wanted to do was do something about that 
and make them a value, rather than something that people just talk about and would like to 
have. You know, it's, to me, a huge part of running a business successfully because it's 
nearly always where that value is sort of lived-up-to but not completely that annoys people, 
irritates people about working there. They don't always put their finger on it as such. But it 
sort of, it's something that annoys, the lack of consistency or "how can I really believe this 
if we don't do this?" So actually that makes it a hollow value, if you like, which is almost 
insulting. 
For Max, then, consistent application of principle is more important than empty rhetoric. 
However, a number of participants, while speaking of the importance of acting in a 
dispassionate and consistent manner, reflect on the challenge that this may present to 
sentiments of affiliation and loyalty. For some, consistency should come first and this 
presents few moral scruples. Ray, reflecting on his experiences in retailing, describes how 
the consistent application of a principle leaves no moral space for personal affiliation. He 
recounts his disapproval at being forced by a former chairman to take longstanding loyalties 
into account in awarding supply contracts. For Ray, contracts should be awarded on the 
basis of a "fair tender process", which precludes partiality: 
I'd decided that one of the suppliers, who had a hundred percent exclusive contract, was 
doing a very bad job, and I decided that I needed to fmd some new suppliers and I went 
through a tender process and out of that tender process the supplier who had hundred 
percent exclusivity didn't actually end up getting any part of the new contract. And I got a 
phone call from the chairman of the business and I was told: ''you've got to give them some 
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of the business". And I remember feeling at the time, you know, that's wrong. A fair tender 
process, they didn't succeed in the process, they're out. ... 
What was the basis for giving them the business then? Is their an implication of a back-
hander going on? 
I don't know. I think it was probably more of the fact that they'd had a hundred percent of 
the business and they were going to go to nil percent, and that they'd been, in the early days 
of this business, they'd been very supportive of the business and the Chairman, I think, felt 
he owed them some ongoing loyalty. I don't think there was any back-handers; but I think 
there was some favouritism. 
Mark, whose background is in the pub trade and retailing, also reflects on the need to 
consistently uphold principles. In this instance, though, Mark has to overcome feelings of 
sympathy for the recipients of his severity: he describes this scenario as the greatest 
dilemma that he had faced as a leader. It involves his decision to dismiss some long 
standing employees for malpractice even though what they had been doing was, so they 
claimed, accepted custom. Furthermore, so determined was Mark to apply principles that he 
resisted, during the ensuing tribunal, overtures on behalf of the claimants to settle out of 
court, a settlement that seemed at the time to be in the best interests of his company: 
There was a time in one of my businesses that I was running where I had to dismiss an 
entire department, I felt - now I'm saying I had to but I believed on consideration that that 
was the only route - and that involved five individuals with between them something like 
110 years service. They were stock takers and they were accepting what could be construed 
as bribes. Now "it was custom and practice", they said in their defence: "it's always 
happened therefore you know its [acceptable]". I had just come in to the job and the fact 
that it always happened, from my point of view, is irrelevant. And it clearly wasn't possible 
for them in their position to do this sort of thing. Cutting a long story short, in those days 
we went to an industrial tribunal and it lasted for weeks and weeks ... but at the end of the 
day they came to us at the eleventh hour and said "would you do a deal". So you know 
"we're willing to settle out of court because we think you're going to lose"- usual stuff. 
And of course the brewery by this stage were paranoid because, in those days, tribunals 
were, you know, get-thee-behind-me-Satan sort of stuff, and really they were seen as being 
always biased towards the employee .... And they said "we'll do a deal" and I said "well no 
I don't - how can we do a deal on something this basic". Anyway the brewery said "well 
why don't we talk to them" ... .1 was lucky because I had a mentor at [the company] at the 
time who was the chairman ... who said: "that's your stance; you're responsible: you get on 
with it; if you want to talk about it come back and we'll talk about it", [whereas] my 
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immediate line boss thought we should settle because he was of that mind. Anyway, I said 
"you can't do that in a business because everyone then loses confidence in your judgement 
and your ability and frankly you're undermining everything we're trying to do" so I said "I 
just won't do it". So, anyway, we stood by our guns and of course we won ... 
So it was a matter of the principle; that was the reason you didn't want to settle? 
Yes but it's about fairness. Ifyou've got a set of rules you can always say well it doesn't 
say I can't do this in the rules therefore it's alright. If you've got a sense of principles and a 
real balanced view of what fairness is you'll probably win in the end, in fact invariably 
you'll win in the end even if it looks pretty dire when you're staring it in the face. 
So, when confronted with a moral dilemma Mark sticks to his principles, even when this 
may seem overly harsh, even when his boss advises otherwise and even when his principled 
stance seems, at the time, to be pragmatically risky. 
A more emotional account of the consistent application of principles is offered by Sarah. 
Reflecting on her experience as FD of a travel company, Sarah describes a redundancy 
scenario, which she felt morally compelled to implement for the greater good of the 
organization. In order to apply this principle consistently, Sarah has to overcome feelings of 
affiliation to, and personal responsibility for, members of her own work team: 
I guess that was a personally difficult decision because I had a personal affection for, an 
attachment to, the team of people, the individuals, but I had to step back from that .... There 
is an element of: "try and detach myself, think of myself in my professional capacity and 
think I'm doing this because the organization needs it" ... If I do become too embroiled in 
the emotional side of some of the decisions then I'm not sure I'd ever make them, but you 
have to step back a bit . . . just step back and say: "I know this to be right for the 
organization, therefore this is what I feel has to be done". 
For Mark, Ray and Sarah, then, feelings of partiality have to be put aside when 
implementing principles in a fair and consistent manner. In each of these cases, then, the 
narrator describes overcoming various degrees of compunction about the impact of his or 
her actions on people to whom he or she was relatively close in order to apply principles 
that he or she held dear. Ultimately, each regards it as his or her moral duty to overcome 
feelings of personal affiliation in order to apply principles in a consistent and impartial 
manner. 
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This veneration of consistency in the face of countermanding emotions was a pretty general 
feature of my research discussions. It emerged most strongly in discussions of redundancy 
scenarios, which I will discuss more fully in the next chapter. Participants spoke frequently 
of the need to suppress sympathies for those who were losing their jobs. Sentiments of 
partiality and sympathy for the unfortunate victims of corporate downsizing were most 
frequently subsumed by fealty to a rule utilitarian-type imperative of organizational 
maximisation. As with the discussions reviewed in this section, participants saw no place in 
the leader's moral toolkit for emotions such as partiality, sympathy and loyalty. 
Tension between Authenticity and Conformity 
In describing the discourse of James, the Moral Crusader, I noted that it is characterised by 
confidence in his own moral agenda and a readiness to shape the moral tone of the 
organization. I observed that the ease with which James assumes moral authorship is 
consistent with existentialist notions of authenticity. James suggests that this moral self-
assurance is a necessary ingredient of moral leadership: he believes that the person at the 
top can and should set the organization's moral agenda. 
James is not alone in stressing the link between ethical leadership and moral authorship. An 
equally emphatic statement of the role of the leader in establishing organizational values is 
offered by Ray: 
I'm a great believer that a business should be very clear about what its values are ... those 
values should be the values of the Chief Executive or certainly the leaders of the business. I 
don't believe that values can come up through a business. They have to come from the 
top .... 
You don'tfeel there's a place for involving subordinates in the evolution of those values at 
all? 
No. No. Because if at the end of the day if the values aren't lived by the leadership of the 
business then they can't survive .... So if they don't see. the leadership of the business living 
the values, they won't live the values. 
Is it not feasible for the values that the leadership of the business lives to be developed in 
consultation with subordinates? 
158 
Oh, it can be developed but the way I would put it is that the leadership needs to be really 
clear these are our values .... How that is then communicated and the behaviours that are 
encouraged to reflect the values, that needs to be worked out. If the leader says: "these are 
the four or five things that are really important", you then have to involve the rest of the 
business and say: "well how do these four things manifest themselves in what I do as a job, 
whether I'm a check-out girl or I'm a buyer or I'm in the supply chain somewhere; what 
does that mean to me?" And then that needs to be, sort of: "well I think that means this, is 
that what you meant?" So there's an iterative process to actually turn the values into 
behaviours and into the language that the average person in the business can understand 
because the leaders may say: "well these are my values", but they may be in a language that 
the vast majority of the people can't relate to what he's on about, so there's a translation. 
Ray's observation that "if the values aren't lived by the leadership of the business then they 
can't survive" is interesting. His rationale is that the sustenance of organizational values 
depends upon their observation by leaders: if leaders do not confonn to those values, then 
junior employees can hardly be expected to do so. And since leaders are only likely to 
observe. values for which they can claim personal authorship, it follows that the values of 
the organization must be those of the leader. This offers a strikingly autocratic 
understanding of moral authorship, one which limits input from junior members of the 
organization to discussion about how they are to put those leader-defined values into 
practice. 
In order to adopt the role of moral authorship with such alacrity, leaders need to be very 
comfortable with their own moral judgement. There is no space for the existential anguish 
that Sartre sees as a probable response to the realisation of ones moral autonomy. James is 
illustrative of existentialist authenticity in more ways than one. He does not conceptualise 
his moral sensitivities in tenns of theoretical principles; he does what his moral intuition 
tells him is right. He does not shirk tough decisions. He is comfortable imposing his own 
version of moral probity, even when this involves hardship for others. While he may regret 
the harsh consequences of his decisions and even try to ameliorate those consequences for 
the unfortunate recipients of his moral fortitude, he shows few signs of remorse for his 
decisions. 
I also found a note of authenticity running through much of Patrick's discourse. Despite 
some apparent contradictions in his conceptualisation of his moral sensitivities, Patrick's 
readiness to accept ownership for his moral decision-making, along with his retrospective 
ease with the decisions that he had taken, were evident. Like James, when reflecting on 
moral dilemmas, Patrick did not try to hedge responsibility for the hardship that his moral 
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resoluteness may have caused. He did not try to absolve himself of responsibility for 
unpleasant decisions; he made no reference to his hands being tied by circumstances or by 
influential stakeholders. He presented his decisions as his and his alone. One particular 
story is illustrative of this. Patrick worked for a large brewing and pub owning company 
and, at one point during his twenty years in various MD roles with that business, he was 
sent to take over one of its subsidiaries. His brief was to make radical changes in order to 
improve the commercial performance of that subsidiary; changes that were to include job 
cuts. Patrick described a dilemma that he encountered when trimming the workforce. The 
dilemma was whether or not to tell his new employees of their impending redundancy. 
Patrick has no qualms about claiming personal ownership for the decision that he took in 
that situation. Twelve years later, he remains comfortable with his actions. 
I suppose the biggest dilemma was always with how honest are you with your business plan 
when the business plan involves restructuring and when the business plan involves trying to 
cut costs out of the business and that's the only dilemma I've ever really had: the difficulty 
of should you tell people everything or should you, because to some extent, I mean there are 
business plans that you come up with where I suppose we felt that you had to keep a bit 
back so that people wouldn't fear the worse of those six months of uncertainty .... 
... can you think of any particular instances there; can you give me any tangible examples? 
Well I knew when I went up to [the pub company in question] that I was going to get rid of 
the whole board and I was going to make, of the office staff, maybe forty percent redundant. 
That's not what I told them and what I did say was I got up there and immediately told them 
that they had been unsuccessful for three or four years and that there would be changes but I 
wouldn't have gone up and told them that I was going to change everything which I felt was 
necessary. I didn't do that. 
And what were the principles at play there; why did you choose to take that course of 
action? 
I think its because the one thing you don't want is people to be panicking that they're going 
to lose their jobs any earlier than it needs to happen because you lose the momentum and 
you lose focus ... I always felt that four or five months loss of focus would cost you and 
you wouldn't get it back ... 
But you'd already made the decision that you were going to take that action but you were 
just shielding the people from it? 
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Yes, yes .... 
And was that something that caused you any discomfort; did you have to think about that 
whether that was the right move? 
I would always mull it over or maybe agonise about the people, not the structure because 
that never worried me. But going up to [that company] I'd known them all very well and, 
you know, as I say, I was [one of the people who were subsequently made redundant's] best 
man and everything, but I mull it over for two or three weeks and then I do the decision 
very quickly: I have people in; I tell them that's it and to go and then when they've thought 
about it come back and see me any time but exit interviews for me never took more than 
five minutes. Having worried and agonised over it I would not have a discussion on it, ever. 
If people ask me why I say: "that's the decision I've made" ... I'd always agonise over it 
and worry about it but then do it very quick. 
And that decision to go in to [the pub company] and not to inform them that you were going 
to be making some fairly drastic changes five months down the road, was that a decision 
which you were at liberty to take or were you influenced in taking that decision? 
... I simply discussed it with my then boss at the time and it was a done deal, carte blanche 
Whether or not to make those redundancies, and whether or not to share the fact that you 
were going to make those redundancies with the people, that was all decisions you were at 
liberty at take? 
Absolutely, completely my choice, absolutely ... 
So this was twelve years ago. Were you in that same position now, would you make exactly 
the same decision? 
I think I would, yes. 
Would you go about things differently? 
I don't think I would. No, funnily enough, I don't think I would. 
In relating this tale, and more generally in our discussion, Patrick adopts a somewhat 
different tone from James. Despite his moral self-assurance, Patrick does not present moral 
choice as a straightforward matter. Whereas James tends to describe ethical decisions as 
161 
pretty clear cut, Patrick offers a more nuanced understanding. He struck me as a reflective 
individual who had thought deeply about the ethical dilemmas that he had encountered. 
Nevertheless, despite acknowledging their dilemmatic quality, Patrick was unlikely to lose 
sleep over his decisions once he had made them. Whereas James tends to fire his ethical 
six-shooter from the hip, Patrick carefully evaluates his target. Nevertheless, once the target 
has been selected, Patrick is equally ruthless in his aim and just as unlikely to show 
contrition for any casualties. 
In contrast to Patrick's account, Max offered a very different story. In Max's case, he 
describes how, in response to pressure from his boss, he made what he considers to be the 
wrong decision; he did what was expected of him rather than what he believed to be right. 
As such, Max's account might be interpreted as a retrospective acknowledgement of earlier 
inauthenticity. The background to Max's story revolves around his promotion from 
London-based MD of the European division of an American music business to the role of 
CEO, based in its New York head office. Once in place as CEO, he was called upon to 
close down some parts of the business that seemed to be underperforming. This included 
closing down a record label in London that he had helped to set up. This, he believes, was 
the wrong thing to do. But he took this action, even though it was against his better 
judgement, because it was expected of him by his Chairman. 
I clearly remember putting a lot of emotion and energy into setting up a [record] label in 
London in the, sort of, early nineties, with a guy who was, you know, quite a close friend. 
And I felt a huge amount of pressure [later when I became CEO], because it wasn't working, 
to make it work. I felt I was put under unfair pressure by [the chairman and owner of the 
business], who was my boss, because ... in the meantime I'd moved from London to [head 
office in] New York and had had to close down a lot of things that weren't working there. 
And I believe that [the chairman] then sort of looked at this ineptness that I was behind and 
put a huge amount of pressure on me to close [the London label] ... A huge amount of 
pressure on me, which you know, clearly it's my job to absorb and to think about 
objectively. I think I had rushed closing it because of that. And I had a big impact on the 
office in London who'd put a huge amount ofresources, not just money but a lot oftime 
and effort. And they were very, very committed to the product. 
That I think, you know, there was a huge clash of your loyalties and your judgements and 
actually I think that I didn't do the right thing; I made a mistake ... .I wanted to be seen to be 
fair and equitable. And I think when you're closing things down you have to be objective, 
right. So when I was going to [the position of CEO at the] New York [head office], clearly 
the reason why I went over there was that the [parent] company wasn't doing so well. And 
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we looked at what was making money and what wasn't making money; what was taking 
people's time; what was making some progress. ... So we went through that exercise and 
made a judgement on a lot of the divisions or joint ventures or projects, because they are 
creatively driven, you just have to use your judgement because they don't always show the 
same signs as other products. So I felt that because I had more emotional attachment and 
maybe to an extent obligation to what I had set up, I didn't want to feel it was 
compromising people's view of my objectivity, right. So I wasn't strong enough to say: "it 
wasn't". It clearly wasn't, I was absolutely :fme. 
So because you'd set up the London business you didn't want anybody to feel that you were 
showing any favour towards it? 
Yes, absolutely. I was shutting down these things and it could look that I was shutting down 
things that I hadn't, that hadn't got my stamp on it. And that wasn't the case but I felt it 
looked that way. And therefore in the interests of being fair and equitable I was unfair to the 
guys who had- I was over hard on them. I guess it's bit like, you know, the bit about you 
can be tougher on the people that are closest to you in many ways. And that was something 
that- it was a huge dilemma for me at the time. 
In his eagerness to do what other people perceived as "being fair and equitable" Max 
therefore acted in a manner that was unfair according to his own moral judgement. His 
acknowledgement that "I didn't want to feel it was compromising people's view of my 
objectivity, right. So I wasn't strong enough to say: 'it wasn't'." could be interpreted as an 
expression ofHeideggerian anxiety at his own inauthentic behaviour. 
Of course, moral authenticity might turn out to be a tough road for those who are embroiled 
in establishment expectations that are discrepant from their own moral sensitivities. Acting 
in accordance with ones own moral judgement might not always be the best career move. 
James and Patrick seem to have been able to pursue their own moral agendas without 
detriment to their personal circumstances. However, authentically moral leadership may not 
always be so simple and it is easy to sympathise with Max's decision to place his 
Chairman's apprehension of fairness before his own. Indeed, organizational leaders who 
aspire to moral authenticity might have to face up to some significant career sacrifices. 
In this respect, the narratives of several research participants are interesting. These are 
people who had occupied leadership roles in corporate environments but who had made 
career choices on moral grounds. George is most emphatic about his reasons for career 
change. After spending ten years in HR directorships with various companies, George 
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encountered a takeover scenario which presented him with a new career opportunity. 
However, he was unhappy with the HRM ethics of his potential new employer so turned 
down a financially attractive board role to eventually take up employment in the public 
sector. 
The first question is to decide whether you want to be a part of what it is that you're serving 
... For instance, [a large multi-national] took over [my company], then merged with 
[another company]. [This other company] were given the sort of whipping hand in the 
integration. The process they followed was to get two directors together - so marketing, 
finance, HR - and give them a set of objectives in terms of how the business was to be re-
shaped and save huge amounts of money at the same time. And a short time scale to agree 
to it all. And then report back to the European head office. So the pressure was incredible, 
because everybody realised that only one of them would have a job at the end of it. Well, 
my response to that was to say, well, thank you it's not for me. So they actually offered me 
the Vice Presidency of Europe for HR and I told them to shove it up their arse. And I took 
some pleasure in doing that. Because it wasn't an environment I wanted to be a part of. 
Dennis is more circumspect than George in describing his move from an executive seat on 
the main board of one of the Europe's largest financial services providers to self-
employment as a change consultant. He diplomatically deflected my attempts to get to the 
bottom of his perceptions on corporate ethics in a large plc. Nevertheless, it is apparent that 
a key reason for switching to self-employment is that it affords him greater flexibility of 
choice about the value systems alongside which he works. He was particularly critical of 
the investment banking industry and explained why he avoided taking clients from that 
sector: 
With reference to [your current consultancy business], you mention that you especially 
enjoy working with people who want to make a difference. How do you understand "making 
a difference"? 
Well, people who want to feel they've left things in a better shape, in a better place, than 
when they started. 
"In a better shape, in a better place" in what respect? 
Well, not purely in commercial terms, if that's behind your question, with some of these 
other sets in mind, so it's more robust, more sustainable environment than previously. 
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And do you find that your clients are generally open to that perspective, or do they tend to 
view things in more instrumental terms? 
By and large the answer to that is yes, although some people have narrower fields of vision 
than others obviously, as you would expect. I don't like working with investment bankers 
and I feel entirely confident that the reason is that they subordinate, insofar as they have 
those instincts, the ones that I've come across, tend to subordinate them to earning lots of 
money. I've got nothing wrong with earning lots of money but I don't like the subordination 
of value systems to capital employment. 
Another 'leaver', Sarah was more open in her discussion ofthe ethical expectations of the 
corporate world and the impact of this on her decision to change careers. In Sarah's case 
she left a senior finance role with a market leading travel company to eventually become 
FD with on of the UK's largest charities. 
I was faced with the next big decision. The frrst time this happened, over a period of time I 
chose my career over my personal life and then dealt with all the personal pain that that 
ultimately caused me, and then I was faced with it again at [the travel company] where, I 
think I mentioned, my sister had this accident and became disabled, but she was initially in 
a coma and whatnot, and I thought here I am again, I have to choose. [The travel company] 
was the classic high pressure corporate: I was Group Head of Financial Planning and 
Analysis, so in a pretty senior role in the centre and really I felt my day to day was driven 
by squeezing an extra couple of pennies out of the share price and that's really what it was 
down to. I had share options and whatever and stood to benefit personally from doing that, 
but ultimately you look at the board of directors and realise they stand to benefit a great deal 
from that, reputationally but also financially. I never really worried too much about all that. 
I had a long commute and I had long, long hours under high pressure and suddenly I was 
trying to fit in driving up to - she was in a critical care unit in a specialist neurological 
hospital in London - and I was trying to decide between staying at work to do what was 
expected of me, knowing then I was going to get in the car and drive up to Tooting and sit 
by her bedside literally. And I decided then that I wasn't able to do both to the level that I 
wanted, because I tend to commit. When I commit to something I do tend to commit to it 
and [the travel company], although they were making the right noises about being flexible, 
when it came down to it, it was very, very clear that I needed to get the job done. I knew 
that I couldn't do both and I thought this time I'm not going to get it wrong, so I resigned. I 
resigned without anything else to go to and they did, on the back of that, let me work part-
time, I went down to four days so that I was able to spend time with my sister and my 
family. I was on six months notice and I ended up working four and a half months at the 
end, but I left without anything else to go to because that was my personal life prevailing 
over my professional life. 
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So that has, my decision to come here ... was partially driven by the fact that I felt that I 
wasn't going to put myself in a situation where I had to make that choice. I wanted to work 
somewhere- it just fitted in every respect. I saw all these jobs advertised in the FT and it 
just fitted in every respect. It was an organization and a cause that I could feel passionate 
about, I had a personal connection with it, I could see there was a massive professional 
challenge and they were, as an organization, because we support flexible working because 
now nearly 20% of our workforce are disabled people who have an impairment, they have a 
genuine commitment to work-life balance. 
For Sarah, then, a personal dilemma- should she commit the hours demanded by her 
employees or should she care for her injured sister - initiated a career change. Her 
recollection "here I am again, I have to choose" is particularly evocative of Sartrean literary 
and dramatic dialogue. This dilemma seems to have acted as a catalyst to stiffen her 
resolve against the general value system in which she found herself embroiled in the 
corporate world. Her personal experience through this scenario also shaped her general 
expectations ofHRM policy: her own reliance on flexible working arrangements has placed 
this high on her list of criteria of workplace ethicality. Sarah is happy that she can now be 
true to her own moral conscience in terms of fulfilling her personal obligations and working 
in what she considers to be an ethical HRM context. 
The fourth of the "leavers" is Gill. Gill had been HR director with several large companies, 
most recently with a major electrical goods retailer. She chose to leave the corporate world 
to set up her own business as a personal trainer and masseuse. Gill's dissatisfaction with 
the values of the corporate world pervaded our discussion. She expressed particular 
frustration at the masculine, short-term, commercially-driven culture that she had 
encountered, in which people came second to profit: 
It's a very difficult macho business to make a difference in- very macho, very male, talking 
about feelings and so on was just not on, you know, it didn't even appear in the dictionary 
... ultimately what do the guys want, what do shareholders want, what do the owners want? 
They want profit. They're not particularly interested actually in the welfare of the people in 
the business. 
In realising their own authenticity, then, different participants have adopted different 
responses. Those responses are partly shaped by the extent to which the participant's moral 
inclinations are congruent with the ethical expectations that permeate her or his 
organizational context. Leaders such as James and Patrick have found it possible to be true 
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to their own moral sensitivities without rocking the boat of organizational expectations. 
This happy contextual alignment derives from harmonisation of their personal 
commitments with the imperatives that shape their operating environment. Since their 
value systems are unlikely to clash with the corporate mantra of commercial maximisation, 
personal moral authenticity is unlikely to entail material sacrifice. Other leaders, who do not 
share so readily the imperatives of contemporary, Anglo-American, capitalist enterprise, 
have found it necessary to leave the corporate world in order to sustain their authenticity. 
As a post script to this discussion of authenticity, I will briefly reflect on contrasting 
attitudes to the role of the leader in facilitating followers' authenticity. In this respect, Gill's 
discourse is interesting. Gill used the word "authenticity" several times to describe her 
experiences. I do not know if she is familiar with the use of this term in existentialist 
philosophy, but it figures prominently in her understanding of ethical leadership. What is 
particularly significant about Gill's discourse, and what differentiates her most strikingly 
from some of the other aspiring "authentics" such as James and Ray, is that she values not 
only her own authenticity but also that of other people. For Gill, enabling others to be true 
to themselves is a key ingredient to ethical leadership. 
I think it comes back to, through my own behaviour and therefore the knock on effect, to be 
honest and straightforward and courageous and to be mysel£ Because only by that can you 
actually ask others to do that. . .. And authenticity I believe is absolutely fundamental to 
being a good leader. It isn't necessarily, interestingly, what I think businesses want. I don't 
think they want authentic leaders because authentic leaders are a little bit difficult; they're a 
bit more hard to manage and to fit in. . . . So, I think in terms of responsibility to the 
employees I think it is to behave in way which you're asking them to behave and to create 
an environment in which it is safe for them to be themselves. 
Authenticity, then, can take different forms, ranging from the self-assured moral autocracy 
exhibited by the likes of James and Ray to the moral empowerment which Gill sees as an 
integral aspect of leadership. Whereas the former emphasises both the inevitability and 
legitimacy of leaders imposing their version of moral probity on the organization, the latter 
stresses the capacity of leaders to enable authenticity in those who they lead. 
167 
Tension between Intersubjective Facilitation and Seeking Reassurance from a 
Homogenous and Supportive Community 
In my discussion of intersubjective ethics I outlined the role for leadership that is indicated 
by the work of Habermas. Despite an apparent incongruity between Habermasian theory 
and received notions of "leadership", I suggested that a place for leadership can be found 
within the framework of intersubjectivist ethics. That intersubjectively ethical version of 
leadership would comprise mediation of communicative action. 
I have already described how Roger conforms quite closely to the Mediator of 
Communication ideal type that is congruent with this version. A feature of Roger's 
discourse, which differentiates it from those of many other research participants, is its 
democratic tenor. Roger speaks of the part that he can play in evoking reflective 
communication amongst those internal and external stakeholders to whom he is expected to 
provide leadership. In contrast to the personally defined moral agendas envisaged by Moral 
Crusaders such as James, Roger thus presents a consultative understanding of ethical 
leadership; one in which the moral tone of the organization is not defined unilaterally by the 
leader but is shaped through intersubjective processes which the leader facilitates. 
In this section I will explore the extent to which other participants share Roger's 
commitment to facilitating moral dialogue between diverse perspectives. In contrast, I will 
also examine the extent to which they tend to seek confirmation of their own moral 
sensitivities from members of a supportive community. In the process, I will also pay 
attention to the extent that a consultative approach to leadership may thrive in 
organizational contexts that do not share the formal democratic expectations of local 
government organizations such as Roger's. 
If Roger's public service context is taken to be partly explicative of the attention he pays to 
consultation, it is perhaps unsurprising that another research participant who leads in what 
might be described as a "quasi-public" environment also speaks of her efforts to incorporate 
the views of employees in defining the values of her organization. Alison works as CEO of 
a regional division of Business Link and the Chamber of Commerce. As with many other 
research participants, Alison responded to my opening query about ethics and leadership by 
stressing the importance of shared values to her organization. Unlike some others though, 
Alison also described the consultative processes that she has put in place in order to 
generate those values: 
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I'm quite interested in the extent to which you've tried to incorporate other people's values? 
Everybody. Everybody in the organization went away [to facilitated "away-days" to discuss 
values]. It wasn't just management team. Everybody - and some of the values ... some of 
them aren't necessarily ones that I would have put down but they're what, you know, [for 
example] people wanted "to have fun". You know, I'm not sure that I would have put that 
one but they felt that they should come to work and have fun .... And there was another one 
that they wanted to put in and that was that they treated each other as they would treat 
external customers. Because what we were finding was that we presented a wonderful face 
to the outside world but we didn't present that face to each other within the organization. So 
that was another one. . . . . I would fmd it, in this very diverse world in which we live, I 
would find it very difficult to take on board an external creed and force people into it. 
... And what we did, we had an away-day, where I tried to get people to tell me what they 
felt. Not what they thought, because I employ intelligent people and they tell me what they 
think all the time, you know, they walk through the door and tell me what they think. But 
getting people to really tell you what they feel is very, that's where they live, it's much more 
difficult. And we used an [other] organization to get to the bottom of some of those things 
and some of those values that they wanted this organization to hold close ... 
. . . And I learned a lesson that you need to listen more and speak less, if you're going to get 
the values - and that's when we then did the values thing, you see. And it's more about 
encouraging people to tell you what they feel. And it's a very fme line because having got 
those core values, occasionally you need to tell people what to do. And you can do all of 
the consultation you want but at the end of the day I will listen to everybody and then I will 
say "this is the way we're going" ... I think I consult: the values of the organization are 
consultative; the vision and mission of the organizations are consultative; and then directed. 
In particular, in what might be interpreted as an endorsement of pluralism, Alison remarks 
on the importance of listening to discrepant voices: 
I think you don't listen to the spiky ones at your peril. I've got a very disparate management 
team; they're not all clones of me. And the quiet ones or the spiky ones who don't want to 
do it your way, don't think it makes any sense, if you don't listen to them, you don't learn. 
Fealty to consultative definition of values is not, however, unique to public and quasi-public 
service organizations. Not all of the leaders that I met from private corporations eschewed 
broad participation in setting the company's moral agenda. For example, Jane, who is MD 
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of a family owned drinks company, describes her leadership role as being that of listener 
and facilitator: 
We're working together .... and my job is to be a facilitator; to actually bring it together. So 
I'm a leader, I will listen to all the things that are put on the table. I will hopefully get 
consensus to what is being discussed for whatever reason. And that will be the way we go. 
So I don't come in and say "I want". I do sometimes ... but then I have to get everybody 
around the table to agree that this is what we should do for the reasons and get the buy-in to 
that. So then you're not so likely to make huge mistakes because you've got different people 
with different disciplines all challenging the ideas that are put on the table. 
Nigel, CEO of a large mutual building society, also spoke of the need for consultation 
around values: 
Ultimately in this role you do things alone because you are in charge. And there are some 
decisions that you know you just need to draw in yourself. I guess I am a democrat by 
nature in terms of the role. So we've got, as you would imagine, formal management 
structures, different executive boards. I don't tend to keep much to myself that I don't share 
with other people and I think the value of debate in terms of the final judgement is key. So 
I'm not an autocrat. I don't sit here and say ''that's how it's going to be", but ultimately I am 
paid to make decisions. 
Yes ok. And how deep down through the organization does that sort of democratic process 
go? You know, if you have to make a decision to what extent would you-? 
Well again it depends, because you can't have six hundred people in the core business being 
involved in every decision. So what we do is, in terms of alignment, hearts and minds, 
personal credibility, direction, all of that stuff, once a year we will kick-off; we'll get 
everybody in from the top team through to the maintenance guy and all of those people. 
And we will say "this is the picture for the next twelve months" or "three years" -
whichever picture we are trying to paint. We will have sessions then, as part of those six 
days we do each year, where there's a: "well, give us your view" you know, "take an hour 
out on your table and discuss this and come back up and, you know, tell the rest of the 
group what you think." So I think you can engage and align, but ultimately, you can't have 
six hundred people making one decision. 
These three passages of discourse share a common characteristic. This is that Alison, Jane 
and Nigel, whilst alluding to the need for consultation and reflecting on their role as leaders 
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in facilitating it, also mention different ways in which they reconcile their mediative role 
with a directive one. To repeat the relevant section of Alison's discourse: 
you can do all of the consultation you want but at the end of the day I will listen to 
everybody and then I will say 'this is the way we're going' ... the values of the organization 
are consultative; the vision and mission of the organizations are consultative; and then 
directed. 
So, for Alison, leadership entails calling time on intersubjective dialogue; making the final 
decision and then enforcing organizational commitment to that decision. Meanwhile, to 
reiterate Jane's recognition that she is more insistent on some issues than on others: 
I don't come in and say "I want". I do sometimes ... but then I have to get everybody around 
the table to agree that this is what we should do for the reasons and get the buy-in to that. 
Jane, then, reserves a leadership veto on certain matters. Similarly, although Nigel is keen 
to invite participation from all levels of the organizational hierarchy at periodic 
communication events, he echoes Jane's contention that there are times when the leader has 
to take the initiative: "ultimately I am paid to make decisions ... ultimately, you can't have 
six hundred people making one decision". 
So, Alison, Jane and Nigel, speaking from the contexts of business network support, a 
family drinks business and a mutual building society, attribute normative significance to 
consultation around values. However, each offers slightly different ways of reconciling 
"leadership" with consultation to that suggested by Roger. Roger focuses on the part that he 
can play, as a leader, in evoking critical reflection. Alison alludes to the role of the leader as 
chairperson and enforcer. Jane and Nigel reflect on the need for the leader to, on occasions, 
take unilateral decisions and build support for those decisions. Whereas Roger's discourse 
draws attention to the role that a leader can play in enhancing the quality of processes of 
intersubjective engagement by encouraging reflexiveness, these other participants dwell on 
the need for the leader to sometimes cut short or bypass those processes. 
But if Alison, Jane and Nigel's intersubjective fealty is restricted in this manner, a far more 
common form of restriction is to limit the universe of discourse. The attitude towards 
intersubjectivity that I encountered most frequently is to limit participation in consultation 
in a manner that is likely to be preclusive of diversity. In particular, consultation tends to be 
limited to a narrow group of professional and social peers. For example, Robert describes 
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how he gathers input to morally charged decisions from senior colleagues m the 
organization: 
Where do you, if you confront something which you find a bit challenging on a mora/level, 
you know something that you feel a bit morally uncomfortable about, how do you go about 
resolving that? What sort of intellectual processes would you go through? 
Well obviously you've got to give it a bit of your own thought and your own intellect put 
into it. But I'd discuss it with HR and I'd certainly discuss it with my legal director and get 
their opinions of what's going on. And if it was, it depends on the nature of the beast really, 
but then I would probably discuss it with the senior management team generally. So I would 
rarely these days, I mean I'm not saying I wouldn't in the past ever make these mistakes, 
but I think rarely would I have a moral situation, sort of thing, that I would just keep it to 
myself. I think that's about right. I actually think who ever you are you don't have, you see 
things the way you see them and you are incapable of seeing them from another perspective 
and you need another perspective. 
Robert, then, acknowledges the limitations of his own moral perspicacity. But the 
intersubjective court of appeal to which he turns to compensate for restrictions to his own 
acuity is limited to senior managers and directors. In a similar vein, Mark describes how he 
depends upon fellow board members when confronted with a moral dilemma: 
You've talked about how you like to have firm principles and you stick by your principles ... 
have you found there's a bit of a grey area outside those rules where you feel a little 
uncomfortable? 
Yes I think there are grey areas and I think inevitably when you're sitting on a board you 
will come across those grey areas. There isn't a simple answer and there very rarely is. 
There's usually, if you've got good experience and good principles around the board table, a 
way through all of those and that is best course, if you will. There's no right or wrong but 
you can, at the end of it, agree that, ''yep that's within my principles, it's within everyone's 
principles; [it's] probably the right way to go" ... that's how a good board works I think. 
But equally, you've got to have diversity on a board as well. If you have a lot of people 
who think - I mean you've got a religious sect haven't you in a business sense. That 
wouldn't be much good I wouldn't have thought. 
Mark suggests that he may also augment input from fellow directors with contributions 
from mentors and consultants: 
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Given that type of situation where you have a moral dilemma, you mentioned that you 
discussed it with your mentor. Is that something that you 're prone to do, to talk things 
through? 
Yes. I've been very lucky. [During ]my time at [a former employer] I had a very good 
mentor and I also had some very good friends [mentions two other MD/CEO figures who he 
previously worked with] and I think you need to be able to talk to people .. . The other 
mentor I had was then when I went to [a major retail consortium]. I was there for ten years 
and I had a mentor, again one of the senior directors, a lady this time, and she remains a 
mentor now and has been in my current c9mpany that I've just left. I think they are very 
important and the reason for it is just to be able to talk something through and have 
someone listen. They rarely make decisions for you, in fact virtually never if they're good, 
but they will ask questions that you've already asked yourself but they'll put it in a different 
way and make you think and make you argue it through. I found that very helpful ... 
Would you discuss with those mentors value-based issues as well as strictly business issues? 
Yes I would. I also was fortunate to fmd a couple of people - consultants if you will - one 
took as a principal foundation of his teachings this thing of "positive mental attitude". I've 
always found that a very attractive and very positive way of looking at things generally. 
The other is a lady who also has done a lot of work on building teams and leadership and 
devolving· leadership and actually dealing with emotional intelligence . . . and she is 
particularly good at discussing things on a broader scale. 
Max also acknowledges the importance of gathering input from peers as well as sounding 
out views from outside of the organization: 
So what was the process, what sort of processes, thought processes, did you go through in 
reaching the decision {to make some people redundant]? 
I talked to quite a lot of people ... Anyone that I felt needed to judge whether the decision 
was right. So some of them were my colleagues, some of them were- one of them was [the 
owner of the business] ... And I always talk things through with [my wife], you know, 
someone from afar. Sometimes I had reference points of friends who I respect. 
Are there any particular individuals that you refer to on a regular basis through your 
career? 
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Yes, there are. Two or three people, if I'm really thinking: is this right or wrong or what's 
your view? I would, ifl'm struggling I always appreciate their view. You don't have to do 
what they say but I appreciate their view. 
Yes. Well, what is it about those people that's made you select them as a-? 
I see qualities in them that I aspire to myself. I admire the way they make decisions and it 
always seems to be fair and equitable, well thought through and done in a way that, an even 
handed way. They're always, you know, that's- Yes. That's what it is, yes. 
These accounts might be interpreted as willingness to seek diverse inputs to morally-
charged decisions. However, an alternative interpretation is that they reveal an inclination 
to reference moral decision-making against the value system of a professional and social 
peer group that is likely to deliver a reassuringly homogenous response. Notwithstanding 
Mark's approbation of diversity around a board table, it is questionable whether the range 
of perspectives accessed through consultation with fellow directors, mentors, business 
consultants and close family members will introduce radically new perspectives to the 
leader's moral horizon. It seems more likely that consulting within this constituency will 
offer comforting reinforcement of the leader's inveterate moral commitments. 
Despite a willingness to consult around moral decision-making, then, consultation is most 
often limited to the peer group of the leader. Participants are more inclined to seek advice 
from within a socially homogenous circle of colleagues, friends and relatives than to engage 
with perspectives that may offer radically new insights. The views of junior employees, in 
particular, tend to be excluded from decision making processes. Robert alludes to a possible 
explanation of this. He describes the range of measures that he has put in place to enable 
engagement with different stakeholders. However, he suggests that participation in these 
processes by junior employees tends to be inhibited by reticence on their part. 
I have a sort of a policy, I mean for instance I am the sort of manager that has an open door 
policy ... so I like to be involved with the employees ... And I think that's quite important 
in management that you are as fairly open as you can be. You can't always be. But I think 
you need to be as open as you can and then you, you know, it's surprises and bad 
communication I think that make for poor leadership. 
Yes, ok. What you refer to as an open door policy; can you give me an idea, any example, of 
how that actually operates in terms of employees? 
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In terms of employees, I mean I have structured meetings during the day but I have periods 
in my day where the door is left open for people to come in and interact with me on a 
regular basis. I also, rather than just them having to come in here, I walk around the 
building at least three times a day and just go to every department and just make sure that 
they can see me ... And I think it's better to try and encourage them to have some dialogue 
with you and not be intimidated and think you're part of the team as well as they are and 
everybody's necessary. You know, I mean, I'm just a necessary evil that controls the whole 
thing. 
But it's a tough thing to do for a junior employee to walk in here and feel-
Well they don't tend to walk in here. What happens then is, if I'm walking round the 
building then they, you know, that sort of thing. But we do, you know, I do encourage, ifl 
sense there's areas in the business that aren't quite right, I go back to HR and say "well I 
think that person isn't quite right", so I sense there is something wrong ... 
So does it tend to be more managers that come in and talk to you than -
Yes it would tend to be more the middle managers and senior managers that would come in 
here and talk to me. From a general point of view then it would be the senior managers. 
So, despite Robert's consultative aspirations, the constituency of intersubjective 
participation is limited by reticence on the part of junior employees. Robert also remarks 
that junior employees are disinclined to contribute to more substantial matters during 
formal meetings, restricting their input to housekeeping issues. He reflects on the reasons 
why this might be so: 
Because at an employee forum level they actually talk about issues that are important to 
them that, you know, could be "the fridge hasn't been cleaned out for a long time", or "why 
do we have to pay for our coffee?" ... things like that: "we always have to go to Tesco for 
our sandwiches because the catering is disgusting", or something. Those sorts of things you 
get from the employees, you know, and they are normal human things. 
Yes, sort of housekeeping things. 
Yes, more sort of housekeeping things, but very important to them ... 
Yes. Do you think the employees feed in to that commercial debate with their managers? 
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I think some do. I think some people naturally, I mean, people aren't sheep, people are 
people. They all have their own characters and some people are more able to express 
themselves better and some people want to express themselves better, and they will engage 
with their managers or they might engage with me, you know. And other people are very 
quiet and don't communicate particularly well and don't feel they would be listened to if 
they did and they sort of, and those people are a bit of a problem. 
Robert's suggestion that junior employees' inhibitions may derive from their sense that they 
"don't feel they would be listened to if they did" is an interesting point. It suggests that an 
open ear on the part of a leader is not the only prerequisite to consultative engagement; 
leaders may also need to think creatively about how they may overcome potential barriers 
to communication in order to enable contribution to consultative fora from marginalised 
groups. 
Two participants actually comment on the fact that the world inhabited by organizational 
leaders is likely to be preclusive of perspectival heterogeneity. It is perhaps significant that 
both of these people are "leavers" who I referred to in the previous section; that is, people 
who have left their previous boardroom lives behind them; one to take up a role as Finance 
Director with one of the country's largest charities and one to work as a self-employed 
change consultant. Thus, Sarah suggests that, in her experience, the homogenous profile of 
many senior management groups tends to preclude diversity of perspectives: 
Again, since [working for a charity] I've been able to look back at [a former employer, one 
of the country's leading travel companies], for example, where the senior finance team was 
the most un-diverse, if that's a word, team that I've ever been part of. I think I was the only 
female in the senior finance team, the group fmance director, and the profile of them was all 
practically identical: all male, all roughly between the ages of thirty-five and forty-five; all 
straight; married with two children; just absolutely clones of one another, if you like. I 
hadn't ever really questioned in my mind whether that, I was vaguely aware that when 
you're in a minority as in the gender minority there, but never questioned whether there's 
any weakness in. that or the strength that diversity can bring ... there wasn't even a female 
member of the executive board- there were a couple of female non-exec directors, I think-
let alone anybody from any form of ethnic minority or sexuality, whatever. 
Dennis also suggests that the rarefied circles within which they move may alienate 
corporate leaders from "ordinary" voices, a factor which may prevent exposure to views 
that differ from their own: 
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I don't come across many people in my walk of life who I would think are, you know, the 
forces of evil and darkness. Most people I come across and talk to, once they get out of their 
corporate straightjackets, as far as they wear them, they seem to be pretty decent people 
with their hearts in the right place and a value system that seems by and large to be very 
honourable. . .. I think the difficulty ... of people who have influence ... then reverts to: 
how open do they remain, once they get to these positions of power and influence, to a 
whole range of influence from fairly ordinary people? And my experience, so far, is that 
they don't remain very open to that, not because they don't wish to but because they just 
move in some very rarefied circles and you can only spend your time once. And they're 
quite used to spending it with movers and shakers; people who have influence; in very 
protected environments. And the impact of day-to-day drudgery and the ordinary lives are, 
sort of, taken away by flunkies and money. 
To summarise, some other participants share Roger's approbation of consultation in setting 
the organization's moral tone and in responding to morally charged issues. However, their 
expressions of intersubjective fealty tend to be more reserved than Roger's. While this may 
lend credence to the view that Roger's public sector context is explicative of his democratic 
style, it still leaves unanswered the question whether a similar level of consultation would 
be morally desirable in alternative settings: even if the public sector is unique in its support 
of consultation, it does not necessarily follow that other types of organization would not be 
morally improved by a dose ofintersubjectivity; is does not necessarily imply ought. 
Restrictions to the breadth of consultation most commonly take the form of excluding 
voices outside of the leaders social and professional peer group. Consequently, the 
consultation that does take place is unlikely to enable representation of diverse perspectives. 
Although such consultation may offer a reassuring sounding board to leaders, it is doubtful 
whether it will present a meaningful challenge to their pre-existing views. 
Non-management employees are least likely to be represented in leaders' decision making. 
Reticence on the part of those junior employees is offered as a reason for this. If this 
reticence is to be overcome, a creative and sensitive response on the part of leaders is called 
for. In particular, if leaders wish to hear the voices of non-management employees, they 
need to make available communication media and consultation fora in which those 
employees feel comfortable giving voice to their views. Given that most participants do not 
appear to place much importance on the views of non-management employees, such 
investment seems unlikely. 
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Some participants go so far as to reflect on the homogeneity of the world inhabited by 
organizational leaders, suggesting that this will inevitably restrict access to discrepant 
voices. However, the majority seem comfortable with the guidance and support which 
access to this restricted peer group permits. 
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5.3 CONSIDERING SOME MORAL CONCERNS WITH LEADERSHIP 
So far in this empirical report I have identified three "ideal type" ways in which leaders 
might think about the ethical dimension of their role. I have indicated a qualified degree of 
congruence between these ideal types and the three meta-ethical perspectives that I 
discussed during my review of the ethics literature. I have also explored in greater detail a 
particular characteristic of each of these ideal type approaches. This exploration has focused 
on particular tensions that are associated with the application of the corresponding meta-
ethical perspectives to the subject of organizational leadership. In this third and last section 
of my empirical review, I propose to use empirical data to add further insights to the issues 
around which I structured my earlier discussion of the leadership literature. Specifically, I 
will explore the way that research participants think about two particular issues examined in 
that leadership literature review: the moral probity of the goals towards which leaders lead; 
and the extent to which leadership may be inherently erosive of the agency offollowers. 
This last section of my empirical report therefore begins by discussing some contrasting 
ways that participants assess the moral desirability of the objectives towards which they 
lead. It then goes on to look at some contrasting perspectives to the issue of followers' 
agency. I will end by reflecting once more upon the three ideal type exemplars with which I 
began this empirical report. This time, I will draw on the discourses of these three 
participants to illustrate contrasting approaches, not to the agency of followers, but to the 
agency of the leader. 
The Moral Probity of the Outcomes of Leadership 
The first issue considered in my review of the leadership literature concerns the moral 
rectitude of the outcomes of leadership. More particularly, it concerns the question: how 
can leaders, and those who evaluate the ethicality of leadership, be sure that leaders are 
applying their exceptional influencing skills to bring about morally desirable, rather than 
morally undesirable, outcomes? In my literature review, I discussed some ways in which 
the leadership literature addresses this question. I drew attention to the emphasis that some 
commentators place on the distinction between altruistic and egotistic motivation in a 
leader. The assumption made by these commentators is that altruistic intent offers some 
reassurance of the ethicality of a leader's agenda. I pointed out that this distinction 
overlooks the hazard of narrowly defined altruism: that, by prioritising the interests and 
aspirations of their followers, leaders may overlook the broader moral implications of that 
agenda. I drew attention to different ways of approaching this hazard. Some commentators 
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adopt a characteristically managerialist approach, putting faith in the personal moral 
perspicuity of leaders; in their capacity to unilaterally identify and respond to these broader 
moral challenges. On the other hand, by focusing on the consultative aspects of effective 
leadership, other commentators strike a tone that is more redolent of a critical perspective 
and which also places a less onerous burden of moral sagacity on leaders. 
In this section, I will explore the way that research participants respond to the challenge of 
assuring the ethicality of their agenda. My discussion so far has already revealed some 
different attitudes to this issue. Some participants judge moral legitimacy with reference to 
the code of a defined community. In the case of David, the Company Man, that code is 
enshrined in the traditions of the organization, while other participants are more inclined to 
seek validation of their moral agenda within a community of professional and social peers. 
A second approach is to trust in the acuity ofthe leader's moral judgement. This approach 
is articulated most explicitly by James, the Moral Crusader but also emerges in the 
discourses of some other participants. The third option, expressed most emphatically by 
Roger, the Mediator of Communication, is to rely on consultative processes in order to 
assess moral legitimacy. 
I will now explore further the way that leaders approach the question of moral legitimation. 
I will begin by considering the extent to which participants reflect on the wider impact of 
their organizations on society and on the environment. Some do this readily, although a 
presupposition of the moral rectitude of the organization's role in society is more common: 
that the organization "does good by doing well" is generally taken for granted. Where 
participants do dwell on the moral impact of their organization, this reflection tends to be 
confined to consideration of how to ameliorate any negative side effects of the 
organization's survival and prosperity. The overall desirability of that survival and 
prosperity, along with its morally beneficent consequences, are not generally questioned. 
This, perhaps, is only to be expected: it would be surprising to find participants questioning 
the moral legitimacy of the organizations that they lead with such vigour; a little like 
turkeys offering a normative justification for traditional Christmas feasting. 
I will elaborate shortly on the way in which participants privilege the prosperity and 
survival of the organization. I will also reflect on the rationales that they offer for this 
preoccupation and on its implications. Before doing so, however, I propose to discuss some 
different accounts offered by the few who do reflect on the wider impact of their 
organizations and on the rectitude of that impact. I focus on these particular accounts 
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because they demonstrate some contrasting ways of evaluating the moral desirability of the 
organization's social and environmental impact. 
The impact of the organization 
Several participants readily reflect on the role played by their organization within a wider 
societal or environmental context. I will describe three contrasting accounts, those of 
Patrick, Roger and James. Whereas Patrick offers a strikingly unilateral approach to the 
assessment of the moral desirability of the objectives towards which he leads, Roger and 
James are more responsive to the moral expectations of other people. However, despite the 
apparent shared intersubjective sensitivity of Roger's and James's accounts, I will draw 
attention to a significant difference between them. 
Patrick, who spent eighteen years as MD with a major brewing and pub owning company, 
reflects on the capacity of the pub trade to play a positive role in society: 
The pub business I've always been so proud of ... there are vast tracts of this country, those 
'50s and '60s housing estates, where if there wasn't a pub there, there would be no social 
infrastructure. There'd be nothing at all. And the good that a well-run pub in a council estate 
does can be fantastic. The purpose in other places is to provide an atmosphere where you 
can do the most important things in life which is to eat and drink in a convivial and pleasant 
manner. So I've always felt that the industry I've worked for was a force for good. Always, 
always .... my happiest memories are always associated with pubs, as most people's are, you 
know, the birth of your child you go and have a beer, you have a beer at your wedding ... 
... you mentioned that the thing that gave you satisfaction about being involved with the pub 
business is because it was adding something to people's lives, adding things to the 
community. Why is that important? 
I do believe that people need company; they need stimulation; they need fellowship. I mean, 
yes, I do believe in society; I don't believe you can ignore how people interact ... I don't 
know anybody who is proud of the fact that he sits indoors all the time on his own. No, no. 
I will recount a relevant passage of Roger's discourse before considering how it differs 
from Patrick's approach. Roger, remember, is CEO of a large, rural county council. 
There is a principle ... an issue about "social morality", which is the best term I can think to 
use, but because it's such a fluffy term I prefer to try to avoid using it as an expression, but 
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it is something that joins those issues together. I mean if you believe as I believe, not in a 
fluffy way, about an ethos of public service. And it's quite easy in an area like this, because 
... if you serve an area like [this county], to use European terms and not party political 
terms, even though we have a wide variety of representation, the community we serve is 
effectively social democrat. So they are not going to let old people die, they are not going to 
fail to educate young people and they wouldn't want to be biased against young people from 
different backgrounds or people with different disabilities. So if you start from that base in 
terms of the society that we serve, and obviously that's a huge generalisation, I am not 
suggesting every member of the community comes in to that category, but there's a broad 
consensus out there around the core. That's how we ought to be managing the area. That's a 
strength in the community which we then need to reflect in the way that we add to that. 
Ok, so there's a sense that because of the political, in a constitutional sense, nature of the 
organization that you represent in the community, the values that you adhere to need to be 
reflective of the values of those people. 
Yes. 
A notable contrast between Patrick's and Roger's approaches is that the moral legitimation 
offered by Patrick is highly personal. He makes a unilateral assessment about what is in the 
best interests of the public; assessments upon which he bases his evaluations of the moral 
rectitude of his industry's social impact. Thus, Patrick takes the beneficent role of pubs in 
everyone's life as a given and deduces from this the morally uplifting capacity of the pub 
trade. However, Patrick's contention is contestable. It is unlikely that his veneration of the 
pub as a social focus would meet with universal agreement. Some people may even suggest 
that some pubs do more harm than good in community terms. Roger, on the other hand, 
alludes to the leader's need to respond to a very different court of moral appeal. Rather than 
relying on his own sense of right and wrong, Roger speaks of the need to respond to the 
moral expectations of the community that he serves. It is, therefore, that community which 
sets the standards of right and wrong by which he judges the moral legitimacy of his 
organization's activities. 
Now, it might be suggested that this difference in emphasis is explained by the difference 
between the governance context within which Roger works and that to which Patrick is 
accustomed. Roger is accountable to a group of democratically elected councillors whereas 
Patrick has spent most of his career with private organizations. While it is appropriate for a 
council to respond to the expectations of the community that it serves, leaders of privately-
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funded organizations are perhaps encouraged to adopt a more unilateral approach to moral 
evaluation. 
This is where James's observations are of interest. James, like Patrick, has spent his career 
in the private sector. James also takes seriously the wider impact of his business, this time 
reflecting on the ecological dimension. James runs an executive travel business and, as a 
major buyer and seller of air travel, is very conscious of his business's environmental 
effect. 
I mentioned to you CSR, which we talk about day in and day out in our business because 
corporate social responsibility is such a huge thing when it comes to business travel that it's 
affecting our business and that is everything to do with the health and safety of people. But 
also it's becoming so much broader and the environmental piece is a big part of that. We are 
doing a huge amount on the environmental side which, I feel, not just from a business point 
of view we should do certainly, but morally and from a personal responsibility point of view 
we should do. 
James goes on to make the point that, although he believes there is an intrinsic imperative to 
take environmentalism seriously, he also needs to respond to the expectations of his 
business's stakeholders. He had spoken earlier of the need to respond to customer 
expectations, but he also refers to the need for his company's environmental policies to be 
in line with the expectations of its employees. 
About a year ago there was a lot of hype being generated about "green" and everyone was 
suddenly talking about it. And a lot of people, lots of cynics, were saying "oh this is just 
another fad. This is another bird-flu and it will go away". And also a lot of people [were] 
saying that companies were riding on the bandwagon because it seemed to be the trendy 
thing to do, you know, from the commercial point of view, [to] jump on the trend. And 
what's happened in the last year is really quite interesting in that, I would say, about 
halfway through the year it started to move from being a fad and something that people 
jumped on the bandwagon to becoming really serious. That all sort of started to happen 
because things like the Stem Report were coming out and stuff like and on the national 
agenda it becoming a bigger thing. Now people are talking about it really seriously . 
... And my point is that, people at home, our people in this company, our employees are 
people. They are individuals. At home they are increasingly being exposed to recycling. 
They are getting more keen on doing their piece; they are looking at how much tax they pay 
on the car because of carbon emissions; they are going to be buying food in Tesco's, 
Sainsbury's and other things with carbon labels on them and whether they are flown into the 
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country or not and it's becoming a part of peoples lives. When they go to work they don't 
expect that to be a different world. When they go to work they expect the company to be 
responsible about recycling paper and those things companies have been doing for some 
time but, in a sense, [have] became a token gesture, but they expect [the company] to be 
responsible about those things, about plastic cups at the vending machine. Increasingly this 
affects us. They expect the company to be responsible about the hotel they book them into, 
and the airline that they book them onto, because those things are also now becoming key 
factors. So the company, our company and all the companies that we deal with, have a sort 
of push-and-pull thing going on. You have your people that are increasingly going to 
demand things of you and saying, "well why aren't we being responsible at work?" and we 
have a responsibility to them to do that. 
James's emphasis on the moral expectations of his stakeholders contrasts with the habitual 
self-confidence in his personal moral evaluation that he manifests elsewhere. James's 
observations imply that, in order to be successful, business leaders must adopt a 
consultative stance towards moral legitimation. However, confident they may be in their 
personal moral proclamations, leaders must, in order to succeed, temper their unilateral 
moral assessments to the expectations of others. 
James's commitment to the stewardship of the organization therefore calls for an 
intersubjective sensitivity that is, in some respects, similar to Roger's democratic proclivity. 
In this sense, it is just as important for a private-sector organization to respond to the moral 
expectations of the community that it serves as it is for a local council. However, despite 
the apparent similarity in Roger and James's articulations of stakeholder sensitivity, there is 
a notable difference between them. That difference lies in the composition of the group to 
whom Roger and James appeal for moral legitimation. In Roger's case, it is the community 
served by his council, which is likely to comprise all those people who, in some way, are 
affected by the activities of his organization. In James's case, the court of moral appeal 
comprises those upon whom the prosperity of his organization depends. The difference 
might therefore be summed up as that between a relationship of affect and a relationship of 
dependency. 
This distinction is important. Roger offers what might be called an intrinsic normative 
stakeholding legitimation of his organization's activities. In other words, Roger's decisions, 
and the activities of his organization, are morally l~gitimated by their responsiveness to the 
expectations of all those who are affected by them. James, on the other hand, offers an 
instrumental normative stakeholding justification. The reason why James responds to the 
expectations of his stakeholders is that doing so helps him to promote a further goal to 
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which he attaches moral value; in this case the prosperity of his organization. Whereas, for 
Roger, his stakeholders' expectations have intrinsic moral value, for James the value of his 
stakeholders is contingent upon their contribution to that further moral target. 
To make this distinction is not to deny the moral tone of James's rationale. Indeed, James 
feels as strongly about the moral justification that he thus proposes as does Roger. 
However, it is important to distinguish their respective foci of moral legitimation. Roger 
attributes moral significance to the people who are affected by his organization's activities. 
James, on the other hand, attributes moral significance to the survival and prosperity of his 
organization (although, as I will elaborate later, even this significance may be contingent 
upon its contribution to a further moral goal). The stakeholders of whom James speaks are 
only significant insofar as they are important to the achievement of that moral purpose. 
This distinction has an important implication. This is that the groups of stakeholders to 
whom these different approaches respond are not necessarily the same: although there may 
be some overlap, the stakeholders who are affected by the activities of an organization may 
not be the same as the stakeholders upon whom it depends for its survival and prosperity. 
Roger's consultative tone is redolent of Habermasian ideal speech insofar as his decision 
making is responsive to the expectations of the constituency that is affected by those 
decisions. James's stakeholder sensitivity, on the other hand, falls short of Habermasian 
ideals in that large sections of the constituency that is affected by his decisions may be 
unrepresented in those decisions. 
Defining the universe of moral relevance 
I will now elaborate on the emphasis that most participants place on the survival and 
prosperity of their organization as a moral goal. I will approach this question, firstly, by 
considering the question of the universe of moral relevance. In other words, by identifying 
those individuals or groups that participants consider to be relevant to their moral decision 
making. 
One indication of participants' perceptions of moral relevance is offered by their responses 
to my questioning about responsibilities. I asked most participants if they think that their 
leadership role entails responsibilities to any particular groups. This question tended to 
elicit reference to a range of stakeholders but most prominent amongst these are employees. 
For example, Patrick describes the sense of responsibility to those people who worked for 
him during his time in pub management: 
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When you are adopting that leadership role within a business context are you conscious of 
any responsibilities, duties to any particular groups or individuals? 
I think you are very much so. I mean as I say I was always very keen indeed to make sure 
that the attitude surveys that were done amongst the companies within our group that we 
scored highest for satisfaction and motivation. 
Among the staff? 
Amongst staff. My responsibility has always been how I felt the staff related and whether 
they felt respected ... I mean I've always said that if there were two phone calls before I 
went out I would always answer the pub manager before I'd answer the chairman, always 
felt that. Whether that's the right way or not of doing it and in many ways it isn't, but I 
always felt that I looked after them always, always. 
Mark also reflects on his experience in the pub trade to focus on his responsibility towards 
his employees: 
When you are fulfilling a [business leadership] role of that nature are there any particular 
groups or individuals to whom you feel you have responsibilities? 
Employees of the business. I think the example of the pub and you know we're going to 
change its entire direction and its product . . . you have just as much responsibility to the 
cleaner in that pub as you have anyone else ... I think that is a big responsibility and in fact 
if anything that's the one I pay most attention to, rather like Richard Branson. I think the 
major stakeholders in any business in that sense are the people who work in it. 
So, when I asked specifically about leadership responsibilities, employees figure 
prominently as the focus of participants' moral sensitivities; as the most morally relevant 
group. But perhaps a more spontaneous expression of participants' sense of responsibility 
towards different people is offered in the context of general discussion. The group towards 
which a sense of responsibility is most commonly averred is, again, the employees of the 
organization. For example, whilst discussing his feelings towards his employees David 
notes that: 
... you feel responsible for them. That's point number one. So every single employee that I 
have whether it's in Holland, because we've got factories in Holland, in France, in the UK, 
in Ireland, you feel responsible. And that responsibility can also bring a burden. I talk a lot 
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about the burdens of leadership because everybody aspires to be the boss but there carries a 
huge amount of burden with it. 
Robert is acutely conscious of a responsibility towards his employees and also towards their 
families: 
I mean you are responsible for people's lives .... 
You mention there that you feel responsible for people's lives, why? Why are you 
responsible for them as a manager? 
Why? 
Yes. 
Well, because they rely on me for their families, if they've got families and you know, 
without a job here what happens to them? 
While these observations offer a glimpse into participants' universe of moral relevance, 
perhaps the most revealing insights come from their accounts of moral dilemmas. 
Participants may pay lip service to the moral significance of employees when specifically 
asked about this, but their most sincere commitments are likely to emerge from their 
accounts of concrete instances when they have had to choose between conflicting 
responsibilities. In this respect, a common picture emerges: this is that the ultimate 
reference point for moral decision-making is the survival and prosperity of the organization. 
When leaders have to make hard choices, the good of the organization is generally upheld 
as the weathervane of moral probity. Despite the high profile of employees in participants' 
universe of moral relevance, when choices have to be made between employees and the 
organization, the organization comes first. For example, Jane describes dilemmas in which 
she has to balance the good of the organization against the interests of specific employees. 
In such situations, the morally-right course is clear to her: 
You know, making people redundant is quite a difficult thing. And the moral dilemma there 
is you're giving someone the sack as such. So to them it's really terrible because their 
livelihood is going to go by the wayside.... But then you've also got a bigger picture to 
look after. So if you don't do that you're not going to save, you know, the rest of the 
business. So those are the sorts of things which are difficult. And you have to be right, you 
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have to be sure that you are doing it for the right reasons; is it necessary to do it for the right 
reasons ... 
Yes. And the right reasons being the, this point that we've talked about already that-
What it is you're here to do. 
Yes. Which in your case is the-
To keep the business going. 
However, it would be misleading to suggest that participants offer the prosperity of the 
organization as a categorical good. They do not tend to hold out the good of the 
organization as, in itself, an overriding criterion of moral evaluation. More usually, the 
survival and prosperity of the organization is valued insofar as it is promotes the interests of 
those people who depend upon it. Thus, Sarah, reflecting on her experiences as a director of 
a small airline, offers the greater good of the "wider group" as a justification for the trauma 
associated with a redundancy programme: 
That was the first time that I'd ever gone through a redundancy programme at all in my 
career and I found that horrifically difficult .... What makes me do it? ... Well, again, I look 
at the other stakeholders. I think there were about thirty-odd engineers in that instance and I 
talk about it easily now but at the time I was in pieces; I found it personally extremely 
difficult. We had guys in their mid-fifties in tears and it's incredibly difficult ... but I have 
to look at the wider group. 
Here, Sarah presents the interests of "the wider group" of employees as her rationale for job 
losses: she takes moral reassurance for the harsh measures that she has to implement from 
her belief that these measures are necessary to ensure the survival of the organization and 
thus the interests of the majority of employees. Therefore, although the organization takes 
priority over group of employees in her moral decision-making, this is because the interests 
of the wider group of employees is identified with the survival the organization: the many 
take precedence over the few in a utilitarian-style moral calculation. However, the survival 
of the organization need not be directly at issue for this utilitarian rationale to be put 
forward. Even when its survival is not threatened, the prosperity of the organization is 
nevertheless advanced as a moral justification for HR efficiency measures. Jane uses the 
example of a local rival to illustrate how a business that fails to pay attention to efficiencies 
can find itself on an unstoppable slide down the slippery slope to failure: 
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Presumably, there are often situations where it's not a life and death situation. 
Yeah. But you don't know when is it going to be death, look at [a local rival]. You know, 
they came up against something which was slowly getting worse and worse and worse. 
And it became terminal and they had, you know, and it was sold. 
James also alludes to his responsibility to retain maximum efficiency, specifically reflecting 
on how this is consistent with the interests of the majority of employees. Again, James 
offers this as a moral justification for making people redundant: 
It's also validated by the responsibility you have to everybody because if you compromise 
on those decisions, the company doesn't perform so well, you might then have to make 
some [more] people redundant. If you make the right decision you are being more 
responsible to everybody else in the business because you are doing the best for the business 
which is then doing the best for them. So you are doing the best for the majority in effect, 
but at the cost of some individual. 
So, even behind participants moral prioritisation of the survival and prosperity of the 
organization there generally sits a valorisation of employees' interests. Employees remain 
at the centre of participants' universe of moral relevance. However, employees are not the 
only group to be valorised by participants. For example, Nigel, CEO of a mutual building 
society, reflects on the importance of the members of the society. In this case he places their 
interests, which are realised through the survival and prosperity of the society, before those 
of a particular group of employees in justifying redundancy: 
Does that leader/follower relationship, for want of better phrase, does that create any 
particular responsibilities on your part, do you feel? 
Lots and lots, yes. You know and sometimes they are quite tough. We made people 
redundant last year, you know; we don't do that lightly. You know they've got mortgages to 
pay and children to feed and all of that emotional stuff. So it does put a fairly significant 
burden. Now you know, again, I always say to myself: "well actually, you know, I'm doing 
what I genuinely believe is right" ... 
... In that sort of situation, how do you morally legitimise to yourself taking that sort of 
action; as you say making people redundant is a big deal, it's a big deal for them. 
Yes 
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How do you come to terms with that? On what sort of basis do you-? 
When you go back to 1860, the founding principles of the building society were you know 
you run for current and future members best interests. And there lies the answer. 
Broadening the range of beneficiary groups still further, Jane identifies the survival of her 
family-owned cider company with the interests of a wide range of dependent stakeholders: 
It's not only us, it's all our employees, all our local farmers. Their main crop now is cider 
apples. We're not only looking after us as shareholders, as directors, but we've got the 
employees, we've got our suppliers. There's a huge knock-on effect .... so I need to keep 
the company sound and that would be looking after everybody that's involved with the 
business. So whether it's a shareholder, whether it's an employee, whether it's a supplier or 
whether it's a customer. 
Some participants even mention shareholders as morally significant beneficiaries, although 
often in grudging terms or as an afterthought. However, despite these occasional references 
to other stakeholder groups who depend on the organization, employees came across 
throughout my research discussions as the most morally significant group. An 
overwhelmingly common, though not unanimous, moral rationale is that employees, and 
also their families, are morally important and that the survival and prosperity of the 
organization is therefore the moral Holy Grail because this ensures the interests of the 
majority of employees. This could be characterised as a rule utilitarian rationale: the moral 
rule of organizational prosperity is privileged above all others because this is believed to 
lead to the greatest good for the greatest number of morally relevant people. And the 
morally relevant people identified by most participants are their employees. 
It is perhaps significant. that the moral dilemmas upon which participants dwell nearly 
always involve harm to small groups of employees. The ethically challenging scenarios 
described by participants, either spontaneously or in response to my specific request to 
identify a moral dilemma, generally concern situations in which groups of employees have 
lost out. In most cases, these scenarios involve redundancy. However, this is not always the 
case. For example, Alison offers an account in which she presents the survival of her 
organization, and thus the greater good of the majority of employees and their families, as a 
moral justification for "dissembling" on her part. In this conversation, Alison had just 
reflected on the vagaries of funding decisions for the business network support organization 
of which she is CEO; a discussion which initiated the following exchange. 
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Have you encountered any situations where, you know, for example, you know that the 
project is going to run out of funding in six months time, this project is extremely important, 
results continue to be extremely important for that six month period? [Where] the people 
who are involved in that project don't know that the funding is coming to an end? Where 
you've had to wrestle with-
Dissemble? 
Well, when you've had to make the decision as to whether to tell them or not? 
Yeah. 
Okay. 
That's a very tricky one... The first thing that I would say is [that] it's happened a couple of 
times. And subsequently to that, because it has been difficult, it's been a problem I've 
wrestled over ... But yes, I have dissembled. And I told one individual because I thought 
they were resilient enough to cope. And I didn't tell another individual until three months 
before the end of the contract. 
And what-
Why did I make the different distinction? One was because I knew the individual really 
well and I thought that she could cope with knowing that that was going [to happen]. I also 
wanted to retain her services in the organization. And I wanted her to apply for the jobs that 
I knew were coming up. In the other case, the individual was - I didn't see his long term 
future with the organization. And I knew that if he'd been told his results would have gone 
out of the window . 
... On what basis, why did you do that? What was the motivation to do that? 
The health of the organization supports currently one-hundred-and-twenty-eight families. 
You've only got to see the Christmas party, where suddenly your responsibilities are clear. 
When you see four hundred people who depend on you getting it right. And at the end of 
the day, the health of the many support the decisions you make about the few. 
It is notable that Alison's story, although it does not revolve around redundancy, involves 
dissembling to an employee. Alison's discomfort about dissembling derives from her 
concern about mistreating an employee. So even though her story does not involve 
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redundancy, it nevertheless concerns harm to an employee insofar as she keeps her true 
intentions from that employee. This feature characterised all but one of my research 
discussions. Every participant told me of a story whose dilemmatic quality stemmed from 
its detrimental impact on a small group of employees, either through redundancy or through 
other forms of harm (the sole exceptions to this was Dennis's account from his days in 
financial services when he and his fellow directors debated whether to inform endowment 
mortgage holders that their policies were unlikely to cover the cost of their house purchase). 
This further underlines the moral relevance of employees in the eyes of research 
participants: not only are employees morally relevant as the potential beneficiaries of 
organizational prosperity; the most troubling decisions taken by leaders to ensure this 
prosperity tend to involve employees losing out. The dilemmatic quality of these scenarios 
almost invariably derives from their injurious consequences to small groups of employees. 
To summarise this section, the basis of moral evaluation that emerges most strongly is the 
prosperity of the organization. This, in turn, is valued insofar as it promotes the interests of 
those who depend upon it; the organization's survival and prosperity is taken as proxy for 
the interests of these various groups. Particular emphasis is placed on the employees who 
stand to lose or gain from changes in the organization's fortunes. Although some 
participants also emphasise the interests of other stakeholders, including shareholders, 
suppliers, and customers, employees are most commonly named as the morally relevant 
beneficiaries of the organization's survival and prosperity. The moral significance of 
employees is further underlined by the regularity with which they feature as the losers in 
participants' accounts of moral dilemmas: it is the harm caused to employees that makes 
these scenarios dilemmatic. 
Basis for attributing moral relevance 
So the picture that emerges thus far is that the universe of moral relevance valorised by 
participants usually comprises employees, although it sometimes also includes other 
stakeholders who depend upon the organization. Therefore, leadership objectives are 
considered to be moral insofar as they promote the interests of employees and those other 
stakeholders. Since those interests are most likely to be promoted through the survival and 
prosperity of this organization, ensuring that survival and prosperity becomes leaders' 
prime moral objective. 
It is instructive to also consider why the interests of these particular groups, especially 
employees, are accorded moral relevance: why do these people matter morally so much to 
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leaders? Participants' responses to this question fall into several different categories. The 
first category received one isolated contribution. This is that there is a sort of social-
contractual basis for business's responsibilities towards the society within which it trades. 
Thus Dennis, former director with a major financial-services provider, adopts the 
perspective of an employee to offer the following rationale: 
Now, in my quirky, individualistic morality, I believe we've sort of signed up to capitalism, 
so, as an employee, I have signed up for capitalism: I obey certain rules; observe certain 
things about the way our society operates; I'm part of that and all the rest of it. Well, I think, 
turning that around, that there's a duty of care of those who benefit most from capitalism to 
look to me. 
A second explanation for moral relevance is proximity and familiarity. I have already 
described, in my earlier discussion of consistent application of principles, the partiality that 
some participants show towards those who are closest to them and the challenge that this 
presents to consistency. 
But the third, most commonly cited, basis for inclusion in the universe of moral relevance 
echoes my previous discussion about affect: those groups who are affected by the activities 
of an organization are seen as those who should be taken into account in moral evaluation 
of its activities. This is clearly articulated by James's description of his sense of 
responsibility for his employees: 
The right way and the responsible way is to say, I have got fourteen hundred people, if you 
like, that sit under my influence, in the shadow that I create as a leader and the culture that I 
create, because it does emanate from me in many respects, and you know one of the things I 
can influence is in trying to ensure that we have a genuine care for people and we have a 
genuine desire to try and create a social, a work life balance ... 
However, as I pointed out earlier, it is important to differentiate between relationships of 
affect and relationships of dependency. I often encountered ambivalence on this issue 
during my discussions: participants were sometimes unclear about whether their sense of 
responsibility for stakeholders who are affected by their business emanates from that affect 
relationship or from a dependency relationship; in other words from the fact that those 
stakeholders exercise influence over the survival and prosperity of their organization. The 
following discussion, in which Ray speaks of his feelings of responsibility for employees, 
colleagues and, in particular, for customers, is illustrative of this ambiguity: 
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Are you conscious of any particular responsibilities to any groups, any individuals. 
I think, I mean the biggest responsibility, I mean there's two groups that I think you're 
responsible to: one is your customers, primarily, because I fundamentally believe that 
customers pay your wages, and then your employees and colleagues ... 
Just coming back to that first group that you mentioned there, customers, what is that 
responsibility? 
Well, to give them what they want. You know, they, customers are very canny people, no 
matter where they're from, who they are, what sex they are. In my experience customers are 
very intuitive and your responsibility to them is to giye them what they want, when they 
want it and to anticipate what they're going to want in the future when they don't even 
know the answer to that, because they know what they want now and they know what 
they're going to want tomorrow but they haven't got a clue what they're going to want in 
eighteen months time. And certainly, as a retailer, your job is to try and work out what it is 
they're going to want in eighteen months time and provide it for them and that's a 
responsibility. 
And you feel that that is a moral duty rather than just a pragmatic duty which contributes to 
the commercial success of the business? 
Well ... it's probably more of the latter than the former. I'm not sure it's a moral, I mean, 
morally, do I have any responsibility to my customers? It's a difficult, I mean, if I'm not 
looking after my customers, they're not going to look after me, and therefore the business 
will suffer. So it could be described as a moral responsibility, but it's also practical, it is also 
pragmatic, and it's also, you know, fmancially essential. 
Ambiguity about the precise nature of his responsibilities is also apparent in the following 
exchange with Max: 
I'd be interested to know, in your business role, do you feel that you have any specific moral 
responsibilities to any people or groups? 
Moral responsibility? Yes. Clearly. You have- I mean you have responsibility morally 
for anyone you come into contact with really; so your customers, your staff, your suppliers, 
your colleagues. Groups that are there to influence your behaviour; pressure groups, I mean 
you have you know, moral responsibility to all those people I think. 
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Well, what's the origin of those responsibilities? Why do you think you feel you have a 
responsibility to those particular groups? 
Because most of the people are interfacing with you through your commercial endeavours 
and are complying with a list of things that you are- are on your agenda and therefore it's 
important, the responsibility that goes with that, your sort of- your role. 
Both Max and Ray, then, seem uncertain about the source of their moral responsibilities. It 
is not altogether clear whether Ray's sense of responsibility towards customers and 
employees and M~'s sense of responsibility towards "anyone you come into contact with" 
derives from the affect that their organizations have on these people or from their 
organizations dependency on them. 
Two possible explanations of this apparent ambivalence merit consideration. The first is 
that these participants are articulating an ethic of reciprocity, which might be paraphrased 
as "these stakeholders give us something; therefore we have a responsibility to give them 
something back". However, I think a more plausible explanation, one which is consistent 
with the general moral valorisation of organizational prosperity that I have already 
discussed, is that these participants are offe.ring an instrumental normative response to what 
I intended to be an intrinsic normative question. In other words, my efforts to find out who 
is intrinsically important to their moral decision making elicited observations about who is 
instrument ally important to the realisation of their moral objectives. Ray and Max are not 
articulating an intrinsic normative valorisation of the groups they mention; they are 
describing instrumental normative responsibilities: they feel a responsibility to look after 
these people because doing so is consistent with the prosperity of the organization, which 
helps them to fulfil their intrinsic responsibilities to those who depend upon the 
organization. 
As I pointed out earlier, whether the sense of responsibility these participants articulate is 
intrinsic normative or instrumental normative does not necessarily detract from or add to its 
moral worth. In either case, the sense of responsibility ultimately derives from a moral 
concern. Although Ray's responsibility to his customers accords intrinsic value not to those 
customers but to those who stand to gain from their support, his is nevertheless an 
expression of moral responsibility towards that latter group. Likewise, Max's 
responsibilities towards customers, staff, suppliers and colleagues may not imply intrinsic 
moral valorisation of those groups. Nevertheless, it implies intrinsic moral regard for 
someone or something. In both cases, Ray and Max may only valorise the stakeholders they 
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mention because of their importance to the prosperity of their organizations. But this still 
implies moral regard for the prosperity of the organization, or beyond that, for those who 
stand to gain from that prosperity. An instrumental normative understanding of ones 
responsibilities towards stakeholders is no less morally charged than an intrinsic normative 
understanding: both are "normative". 
However, as well as further illustrating the intrinsic normative/instrumental normative 
stakeholding distinction discussed earlier, the present discussion also points towards 
another important distinction: this time, that between two different notions of intrinsic 
normative stakeholder. This distinction is between the people who are affected by the 
activities of the organization, and thus by the decisions of a leader, and those people who 
depend upon the prosperity of the organization. To illustrate this difference, I will draw 
again on Jane's example. Jane, remember, is MD of a family owned cider company. Jane 
accounts for her responsibility to various stakeholder groups as follows: 
It's not only us, it's all our employees, all our local farmers. Their main crop now is cider 
apples. We're not only looking after us as shareholders, as directors, but we've got the 
employees, we've got our suppliers. There's a huge knock-on effect.. .. so I need to keep 
the company sound and that would be looking after everybody that's involved with the 
business. So whether it's a shareholder, whether it's an employee, whether it's a supplier or 
whether it's a customer. 
Jane is focusing here on those stakeholders who depend upon her organization's ongoing 
prosperity. This includes the shareholders and creditors who depend on the organization for 
a return on their capital. She also mentions her employees, who depend on the organization 
for an income and for all the other benefits associated with employment. Local farmers are 
also dependent on the organization, for they would have to find another outlet for their 
apple crop if it went out of business. Other members of the local community also have a 
dependency relationship with the company: the company is deeply embedded in the local 
economy; other local businesses, as well those stakeholders who depend upon them, would 
suffer were Jane's company to fail. It could even be argued that the retailers and pubs who 
buy cider from Jane's company depend, to some extent, on her organization's survival and 
prosperity. Although these outlets could source their cider elsewhere in the event of the 
company's demise, this would probably entail switching costs on their part. 
Jane does not, in this passage, refer to stakeholders who may not have a dependency 
relationship with her organization but who are nevertheless affected by its activities. For 
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example, Jane's company might choose to aggressively market high-alcohol cider to young 
people. The company might do this because it enhances commercial performance and thus 
promotes the interests of all those dependent stakeholders mentioned above. However, 
encouraging teenagers to drink strong cider may incur a range of social and economic costs 
that would have to be borne by other members of society: those people who may be directly 
affected by the actions of binge drunk teenagers; or those who may find their own demands 
for medical and police services delayed because the providers of those services are dealing 
with the repercussions of teenage drunkenness. All of these people are affected 
stakeholders. However, they are not dependent in any way on the survival and prosperity of 
Jane's business. 
The environmental affects of Jane's business are also potentially significant. She may 
choose to cut corners in matters such as waste disposal, thus enhancing profitability and 
protecting the interests of her dependent stakeholders. However, all those other stakeholders 
who are affected by the consequent environmental degradation would pick up the tab for 
such ecological inattention. 
Now, I am not suggesting for one moment that Jane would sanction such socially or 
environmentally damaging actions. Indeed, as far as I can tell, her company takes its social 
and environmental responsibilities far more seriously than do some of its competitors. 
Nevertheless, to focus uniquely on responsibilities to dependent stakeholders may serve to 
marginalise, or even obscure, the broader social and environmental consequences of the 
organization's activities. Prioritising the categorical moral significance of dependent 
stakeholders may thus detract attention from the consequences of the organization's 
activities for its affected stakeholders. 
It is therefore possible to distinguish three different stakeholder groups. The first group is 
the instrumental normative stakeholders to whom I have already referred: those groups 
without whose support the company would fail - for example, its customers, suppliers, 
shareholders and employees. The second group comprises those stakeholders who depend 
upon the organization's survival and prosperity: one category of intrinsic normative 
stakeholder- dare I refer to them by the even more cumbersome title of dependent intrinsic 
normative stakeholders. Clearly, there is a lot of crossover between these first and second 
groups: most of the shareholders, employees, suppliers and, to a lesser extent, customers, 
upon whom a commercial organization depends for its survival (its intrinsic normative 
stakeholders) also tend to fall into the category of dependent intrinsic normative 
stakeholder. The third group comprises those people who are affected by the activities that 
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the organization pursues in seeking to secure its survival and prosperity. I will call these 
affected intrinsic normative stakeholders. Again, there is quite a lot of cross over between 
this and other stakeholder groups. For instance, all of an organization's dependent intrinsic 
nonnative stakeholders are likely to also fall into the category of affected intrinsic 
nonnative stakeholders, since their dependency relationship with the organization entails an 
affect relationship. However, the key point is that there will be some affected intrinsic 
nonnative stakeholders who are not also dependent intrinsic nonnative stakeholders. The 
interests of these people will not be included in the moral calculus those leaders who focus 
uniquely on their responsibilities to instrumental nonnative stakeholders and dependent 
intrinsic nonnative stakeholders. 
It is important, then, to be clear about who we are talking about when we consider our 
moral responsibilities. It is important because, as I pointed out earlier, the precise nature of 
those responsibilities has significant implications. The key point to make from this 
discussion is that different universes of moral relevance are venerated by different 
interpretations of stakeholder responsibilities. When we speak of responsibilities to 
stakeholders, we should be clear about which "stakeholders" we are morally venerating, for 
we are potentially speaking about three different groups of people: those upon whom an 
organization· depends; those who depend upon it; and those who are otherwise affected by 
it. A highly salient point is that, although there may be some crossover, there are also likely 
to be people who fall into one of these groups but not the others. In particular, there will be 
affected intrinsic nonnative stakeholders who fall into the categories of neither dependent 
intrinsic nonnative stakeholder nor instrumental nonnative stakeholder. By focusing on 
their responsibilities to either dependent intrinsic nonnative stakeholders or instrumental 
nonnative stakeholders, leaders may overlook those other people who are affected by their 
actions. And since affect is offered by many participants as a basis for moral responsibility, 
a potential inconsistency in their discourse becomes apparent. 
General observations 
Some general points have emerged from this enquiry into how participants establish the 
moral legitimacy of their organizations' activities. Several participants reflect on the 
broader social and environmental impact of their organization. Some of these are inclined to 
adopt a strikingly unilateral stance in evaluating the moral desirability of that impact, a 
characteristic that accords with the picture of moral autocracy discussed in the previous two 
chapters. An alternative approach to assessing moral legitimacy is to respond to the moral 
expectations of the community served by the organization; a more democratically-
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constituted court of appeal. However, it is important to be clear about the group whose 
expectations are being responded to by this apparent intersubjective sensitivity: is it those 
who are affected by the activities of the organization or is it those who influence the 
prosperity of the organization? If it is those people upon whom the organization depends 
for its prosperity, we should be clear that this may differ from those people who its 
activities affect. 
In defining the universe of moral relevance, participants tend to focus on the importance of 
organizational stakeholders, placing particular emphasis on employees. The moral 
significance accorded to employees is apparent insofar as they are generally cast as the 
ultimate beneficiaries of moral decision-making and also from the fact that moral dilemmas 
tend to revolve around detrimental treatment of minority groups of employees. 
Organizational prosperity is held out as the ultimate indicator of moral legitimacy. This is 
not because organizational prosperity carries intrinsic moral value; it is because the 
prosperity of the organization promotes the interests of those stakeholders who depend on 
it. Most notable amongst these dependent stakeholder groups are the organization's 
employees. 
The importance of stakeholders, and particularly employees, in participants' moral calculus 
seems to stem from the relationship that exists between the organization and those 
stakeholders. However, some ambiguity about the precise nature of that relationship is 
apparent: it is not always clear whether stakeholders are morally significant because they 
are affected by the actions of the organization, because they are dependent on its prosperity 
or because they influence that prosperity. This discussion enables the identification of three 
·notions of "stakeholder". Stakeholders may be those upon whom the organization depends 
for its prosperity (instrumental normative stakeholders); they may be those who stand to 
benefit from that prosperity (dependent intrinsic normative stakeholders); or they may be 
those who are affected by the organization's activities (affected intrinsic normative 
stakeholders ). There will be a great deal of crossover between these three groups: a lot of 
people may fall into more than one group. However, there may be some who only fall into 
one group. 
This tripartite distinction is important for the following reason. The prosperity of the 
organization is generally the moral trump card that outbids all other considerations in 
participants' ethical deliberations. This is because the prosperity of the organization is taken 
as proxy for the interests of those who depend upon it. So the ultimate moral focus is those 
stakeholders (generally those employees) who stand to gain from the prosperity of the 
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organization. On the other hand, the reason most often given for leaders' responsibility 
towards these stakeholders is the affect that the organization has on them and thus the 
magnitude of the impact of the leader's decisions for them; there is a presupposition that 
"affect" entails "responsibility for". However, a possible area of tension emerges insofar as 
those people who are affected by the organization's activities are unlikely to be identical 
with those who stand to gain from its prosperity. If affect is a criterion for intrinsic moral 
responsibility, then privileging the rule utilitarian principle of organizational prosperity 
above all other considerations may cause some morally significant stakeholders to be 
overlooked by the leader. Given the magnitude of the organizations that some of these 
participants lead, and the breadth of groups that are likely to be affected by those 
organizations activities, and thus by those leaders' decisions, this seems to be a very 
significant omission. 
Tension between Imposition and Agency 
In this section I will consider the second of the two questions that I explored earlier in my 
discussion of the leadership literature: that is, the extent to which leadership tends to be 
intrinsically suppressive of the agency of those who are "led". I will outline two different 
ways that participants evaluate the interests of those who they lead. I will suggest that one 
of these attitudes amplifies this concern while the other alleviates it to some extent. 
I will conclude this empirical report by moving away from the issue of followers' agency 
and considering that of leaders. To do so, I will return to the people with whom I began the 
report: those three participants who, to a large extent, exemplify three different ideal type 
approaches to the evaluation of ethicality. This time, I will discuss how these three 
articulate contrasting approaches to the question of their own agency, with specific 
reference to the extent to which they concede culpability for the moral dilemmas that they 
find themselves having to address. 
Who is to be the judge of personal enhancement? 
In keeping with the valorisation of employees that I have already discussed, participants 
tend to dwell on the personal satisfaction that they take in being able to release potential in 
people. Given the moral significance accorded by research participants to their employees, 
it is unsurprising that they speak of the satisfaction they derive from enabling the personal 
development of their people. However, a subtle difference is apparent in the manner in 
which different participants speak about releasing potential. I will illustrate this contrast by 
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comparing two pairs of narrative. I will begin by presenting discussions with Mark and 
Patrick, before drawing attention to a common characteristic manifested by these two 
excerpts. I will then present discussions with Gill and Dennis, reflecting on the way in 
which these differ from the first pair. 
Mark reflects on the personal satisfaction that he derives from seeing people develop, 
offering an example which illustrates this: 
What would be the things that have given you a great deal of satisfaction in your business 
career; what sort of thing gives you satisfaction as a leader of business organizations? 
... What gives me most pleasure in it quite apart from results, because results do give me 
pleasure, is the people, particularly in terms of those who are there when you arrive in a 
business and who you are able to, through whatever minor skills you may have in this area, 
develop those people so they can come through the business. To give you a good example 
when I was first a director with [a major brewery], I was a retail office director in a region 
of the country running a few hundred managed houses and there was one pub ... the one 
thing that gave me a lot of pleasure was one of the cleaners there had been cleaning in the 
pub for years, and of course a great cleaner, very proud of the work she did ... but she had a 
daughter who also used to do some part-time cleaning and that daughter was really very 
impressive just in terms of personality. She worked behind the bar then and then she 
became, over a few years, an area manager and worked up to that and then she became a 
director and the last I heard of [her] she was actually working for [the brewery] as one of 
their two major retail directors. Now that is a good example of things that give you a real 
pleasure in business. 
Patrick also describes how important it is to him to develop his people: 
If I could start Patrick by asking you to reflect back on the things that have given you the 
greatest satisfaction in your business career. 
. . . The things that I was proudest of always was wherever you were you had a good team 
... by and large there would be a core of thirty or forty people I'd known when we changed 
structures, as we did fairly regularly, [so] you at least had some basis of trust with the 
people . . . So I mean I enjoyed it and we did well, we grew the business and we made a lot 
of profit and we took great pleasure in making profit targets but mainly it's getting in and 
having people there for whom you've got respect; seeing them. 
Patrick revisits this theme a little later: 
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I'm certainly somebody that liked teams and liked seeing people and the interaction with 
people. I mean, I'm not saying I was a consensus manager, but it would upset me if I felt 
people were either in violent disagreement or unhappy or felt that they weren't valued. So at 
the bottom of what I was trying to do, I always felt that there's far more potential in far 
more people than we can ever release. I mean we never really do, you know ... I've always 
believed that, that there's a huge amount of latent talent and I guess what I was always 
hoping was, if people are well motivated, then they will go that extra step. But whether that 
was to make the business prosper or whether that's just a belief that I'd have done [that] 
whether it made the business prosper or not is a different matter and I can't tell you which 
... I mean, for some people its almost a calculated way of doing business or indeed making 
sure that you don't get banged up. And for others there's may be an innate sense and ... it's 
impossible really for people to decide what their motivations are ... 
But the fact that you derived a certain degree of satisfaction from seeing that potential 
realised in people would suggest that there was something intrinsic about that that was 
appealing to you? 
I think so. I've always been gregarious and I've always wanted to see people do well always 
at whatever level. 
Was this because you felt that in your leadership role you had some responsibility to try and 
develop that potential? 
Yes. 
Or was it because it gave you pleasure? 
I think I felt there was a responsibility as well as that being my style of management. 
A common feature of these accounts is that both Mark and Patrick describe the satisfaction 
that they derive from facilitating the personal development of their people. Mark describes 
this as an intrinsic satisfaction: he likes seeing people do well irrespective of the 
consequences of that success for the business. Patrick is a little more circumspect. Like 
Mark, he tells of the personal satisfaction that he gets from developing others but he also 
allows that part of this satisfaction may derive from the consequent enhancement in that 
person's contribution to the commercial success of the organization. Despite this allowance 
on Patrick's part, though, it is clear that, like Mark, he derives personal satisfaction from 
seeing other people develop and from having been able to contribute to that development. 
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A further common feature is the criteria by which both Mark and Patrick assess personal 
development. Both evaluate the personal development of their people in accordance with 
criteria which appeal to them personally. In other words Mark and Patrick tend to refer 
mainly to their own standards of evaluation in appraising the development of their people. 
Now, these standards may not be contentious; they may be perfectly in keeping with the 
standards of evaluation which those employees would use to evaluate their own personal 
development. Indeed, in these examples, it is unlikely that the individuals described by 
Mark and Patrick would disagree about the positive nature of the development which Mark 
and Patrick have facilitated. However, the key point is that neither Mark nor Patrick gives 
much thought to the possibility that the perspectives of those people may differ from their 
own. Indeed, Mark offers elsewhere a somewhat more contentious appraisal of the best 
interests of his employees. Having described his sense of responsibility to do the best for 
hi~ people, he then adopts a highly paternalistic stance in suggesting that there are times 
when it may be in an employee's best interests to show them the door: 
I don't look upon that in any sort of philanthropic way though, it might be your 
responsibility is to explain to that person that they would really hate it in there in future and 
therefore their best interests are served being somewhere else. 
A subtly different approach from that of Mark and Patrick is apparent in the following two 
accounts. Firstly, Gill, a former HR director with a major retailing group, tells of the 
satisfaction that she derives from releasing potential in people. 
Can I ask you what sort of things have given you the most satisfaction in your business 
career? 
In my business career, the things I have done which have made a positive difference and not 
just to the organization but to individuals. And, now when I look back I realise that the best 
impact a person can make is upon other individual people. You can make an impact on an 
organization, you can make an organization different, you can help an organization to 
change, but any sort of sustainable difference, any sustainable change, I think, is much more 
likely and evident at an individual level. And, there's a great quote actually, or a poem or 
something, by a guy called Ralph Waldo Emerson and it's called Success Is. And it goes 
through a number of things and it fmishes off with "knowing that one life is breathed easier, 
that is success". And that's a little bit actually where I come from is that, if I've made 
individuals' lives more easy or better, then actually that's successful. That's what I wouli:l 
aim to achieve. 
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OK. Can you give me any examples of how that is, how you've achieved that within a 
business context? 
Yeah, I mean the role of HR Director is essentially, supposedly, about people and it's 
possible to make a huge amount of difference to groups of people as an HR Director 
because in essence what you're trying to do is help those people, this is my view of the HR 
Director role, is to help those people to create the environment where everybody can be 
their most productive. So, why do you develop managers? Why do you put performance 
appraisal processes in place? Why do you help people to develop their behavioural skills 
and so on? Ultimately, they will only really be effective if there is a climate and the 
environment that allows them to be like that. . . . It is about creating the right environment 
to allow people to flourish and to deliver their best; to be the most productive. And there are 
all sorts of systems and processes and mechanisms that the HR function, as the experts, 
should put in place to allow that to happen ... I think every person actually, manager, leader 
or any other individual, can help another individual to grow and develop. And I've just said 
to grow and I sort of resist saying that because it sounds so "brown rice and sandals", if you 
know what I mean. But, yeah, any individual can help somebody else be the best that they 
can be . 
... you mention that this is the thing that gives you the greatest satisfaction, creating an 
environment within which people can flourish and people can develop, is that because you 
take intrinsic satisfaction from doing that and from the development of people, or is it 
because you take satisfaction from developing those people to promote the business case? 
Hmm. Well I think this answer is quite clear really- in terms of where I am in my career 
[Gill has left her corporate role to start her own business as a personal trainer] because I 
think it's probably the former rather than the latter. And I think through the whole time that 
I was within the corporate environment my satisfaction came from what you could do with 
people. The rationale for it, the raison d'etre, is so that the business can increase its 
profitability. Making money doesn't do it for me, you know, so then you might argue what 
on earth are you doing in business? Well, actually because I thought, and I still do believe, 
that businesses are more successful if they've got a group of people working within them 
who are at their most productive. 
Like Patrick, Gill reflects, when invited to, on the distinction between valuing the 
development of her people as an intrinsic good and valuing that development insofar as it 
enhances the performance of the organization. Gill's suggestion is that, although her focus 
is on the former, the two are mutually compatible. This distinction between the intrinsic and 
instrumental value of personal development is peripheral to main point that I wish to make 
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here however. The main point is that there is a rather different tone to Gill's narrative than 
to those of Mark and Patrick. This difference is articulated most succinctly in her 
suggestion that "if I've made individuals' lives more easy or better, then actually that's 
successful". This phrase points to the involvement of those people whose potential Gill 
unlocks in the evaluation of that development; in order for personal development to deliver 
the satisfaction .which Gill describes, those peoples' lives need to be enhanced on their 
terms rather than purely on the terms of the leader. Gill thus moves away from the 
unilateral estimation of people's enhancement that characterises Mark and Patrick's 
narratives. She implies that personal development only counts if it is seen as such by those 
people whose development is in question. This distinction is illustrated still more explicitly 
in the following conversation with Dennis: 
What I'd like to begin with Dennis, is just to get some understanding of what are the sort of 
things that have given you personal satisfaction in your business career? 
To a degree they've been really about seeing other people take off, as it happens ... 
Can you give me any tangible examples of any particular events that have given you 
particular satisfaction? 
Early in my career, I think it was successfully leading and running a process that involved 
substantial operational change and building a good team and helping that happen. I think in 
my middle career it was seeing people that had felt they couldn't break through to the levels 
and perhaps positions they aspired [to], to sort of work with them; to find experiences that 
enabled them to do that. And I am particularly thinking of one occasion where ... somebody 
that led a very old-fashioned work-measurement team converted [it] completely into a 
group of people that added enormous value to the operation, into the customer service units 
and the rest of it. And that was based solely on the key guy having an experience of [a 
coaching organization], in this particular case, that quite transformed the way he thought 
about his role and himself. And I bumped into him three months ago, having not seen him 
for seven years, and he's still working with the people from [the coaching organization] but 
now they are working together and it's a lovely organization now, so it's a much changed 
situation. Those kind of things give me a certain kind of pleasure. 
So just looking at that last example, what is it in that situation that you found particularly 
satisfying? 
I think at the root of it is, it's a combination of two kinds of things. Firstly the key 
individuals, building their self-belief and being able to express it in a way they find 
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meaningful and motivational and fulfilling, and at the same time doing something that lends 
a value to the team that they work for or people outside the business, people who buy and 
sell [their services], also find [to be of] value. And I think a further experience of that kind 
which is later in my corporate career, where we mobilised the entire front-end team of an 
insurance business to reinvent, over a very short timescale, the proposition to the consumer 
which involved working differently with each other, breaking some of the rules that they 
felt existed, resolving those constraints, working completely differently with suppliers ... 
and showing what they could do as a team of people, which completely transformed our 
customers' experience ... Another example of people changing forever on the basis of an 
experience they had and making change happen and doing things that they believed were 
right but they felt were constrained by the way they thought the organization wanted them 
to work. 
So there seem to be two threads coming through there. The first is the development of 
people's potential, helping people to realise and achieve their potential, and secondly 
there's something about the quality of the offering, the actual outcome of the process. 
Yes, I think so. The quality of the outcome having two bearings. The first, how it's 
measured by the outside world, the recipients, so people might have a view about what they 
get. But also that the people delivering it thinking that what they're now doing is right or 
righter than it was, so there's a sense in which I now believe that what I deliver, my day job, 
is now much more fulfilling because I think I now deliver something that I'm proud of, that 
other people respect and like, whereas before I didn't. 
The subject-centred quality of Dennis's estimation of desirable change is particularly 
apparent in his reference to people "making change happen and doing things that they 
believed were right but they felt were constrained by the way they thought the organization 
wanted them to work". It is also explicit in the second of the ''two bearings" which he 
mentions in the last paragraph of this narrative: projecting himself into the changed 
person's perspective, he suggests that "there's a sense in which I now believe that what I 
deliver, my day job, is now much more fulfilling because I think I now deliver something 
that I'm proud of, that other people respect and like, whereas before I didn't". 
The distinction that I have made in this discussion seems significant to the issue of the 
suppression of agency. If leaders use their influencing skills to bring about changes in 
people that are valued by those people, then the potential for suppression of agency is at 
least diminished. On the other hand, if the sole arbiter of the desirability of change in 
people is the leader, who also happens to wield exceptional influence over those people, 
then the threat of suppressed agency looms larger. It is understandable that leaders will wish 
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to enhance people's contribution to the performance of the organization.and that they may 
use this contribution as a yardstick to appraise and evaluate people's personal development. 
As Patrick mentions, it is not always easy to separate this motivation from a categorical 
care for the personal development of the individual. Neither, as Gill suggests, need the two 
imperatives conflict. But if some attention is also paid to the individual's opinion of what 
constitutes desirable personal change, then a more genuine harmonisation of individual with 
organization seems likely. 
Contrasting responses to the contribution of the leader in bringing about dilemmas 
Having discussed the agency of followers, I will now give some consideration to a separate, 
although not unrelated subject: the agency of leaders and the extent to which different 
individuals avow or disavow that agency. In order to illustrate this distinction, I will draw 
again on the three research participants whose perspectives I described in my first section. 
Remember that David was described as the Company Man who faithfully orients his moral 
compass in accordance with the values of the organization; James is the Moral Crusader 
who unflinchingly privileges his own apprehension of moral probity; Roger is the Mediator 
of Communication who encourages and responds to intersubjective processes. 
I will describe here how the discourses of David and James indicate one way of thinking 
about the leader's agency and how Roger articulates an alternative way. Interestingly, these 
different ways of thinking about their own agency gainsay, in some respects, the ideal type 
caricatures that emerged in my earlier discussion. I will discuss this apparent contradiction 
in a little more detail once I have presented the contrasting perspectives. 
I will illustrate the difference between the two approaches by drawing once more on the 
issue of redundancy that features so prominently in participants' moral deliberations. David 
identifies redundancy decisions as the most morally challenging situations he faces as a 
leader: 
Can you think of any situations where that feeling of responsibility for those people has 
conflicted with what is expected of you as the person who is in charge of this organization? 
Oh many I guess. I guess if you are going through a rationalisation programme where you 
may have to make people redundant; that hurts. That hurts. 
Ok, so how do you come to terms with that? 
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I don't think you do. If I am really honest I don't think you do. I mean you try and blank it 
out, but it's painful. 
But presumably you morally justify that. 
I think from my point of view; one is you know you have to give a return. So, you know, it 
sounds callous but, you know, do you sacrifice a hundred to save the thousand? And 
sometimes you've got to make those decisions to be honest. It's no different from when you 
are in the army, I guess, making those decisions. But sometimes if we've got a business 
that's dragging the whole down, you know, do you get rid of that business in order to make 
sure the whole is ok? 
James also identifies redundancy as presenting his greatest moral challenge: 
Can you think back to any particularly dilemmatic situations? Any particular moral 
dilemmas that you have had to deal with in a leadership role that you would be comfortable 
telling me about? 
I suppose the sort of examples that immediately spring to mind where I am always most 
uncomfortable is when you have to make people redundant. 
Ok. Why is that particularly uncomfortable? 
Because you know what it is doing to the person .... And it's hard, you know, because if 
you think, where it's hard and where it's relevant to your question, is where it potentially is 
a marginal decision. Sometimes it is really clear cut: you just say "look those roles don't 
exist; most people are going to go". Other times you have really got to try and hit your 
budget. You have really got to try and make sure that you are running as efficient as 
possible but there is somebody that you quite like, they are doing a sort of comfortable job, 
they are not going to change the world but they have been there for years and it's a 
comfortable environment and when you go into a company there is always those people 
around. And some of them you keep because you value the knowledge that they have got 
and you put them into industry relations or industry affairs or something like that, you know 
the sort of thing I mean? And there are others who you say, "well actually we can't afford to 
carry you anymore". But you know that they are so committed to the company. They love it 
and their social world is around it and they have got a family with children and they might 
be approaching an age where they are ten years from retirement but if you make them 
redundant now they are going to struggle fmding another job. What do you do? And at the 
end of the day you have to do what is right for the business. That is the dilemma. Because 
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you are paid ... you at the end ofthe day are paid by the shareholders to do what is right for 
the business and if it's the right thing for the business, however much you would like to go 
with the comfortable route, you have got to do what is right and you have got to lose them. 
Now in previous lives I can think of examples where I have compromised in lots of those 
situations and I have compromised probably on more things than I would ever compromise 
on now simply because you only get one chance to get it right and so you, you know, 
you've got to be decisive, that's what you are paid for. But that's classic dilemma and that's 
probably the worst dilemmas are when, you know, you sit down and have a conversation 
with the person and however generous you are with the package, however kind you are, you 
know what you have done to their lives and that's really hard. 
A common feature of both of the above accounts is that the need for redundancy is 
something which David and James depict as being beyond their control. In both cases, they, 
as the leaders, regard it as their unpleasant task to do what has to be done. Neither David 
nor James is inclined to dwell on the possibility that he might have averted the need for 
redundancy or even that he, as a leader, may have contributed in some way to its necessity. 
The redundancy scenario is, for both, a done deal; the only personal participation that they 
envisage is its enforcement. A somewhat different approach is apparent in the following 
description from Roger. 
And I think it's one of the, you know, it's probably one of the greatest challenges in 
leadership is those difficult situation you face when you have to balance the interests of the 
individual against the interest of the organization. And where ultimately you know the right 
answer must be that it's the organization that must triumph in those circumstances ... There 
is always a sense of failure I think in those situations where you find yourself in a situation 
of having to take a decision against an individual in the interests of the organization. And 
the first question I tend to ask myself in those circumstances is "how did I create this 
problem? What role did I have in creating this?" Because you can't always believe that the 
individual or the organization has created it, because you know sometimes it's leadership 
that creates those situations ... 
Could you give me any examples, which you would be comfortable to give, of that tension 
between the interests of the individual and the interests of the organization? Is there 
anything that-? 
Oh yes some of the, you know, some of the best people that we employ as an organization 
and who challenge the organization most effectively and therefore enable the organization 
to change, are the very people who have a tendency sometimes to go too far ... And when 
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the organization has run out of steam with them, because actually you need [such people 
sometimes] ... actually lots of organizations require people who provide the grit to make 
them change and sometimes they provide too much grit and as a result they fail and have to 
move on. Sometimes you do that comfortably and people make progress; you recognise that 
their contribution to the organization is part of that process. Sometimes you are not able to 
do that. So those are the hard situations I think; around individuals who you actually know 
made a significant contribution to shifting the organization on, that have gone so far out of 
kilter with too much of the organization and you actually have to say "what you have done 
has been really valuable to us, but actually we can't use this particular style for too much 
longer''. I'm sure it happens all over. 
So in that sort of situation; what are the principles there? What are the moral principles 
that are causing you discomfort? 
The principles are the conflict between exercising leadership in a way that allows the 
organization to move on, recognising that the organization is benefiting from it . . . and 
probably not stepping in soon enough to say to the individual "if you are going to carry on 
this course, exhibiting these characteristics, you will continue to shift the organization, but 
actually you will run yourself in to a position where your employment can no longer be 
sustained". 
Like David and James, Roger describes a scenario where individual jobs must be sacrificed 
in the interests of organizational prosperity. Like them, he regards such situations as highly 
dilemmatic and, as they do, he proposes that, in such situations, the organization must take 
precedence over the individual. The difference, however, lies in Roger's response to these 
scenarios. For David and James, the redundancy decision is not only a done deal; it is 
presented as the inescapable resolution to a predicament for which they eschew p~rsonal 
accountability. David and James present such situations as inevitable; they do not dwell on 
the possibility that they may have contributed to their creation. Roger, on the other hand, is 
inclined to reflect on the role that he may have played in bringing about such predicaments; 
to consider what he might have done to avoid the need for redundancy and to learn from the 
experience: 
What role did I have in creating this? Because you can't always believe that the individual 
or the organization has created it, because you know sometimes it's leadership that creates 
those situations .... it is important to try and sort out why it's arisen and you don't learn if 
you don't sort it out. 
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Now this difference in response might be explained by Roger's longevity in his role (ten 
years). James's more transitory career path is likely to have presented him with 
inefficiencies that were not of his making but which he has had to resolve. Furthermore, the 
acquisition context with which both David and James are familiar is likely to have placed 
demands on them to rectify perceived inefficiencies to which they have not contributed. 
Nevertheless, despite this possible explanation for these contrasting responses, the 
reflective tone of Roger's response offers a model of personal accountability that seems to 
be morally significant. 
A final point concerns the extent to which these different avowals of agentic responsibility 
contrasts with the ideal type characterisations that I attributed earlier to David, James and 
Roger. In David's case, dissolution of his own agency in the face of corporate strategy is 
perhaps understandable given his eagerness to harmonise his own agenda with that of the 
organization. In James's case, though, it is surprising that he does not dwell on his own 
contribution to the situation whose resolution he describes. This seems to conflict with the 
willingness that he· demonstrates elsewhere to take ownership for what happens in his 
organization. In Roger's case, his willingness to reflect on the part that he has played in 
bringing about the need for redundancy indicates a degree of personal authorship that may 
be at odds with his generally consultative mien. 
Perhaps, in these cases, contextual circumstances are more elucidative of these differences 
in approach than are the inherent characteristics of the respective leaders. The transient 
nature of James's career to date and his relatively recent appointment to his present role 
might account for his uncharacteristic abrogation of ownership. On the other hand, Roger's 
ten year tenure in his present role, and the similarly lengthy stays that have characterised his 
previous leadership appointments, may have encouraged responsibility for and ownership 
of the unpleasant situations that he has had to resolve. If this is so, then perhaps it says 
something important about the moral desirability of transient leadership appointments: if 
leaders change so frequently that each spends their time mopping up the moral spillage of 
their predecessors, then ethically sensitive behaviour seems less likely. On the other hand, if 
leaders hang around long enough to confront the moral downsides of their own leadership 
actions, rather than moving swiftly on to their next leadership challenge and leaving a 
successor to pick up the pieces of their present actions, then they may be more sensitive to 
the potential moral repercussions of those actions. 
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General observations 
As far as agency is concerned, then, I have made two distinctions. The first is to contrast 
leader-centred and subject-centred perspectives to the evaluation of personal change in 
people. I have suggested that a subject-centred perspective diminishes the threat that 
paternalistically-inclined leadership agendas present to the agency of followers. I have also 
distinguished between those leaders who are inclined to overlook their own contribution to 
moral dilemmas and those who acknowledge it and learn from it. I have suggested that the 
occurrence of such dilemmas may be reduced if leaders pay greater attention to the part that 
they may have played in bringing them about. I have also proposed that leaders may be 
more inclined to acknowledge their own agentic responsibilities if they remain in leadership 
roles long enough to confront the morally troubling consequences of their earlier decisions. 
In this respect, length of tenure is likely to generate a longer-term moral perspective than 
transient leadership careers. 
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6.0 CONCLUSION 
In this final chapter, I propose to pull together a number of strands from my theoretical and 
empirical research in order to develop a normative model of ethical leadership. Before 
doing so, I will summarize these preceding sections, highlighting some key points that have 
emerged so far. 
The review of the leadership literature with which this thesis began looked at two potential 
areas of moral concern about leadership: that leadership may be applied to bring about 
goals that are morally undesirable; and the possibility that leadership may be inherently 
suppressive of the agency of so-called followers. As far as the first of these issues is 
concerned, many theorists assume that, as long as leaders are not egotistically motivated, 
then they will lead towards morally legitimate outcomes. However, in placing such faith in 
altruism, these commentators confront another moral hazard: that of narrowly defined 
altruism. There is a danger that, in according primacy to the interests and agendas of their 
so-called followers, leaders will lose sight of the wider repercussions of their and their 
organization's actions. 
One response to the second challenge, leadership's potential to erode the agency of 
followers, is to point to the congruence between effective leadership and sensitivity to 
followers' needs. If it is the case that, in order to be effective, leaders must respond to 
followers' needs, then the challenge to agency at least seems to be diminished. However, a 
shadow is cast over the ethically legitimising force of leaders' responsiveness to followers' 
needs if it is driven by expediency rather than by sincere care. Furthermore, in championing 
the needs of employees, the emphasis that some theorists place on the collective may pose a 
threat to those groups or individuals whose profiles, aspirations or interests differ in some 
way from those of the majority. 
The responses that commentators offer, either explicitly or tacitly, to these moral challenges 
can be classified according to the extent to which they are congruent with either a 
managerialist or a critical perspective. Those stances that reveal a managerialist 
commitment tend to place considerable onus on the leader as arbiter of moral probity. They 
also reveal a characteristically unitarist understanding or peoples agendas. On the other 
hand, critically tinged accounts are more open to the possibility of diverse agendas and also 
allow more space for contributions from multiple perspectives in defining moral probity. I 
concluded my discussion of the leadership literature by suggesting that managerially-
oriented and critically-inclined accounts may present rather different challenges: that the 
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former may perhaps be harder to justify from an ethical point of view while the latter may 
present greater practical difficulties of application within contemporary organizational 
contexts. 
Having considered ethics through the lens of the leadership literature, I then went on to 
consider leadership from a range of ethical perspectives. My review of the ethics literature 
was divided into three sections, each section relating to a different meta-ethical orientation. 
My discussion of principle-based ethics briefly described some prominent theories and 
explored their implications for lead~rship. On the subject of utilitarianism, I drew attention 
to a number of conceptual and practical difficulties of application that it presents, 
highlighting rule utilitarianism as a possible solution to some of the latter. I pointed out how 
social contract theory offers a highly contestable basis for organizational ethics, given the 
likelihood of asymmetrical bargaining positions from which any hypothetical, original 
position may be presumed. I proposed that Kant's principle of universalisation and his 
principle of ends may offer some useful insights to leadership ethics in contemporary 
organizational contexts. However, I also suggested that Kant's preclusion of charitable 
emotions from ethical arbitration, or at least their relegation to a lesser status than rationally 
specified duty, seems rather harsh. I briefly mentioned how John Rawls' theory of justice, 
in drawing selectively from social contract theory and Kantian theory, may avoid some of 
the difficulties associated with each. 
I concluded my discussion of principle-based ethics with some general observations. The 
first is that, although principle-based theory seems to hold out the promise of 
straightforward principles of moral legitimation, the actual application ofthose principles is 
a highly complex matter, involving many practical and theoretical challenges. As such, to 
expect leaders to single-handledly shoulder the burden of principle-based legitimation on 
behalf of organizations would be to ask an awful lot of them. I went on to observe that the 
multiplicity and complexity of principle-based theory renders it prone to co-optation by 
leaders who seek a convenient ethical rationale to justify whatever actions they may choose 
on non-moral grounds. I proposed that, to avoid charges of expedient co-optation, it seems 
reasonable to expect leaders to apply their chosen principle-based approach with a degree of 
consistency. My discussion of principle-based ethics ended by considering the charge that it 
fails to account for the way that people actually approach moral decision making: that we 
do not tend to think about ethical dilemmas in terms of principles. Even if we accept these 
criticisms, I suggested that principle-based theory may still have something to offer to 
ethical evaluation of leadership. Firstly, by theorising about straightforward ethical 
scenarios in terms of principles, we might be able to derive guidelines that will help us to 
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resolve more complex dilemmas. Secondly, considering moral dilemmas from the 
perspectives of a range of principle-based theories may draw attention to salient aspects of 
those dilemmas that we would otherwise have overlooked. As such, principle-based ethics 
offers, at the very least, a useful aid to moral reflection about leadership. 
My second ethics chapter discussed existentialism. In briefly reviewing the philosophy of 
Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre, I highlighted some common themes and also 
some significant points upon which these writers differ. A common ingredient of 
existentialist theory is its repudiation of universal, objective standards of evaluation. I 
suggested that Nietzschean ethics offers the basis for a highly elitist style of leadership that 
is not constrained by conventional moral standards. Other existentialist commentators 
emphasise the importance of an authentic way of life; one which acknowledges and 
responds to the autonomy of the human condition. Heidegger and Sartre consider a range of 
factors that may impede an authentic lifestyle. Chief amongst these is the apparent 
dependency of our choices on our contextual circumstances and upon those around us. 
Against this apparent determinism, existentialism emphasises that we are always free to 
choose. So, although it is important to acknowledge that our choices are, to some extent, 
influenced by our circumstances, we must not lose sight of our ineluctable autonomy. This 
goes for leaders as much as anyone else. Despite circumstances that may seem to impede 
and limit leaders' choices, they are always free to decide how they respond to those 
circumstances. So while existentialism undermines the notion of universal, objective 
standards of rightness and places the onus of moral choice fairly and squarely on the leader, 
it also permits leaders no hiding place from their moral commitments. 
A further important issue for existentialism, to which different philosophers offer 
co~trasting responses, relates to the authenticity of other people. On the one hand, Sartre's 
early work draws attention to the conflictual quality of intersubjective encounters, 
proposing that one person's authenticity can only be sustained by eroding that of other 
people. So, applying this understanding to leadership, leaders' authenticity necessarily 
challenges that of their followers. On the other hand, Heidegger holds out the prospect of 
mutually authentic co-existence. Heidegger's analysis of intersubjectivity thus offers the 
basis for a leadership relationship in which leaders sustain their own authenticity whilst also 
facilitating that of their followers. 
The· third and last of my ethics chapters discussed intersubjectivity in greater detail, 
focusing in particular on the philosophy of Jiirgen Habermas. It began by considering some 
similarities between Habermasian theory and Aristotelian and virtue ethical perspectives: 
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that ethical probity does not derive from either congruence with external standards or from 
individual commitment but that it derives from the quality of the communicative processes 
by which decisions are made. I went on to outline how, given the inescapably social nature 
of human existence, and the criticality of communication to social existence, Habermas 
places communication at the heart ethics. I then described some rules of communicative 
legitimisation that Habermas derives from his transcendental-pragmatic analysis of 
communication. 
In drawing out the implications of Habermas's intersubjectivist ethics for leadership, 
particularly his focus on critical reflection and on raising and challenging validity claims, I 
pointed to the role it presents for leaders as facilitators of communicative action in 
organizations. I also drew attention to some difficulties that this depiction might present: 
that certain forms of rational articulation might be privileged over others; that leaders' 
status might act as a barrier to communicative action; that leaders may have to audit their 
own communicative fealty in a never ending succession of intersubjective fora; that, given 
the difficulties of achieving consensus, leaders may feel inclined to manipulate and enforce 
in order to generate apparent consensus. In particular, I outlined the challenges that 
delinguistified steering media such as power and money might present to communicative 
action; a matter that is of particular relevance to organizational leadership ethics within a 
capitalist economy. I suggested that, despite these difficulties, the processual model of 
moral legitimation offered by Habermas may nevertheless offer a workable, moral 
orientation point to leaders. 
The next section discussed my empirical research. After outlining the empirical method that 
I adopted in my discussions with practising leaders I presented the findings of these 
discussions over three chapters. The first chapter described some ideal type ways of 
thinking about morality and leadership, drawing upon the discourses of three particular 
participants to highlight characteristics associated with each ideal type. For the Company 
Man ideal type, his company's moral sensitisation assures the moral legitimacy of its 
agenda. Consistent application of that agenda therefore takes moral primacy for him. 
Morality is presented as a fairly straightforward matter, so the Company Man sees no need 
for ethical soul searching. As long as he enforces his organization's moral code, he will be 
leading morally. The Moral Crusader ideal type also presents morality as a fairly 
straightforward matter. However, for him, it is his own infallible moral judgement that 
assures probity. The Moral Crusader is characterised by his moral self-assurance. He is 
confident in his own perspicacity and shows no reticence in acting as moral judge and jury 
for his organization. Given that standards of moral probity are self-evident to the Moral 
216 
Crusader, the only possible inhibition to moral leadership is unwillingness to apply those 
standards. The Moral Crusader shows no such reticence. Notably, neither the Company 
Man nor the Moral Crusader see much need to involve other people in shaping moral codes. 
The Mediator of Communication ideal type differs from both the Company Man and the 
Moral Crusader in several ways. For the former, apprehension of moral probity is a less 
straightforward matter, so there is ground for tension between personal and organizational 
values. Whereas the Company Man trusts in the moral code handed down by global head 
office and the Moral Crusader privileges his own moral judgement, the Mediator of 
Communication is inclined to consult around ethics. Although he believes that leaders have 
a role in shaping and sustaining organizational values, he presents this role within a 
framework of participation. In considering tensions between his role as leader and as a 
participant in consultation, he focuses on his part in encouraging and informing other 
peoples' critical reflection. 
In reflecting on these ideal types, I pointed out that the contrasts between those three people 
who I chose to illustrate them may be partly shaped by their respective organizational 
contexts. However, I also suggested that this need not necessarily preclude the applicability 
to alternative contexts of these ways of thinking about the morality of organizational 
leadership. I also noted some congruence with, and also some differences between, each of 
these ideal types and the meta-ethical approaches reviewed in my ethics literature chapters. 
I noted that the Company Man, Moral Crusader and Mediator of Communication evoke, 
and also depart in some respects from, principle-based, existentialist and intersubjective 
ways of thinking about leadership ethics. 
The next chapter pursued this tripartite schema of ideal types by drawing on my other 
discussions to further illuminate these ideal type understandings. It did so whilst exploring a 
particular tension associated with the practical application of each different meta-ethical 
understanding to organizational leadership. In further elaborating upon the Company Man 
ideal type I focused on the issue of consistency. I pointed out that a number of research 
participants consider it their duty to consistently apply principle but that they often find this 
very challenging on an emotional level. In considering further the Moral Crusader ideal 
type, I explored some contrasting responses to the issue of authenticity. I noted the 
challenge that pressures to conform might present to leaders' fealty to their own moral 
commitments. I also noted that while most research participants were inclined to privilege 
their own authenticity, a few mentioned the need to also enable authenticity in others. As 
far as the Mediator of Communication is concerned, I explored conflicting pressures on 
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leaders, on the one hand, to facilitate an exchange of diverse perspectives and, on the other 
hand, to seek reassurance in a supportive community of thought. I noted that, amongst my 
research participants, the latter is more common than the former. 
In third and final chapter of my empirical report, I described some insights that my research 
discussions enabled to the two questions discussed in my earlier review of the leadership 
literature: the ethicality of leadership goals and the potential for leadership to undermine 
followers' agency. I noted an overwhelming tendency to uphold the prosperity and survival 
of the organization as a moral imperative. Rather than being presented as a categorical good 
though, this imperative was generally privileged insofar as upholds the interests of a · 
particular universe of moral relevance, which I described as "dependent intrinsic normative 
stakeholders". Of greatest significance in research participants' moral calculi are their 
employees, to whom they report a particular affiliation. I noted, however, a possible tension 
between, on the one hand, participants' preoccupation with dependent stakeholders and, on 
the other hand, a tendency to present affect, rather than dependency, as a basis for inclusion 
in their universe of moral relevance. 
As far as the issue of suppressed agency is concerned, I remarked upon participants' 
tendency to speak about the importance of developing their people. However, I also noted 
that some evaluate employee development irt their own terms while others adopt a more 
dialogical approach to evaluation. I observed contrasting responses on the part of research 
participants to the issue of their own agency: while some seem to view the moral dilemmas 
that they encounter as inevitable, others are inclined to reflect on the part that they may 
have played in bringing these dilemmas about. 
Once again, then, my intention in this chapter is to pull together these strands in order to 
develop a normative model of ethical leadership. In doing so, I will borrow selectively from 
the philosophical method of G.W.F. Hegel. In the Phenomenology of Spirit (1977 [1807]), 
Hegel proposes and implements a particular approach the development of a normative ethic. 
This approach is premised upon two observations: the first is that most well-considered and 
thoughtfully presented perspectives have something valuable to offer. Therefore, rather than 
dismissing ideas out of hand because they do not absolutely provide the final truth that we 
seek, we should try to build upon those insights that they enable. The second observation is 
that consideration of the implications of various perspectives will draw attention to 
potential areas of contradiction and inconsistency within them. The secret to moving 
forward, then, according to He gel, is to retain the kernel of moral truth that resides within 
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each perspective whilst avoiding the contradictions and inconsistencies to which it might be 
prone. 
Hegel believed that by following this method, he could move towards a systematic and 
utopian vision of moral truth. Furthermore, he believed that his own philosophy 
approximated to the fulfilment of that process. Now, I make no similar claim, either in 
relation to the possibility of a systematic utopian truth or in relation to my own ethical 
ramblings. However, I do ?gree with Hegel that, by considering some key themes that have 
emerged through my theoretical and empirical research, it is possible to identify some 
important insights into what ethical leadership might consist of. I also agree that, by 
drawing out some of the implications of these ideas, particularly when expressed in their 
more extreme forms, it is possible to identify some significant difficulties that they present. 
This, then, is what I will try to achieve in this concluding chapter. 
Having thus elaborated on a number of themes, highlighting the merits and drawing 
attention to some of the corresponding pitfalls of each, I will propose an approach to 
leadership which, I believe, is most likely to retain the former whilst avoiding the latter. I 
will finish with some reflections on the practical feasibility of this normative model of 
ethical leadership in contemporary work organizations. 
The model of ethical leadership that I present here is inevitably a personal one. In 
describing moral leadership, I do not aver an objectivist meta-ethic. I appreciate that other 
people who base their ethical judgements on different fundamental presuppositions may not 
share my conclusions. However, in each of the preceding three sections - the leadership 
literature review, the ethics literature review and the empirical report - I have sought to 
draw out the implications of different ways of thinking about leadership, about morality and 
about the relationship between them. I thus expect to . draw attention to and illuminate 
tensions which may infuse those patterns of thought. Therefore, I hope my conclusion will 
assist refection on the relationship between morality and leadership even amongst those 
whose presuppositions differ from my own. 
Moral Sensitisation as a Guarantor of Moral Leadership 
Many commentators speak of the amoralisation of work organizations. Drawing on 
Weber's (1968 [1911-1920] description of a rationalisation process that defines late 
modernity, they note the tendency for the business environment to be perceived by those 
who work within it, and particularly by those who take on its more influential, leadership 
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roles, as a context in which measures of effectiveness do and should dominate. Alasdair 
Maclntyre, commenting on the pervasive influence of managers in the contemporary scene, 
notes their tendency to "conceive of themselves as morally neutral characters whose skills 
enable them to achieve the most efficient means of achieving whatever end is proposed" 
(1984 [1981]: 74). In such an effectiveness-driven culture, there is little space for 
consideration of the moral desirability of either the ends towards which that effectiveness is 
directed or the consequences of its single-minded application. Meanwhile, Zygmunt 
Bauman (1993) refers to the "adiaphorisation" of social organization; a process in which 
distancing agents from the consequences of their actions and minimising ownership of 
outcomes through strict functional compartmentalisation leads to a numbing of the moral 
impulse. Tom Sorrell echoes this theme when he speaks of the "alienation problem"; an 
apparently unbridgeable divide between ethicists and business practitioners in which the 
pronouncements of the former can seem "self-righteous and utopian" (1998: 17) to the 
latter. James Hine (2007) likewise observes that participation in corporate bureaucracies 
encourages amongst senior managers an overriding commitment to shareholder value which 
suppresses any broader normative considerations; a fidelity that is further enjoined by its 
congruence with career and livelihood responsibilities. 
The tone of a great deal of the leadership literature reinforces this view of organizations as 
morality-free zones. Leadership commentators tend to present leadership as an instrumental 
tool to be applied in the interests of objectives defined by the leader. As I have already 
noted, they pay little attention to the moral worth of those objectives or to the ethical 
desirability of the means adopted to achieve them. As well as manifesting the amoral 
understanding of organizational life to which the likes of Maclntyre and Bauman allude, 
this disinclination to dwell on leadership's moral dimension might also serve to perpetuate 
that understanding. 
Contrary to this gloomy Weberian picture, my own discussions with organizational leaders 
offer grounds for optimism. The people who participated in my research do not tend to 
prostrate themselves before the altar of effectiveness. Each articulated varying degrees of 
interest in morality and all considered it to be relevant to their leadership duties. They do 
not tend to think of leadership as a purely instrumental undertaking that is devoid of moral 
relevance. All were ready to reflect on the ethical quality of the goals towards which they 
lead, on the repercussions of achieving those goals or on both. 
Of course, this may not be indicative of the attitude of organizational leaders in general, for 
this is not necessarily a representative group. All of these participants explicitly agreed to 
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participate in discussions about morality so one might expect them to have some interest in 
the subject. For each of these morally sensitized leaders, there may well be many others 
who would see little point in talking about organizational leadership ethics29• Nevertheless, 
that these people participated in my research with a degree of enthusiasm suggests that 
there is at least some space in organizational life for ethical discourse. 
At least in one sense, therefore, all of the people who I met might be called moral leaders: 
each articulates concern for leadership's moral dimension and each professes to embrace 
ethical considerations in carrying out his or her leadership role. Whatever thoughts a reader 
might have about the precise. content of their moral commitments, these leaders declare 
their reverence for ethics and speak of its importance to their decision-making. Therefore, 
through the influence that each wields in his or her respective leadership context, he or she 
might be expected to raise the profile of organizational life's moral dimension. 
However, while it is encouraging to know that at least some people who occupy influential 
leadership roles consider morality to be relevant to "doing" organizational leadership, some 
contentious points emerge from their discourses. One particular problem concerns the 
reassurance that some of these people take from moral sensitisation; either from their own 
moral sensitisation or from that of the organizations for which they work. In such cases, 
there is a tacit assumption that moral sensitisation ensures moral conduct. If leaders care 
enough about ethics to include moral considerations in their decision-making, it is assumed 
that that decision-making will be ethically correct. Similarly, if the moral dimension of 
organizational life is accorded a sufficiently high profile, then it is assumed that that 
organization will conduct itself in a morally correct manner. As long as leaders and 
organizations care about ethics, it is assumed that they will be ethical. 
This faith in the uplifting power of moral sensitisation is premised upon a belief that the 
apprehension of moral rectitude is a straightforward matter: that we all know what is right 
and wrong; it is just that some of us choose to do what is right while others choose not to. 
And since we all know what is moral, as long as leaders and organizations care about the 
moral quality of their actions, that moral quality will be assured. If they conform to these 
self-evident standards of moral probity, they will necessarily act in an ethically sound 
manner. 
29 I accessed research participants either , through direct approach to people with whom I had 
previously had no contact (five people), through personal acquaintance (two people) or through 
referral (nine people). Of my direct approaches, three other people turned me down. These were the 
only two personal acquaintances that I approached. I do not know how many referrals declined to 
meet me. 
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Such is the basis of the moral self-assurance of the Moral Crusader ideal type that is 
exemplified, in particular, by James. I have characterised Moral Crusaders by their 
existentialist authenticity, although they could equally be perceived as self-acclaimed moral 
sages who credit themselves with an unerring vision of universal principles of right and 
wrong. Whichever is the case, they are committed to pursuing the moral agenda that is so 
clearly apparent to them. They see little need to corroborate their personal moral acuity. 
They perceive their leadership role as being to build organizational commitment to that 
moral agenda; they are unlikely to devote time to critical reflection on its content. Theirs is 
a top-down recipe for organizational morality. For them, moral leadership is all about 
ensuring that the strategic objectives of the organization, and the tactics chosen to achieve 
those objectives, are shaped by the standards of right and wrong that are so clearly apparent 
to them, the leaders. 
The Company Man ideal type, personified by David, is no less certain of the moral furrow 
that he ploughs. But whereas Moral Crusaders find moral certitude in the infallibility of 
their own judgement, the Compan)' Man trusts in the wisdom of the corporation's moral 
lawmakers. So confident is he in the quality of the tablets of stone that are passed out from 
Global Head Office that he is happy to measure the ethicality of his own leadership 
decision-making in accordance with them. The Company Man, like the Moral Crusader, 
sees little need for critical reflection on the substance of those values and wastes no time 
debating the company's moral stance. That Head Office cares about ethics, and that it cares 
enough for ethics to shape organizational policy, is enough to ensure the ethical quality of 
leadership behaviour that is consistent with corporate values. 
Now, to find Moral Crusaders in organizational leadership roles, willing to challenge the 
status-quo and even, on occasions, to commit career seppuku by throwing themselves on 
their moral swords offers a welcome antidote to Weberian visions of a morally torpid 
organizational world. Similarly, for values to be accorded the primacy reported by the 
Company Man, so that they shape senior manager . recruitment, acquisition strategy and 
choice of markets is, again, contrary to the characterisation of organizations as shrines to 
bureaucratic efficiency. This suggests that "delinguistified steering media" may not, as 
Habermas (1984 [1981; 1987 [1981]) warns, have completely overstepped their role as 
mediators of communicative action; it indicates that money and power may not yet have 
concluded their colonisation of the lifeworlds of organizational players. And were the 
apprehension of right and wrong as straightforward as is suggested by the discourses of 
James, David and suchlike, then it would be easy to share their trust in the morally uplifting 
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force of moral sensitisation. However, things are not that simple. The occurrence of 
personal moral dilemmas and interpersonal moral disagreements, as well as the failure of 
over two-thousand-years of moral philosophy to identify commonly agreed criteria of right 
and wrong, testify to the complex, nuanced and contested nature of moral judgement. 
Therefore, to assume that a leader's or a company's preoccupation with morality is 
sufficient to ensure moral probity seems overly optimistic. What is more probable is that the 
version of moral probity favoured by the leader or by the company's key influencers will 
prevail over rival versions. 
So, while it is encouraging to find morality treated with such reverence by some leaders in 
large organizations, and while it is good to know that those organizations offer fertile 
ground for a preoccupation with ethics, this only takes us some of the way towards 
reassurance of the moral quality of organizational leadership. There is more than one aspect 
to moral leadership: that leaders care enough, and that they are allowed to care enough, 
about ethics for it to impact on their decision-making is of fundamental importance. But 
that care needs to be augmented by some acknowledgement that moral judgement is not, 
and never will be, a simple affair and that the manner in which morally charged decisions 
are reached ought to reflect their complexity. 
The Morally Legitimating Force of Consistency 
A preoccupation with consistency emerges from my discussions with practising leaders. 
Most make some mention of the need to behave in a consistent manner; that is, to treat 
different people similarly and to apply similar standards at different times. This is 
articulated most vociferously by David, the Company Man, who regards consistent 
application of corporate values as having fundamental importance. Meanwhile, Mark is so 
concerned to consistently apply moral principles that he forsakes prudence and also 
disregards the advice of more senior colleagues in order to do so. Consistency is also 
apposite to Max's commendation of congruence between rhetoric and reality and to Ray's 
disapprobation of allowing long standing, historical relationships to interfere with what he 
considers to be a fair and transparent tender process. 
Consistency is also important to principle-based ethical theory. It is accorded particular 
significance in Kantian ethics. Kant' s first formulation of the categorical imperative ( 1997 
[1788; 1948 [1797])- that we should only act upon those maxims that we would wish to 
become universalised - offers a simple and straightforward expression of the legitimating 
force of treating all people, including ourselves, in a consistent manner. More generally, 
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consistency is an important ingredient to the application of principle-based ethics if it is to 
avoid the charge of expedient flexibility. Such is the range of consequentialist and 
deontological theory, and so many are the directions in which different interpretations and 
applications of any one of them can lead, that the least we can expect from anyone 
measuring their own conduct in accordance with principle-based ethics is consistency of 
application and interpretation. 
This emphasis on consistency is intuitively appealing. It seems reasonable to expect people 
in positions of power to dispense that power in an impartial and disinterested manner. For 
leaders to treat some people differently from others seems wrong. And for them to apply 
different standards at different times according to arbitrary preference also seems morally 
problematic. In particular, it would seem unreasonable for leaders to leverage their 
influence in order to privilege their own interests, or those of close colleagues, at the 
expense of others. For this reason transformational and charismatic leadership theorists' 
reliance on altruism as an indicator of moral probity has quite a lot going for it. The villains 
of the charismatic and transformational leadership world are those who make of themselves 
a special case; the heroes are those who use their exceptional talents impartially in the 
common interest. This, despite its limitations, seems to offer at least a basis for moral 
legitimation. 
However, measuring the ethicality of leadership in terms of consistent application of 
principle is not without difficulties. A notable challenge is that consistency is always a 
contestable attribution (Toulmin, 1990); that what looks like consistent treatment to one 
person may not look so to another. The consistent application of principle demands that 
relevant similarities in various scenarios are identified and responded to. Of course, no two 
scenarios are identical; all have differences and similarities. The key to consistent treatment 
is to identify those dimensions upon which similarity or dissimilarity is relevant to a 
particular decision. However, to make such assessments of relevance is to take a stance; 
such assessments require judgements concerning which of a range of similarities matter; 
which are germane to a particular decision and so call for equal treatment. And just as 
importantly~ it requires judgements concerning those differences between scenarios that are 
germane to a decision and which thus justify contrasting treatment. 
Consider, for a moment, Ray's disquiet at having been asked by a previous chairman to 
show favour, in a tender process, to a supplier who had supported the organization through 
its early days. To Ray, this constitutes unfair favouritism. It contravenes his wish to treat all 
parties consistently. The choice of supplier, according to Ray, should have been made 
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purely upon considerations of price, quality and service. All tenders should have been 
evaluated consistently against those criteria. But this is only Ray's version of consistency. 
Another person may have argued, as perhaps did Ray's chairman, that all stakeholders with 
whom the organization had enjoyed mutually supportive historical relationships ought to be 
allowed some latitude in supplier negotiations. This, like Ray's outlook, seems to offer a 
basis for consistent treatment. But whereas Ray focuses on particular dimensions of 
sameness in making his evaluation of consistent treatment, this latter principle responds to 
an alternative dimension of sameness. I am not suggesting that this second way of looking 
at Ray's situation is more morally sound than Ray's evaluation. I am just using this 
example to demonstrate that both Ray and his chairman might be judged to have been 
championing consistent treatment, albeit with reference to contrasting notions of 
consistency. The important point is that choice of dimensions against which consistency is 
assessed is premised upon a prior value judgement; a value judgement upon which, in this 
case, Ray and his chairman seem to have disagreed. 
This is an inevitable and unavoidable aspect of consistent application of principle. It need 
not undermine the desirability of consistency, particularly as a foil to the expedient 
flexibility to which the co-optation of principle-based ethics might be prone. However, if 
the notion of consistency is to fulfil its legitimising function, the contestable nature of its 
associated attributions of relevance needs to be allowed for. In particular, in seems 
reasonable for those attributions of relevance to be negotiated between the implicated 
parties rather than unilaterally proclaimed by the most powerful. Consistency loses its 
morally legitimising appeal if the basis of relevance against which it is attributed is 
contested. This requirement is alluded to by those research participants who discuss the 
legitimating force of consistency. Their discourse tends to dwell on the need for attributions 
of consistency to be commonly accepted as valid. It is important, they suggest, that 
"people" - in other words, those who are on the receiving end of the leader's consistent 
application of principle- feel that they are being treated in a consistent manner. Indeed, 
according to David, the most outspoken advocate of consistency, the people in his 
organization care more about consistency of application than they do about to the content of 
the principles being applied. Clearly, it would not do for David to consistently apply 
principle according to an understanding of consistency that did not concur with that of those 
employees. Consistency would lose its moral credibility if implicated parties considered 
attributions of consistency to be haphazard, arbitrary or just plain wrong. 
So, on the one hand, the notion of consistency does seem to have something important to 
say to moral leadership; it offers at least a legitimating core. Charismatic and 
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transformational leadership theorists, some principle-based ethicists and some research 
participants point to this morally legitimating core. This is that leaders ought not to use the 
influence of their position to privilege their own material interests and career aspirations or 
those oftheir social and professional allies. However, the assumption that leaders can stand 
apart from their organizational contexts, cool-headedly dispensing moral justice in 
accordance with the consistent application of principle is unhelpful. Such a depiction 
obscures the contestable nature of attributions of consistency as well as the inevitable 
complexity of the organizational contexts within which those attributions are made. 
Given this contestable nature, monological pronouncements of consistency on the part of 
leaders are likely to rest on unstable foundations. The legitimating force of consistency only 
works against a presupposition of multi-lateral agreement. The most we can say for 
unilateral proclamations of consistency is that they offer leaders a potential source of self-
regulation against personal misuse of power. The only unilateral act of consistency that 
seems apposite to moral leaders is that they should take care not to use the privilege of 
power and influence that attends their position in order to champion vested interests. 
Beyond this, moral probity requires agreement on the terms upon which attributions of 
consi~tency are made and this demands a dialogical, rather than a mono logical stance. 
Suppressing Emotion in Order to Do the Right Thing 
In speaking of the importance of consistent application of principles, a number of research 
participants also dwell on the need to suppress their emotions. In particular, several speak 
of the need to overcome feelings of loyalty and partiality in order to do what they consider 
to be the right thing. When confronted with moral dilemmas, they consider it their 
responsibility to apply principle in a rational, cool-headed and dispassionate manner. In 
dealing with morally charged issues, the heart should not be allowed to rule the head. 
This understanding concurs with a Kantian (1997 [1788; 1948 [1797]) notion of ethics: that 
ethical conduct consists of doing what reason tells us is our duty. According to Kant, 
emotions such as charity and benevolence fall under the heading of imperfect duties. 
Although not devoid of moral worth, such sentiments should take second place to the 
perfect duties that are apprehended via the application of moral reason. For Kant, acting in 
response to the "imperfect" duties indicated by moral sentiment is a frivolity that is 
permissible only after the main business of rational, "perfect" duty has been dealt with. 
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However, the accounts offered by research participants indicate that cool-headed, rational 
application of principle can be a challenging undertaking. It is not an easy thing to overlook 
feelings of partiality towards familiar faces, and participants' accounts of having to do so 
exhibit quite a lot of personal trauma. Nevertheless, their leadership duty, as they present it, 
is to set aside such misgivings. According to this understanding, moral leadership demands 
dispassionate application of principle; there is no space for sentimentality. 
This valorisation of rational duty, and its associated emotional discomfort, features in 
particular in participants' accounts of redundancy scenarios. Many recount the personal 
distress that they have experienced when laying off people with whom they were personally 
acquainted. Patrick even tells of not only having had to lay of a colleague at whose wedding 
he had been the best man but also having had to conceal from this colleague, for six 
months, his impending redundancy. This was hard for Patrick to do. Nevertheless he, like 
others faced with similarly heart-rending choices, did what he was morally obliged to do: 
act with the dispassion that his leadership role enjoins. 
Even when the casualties of their tough, rationally driven actions are not close colleagues, 
research participants report discomforting sympathy for the predicaments that they bring 
about. But such is the burden of leadership: leaders must not permit the indulgences of 
sentiment to intrude on their decisions. Whereas those in less exalted roles might feel 
inclined to take the soft course and act on their emotions, leaders must avoid such urges in 
order to dispense moral justice in a level-headed and even-handed manner. It is the 
unpleasant, but nevertheless necessary, task of leaders to do what the voice of reason tells 
them has to be done. That is what, as one research participant emphatically states, he is paid 
to do. 
But is this really what moral judgement is all about? David Hume (1985 [1738]; 1998 
[1752]) alerted us over two-hundred-and-fifty years ago to the role played by passion in 
moral evaluation. Subsequent efforts by Enlightenment thinkers to banish this 
untrustworthy and uncontrollable aspect from the field of moral debate have not been 
entirely successful. Ethical judgement's ineluctable emotive dimension was re-emphasised 
by the logical positivists in the early-to-mid-twentieth century. It is also a fundamental 
aspect of existentialist philosophy. Thus, William Barrett (1990 [1958]) speaks of 
existentialism's contribution to the "flight from Laputa", that world of unbridled rationality 
encountered by Gulliver on his fictitious travels. According to existentialist theory, 
Enlightenment rationality would be of little use to the leader in apprehending moral probity. 
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These ideas are captured by Zygmunt Bauman's (1993) description of how disinterested 
application of moral principle detaches us from our moral sense. Drawing upon the work of 
Emmanuel Levinas, Bauman proposes that the nature of moral commitment can only be 
accessed through direct, face-to-face encounter with people who are affected by our actions. 
Bauman observes the tendency for social organization to separate us from such encounters, 
or at least to suppress their affects. It thus makes redundant the moral sense, substituting it 
with a cruel, rational accounting that is consistent with the bureaucratic expectations of the 
contemporary organizational world .. 
Parker (2002) echoes Bauman's theme when he reflects on ways in which contemporary 
forms of organising might be inimical to traditional notions of workplaces as communities. 
Parker notes, in particular, how globally dispersed organization, in which electronic 
communication increasingly replaces face-to-face encounters, tends to undermine any sense 
of local responsibility amongst senior management. He also recounts deliberate actions 
taken by companies to distance senior managers from exposure to the consequences of their 
decisions, thus making it easier for them to "downsize without looking employees in the 
eye" (2002: 85). 
According to writers such as Levinas and Bauman, the consistent application of principle, 
far from morally invigorating workplaces, denudes them of moral sensitivity. By 
conforming to the expectations of rational moral law, leaders who describe the pain of 
suppressed partiality are, on this account, cutting themselves off from the moral sense upon 
which ethically responsive decision-making depends. So the research participant who 
suppresses his contrition at withholding, from close associates, the news of their impending 
redundancy may be ignoring an important cue to the ethical legitimacy of his subterfuge. 
Similarly, those leaders who silence t~e inner voice of remorse while cutting the jobs of 
loyal colleagues in the interest of productivity gains could be denying themselves access to 
a key indicator of the rightness of their actions. And the person who eschews leniency to 
dismiss long-serving employees on a matter of rational principle may be repressing insights 
that would have enabled a more morally-balanced decision. Like the Boeing CEO who 
moved the company's corporate head office away from its production plant in Seattle to 
loosen any ties of loyalty to the workforce (Kaghan, cited in Parker 2002), these leaders are 
eschewing the life blood of moral decision-making. Instead of subsuming their emotional 
misgivings under a tide of supposedly rational, moral accounting, they might do well to 
recognise that those misgivings have something important to say about the moral quality of 
their actions. Moral sentiment sends important messages. Censoring these messages out of 
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organizational decision-making may deprive it of the nutrients that it needs to sustain its 
ethical quality. 
Now to suggest that, in evaluating the ethicality of their actions, leaders ought to respond to 
the messages sent by their emotions is not to propose non-reflective sentimentality as a 
basis for ethical leadership. In emphasising the part played by passions, writers from Hume 
to Bauman are not advocating that emotion is all there is to moral judgement. By proposing 
that the ultimate grounding point of any ethical decision must lie in some form of emotional 
commitment, there writers do not seek to banish cognitive processes from the field of 
ethics. Rather, they envisage interplay between cognitive reason and moral sentiment, in 
which each supports the other. Our emotional responses to situations can be informed 
through reflection and discussion, particularly where that discussion involves those who are 
implicated in those situations. So to draw attention to the role that moral sentiment might 
play in guiding leadership decision making is not to claim hegemony for it; it is simply to 
appeal for it to be permitted entry to the leader's moral calculus. 
So, on the one hand, there seems to be something important in the notion that organizational 
leaders might need to overcome feelings of partiality in order to do the right thing. In 
particular, it would seem wrong to privilege the interests of those in-groups to which the 
leader might be tied by relationships of common interest. It is also reassuring to find leaders 
willing to step back from the seething turmoil of emotional immediacy in order to make 
considered judgements that embrace a range of perspectives. However, to present such 
reflection as no more than a monological exercise in rational accounting is likely to be self-
defeating. The notion that a leader can stand as captain on the bridge of the ship of moral 
evaluation, cool-headedly directing in accordance with the principles of ethical navigation 
is as unhelpful to organizational leadership as it is to sailing a ship. Just as a ship's captain 
depends on intimate encounters with the marine environment in order to make well-
informed navigational calls, so does the ethical quality of leadership thrive on the emotional 
messages that attend leaders' exposure to the consequences of their decision making. 
For the Good of the Organization 
A common feature of my discussions with practising leaders is that they attach moral 
primacy to sustaining their organizations. The survival and prosperity of the organization is 
generally presented as an overriding preoccupation that trumps other moral considerations. 
However, it is also apparent that the good of the organization is not seen as carrying 
categorical value. Rather, its survival and prosperity is accorded value insofar as this 
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promotes the interests of stakeholders. In other words, ensuring the good of the organization 
is valorised because this enables research participants to fulfil their perceived 
responsibilities to various people. 
It is unsurprising that leaders should prioritise the organizations that they lead and that they 
should do so on the basis of protecting the interests of those who are associated with those 
organizations. A sense of responsibility to the organization and its stakeholders seems 
intuitively reasonable as a moral basis for action. Such an understanding accords with the 
emphasis that some charismatic (Howell, 1988; Conger and Kanungo, 1998) and 
transformational leadership (Bass and Steidlmeier, 1999) theorists who place on altruism as 
a moral indicator, where altruistic sentiment is focused on the constituency that is led by the 
leader. 
The ethical theoretical perspective that best captures this prioritisation of the organization is 
a utilitarian one. Its underpinning assumption is that leaders have a responsibility to 
maximise the good of certain groups of people and that they are best placed to achieve this 
end by maximising the good of the organization. It might thus be characterised as a rule 
utilitarian rationale, in which the rule of promoting the survival and prosperity of the 
organization is taken as proxy for maximising the interests of its stakeho lders. 
Given the difficulties associated with making utilitarian calculations, a rule utilitarian 
approach of this nature seems sensible. It responds to the difficulty of predicting, analysing 
and evaluating various courses of action when confronted with moral conundrums. Instead 
of trying to foresee the potential consequences of their decisions, before carrying out 
complex utilitarian calculations, leaders simply have to do what they believe will best 
sustain the organization, safe in the belief that this will maximise the good for relevant 
stakeholders. This approach therefore relieves to some extent the leaders' burden of moral 
sagacity. It also compensates for the hazard that utilitarian calculations may be distorted by 
the stance from which the leader makes them. 
The notion of stakeholding has received quite a lot of attention in the business ethics 
literature since Freeman (1984) introduced it to corporate governance theory. In efforts to 
clarify the "blurred character of the stakeholder concept" (Donaldson and Preston 1995: 
66), distinctions have been made between· contrasting interpretations of stakeholding, or 
different ways in which a person might be regarded as a stakeholder of an organization. In 
particular, business ethics commentators have focused on the difference between 
instrumental and normative stakeholder theory (Donaldson and Preston, ibid) or, as Kaler 
230 
(2002) puts it, the distinction between regarding stakeholders as influencers and regarding 
them as claimants. 
Helpful though this instrumental-normative distinction is, I do not believe that it offers an 
adequate framework for capturing the understanding of moral leadership that I am 
describing here. For Donaldson and Preston, instrumental stakeholder theory focuses on 
the connection between stakeholder-management and the achievement of "traditional 
corporate objectives (e.g. profitability, growth)" (1995: 71). Normative stakeholder theory, 
on the other hand, concerns the function of the organization and is based around the notion 
of "some underlying or philosophical principles ... [which are] not hypothetical but 
categorical" (ibid: 72). According to this depiction, normative stakeholding is offered as a 
basis for opposing shareholder theory, the Friedmanesque prioritisation of shareholder 
wealth, by pointing to the intrinsic moral worth of all the stakeholders who have some form 
of relationship with the organization. In contrast, instrumental stakeholding is cast as an 
amoral, or perhaps even an immoral, perspective, which values stakeholders for no reason 
other than their importance to the achievement of corporate success. Normative 
stakeholding thus radiates a comforting, moral glow while instrumental stakeholding 
reflects the steely glint of Machiavellian calculation. 
This strict divide between normative and instrumental stakeholder theory is, I believe, 
misleading. It oversimplifies things by presenting too stark a contrast between, on the one 
hand, the amoral or shareholder-driven prioritisation of commercial performance, where 
stakeholders are only attended to insofar as they serve that end, and, on the other hand, 
considering stakeholders as intrinsically deserving of moral regard. This overlooks the 
capacity of instrumental stakeholding to contain a normative element; a normative element 
that is not exhausted by the shareholder rights discourse (e.g. Friedman, 1970; Hayek, 1969 
[1960]; Sternberg, 1998; 1999; 2000). In other words, it obscures the possibility that 
prioritising commercial performance may contain a moral dimension that goes beyond 
responding to the rights of shareholders. 
The rule utilitarian style justification to which I am referring here expresses that moral 
dimension. The preoccupation with corporate success that these research participants 
articulate cannot be explained as an inability or unwillingness on their part to see beyond 
the iron bars of bureaucratic efficiency. Nor can it be dismissed as a happy congruence 
between corporate achievement and their own short-term and long-term material gain. 
Furthermore, this moral dimension is more than an expression of the primacy of 
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shareholder rights. Indeed, those who spoke of shareholders tended to downplay or dismiss 
the importance of the latter in their hierarchy of moral commitments. 
For these people, prioritising commercial performance and thus ensuring the prosperity and 
survival of the organization is a moral imperative. It is so because doing this will promote 
the interests of those people to whom these leaders feel morally responsible; that is, not just 
to the shareholders of the organization, who they tend to talk down, but to all those who 
depend upon it and most importantly to its employees. For this reason, they feel morally 
justified in acting in ways that are detrimental to the interests of small groups of employees. 
The moral rationale for doing so is that this serves the interests of the majority of what I 
referred to in my empirical report as intrinsic normative stakeholders; those people who 
depend upon the survival and prosperity of the organization. These are the stakeholders to 
whom research participants tend to accord categorical moral significance; these are the key 
members of their perceived universe of moral relevance. 
Some research participants exhibit what Donaldson and Preston describe as a tendency to 
"slide easily from one theoretical base to another" (1993: 72) in accounting for their 
responsibilities to stakeholders. I described in my empirical report the ambivalence that 
characterises some people's accounts of their moral responsibilities. They seem uncertain 
whether their moral responsibility towards stakeholders derives from the categorical worth 
of those people or from their significance in influencing the success of the organization. 
According to Donaldson and Preston's distinction, this would be described as confusion 
between a normative understanding and an instrumental understanding of stakeholding. I 
suggest, however, that even these people articulate a normative understanding. Insofar as 
those influencers are accorded instrumental significance, this is not a morally vacuous 
significance. It derives from the moral compulsion that these research participants feel 
themselves to be under to promote the survival and prosperity of their organizations. And 
this responsibility for the organization can be further rationalised in terms of the interests of 
those dependent stakeholders who are thus cared for. For this reason, I described this 
regard for stakeholders-as-influencers as a normative instrumental stakeholder 
understanding. 
However, despite the undoubted ethical tone of the rule utilitarian rationale that emerges in 
research participants' discourse, I nevertheless find that discourse problematic. My concern 
relates to the ease with which organizational survival slides into organizational prosperity 
as a moral imperative. While it is easy to align the survival of the organization with the 
interests of those who depend upon it, this association is not quite so straightforward in the 
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case of its prosperity. Consider, for example, the organization's employees. The association 
between the survival of the organization and employees' interests is clear: if the 
organization goes down, they lose their jobs. However~ it is far from clear that small 
enhancements to the prosperity of the organization will serve the interests of employees. 
Indeed, where these enhancements are achieved through efficiency measures such as 
"downsizing", "de-layering", "offshoring" or simply by keeping pay levels as low as 
possible, there is a tangible conflict with employee well-being. But there are also many 
other ways in which productivity enhancements may erode the quality of the employment 
experience and thus chip away at the welfare of those employees whose interests are held in 
such high esteem by most research participants. These might include the potential 
intensification of risk and stress borne by employees as a consequence of the imposition of 
performance-related reward structures (Heery, 2000; Winstanley, 2000) or flexible working 
patterns (Stanworth, 2000); the potentially intrusive impact of ostensibly performance-
enhancing, occupational testing instruments (Baker and Cooper, 2000); or the impact of 
aggressive and stressful selection processes on employees' dignity and self-esteem (Spence, 
2000). 
Some participants explicitly address this question by warning of the insidious creep of 
inefficiency. They point out that failure on their part to attend to opportunities for small 
productivity gains today may result in the collapse of the organization tomorrow. There is 
something in this. In the increasingly competitive organizational landscape, to which 
business strategy theorists are eager to alert us, it is understandable that leaders feel morally 
compelled to keep their organizations on their toes. However, to assume that prosperity 
must always be maximised in order to ensure survival is a misleading oversimplification. It 
obscures the magnitude of the negative consequences that small efficiency measures may 
have for employees; efficiency measures which may have only a minimal impact on the 
organization's capacity to resist predation but which may nevertheless have severe 
repercussions for the very people who are valorised by the moral rationale in whose name 
they are taken. 
Karen Legge offers a critical observation on the moral legitimisation of efficiency that 
underpins accounts such as these. Its consequence is that "'tough love' in all its forms is 
morally justifiable: [that] employees may be compelled to work harder and more flexibly 
for 'their own good' and they may be made redundant for the greater good" (1998: 163). 
This preoccupation with efficiency clearly makes a highly contestable, unitarist-style 
assumption that all dependent stakeholders are able to share in the fruits of minor 
commercial enhancements. Maybe oversimplifications such as this are an unavoidable 
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characteristic of the application of rule utilitarian ethical rationales. In easing the burden of 
prediction, evaluation and analysis that attends moral judgement, it is perhaps inevitable 
that rule utilitarianism will fail to respond to the ineluctable complexity of moral 
judgement. However, to follow clear and simple prescriptions which end up undermining 
the very basis that they are intended to serve seems a particularly inadequate response to 
that complexity. 
There is, then, undoubtedly a moral tone to the rationale that most research participants 
offer for their preoccupation with the survival and prosperity of the organization. Although 
this moral tone is not easily expressed in the terms of the most prominent commentaries on 
stakeholding, it is nevertheless present. However, by bundling together the prosperity and 
the survival of the organization as equally legitimate means to the achievement of morally 
desirable ends, leaders may find themselves undermining those very ends. To conflate the 
survival of the organization with its prosperity and to offer both as an identical rationale for 
leadership decision-making is to misrepresent the congruence between incremental 
enhancements to organizational success and the interests of dependent stakeholders. The 
continued survival of the organization may indeed be in the interests of its dependent 
stakeholders. However, this should not excuse every measure taken to keep the organization 
in a position of unchallengeable competitive dominance. Greater responsiveness of the 
potential human downside of productivity enhancement measures may evoke a more 
balanced assessment of the moral desirability of those measures. 
Looking after the People who Matter 
Despite the difficulties presented by the rule utilitarian rationale that research participants 
commonly offer in support of their cost-trimming endeavours, the preoccupation with 
stakeholders that is implicit in that rationale is nevertheless encouraging. These leaders are 
not unconcerned with the moral impact of their organizations' activities on stakeholders; 
they do not seem to be driven by a morally negligent obsession with rational effectiveness 
or even by the happy congruence of organiza~ional success with their own material reward. 
Nor is their preoccupation with the good of the organization driven by prioritisation of 
shareholders over other stakeholders. They care about morality and they believe that, in 
furthering the commercial health of the organization, they will be furthering the interests of 
the people to whom they accord moral relevance. This is all good news for anyone who 
believes that morality should matter for leaders; that they should consider the people who 
are impacted by their actions; and that the morally relevant group does not end with the 
company's owners. 
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However, while taking encouragement from the concern for people that these leaders 
articulate, I also have reservations about the way in which they define which people matter 
morally and the extent to which their rule utilitarian rationale serves those people best. In 
this respect, there is some ambivalence about who matters and why they matter. On the one 
hand, the people who are placed on the pedestal of moral relevance by the rule utilitarian 
rationale that I have discussed are those who depend upon the survival and, as I have 
pointed out above, to a less self-evident extent, upon the prosperity of the organization. 
However, a slightly different criterion of moral relevance emerged when I asked research 
participants why certain people have moral significance for them. The most common 
response to my question about why they consider they have responsibilities to certain 
groups relates to the affect that their decisions have on those groups: the fact that their 
decisions and the activities of their organizations have a significant affect on these peoples' 
lives seems to generate, in their mind, a moral responsibility to them. Thus employees and 
their families are accorded particular moral significance by most participants because they 
are profoundly aware of the impact that their decisions have on these people. Similarly, 
some broaden the scope of their moral responsibilities in recognition of the social and 
environmental impact of their organizations' activities. 
There is a possible contradiction here that is best conceptualised by the distinction, which I 
drew in my empirical report, between dependent intrinsic normative stakeholders and 
affected intrinsic normative stakeholders. Dependent intrinsic normative stakeholders are 
those people who depend in some way upon the prosperity of the organization. Employees 
and shareholders obviously fall into this group, along with people such as suppliers and 
perhaps also customers. The interests of all these groups are linked by a dependency 
relationship with the organization. These are the people whose interests are purportedly 
served by participants' rule-utilitarian-style preoccupation with the survival and prosperity 
of the organization. All of these dependent stakeholders also fall into the category of 
affected stakeholder: due to their dependency relationship, these people are clearly affected 
by the organization's activities. However, affected stakeholders also include other people 
who do not have a formal or informal dependency relationship with the organization but 
who are nevertheless affected by its activities. This includes all those people and 
communities which bear the social and ecological consequences of corporate activity. For 
example, businesses such as the pub trade, the travel industry and food production have an 
enormous impact on society and on the environment. They therefore affect many people -
geographically close and geographically remote; present generation and future generations 
- who do not depend in any way on the survival and prosperity of the organization. 
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My concern with the justification for prioritising organizational survival and prosperity that 
is offered by research participants is that it may indeed embrace the interests of 
organizations' dependent intrinsic normative stakeholders. However, it pays no particular 
heed to its affected intrinsic normative stakeholders. Many people who are deeply affected 
by the activities of the organization are thus precluded from consideration by the moral 
calculus of the leader. This justification thus courts the challenge that writers such as Price 
(2003) level against the pernicious, narrowly-defined altruism that is valorised by some 
leadership theorists. Price points out how, by distinguishing leadership's shining knights 
from their sinister, tarnished counterparts on the basis of the former's altruistic intent, these 
theorists underplay the hazards presented by leaders who uphold the interests of an in-group 
over and above all other considerations. The case of Radovan Karadzic offers a topical 
illustration of this issue from the political arena. Karadzic did a lot during the early-1990s 
to further the interests of the Serbian people of Bosnia. Karadzic does not seem to have 
been a self-interested egotist; he believed deeply in the ideological cause that he furthered 
in such a brutal manner. However, the consequences of his altruistic care for his dependent 
stakeholders had disastrous consequences for his affected stakeholders, most notably the 
Muslim people ofBosnia who were massacred on his orders. 
To compare the sophisticated, suavely-tailored leaders of Western European and American 
work organizations with one of the worst initiators of ethnic cleansing in recent times may 
seem unfair to the former. However, given the global spread, the intrusive social impact and 
the far reaching environmental consequences of the decisions that these people make, 
omitting affected groups from their universe of relevance could have similarly tragic 
repercussions. Through their influence over the activities of their organizations, these 
people carry awesome power. That they exercise that power in the interests of a narrowly 
circumscribed group of dependent stakeholders who stand to gain today, tomorrow and next 
year from their dependency relationship with the organization, without a thought for the far 
more numerous groups who are affected by those organizations now and in the future is 
troubling. It is also inconsistent with the sense of responsibility that many of them articulate 
for these affected stakeholders. On the one hand they speak of the moral responsibilities 
that are generated by the potency of their role; on the other hand, they proffer, as a guide to 
ethical decision-making, a rule utilitarian rationale that precludes large swathes of the 
people who their decisions affect. 
That these people care about the moral dimension of organizational leadership is 
comforting. That they include in their moral calculations the consequences of their actions 
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on groups other than shareholders is also comforting to anyone who believes that 
shareholder theory offers an inadequate basis for corporate governance ethics. However, to 
venerate the survival and prosperity of their organizations as the ultimate indicator of moral 
probity is both negligent of the broader impacts of those organizations and inconsistent with 
the moral narrative that is offered by most research participants. Even if a focus on the 
survival and prosperity of the organization is indeed in the best interests of its dependent 
stakeholders, this says nothing of the interests of its affected stakeholders. While the 
stakeholder sensitivity that is articulated by practising leaders is encouraging, it would be 
far more encouraging to see greater thought given to the repercussions of organizational 
activities for people who are not linked to the organization by a dependency relationship. In 
particular, it would be reassuring to find leaders paying greater attention to those 
stakeholders for whom geographic and temporal distance from the organization does not 
diminish the impact of its activities. 
Facilitating the Development of Followers 
Quite a few of the leaders who took part in my research described the pleasure that they 
derive from seeing their employees progress. When I asked what gave them the most 
satisfaction in their business careers, several spoke about releasing potential in people. I 
was struck by their interest in employee development and in the role that they, as leaders, 
can play in helping their people to grow. This is consistent with the general attentiveness to 
employees noted earlier. I have already drawn attention to the central role that employees 
play in research participants' universes of moral relevance. They figure most prominently in 
participants' utilitarian calculi, both as beneficiaries and as the victims whose privation 
lends those calculi their morally perplexing tone. It is therefore unsurprising that these 
leaders value employee development so highly and that they emphasise their own 
contribution to facilitating that development. 
The theme of employee development also looms large in the leadership effectiveness 
literature, lending intuitive moral worth to theoretical accounts. For example, human 
relations-oriented leadership prescriptions (e.g. Herophili and Coons, 1957; Lickert, 1970; 
Blake and Morton, 1985) ~mphasise attending to the development needs of people, while 
those commentaries that stress the effectiveness of feminine leadership qualities (e.g. 
Johnson, 1976; Rosener, 1990) draw attention to the nurturing role that leaders can play. A 
developmental preoccupation is also evident in the attention paid by transformational 
leadership theorists to providing "intellectual stimulation" for, and giving "individualised 
consideration" to, employees (Bass, 1985; 1990) and also to "empowering and developing 
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potential" (Alimo-Metcalfe and Alban-Metcalfe, 2001 ). It is particularly congruent with the 
notion of servant leadership (Greenleaf, 1977; Spears, 2002), a key element of which 
involves commitment to the "growth" of followers. 
Now, this preoccupation with developing people seems to bestow upon leadership a certain 
amount of moral credit. The idea of organizational leaders ministering to the formational 
needs of their followers is compelling. If effective leadership entails stimulating followers' 
career progression whilst also evoking their moral and emotional self-actualisation, then 
effective leadership seems to have a lot going for it ethically. However, before we get too 
carried away by this enticing vision of organizational leaders as custodians of the material, 
intellectual and emotional flourishing of their followers, it is as well to highlight some 
grounds upon which it might give cause for concern. 
The first point is that the moral allure of an employee development focus, like that of 
relationship-oriented leadership in general, becomes a little tarnished if that focus is 
switched on-and-off in response to pragmatic need. In this respect, the discourses of some 
of the leaders with whom I spoke during empirical research exhibited a degree of 
ambivalence. Some seemed uncertain whether the value that they attach to employee 
development is intrinsic or whether it is contingent upon the contribution that that 
development might make to the commercial success of the organization. Those theoretical 
prescriptions for leadership effectiveness which advocate the adoption of apposite blends of 
employee-related and task-focused leadership behaviours in response to contingent need 
(e.g. Fiedler, 1967; Hersey and Blanchard, 1982) may serve to foster such instrumentally-
driven affectation. These call to mind Alvesson and Willmott's description of the 
emancipatory and humanistic pretensions of progressive management theories, which 
"serve to advance and legitimise an expansion of systems of management control that aspire 
to infiltrate the hearts and minds of employees" (1998: 34). 
Against this ambivalent allocation of moral worth and the expedient instrumentality of 
these situational (Grint, 2000) accounts ofleadership, our moral approbation ofleaders who 
affect care for the development of their people seems to be at least partly dependent on a 
presumption of sincerity. If leaders only care for staff development insofar as this 
contributes to further objectives that are valued by that leader, this does not necessarily 
deprive their care of moral worth. But, as I have already discussed in elaborating the 
concept of instrumental normative stakeholding, such care would derive its moral worth 
from the moral worth of those further ends which it promotes. Moral worth would not be 
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intrinsic to it. In order for leaders' care for people's development to carry intrinsic worth, it 
seems reasonable to expect it to be heartfelt and genuine. 
Charles Handy (1998) uses the phrase unconditional positive regard to describe such a 
disposition on· the part of leaders. Handy compares unconditional positive regard to the 
unqualified love that a person feels towards close friends and family, contrasting this to a 
conditional regard that is premised upon an anticipated exchange of benefits. It is perhaps a 
little far fetched to expect organizational leaders to summon the same level of emotional 
commitment towards their employees as they feel towards their friends and family. 
Nevertheless, the moral worth of the mentoring, coaching and educative aspirations of 
leaders presupposes a disposition that is comparable at least in quality, if not in quantity, to 
that described by Handy. 
A second potential area of concern with leaders' preoccupation with the development of 
their people relates to how they define meritorious development. I drew attention, in my 
empirical report, to the tendency of some research participants to evaluate the desirability of 
employee enhancement according to their own, monologically-pronounced standards. On 
the other hand, a few are sensitive to the views of the recipients of their putative 
developmental endeavours. Those in the latter category tend to speak of the need for 
employees to value the development to which they have been subjected on their own terms 
rather than on the terms of the leader. 
The monologically tinged approach is consistent with patriarchal and paternalistic 
approaches to leadership, which cast the leader as a beneficent arbiter of employees' 
interests. In e~treme cases, such approaches would legitimise leaders taking action that they 
perceived to be in the interest of employees even where those actions were directly against 
the will of employees. Such is Mark's observation that it is sometimes his unpleasant, 
though necessary, task to inform employees that their interests would be better served if 
they left Mark's organization and found work elsewhere. Less extreme manifestations of 
this benign paternalism may lead to leadership energies being focused in directions that, 
although well-meaning, are not quite so well received by their intended beneficiaries. 
Now, such approaches as these might be morally justifiable according to certain 
consequentialist analyses. For example, welfare utilitarians might call upon leaders to act in 
what they perceive to be the long-term interests of employees, or objective-list utilitarians 
might approve of leaders bringing about ends which they consider to be objectively good 
for employees, even though employees do not immediately welcome the consequent 
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benefits. Nevertheless, the practical application of justifications such as these to the 
leadership domain depends upon some highly contestable assumptions. Notably, it assumes 
that leaders know best what is in employees' long term interests, or that leaders are the best 
judge of what is objectively good for their employees. This seems to ask a lot of leaders. 
Not only must they carry all the usual paraphernalia that assures success in their role; they 
must also adopt the mantle of the organization's agony aunt. Inviting employees to 
participate in the elucidation of their interests, and in the identification of personal 
development that might serve those interests, therefore seems a safer option than well-
intended, paternalistic meddling. 
Therefore, although commitment to facilitating followers' development draws to leadership 
a certain amount of intuitive moral worth, this moral worth would be less contentious if two 
further conditions were met. Firstly, it is easier to applaud leaders' developmental 
endeavours if they are driven by a sincere interest in their direct beneficiaries than if they 
are motivated purely by expediency. Secondly, the involvement of those beneficiaries in the 
identification and evaluation of worthwhile personal development would also enhance its 
morally legitimating force. 
Building Commitment to a Shared Vision 
A lot of the leadership literature emphasises the role played by leaders in building support 
for a shared vision. This notion is particularly prominent in some transformational 
leadership literature, where it also acquires a moral dimension that links with the topic of 
employee development that I have just discussed. As far as theorists such as Burns (1978; 
2003) and Bass (1985; 1990) are concerned, the fundamental, morally legitimating core of 
transforming or transformational leadership lies in the self-actualisation that followers 
achieve by participating in a shared endeavour. These theorists propose that such 
participation raises followers above the level of self-interested, transactional exchange and 
evokes the real humanity within them that can only be achieved through being part of a 
common purpose. 
It is easy to see how generating shared commitment helps leaders to achieve organizational 
success. If all workers are contributing wholeheartedly to the achievement of an 
organization's objectives, rather than weighing up the transactional costs and benefits of 
each and every input, then productivity is likely to be enhanced. On the face of it, this is 
also a harmless enough notion from an ethical perspective. There seems to be something in 
the idea that it is good for people to be part of something and that they may become, in 
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some way, "better" people as a consequence of such participation. This smacks of the social 
understanding of humanity upon which the intersubjectivist ethics that I reviewed earlier is 
premised. However, this commendation of building commitment to a shared vision also 
poses a number of questions. 
The first question concerns the definition of the common purpose to which the leader 
engenders self-actualising support from followers: in other words, who sets the agenda? A 
common response to this question in the leadership literature is to place the definitional 
onus on the leader. Leaders are not only cast as those who can build commitment to a 
shared undertaking; they are generally portrayed as taking the lead in the identification of 
that transformational vision in the first place. Whether it concerns the setting of strategic 
goals, the shaping of a shared culture or the establishment of core values, leadership writers 
of many hues describe how leaders are able to generate visions that capture the imagination 
of organizational members and take those organizations to better places. Several of the 
leaders who I encountered during empirical research articulated a similar theme, reflecting 
on their role in establishing their organizations' common, moral agenda30• Although some 
spoke of sharing this defmitional task, the extent of intersubjective participation usually 
started and ended with senior management. A strong note of unilateralism is therefore 
apparent in relation to the setting of a shared direction, both from my research and from 
broader theoretical and empirical studies. I have already touched on some difficulties that 
this might present for ethical legitimisation of organizational agendas, particularly in 
relation to the demands it places on leaders' moral sagacity, and I will say more about this 
shortly. 
The second question concerns the possible effects of their participation upon those who are 
embraced by leaders' transformational inclusiveness. Despite the intuitive allure of group 
participation, and despite the self-actualising propensity that transformational leadership 
theorists claim for it, commentators from various fields have drawn attention to its potential 
to affect participants in less desirable ways. From a philosophical perspective, Heidegger 
(1962 [1926]) warns that people might dissolve their individuality in the "averageness" of 
the crowd. This, for Heidegger, is one manifestation of an inauthentic form of Being: 
succumbing to the temptation to renounce ones agentic autonomy and blend in with ones 
intersubjective context. Social commentators have also drawn attention to the disagreeable 
30 Although organizations' broader strategic missions clearly have considerable ethical implications 
and cannot be separated from discussions about morality, participants tended to focus, in my research 
discussions, on the importance of a shared moral code and on the role that they play in defining this. 
This focus is to be expected given the ethics-oriented nature of my questioning. 
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ramifications of fealty to a large collective. For example, Festinger et al (1952) use the term 
deindividuation to describe how participation may engender in group members a sense of 
anonymity that loosens constraints on their behaviour. This may lead to a reduced sense of 
responsibility, heightened inclination to act impulsively and an increased propensity to 
commit violence and other forms of antisocial act. Marion Hampton (1999), looking 
specifically at the impact of group membership in work contexts, notes its capacity to 
induce conformity, depress individual intelligence and eliminate moral responsibility. She 
proposes that this, along with the powerful feelings of loyalty, anxiety or anger that often 
attend group membership, can lead to suffering and despair in members and may even 
encourage them to perpetuate acts of great cruelty. 
The field of identity work may also have something important to say on this topic. Identity 
work seeks to illuminate the way in which individuals embedded within organizations 
create and experience the subjective meanings which shape their responses to questions 
such as: "'Who am I? - and, by implication - 'How should I act?'" (Alvesson et al, 2008: 
6). Now, leadership may be presented as a benign undertaking which helps followers to 
negotiate a pathway between the conflicting demands of multiple personal and professional 
identities as they seek to respond to such questions (e.g. Hill and Stephens, 2005). On the 
other hand Alvesson et al (ibid) offer a more critical perspective from which leaders' 
transformational endeavours to unite followers to a common agenda might be understood as 
an attempt on the part of elites to orchestrate identities within a managerially inspired. 
discourse; one which offers the totem of the organization as the primary source of 
identification and which thus marginalises those sources which draw on extra-
organizational affiliations. 
A further issue with unequivocal veneration of participation in a common undertaking 
concerns those who might be excluded from such participation for one reason or another. 
There may be people who fall under a leader's sphere of influence who do not wish to 
commit themselves to the full gamut of emotional belongingness that is acclaimed by 
transformational theorists. Some may prefer, instead, to regard their workplace as no more 
than a stage upon which to satisfy basic material needs. That these choose to restrict their 
relationship with an organization to the level of transactional exchange would be considered 
by transformational leadership theorists as in indication of failure on the part of the leader. 
However, given the reservations about inclusion just mentioned, that some take shelter from 
the transformational thrall of a leader's all-consuming vision should come as no surprise. 
So what is to become of these people? Are they to be cast aside; stigmatised; rejected as 
being unsuitable for organizational membership? 
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On the other hand, other people may find themselves excluded, not by a deliberate act of 
choice on their part, but because they do not fit the mould out of which suitability for 
inclusion is cast. In discussing the idea of organizations as communities of citizens, Parker 
observes that, amongst other failings, such a depiction makes a highly contestable 
assumption of homogeneity amongst its so-called citizens. However, organizational, 
citizenship projects are likely to present criteria of inclusion to which not all of the. 
organizational community conform, with the consequence that non-conformist "others" 
come to be regarded by the in-majority as in some way uncivilised or uncivilisable. 
Leaders' bold aspirations of inclusion are thus likely to appeal to what Parker describes as 
"a unifying category" (2002: 57) that reflects the attitudes and priorities of dominant 
members, and particularly those of the leader. Those whose difference disqualifies them 
from this unifying category may find the self-actualising gift of transformational inclusion 
denied to them. 
So, it seems reasonable to suppose that people's experience of organizational life will be 
enhanced by the camaraderie and inclusiveness that comes from working towards a 
common goal. It is nice to be part of something and it is heartening to know that ones 
efforts contribute towards an agenda that is valued by others. If leaders are able to generate 
that sense of togetherness and if they can facilitate agreement around a shared agenda, then 
their leadership draws a certain amount of moral credit. In that respect, transformational 
leadership theorists offer an important insight to the morality of leadership. However, 
sensitivity, on the part of theorists and leaders, to the hazards presented by the latter's 
transformational endeavours might ameliorate some of those hazards. It would be 
reassuring to see both theorists and practitioners place greater emphasis on encouraging 
participation in the definition of shared agendas, rather than just on generating fealty to 
those agendas. Sensitivity to the negative repercussions of being part of a group 
undertaking would also be comforting. Responsiveness to leadership's propensity to erode 
followers' critical judgement would be especially encouraging. Furthermore, while it is 
important to acknowledge the potentially enriching role of the collective in the creation and 
sustenance of people's self identity, it is also important to acknowledge the threat that 
collective identity may present to followers' self-worth and also to extra-organizational 
sources of affiliation. And lastly, the radiance of self-actualising transformation should not 
be permitted to eclipse either the more prosaic agendas of some followers or their 
entitlement to pursue such agendas. Nor should it conceal the predispositions that inevitably 
underpin the valorisation of specific projects and specific notions of community, and which 
are likely to present barriers to the inclusion of those who do not share or conform to those 
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predispositions. Were all transfonnational theorists31 and practising leaders to articulate 
greater responsiveness to these issues, then it would be easier to uphold the ethical 
legitimacy of the celebratory prescriptions for leadership effectiveness offered by the first 
group and the self-elucidative accounts offered by the second. 
Taking Responsibility for Morality 
Most of the practising leaders who I met during the course of my research struck me as very 
keen to take charge in relation to morality. This characteristic accords with the depiction of 
leadership that is overwhelmingly presented in the literature. Qualities such as dominance 
and self-assurance are valorised by the early trait theories and also by more recent -
descriptions of charismatic leadership. Those writers who differentiate leaders from 
managers also tend to emphasise the willingness of the fonner to take initiatives and make 
decisions on behalf of others. Their salutary descriptions of leaders as wholesome change-
agents are contrasted to the somewhat pejorative picture of bureaucratic managers who 
restrict themselves to maintaining the status-quo. Even those behavioural theorists who 
champion a human relations-friendly approach tend to portray the leader as the arbiter of 
the right amount of relationship-orientation. Situational theorists, in particular, present' 
effective leaders as those who, like military strategists, are able to skilfully assess the 
terrain into which they propose to conduct their leadership intervention before selecting an 
apposite blend of respect-for-persons and task-focus. I have already remarked how 
prominent versions of "new-paradigm" (Alimo-Metcalfe and Alban-Metcalfe, 2004) 
leadership also focus on the need for leaders to call the shots. For example, the self-
actualising gifts that Bernard Bass (1985; 1990) ascribes to transfonnationalleaders are not 
presented as stardust to be sprinkled willy-nilly; they are tools to be carefully and 
selectively applied in order to bring about ends that are pre-defined by the leader. 
But after all, is this not what leadership is all about? What are we to expect of leaders if not 
that they lead? Even the Concise Oxford Dictionary defines a leader as "the person who 
leads, commands, or precedes a group, organization, or country". Should I be surprised, 
then, that the leaders who I met during the course of my empirical research carry their 
general eagerness to direct into the domain of moral decision-making. If these people 
habitually take command, and if their ascendance to positions of pre-eminence in their 
organizations is a consequence of their effectiveness in doing so, to expect them to set aside 
31 Beverley Alimo-Metcalfe and John Alban-Metcalfe's accounts of transformational leadership pay 
a great deal of attention to issues such as these. My observations here on the limited ethical purview 
of transformational leadership theory relates principally to the work ofBemard Bass. 
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the conductor's baton when they climb upon the moral podium would seem unrealistic. 
Readiness to take ownership of moral decision-making is particularly evident amongst 
those research participants who approximate to the Moral Crusader ideal type. However, 
even those who demonstrate a less autocratic style are keen to retain their power of veto, 
just in case others try to point the organization's moral agenda in the "wrong" direction. 
At first glance, principle-based theory and existentialism both seem to present a supportive 
foundation for unilateral, moral decision-making. They thus offer a glimmer of legitimation 
for those leaders who assume moral monocracy on behalf of their organizations. Principle-
based ethics demands that leaders who aspire to moral probity identify an appropriate set of 
principles and apply these in a consistent and detached manner. In theory, this is something 
that leaders should be able to do on their own without calling upon others to audit their 
moral pronouncements. However, on closer examination, the monological application of 
principle-based ethics is problematic. Given the practical difficulties associated with 
applying principle-based theory, and also the inherent complexity of moral dilemmas, it 
seems unrealistic to expect anyone to single-handedly wield the gavel of moral legislator. 
Monological application of principle-based ethics would demand a degree of moral sagacity 
on the part of organizational leaders that we have no reason to suppose they possess. 
Despite their undoubtedly impressive range of personal capabilities, CEOs, MDs and 
company directors are not necessarily imbued with a higher level of ethical perspicuity than 
anyone else. So, given the potency of their decision-making, the idea that the moral 
implications of those decisions should be evaluated unilaterally is troubling. 
Existentialism's veneration of authenticity also promises, on the face of it, a legitimation of 
moral unilateralism. If the only criterion against which moral pronouncements are to be 
assessed is the intensity of personal commitment with which they are made, then the self-
assured moral autocrat seems to offer a valid template for ethical leadership. However, 
moral autocracy necessarily erodes opportunities for others to realise their authenticity. 
Organizational leaders are not self-contained, sole operators. The decisions that they make 
and the courses upon which they set their organizations shape the moral agendas of many. 
Authenticity is as important for those many as it is for the leader. Moral autocracy 
necessarily undermines opportunities for followers to exercise the choices and realise the 
self-actualising state of authenticity that writers such as Kierkegaard, Heidegger and Sartre 
cherish. Short of undertaking the wholesale "revaluation of values" envisaged by Nietzsche, 
and sharing his elitist veneration of the "super-man", existentialist theory offers little 
justification for elevating the authenticity of the leader over that of the led. Therefore, 
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despite its apparent friendliness to moral unilateralism, existentialism might also be 
interpreted as pointing towards a more facilitative model of moral leadership. 
Judged against both principle-based and existentialist theory, then, moral unilateralism on 
the part of leaders is problematic. It is also self-evidently at odds with the principles of 
intersubjectivist ethics. Some of the points that I have made in this concluding chapter also 
indicate difficulties with the notion that leaders can unilaterally define moral probity 
without the need to consult others. While it is heartening to have conducted research 
discussions with leaders who care so much about ethics, that care would be even more 
reassuring were it accompanied by a willingness to consult about morality. To present 
moral rectitude as a matter for straightforward, commonsensical apprehension, as some 
participants do, is to misrepresent its complex, nuanced and contested character. The 
intricacies of moral evaluation are likely to be better catered for if leaders share the burden 
of judgement. The importance that some leaders attach to consistency also seems to say 
something important about morality. However, the legitimating force of consistency is 
premised upon shared agreement on the terms against which attributions of consistency are 
made. Multilateralism meets this assumption of agreement in a way th~t unilateralism does 
not. The desirability of consultation is also indicated by the nagging intrusion of sentiment 
into moral judgement. If emotional assaults upon rational calculation are viewed as 
important cues to the moral quality of our actions and decisions, then it seems important to 
also hear what other people's moral sentiments are saying. The mutually supportive balance 
of emotive and cognitive processes is surely enhanced if it embraces the perspectives, both 
emotive and cognitive, of other people. My discussion of different interpretations of 
stakeholder-related responsibilities also underlines the need for consultation around moral 
issues: if the· ultimate benchmark of moral leadership is, as some participants suggest, 
maximising the interests of the organization's stakeholders, then surely leaders should 
incorporate the views of those stakeholders, or at least of their representatives, in decision 
making. Furthermore, the premium placed on employee development by the leadership 
literature and by my research participants seems to rely, for its morally legitimating force, 
on dialogue with those followers about the nature of that development. And lastly, the 
morally uplifting quality of participation in a common mission seems to depend to a large 
extent on the degree of consultative circumspection that accompanies consideration of that 
mission and of its impact on both participants and non-participants. 
For a whole range of reasons, then, moral unilateralism on the part of leaders is 
problematic. On the one hand, it is heartening to know that leaders care enough about ethics 
to take personal responsibility for their organizations' moral agendas. Those organizations 
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are likely to be far more morally responsive places if leaders use their influence to evoke 
reflection on the ethical implications of their activities. On the other hand, though, for 
leaders to approach their moral crusade as a sole undertaking surely inhibits its quality. For 
leaders to wield their authority in such a way that they make morality matter to 
organizations is one thing; for them to single-handedly define what matters morally and to 
impose that monological definition upon their stakeholders is quite another thing. 
Morality from One Side Only 
Given the problems associated with unilateral moral pronouncements on the part of leaders, 
it is comforting that most research participants are also willing to share the burden of moral 
authorship to some extent. Despite a general desire to take charge, all except the most 
autocratic advocate some form of participation in setting the moral tone of the organization 
and in confronting moral dilemmas. Expectations of moral sagacity are thus partially 
alleviated, while this participative mien also promises to disperse the gift of authenticity. 
The concerns to which I have alluded thus far in this concluding chapter are also eased if 
leaders are prepared to involve others in moral evaluation. 
However, lest these nods in the direction of consultation are misinterpreted as 
manifestations of intersubjective zeal, it is important to draw attention to the circumscribed 
nature of the court of moral appeal that is thus accessed. Typically, this includes fellow 
directors, senior managers, consultants, mentors and close family members. Research 
participants make some allusion to including the views of non-managerial employees, but 
this is rare. More often, either they explicitly repudiate the legitimacy of junior employee 
involvement or they speak of practical barriers to broader consultation. These findings 
indicate the predominance of a managerialist understanding that is consistent with what 
Alvesson and Willmott refer to as a maneggiare metaphor; one which presents a senior 
management community as "an elite group or stratum, that is different from and superior to 
those they 'handle"' (1998: 29). The impression I gained from my discussions was that 
most of the leaders with whom I spoke see no more point in consulting about morality 
outside of this circumscribed group than Alvesson and Willmott' s metaphorical "managers 
as handlers" see in consulting with those who they handle. Junior employees are thus 
portrayed as little more than the "'horses' who supply the labour, and have the managerial 
skills applied to them" (ibid). 
The forums to which leaders appeal in support of their moral decision-making are therefore 
unlikely to be sufficiently diverse to provide significant exchange of opinion. More likely, 
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they will offer a reassuringly homogenous voice that confirms the leader's stance. Instead 
of offering a platform to diverse groups of stakeholders, these forums admit only those who 
are singing enthusiastically from the senior management hymn sheet. A comforting chorus 
of affirmation of the leader's inveterate moral commitments is thus more probable than any 
meaningful challenge to them. Such dialogue is unlikely to evoke critical reflection or to 
produce startling new perspectives. Nor will it do justice to the inherent complexity of 
moral decision making. Rather, it will sustain the illusion of morality as a simple and 
straightforward matter, perpetuating the notion that ''we all know what's right" so the only 
task of moral leadership is to ensure fealty to that self-evident path of moral rectitude. 
The path to which fealty is thus evoked will be that which is expressive of a particular 
community; a community that, as many commentators (e.g.: Moss Kanter, 1977; Marshall, 
1995; Alvesson and Wilmot, 1996; Hancock and Tyler, 2001; Parker, 2002) suggest, and 
also as one or two of my research participants have pointed out, is likely to be restricted in 
terms of its socio-economic, ethnic and gender make up. Thus, as Alvesson and Willmott, 
citing Deetz, suggest, "'favoured' representations routinely operate to reproduce the 
prevailing pattern of domination as alternative representations are marginalised or 
suppressed" (1996: 202). 
This is likely to shape leadership perceptions and behaviour across all of the dimensions 
that I have reviewed in this concluding chapter. Attributions of consistency will be 
primarily made from within the parameters of these favoured representations, thus 
potentially undermining the morally legitimating force of consistent application of 
principle. Any emotive responses that are embraced in ethical decision making will also be 
those of a characteristically white, male, middle-class constituency. In addition, by 
restricting entry to moral debate to colleagues, mentors, consultants and family members, 
the vast majority of dependent stakeholders, most notably the organization's employees, 
will be precluded from taking part. Consequently, when the rule-utilitarian imperative of 
the survival and prosperity of the organization slides so far from the former to the latter that 
it undermines the interests of the very people that it is presumed to serve, those voices that 
are most likely to sound the alarm will not be heard. Moreover, insofar as the interests of 
affected stakeholders are considered at all, that consideration will be undermined by the 
non-participation and non-representation of most that group. Unilateral attributions of 
worth relating to the personal development of employees are also likely to be made from 
within this narrowly circumscribed frame of reference, as are the agendas and criteria for 
inclusion of those shared missions to which transformationally-inclined leaders rally 
support. 
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Towards a Normative Model of Moral Leadership 
So where does all this leave us in terms of generating an understanding of moral leadership? 
My discussion so far in this concluding chapter has pointed towards some ways in which 
leadership might be moral. I have drawn on research discussions with practising leaders, 
synthesising this material with theoretical perspectives from the leadership and ethics 
literature in order to identify some characteristics of leadership that might support its claims 
to ethicality. But I have also drawn attention to some corresponding ways in which those 
claims might be undermined. 
The first criterion that lends an ethical quality to organizational leadership concerns the 
moral sensitisation of the leader. If people in leadership positions care about morality and if 
they devote energy and resources to encouraging other people in their organizations to 
reflect on the moral implications of their actions, then they might be considered to be 
leading in a moral way. However, the uplifting quality of moral sensitisation is undermined 
if ethical judgement is thought of as being a straightforward and commonsensical affair. 
Moral sensitisation needs to be attentive to the intricacies of moral evaluation. The 
assumption that is implicit in the discourse of some research participants, and also in the 
work of some leadership commentators who seek to morally validate the leadership 
prescriptions that they offer, is that moral right and wrong are self-evident. The persistence 
of moral dilemmas and the actuality of moral disagreement testify to the mistakenness of 
this assumption. Moral evaluation is a contested, nuanced and complex affair. Unless 
morally sensitised leaders are alert to these intricacies then the agendas that they champion 
and the moral responsiveness that they evoke in their organizations may diminish, rather 
than encourage, morally legitimate outcomes. Morality is not simple and the processes that 
are put in place to address the moral dimension of organizational activities need to 
accommodate its ineluctable complexity. 
A second way in which leadership can be morally uplifting is if leaders treat people in a 
consistent manner. However, the contestable nature of attributions of consistency must be 
acknowledged. What may seem like consistent treatment to one person may seem arbitrary 
to another. The morally legitimating force of consistency rests on an assumption of 
agreement. If attributions of consistency are delivered mono logically, without reference to 
the recipients of supposedly consistent treatment, then that legitimating agreement is absent. 
While the notion of consistency has something important to say about not making a special 
case of the leader's own interests or those of close associates, and thus offers an important 
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first principle of self-management, beyond this minimum it entails dialogical engagement. 
Furthermore, if leaders perceive the consistent application of principle as a purely rational 
undertaking, in which they can engage with a cool head and a hard heart, then they may 
miss some important indicators to the moral quality of their judgements. The signals sent by 
the emotions, our own and those of other people, may have something very important to tell 
us about ethics. 
There also seems to be something intuitively right about leaders taking care of the 
organizations that they lead and thus looking after the interests of the people who depend 
upon those organizations. However, if the simple rule of maximising organizational good 
ends up undermining the interests of the very people that it is supposed to serve, then the 
rule should be ditched. Although the maximisation of organizational good may offer a 
practical and simple guide to ethical leadership in many cases, it should not be accorded 
such primacy that it occludes all other considerations. Moreover, leaders should remain 
alert to the hazards of a narrowly-defined altruism that privileges the interests of dependent 
stakeholders while potentially harming the more numerous groups of people who may be 
affected by the activities of their organization. 
The moral allure of looking after their people also highlights the apparent worth of those 
leaders who show concern for their employees' development. However that worth is 
diminished if leaders' developmental attentions are driven more by instrumentality than by 
intrinsic care for their direct targets. On the other hand, it is enhanced if those employees 
are allowed to have their say about what does and what does not constitute worthwhile 
personal development. The morally uplifting propensity of participation in a common 
undertaking also seems to have something to say to a normative model of moral leadership. 
However, inflated claims of transformational bluster need to be balanced by sensitivity to 
the hazards of group commitment and by recognition that not everybody wants to 
participate or is able to participate in the supposedly self-actualising gift of transformation. 
I have also noted, in this chapter, a tendency on the part of those leaders who I met to either 
take unilateral personal ownership of moral decision-making or to share that burden with a 
narrowly circumscribed group of social and professional peers. While it is encouraging that 
leaders care enough to take responsibility for morality, and also that their peers are willing 
to devote time to advising and discussing moral issues, this is problematic from whichever 
m eta-ethical perspective it is viewed. It places unreasonable expectations of moral sagacity 
upon leaders and their peers; it rations the self-actualising gift of moral choice to the very 
few; and it breaks all the processual rules of discourse ethics. Furthermore, to keep morality 
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to themselves, or to include only a small and homogenous constituency m moral 
deliberation, can only exacerbate the tensions that I have already elaborated on. 
On the other hand, the ethical up-sides that I have identified here are more likely to be 
achieved without their corresponding down-sides if shaded with the hue of intersubjectivity. 
Furthermore, broad and diverse consultation on the part of leaders will enhance the 
ethicality of leadership, not only from an intersubjectivist perspective but also from the 
m eta-ethical stances of principle-based and existentialist ethics. Therefore, the involvement 
of implicated parties in consultative processes or, in the language of Hab~rmasian ethics, 
the mediation of communicative action, seems to offer the most compelling normative 
template for ethical leadership. But, while intersubjectivism offers a normatively appealing 
leadership recipe, to what extent is it a realistic and practicable option for leaders of work 
organizations? I will conclude by considering this question. 
The Practical Feasibility ofFacilitative Leadership 
Although intersubjective facilitation offers the most compelling normative model for ethical 
leadership, the disinclination of most of my research participants to adopt such a style and 
also the tendency of the leadership literature to encourage a more impositional approach 
might indicate its impracticability in real life organizational contexts. When confronted 
with the competitive exigencies and the pressured time frames of organizational bustle, 
even those leaders who are inclined towards consultation may feel compelled to take a more 
autocratic stance. Furthermore, popular expectations of leadership, perhaps reinforced by 
tales of heroic figures parachuting into organizations and single-handedly transforming 
their fortunes, are unlikely to encourage intersubjective mediators. If we hope for 
transformational crusaders, we are apt to be disappointed if our leaders assume the less 
dramatic posture of facilitation. 
I will consider this issue from three different directions. I will begin by briefly reflecting 
again on what the leadership literature has to say about unilateralism and intersubjectivism. 
I will then consider the extent to which more general developments in the environment 
surrounding work organizations might be supportive of a facilitative leadership style. 
Lastly, I will say a few more words about the extent to which my own empirical research 
has indicated the feasibility of facilitative leadership. 
I have already discussed, in my review of the leadership literature, the emergence of a 
human relations orientation in leadership studies. In other words, researchers have noted 
251 
that, in order to lead successfully, leaders should pay attention to the needs of followers. A 
"soft" approach to people is thus advocated, in contrast to the "hard", task-focussed 
approaches advocated elsewhere, particularly by some early trait theories. This softer, 
human relations-friendly trend is potentially supportive of a consultative leadership style, at 
least amongst employees. By stressing as it does the motivational benefits of shared 
ownership for decision-making, it establishes a link between dialogue and leadership 
effectiveness. The achievement of the performative outcomes with which leadership is 
more traditionally associated may thus require leaders to adopt a facilitative style that is 
' 
conducive to ethicality. 
I, 
However, I have also alluded to the hazard of relationship-orientation being regarded as just 
one leadership tool amongst many, to be taken out when specifically suited to a particular 
leader-defined project, but to be put firmly back in its box and replaced by the hammer of 
imposition once the moment for participation has passed. These apparently human 
relations-friendly leadership recipes are thus subject to the same criticism that has been 
levelled at the human relations movement more generally: that it is just another, rather more 
sophisticated, variant of scientific management (Parker: 2002); a fitting-up of different 
methods to different needs as directed by the efficiency-oriented principles of 
managerialist, organizational science. In this case, facilitative leadership is not likely to 
become an enduring feature of organizational leadership; it will be wheeled out only as and 
when leaders perceive the motivational need for some facilitative charm. 
Then there is the problem that, by casting participation as no more than a motivational 
leadership tool, the impression of involvement takes on more significance than its actuality. 
It is enough for people to feel that they are listened to by leaders; whether or not leaders 
actually take any notice of them is immaterial. There is a danger that superficial, "stage 
managed" employee voice practices (Dundon et a/ 2004), which are aimed purely at 
engendering a sense of belonging amongst employees but which have no real impact on 
decision-making, will take precedence over genuine attempts to access and respond to 
diverse perspectives. Therefore, even theoretical spurs to dialogue may be imbued with a 
patriarchal undertone: an assumption that leaders know what's best for us all but that they 
must generate an illusion of inclusion in order to generate support for their predisposed, 
self-defined and morally self-audited mission. 
So the emphasis that researchers place on human-relations sensitivity is not necessarily 
supportive of intersubjectivist leadership. On the one hand, those researchers who draw 
attention to the link between consultation and effectiveness may at least make it permissible 
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for people in fonnalleadership roles who are naturally disposed to a consultative approach 
to indulge their proclivity. If aspiring leaders are told by leadership educators that it is OK 
to involve people, then perhaps the natural facilitators will shine through. They may even 
make it to the very top instead of being shuffled off into ''female ghettoes" (Marshall, 1995: 
16), such as middle-ranking HR management positions, while the impositional, masculine 
crusaders take up their seats around board table. However, given the weight of expectation 
upon leaders to confonn to managerialist stereotypes, it is hard to envisage a tide of 
intersubjectively facilitation being driven from the pages of the leadership literature in the 
foreseeable future. 
If leadership theory does not inspire greater intersubjective responsiveness amongst leaders, 
then perhaps legislative pressure will. In this respect, recent EU-driven, employment-related 
law offers some encouraging signs. European Works Council Regulations encourage 
transnational organizations to communicate with their employees, while the Infonnation 
and Consultation of Employees Regulations have extended this requirement to all 
organizations above a certain size. Although these regulations are only aimed at involving 
employees and do nothing to engender communication with wider groups of affected 
stakeholders, they at least offer a potential antidote to the general disinclination, which I 
encountered during empirical research, to communicate outside the inner sanctum of senior 
management. 
However, early indications are that these measures are doing little to enhance 
communication between top management and employees. This is partly because caution on 
the part of employers and trade unions is impeding their implementation (Hall 2005; CIPD 
2007). It must also be due to the relatively toothless nature of the legislation, the application 
of which works on the assumption that all is well with an organization's communication 
processes unless employees rock the boat. Since few employees, particularly in non-
unionised settings, are likely to even be aware of the regulations, such challenges to 
organizational equilibrium seem unlikely. And as for business leaders grasping this 
legislation as an opportunity to improve the quality of their communication procedures, the 
response that I personally encountered upon making this suggestion to one particular board 
of directors might be indicative of a more general attitude. That response is summed up by 
the CEO's comment that this would involve "meetings just for meetings sake". The notion 
that there may be some moral or practical benefit to be gained from seeking the views of 
employees escaped him. 
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So although human relations-oriented leadership theory, the growing interest in employee 
voice that characterises practitioner and academic HRM literature (Dun don et a/2004) and 
recent legislation have the potential to be supportive of the normative model of ethical 
leadership that I have developed here, there is some way to go before that potential is 
realised. There is, however, another aspect of the contemporary organization landscape that 
might encourage intersubjective responsiveness. This is the general rise in CSR-
consciousness amongst the business community. Increasingly, corporate leaders are coming 
to terms with the reality that, in order to be commercially successful, they need to respond 
to the expectations of their key stakeholders. And as concern about business's 
environmental and social performance grows amongst customers, employees and 
shareholders, so business leaders must attend to their profile in these areas. The 
overwhelming tide of "ethical" public relations initiatives undertaken by businesses and the 
amount of space on corporate websites devoted to headings such as "social accountability" 
and "sustainability" are testimony to the seriousness with which this subject is currently 
treated in the corridors of corporate power. 
It might be said that there is a sort of hidden hand of intersubjectivity at play here: that 
business leaders' interest in maximising profit necessarily engenders stakeholder 
responsiveness; that if leaders to not respond to the wishes of stakeholders, those 
stakeholders will vote with their feet and take their support elsewhere. Battalions of 
corporate social responsibility consultants are therefore engaged, as intersubjective 
mediators, to identify the present, and second-guess the future, ethical expectations of 
stakeholders so that CEOs and MDs can direct the activities of their businesses accordingly. 
However, even if we assume that business leaders actually do what they say they do in their 
ethically-inclined public relations pronouncements, which is by no means certain, this 
commercially self-interested, intersubjective responsiveness is seriously flawed in another 
respect. This is that, in responding primarily to the expectations of what I have referred to 
earlier as instrumental normative stakeholders, business leaders overlook the views of a far 
broader constituency. Instrumental normative stakeholding may evoke responsiveness to 
those stakeholders who have a significant influence on a business's fortunes. These are 
likely to include institutional shareholders, key customers and those employees who are 
fortunate enough to possess rare and sought-after skills. It does little to encourage leaders to 
offer an audience to anybody else. This is a democratic responsiveness in which the most 
influential get the most votes; the rest are not even allowed into the polling station. 
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It seems, then, that these aspects of the general organizational landscape are no more likely 
to foment intersubjective responsiveness on the part of organizational leaders than is the 
theory of leadership. But what of my own research; what indicators did this offer that an 
intersubjectivist leadership style might be feasible in organizations? Here, two findings are 
immediately apparent. The first is that Roger, the one person who embodies most closely 
the Mediator of Communication ideal type, works for a public sector organization. The 
second is that those who come closest to Roger in articulating intersubjective 
responsiveness have left their corporate leadership careers behind them in order to take up 
occupations that are more in keeping with their ethical commitments. 
Now, the fact that the person who expresses most strongly the intersubjectivist ethic works 
as CEO for a large rural county council might be interpreted as an indication that public 
sector organizations are more likely to be supportive of intersubjectively ethical leadership 
than are private sector organizations. This is not a conclusion that I seek to draw: my 
intention in this PhD was to explore organizational leadership more generally and I did not 
set out to make distinctions between sectors. Furthermore, additional research amongst 
public sector leaders would be required to support such a contention. However, 
developments that have taken place since my meeting with Roger might actually indicate a 
contrary conclusion. Six months after our meeting, I read in a local paper that Roger had 
been asked to take early retirement. This request was in response to the findings of an 
enquiry into allegations of mismanagement in the council. The enquiry had found evidence 
of "poor management of both organizational and individual performance" along with 
"extensive delegation when tighter controls in some corporate areas were needed". The 
report recommended that management of performance needed to be more robust, 
underpinned with clear, realistic and understandable policies and procedures for staff, with 
discipline that holds them to account. Furthermore, it found that "senior managers of the 
council could have acted to exercise a greater degree of control over events" and that 
"corporate checks and balances were not robustly applied". It seems that Roger may have 
been too intersubjectively responsive for the liking of his political masters. At least in this 
case, rather than public sector organizations supporting intersubjective responsiveness, the 
opposite may be the case: that the public sector is as covetous of directive, controlling 
leadership as is the private sector. 
As far as the leavers are concerned, that they have left their corporate leadership roles 
behind in order to take up what they consider to be more socially responsible careers may 
well indicate that leading in the normatively ethical manner that I have developed here is 
not easy. This does not indicate that those who continue to occupy the roles of power and 
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influence in organizations are necessarily immoral people. However, it probably says 
something about the nature of the organizational environment, and perhaps also about the 
affect that it has on people who ascend to its positions of pre-eminence. This point is well 
articulated by one of these leavers. I recounted his words in my empirical report and it 
seems appropriate to repeat them here: 
I don't come across many people in my walk of life who I would think are, you know, the 
forces of evil and darkness. Most people I come across and talk to, once they get out of their 
corporate straightjackets, as far as they wear them, they seem to be pretty decent people 
with their hearts in the right place and a value system that seems by and large to be very 
honourable. . .. I think the difficulty ... of people who have influence ... then reverts to: 
how open do they remain, once they get to these positions of power and influence, to a 
whole range of influence from fairly ordinary people? And my experience, so far, is that 
they don't remain very open to that, not because they don't wish to but because they just 
move in some very rarefied circles and you can only spend your time once. And they're 
quite used to spending it with movers and shakers; people who have influence; in very 
protected environments. And the impact of day-to-day drudgery and the ordinary lives are, 
sort of, taken away by flunkies and money. 
A Need for Leadership in the Field of Ethical Leadership 
So, where does this leave us with regard to ethical leadership? Having developed a 
normative model of ethical leadership I have suggested that the actual implementation of 
such an approach in work organizations is likely to be beset with difficulties. What are we 
to make of this gloomy prognosis? 
Perhaps the conclusion that this leaves us with is that if leadership is to be ethical, then 
leadership is needed in the field of ethical leadership. Leadership theorists are inclined to 
emphasise the willingness of leaders to challenge convention; to swim against the tide; to 
question accepted practices; to oppose the status-quo. Well, in that case, it seems that if 
leaders are to lead ethically, then they need to challenge conventional expectations of 
leadership; they need to lead leadership. Managerialist convention may well call upon 
leaders to make unequivocal, self-assured pronouncements of right and wrong; to stand 
apart from emotional engagement in order to apply principle in a cool-headed and 
dispassionate manner; to uphold the survival and prosperity of their organizations as an 
absolute moral imperative; to cast themselves as the arbiters of employees best interests; 
and to impose their monologically defined transformational visions on their followers. But 
if convention demands all of these things, then leadership in the field of moral leadership 
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calls for challenge to this conventional understanding. If convention expects a directive, 
impositional stance of leaders, if it calls upon leaders to consult only amongst a privileged 
cabal of like-minded social and professional peers, then those who seek to lead in the field 
of ethical leadership need to challenge that convention. They must dare to be different. If 
the ethical quality of leadership is, as I have concluded here, distinguished by 
intersubjective responsiveness, then ethical leaders need to show leadership by challenging 
conventional, managerialist expectations of autocratic or oligarchic imposition in order to 
champion the role of intersubjective facilitator. 
If leadership is to play a part, not just in achieving the performative outcomes that are so 
widely revered in the organizational world, but in actually making that world a morally 
better place, then perhaps what is needed is not just more of the same but a different type of 
leadership; a type of leadership which challenges the managerialist presuppositions that 
characterise most of the leadership literature. Maybe the clamour for leadership that, as I 
noted in my introduction, seems to be enveloping our society is misguided. It is looking for 
the wrong thing. Instead of awaiting crusading, charismatic champions who will single-
handedly show us the way to a better world, we ought to be looking for another sort of hero 
altogether. As existentialist ethics suggests, we should be looking to investigate the capacity 
that resides within each of us to find that better world. That quest will necessarily be 
enhanced through processes of critical reflection and principle-based ethics, for its part, 
offers a range of perspectives that might facilitate those reflective processes. But as 
intersubjectivist ethics suggests, we should seek to do this as a communicative endeavour. 
So what we need in our leaders is not assertive self-assurance but the mediation and 
facilitation skills that will enable that communicative endeavour. 
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Appendix 1 
Sample Empirical Research Discussion Guide 
Participant: Nigel Brown (Chief Executive of Anytown Building Society) 
Date: 22.05.07- 12.00 
Phone number: 0845 XXXXXX 
Name ofPA: Jane Dobson 
Introduction 
1. Explain objective of research. 
2. Outline approach. 
3. Purpose of interviews. 
Leadership and morality 
1. Do you think about the moral dimension of organisational leadership? 
2. Does it present any particular moral challenges? 
Responsibilities 
1. Who to? 
2. Prioritisation? 
3. Reasons for? 
4. Conflicts? 
5. Examples? 
People 
1. How would you describe your feelings towards those people who report to you? 
2. Does the leader-follower relationship mean that you feel differently towards them than 
towards other people? 
3. How does that impact on the way that you relate to them? 
4. Is this instrumentally or emotionally driven? 
5. Does it create any particular responsibilities? 
6. Why? 
7. Any examples? 
Building support for collective agenda 
1. Is it important? 
2. Example? 
3. Does it bother you when people don't support the common agenda? 
4. How do you resolve such situations? 
5. Examples? 
6. Should leaders influence the values of others? 
7. Examples? 
8. What about responding to the values of others? 
9. Examples? 
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Evolution of personal values 
1. Where do you they come from? 
2. Formative influencers or experiences? 
3. Examples? 
Impact of the organisational leadership role on personal morality 
1. Has your morality changed? 
2. If so, why? 
3. Impact of seniority? 
4. Examples? 
Change 
1. Do you agree that leaders are change agents? 
2. Change making affects lots of people - does that trouble you? 
3. How do you morally justify the negative impacts? 
4. Examples? 
5. Input from others? 
6. Input from subordinates? 
7. How/why not? 
Dilemmas 
1. Describe one? 
2. Responsibilities/principles/values at stake? 
3. Decision-making process? 
4. Involvement of others- did you seek it? 
5. Impact on your decision-making? 
6. Was decision entirely within your remit? 
7. How would other people have responded if you had decided otherwise? 
8. How would you resolve that dilemma now? Would different factors impact on your 
decision, would they be weighted differently? 
9. Looking back, do you feel that that you made the right decision? 
Review 
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Appendix2 
Sample Introductory Letter to Research Participant 
[Printed on to Loughborough University Business School letter headed paper with researcher's 
contact details added] 
30 March 2007 
Nigel Brown 
Chief Executive 
Anytown Building Society 
PO Box :XX, 
Richman Street 
Anytown 
XYIO IWX 
DearNigel 
I am writing to ask for your assistance with PhD research that I am undertaking in association with 
Loughborough University Business School. 
The subject of my PhD is the relationship between organisational leadership and morality. Although the 
subject of leadership has been extensively researched, relatively little attention has been paid to the ethical 
questions raised by the leadership undertaking. I hope that my PhD thesis will contribute to reflection on 
those questions. To assist with my research, I am keen to gather input from people who hold, or who have 
held, formal leadership roles in large organisations. I would therefore be extremely grateful if you could 
spare an hour or so to meet me and discuss this subject. 
My aim in meeting you would be to gain an insight into how you think about the ethical challenges presented 
by the organisational leadership role. I am particularly keen to gain an understanding of how you think about 
morality, how you approach moral dilemmas and the extent to which the organisational leadership context 
supports or constrains you in doing what you consider to be right. This will include exploring the principles 
and decision-making criteria to which you appeal when confronting moral dilemmas. 
If you are able to help with this matter, I can meet you wherever is convenient for you. I am based near 
Mitown, so I can easily travel to Yortown. Alternatively, I could meet you at any other venue. We would 
need to meet somewhere fairly quiet as I would like to record our discussion. 
I would expect our meeting to last for about one hour, although I would be grateful for any time that you can 
spare. I would like to be able to use quotes from the transcript of our discussion in my research report. I will, 
however, maintain strict anonymity in doing so. Although I would like to mention in my report the nature of 
your leadership position and the type of organisation you have worked in, I will mask any references 
to specific people or specific organisations. 
Many thanks for taking the time to consider my request. I will call you in a few days to discuss this further. 
Yours sincerely 
Mick Fryer 
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